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PREFACE 
The South African road transporation industry has been regulated by 
means of an administrative tribunal system si nee 1930. Despite 55 
years of regulation legal writers have ignored this aspect of the 
law to a large extent. The law reports, on the other hand, contain 
more and more reported decisions. The importance of these decisions 
is twfold: they provide insights into the functioning of the 
regulatory system itself and they play a part in the development of 
South African administrative law in general. This 1itork is· aimed at 
examining the structures and the legal principles which govern road 
transportation in South Africa. In doing so various aspects of 
administrative law have been dealt with in lithat I hope is an 
accurate and fair manner. 
I started work on this thesis at the Universit;y of Natal, 
Pietermaritzburg and canpleted it at Rhodes University. A number of 
people at both institutions have been of great assistance to me, 
although I, of course, remain responsible for errors: Prof Lawrence 
Baxter of the School of Law, University of Natal, Pietennaritzburg 
was nr, supervisor. I would like to thank him for his patience, 
encouragement and useful criticisms throughout ll!f work on this 
topic; Prof John Mil ton, Director of the School of Law, University 
of Natal, Pietermaritzburg read a draft of the section dealing with 
criminal liability and I thank. him for his thorough and helpful 
criticism; Mrs Sarah Christie of the Faculty of Law, Rhodes 
University read some of the chapters and I am grateful to her for 
many suggestions for improvements; Mr 0fllon Naidoo, Librarian at 
the School of Law. University of Natal, Pietennaritzburg provided me 
with great assistance in finding research material for lithich I a.m 
most grateful. 
A number of typists have been involved in the preparation of th;s 
work. In particular I owe a debt of gratitude to Mrs J Gauche, Mrs 
Y Arbuthnot and Mrs V Rencken of the School of Law University of 
Natal Pietermaritzburg and Mrs A Collis of the East London Division 
of Rhodes University. 
Finally I wish to -thank l1lY parents, Ron and Helen Plasket, for their 
support and concern during the time I spent cmpleting thi� work. 
The Road Transportation Act 74 of 1977, its predecessor, the Motor 
Carrier Transportation Act 39 of 1930 and the Transport 
( Co-ordination) Act 44 of 1948 are referred to repeatedly in this 
work. No reference has therefore been made, either in the text or 
in the footnotes, to the number and date of promulgation of these 
statutes. Cases reported in, and prior to, 1985 ( 2) of the South 
African Law Reports have been considered. Where possible later 
cases of importance have been included. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The topography of a country plays an obvious and important 
role in determining the modes of transportation that are used 
or are dominant in its communications network. In South 
Africa the country 1 s physical features tended to favour rail­
and, later, road transportation: the absence of navigable 
rivers made the exploitation of inland waterways for the 
purpose of conveyance impossible; the interior of the 
country is fairly flat and so is suited to railway and road 
construction. This characteristic increased the possibility 
of speedy conveyance over large distances; the interior 
region, especially the Witwatersrand, is the hub of economic 
life, so conveyance of persons or goods between the major 
4 
centres is economically viable, and indeed vital. 
Initially, all inland conveyance was undertaken by animals or 
animal drawn vehicles. The advent of railway systems and the 
steam locomotive had the effect of replacing less sophisti-
cated transport, certainly on main routes, but in the years 
immediately following the First World War the supremacy of 
rail was itself challenged by road transportation. Rail and 
road conveyance have been the most accessible forms of 
transport over the years, and have carried the largest number 
of people and the highest mass of freight. At the same time 
they compete with one another for essentially the same 
market. Before dealing with this rivalry in more detail, 
certain general factors affecting transportation development 
will be examined and a brief discussion of the historical 
evolution of the two modes will be undertaken. 
i 
The geographical characteristics of South Africa have been 
considered in explaining why certain modes of transportation 
predominated. This factor also played a part in the develop­
ment of a transportation system. The si2e cf the country 
when considered against its relatively 5parse population 
tended to be a negative factor. Prior to the advent of road 
transportation, rail transportation was the speediest means 
of convey ance over long distances. At the same time it was a 
very costly operation, requiring the laying of lines, the 
purchase and maintenance of locomotives, carriages and other 
rolling stock, the construction of stations and supply depots 
as well as the employment of large numbers of persons. The 
railway system could therefore only venture into areas where 
the return could be expected to cove� the immense input of 
capital and resources. 
The discovery of diamonds near Kimberley in 1869 and gold on 
the Witwatersrand in 1886 overcame, to a certain extent, the 
10 
disadvantages which rail transportation experienced. Vast 
numbers of people converged on these areas and lucrative 
markets were created. The new found wealth provided an 
incentive for �he development of tran�portation systems, not 
only from the coast to the interior, but also from rural 
agricultural areas to the newly formed urban centres. 
12 
Political factors were also of great importance. The 
political structure of South Africa was initially a hindrance 
to growth, but later was able to provide the framework for 
the rapid evolution of a national, co-ordinated transport­
ation network. The entity which now forms the Republic of 
South Africa consisted, prior to 1902, of two British 
3 
CIIJ 
colonies and two Boer republics. The period from 1870 to the 
start of the Anglo Boer War was a time of aggresive 
13 
imperial expansion. Co-operation between the opposing 
parties never reached great heights and mistrust was an ever­
present feature of relations between the British officials 
14 
and their Boer counterparts. Prior to Union in 1910 there-
fore, the concept of a uniform policy to co-ordinate trans­
portation was nothing more than a dream, although various 
15 
customs agreements were reached during this period. 
After Union, serious consideration was given to the trans-
portation needs of the country. The formation of a Roads and 
Bridges Committee in 1925 was one product of the move towards 
16 
rationalization. In 1930, motivated by the same 
considerations, Parliament passed the first Act aimed at 
controlling the development of transportation and regulating 
17 
competition between road and rail transportation. 
IH���OLYIION OF ROA��AND RAILWAYS IH_SOUTH AFRICA 
[A] ROADS
The first roads to be 'built' by European settlers in South 
Africa were those which Van Riebeeck•s exploring parties cut. 
Thereafter, as the settlement at the Cape expanded inland, a 
road system of a primitive nature grew up on an ad hoc basis. 
Certain maintenance powers and functions were vested in the 
Board of Heemraden in the 18th Century but it was not until 
the second British occupation in 1806 that road building 
18 
began in earnest. 
Roads were initially constructed by the military authorities. 
In 1826 provision was made for the levying of tolls over 
4 
certain roads and pa5ses. In 1843 the building of roads was 
taken over by the colonial authorities and the first roads 
policy was initiated under the guidance of John Montagu, the 
Colonial Secretary. The chief aim of the policy was to 
establish major lines of communication throughout the colony. 
The project resulted inter alia in the easier and speedier
distribution of agricultural produc& t an important benefit 
for the Cape which had an agriculturally based economy. 
Planning for the project was undertaken by a Central Road 
19 
Board. 
The granting of responsible government in 1853 saw a re-
arrangement of road organisation. A Chief Commissioner of 
Roads was appointed along with other Commissioners. Funds 
for maintenance and improv&menta were granted by the Cape 
Parliament. Later, Divigional Councils were given certain 
powers and duties in respect of the maintenance, improvement 
and construction of roads. By the time of Union 1 therefore, 
the Cape had not only integrated road construction and �ain­
tenance into the structures of the State but had also 
20 
developed policies. 
The earliest roads in the colony of Natal stretched from Port 
Natal westwards to the Orange Free State border, north to 
Zululand and south to the Cape Colony. With the increase in 
the White settler population, townships were planned and at 
the same time roads were built, primarily as a mean5 of 
communication. The sparsjty of the population, lack of 
finance, rugged terrain and climatic conditions were, ·how-
21 
ever, factors which retarded road building in the colony. 
Road development evolved on a more ad hoc basis in both 
the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. It was only in 
5 
1871, in the former, and 1876, in the latter, that the 
central governments of the Boer republics became 
22 
involved in roads in any substantial way. 
After Union in 1910 the integration of a road transportation 
network became possible for the first lime. A Roads and 
Bridges Committee was established in 1925. Its function was 
lo investi.ate the condition of roads and bridges in the 
Union with 5pecial reference to their suilabiliti for 
23 
motorized road transportation. As a result of its report 
the government voled large sums of money to the provincial 
administrations for the construction of roads. These grants 
were conditional upon the propo5ed roads being either 
developmental roads or roads suitable for motor services. 
24 
In this way the stage was set for the rivalry between road 
and rail transportation which later became the prime reason 
for the promulgation of the Motor Carrier Tran5portation Act. 
[BJ RAILWAYS 
The first railway services in South Africa were operated by 
companies from the private sector. Thi• form of transport-
alien was introduced for two major reasons: to cater for the 
needs of the steadily growing white population and as a 
result of th• agricultural development of the two British 
25 
colonies. The railway companies did not operate for very 
long. It became clear al an early stage that the colonial 
governments of the Cape and Natal would have lo take them 
26 
over if they wished the services to continue. After the 
take overs the railway networks were able to expand in a 
relatively short period of time. Two causes may be found 
for this phenomenon: the increased capital which becam� 
6 
r 
27 
available and the discovery of diamonds at Kimberley. The 
benefits which rail transportation yielded as a result of 
easier and speedier contact with the diamond fields clearly 
illustrated the importance of the railway lo the economic 
development of the region. By 1885 the railway network of 
28 
the Cape Colony consisted of 1 599 miles of track. 
Twelve years later a line joining Vryburg and Bulawayo was 
29 
completed. The most important economic result of railway 
construction in Natal was the 'opening up' of the coalfields 
30 
in 1899 by means of a railway that reached Glencoe. 
Prior to -that time coal had been moved by wagon which 
ailitated again�t the viability of its exploitation. 
The land-locked Orange Free State did not own any railway 
lines until 1897. Completed lines had been in existence for 
7 yeara prior to that lime, but had been constructed by, 
and were operated by, the Cape Colony. the latter had been 
quick lo realize the importa0ce of a rail link between the 
Free State and the coast as well as the economic benefits 
31 
which such a line would produce. 
The Transvaal had, as early as 1875, initialed plans to give 
itself access to the port of Delegoa Bay. For various 
32 
reasons it was only in 1894 that this line was completed. 
In the meantime, the most important event in the economic 
history of South Africa had taken place: gold was discovered 
al Barberton in 1884 and on the Witwatersrand in 1886. The 
building of railways was immediately boosted by the new found 
33 
prosperity of the Transvaal. By 1895 it had three rail 
routes to the coast: to Delegoa Bay, to Natal and to the 
34 
Cape. 
7 
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Especially rapid growth took place in the evolution of rail-
ways when production of gold resumed after the Anglo Boer 
35 
War. A large market had to be supplied by the rural areas 
on the one hand, and the miners required a more effective 
means of acquiring coal from the Transvaal coalfields on the 
other. The result was a railways bonanza, not only from the 
rural areas of the Transvaal to the Witwatersrand, but also 
36 
between the interior and the coast. After Union, with the 
pooling of resources into a unified Railways Administration, 
the railway system in South Africa began to change. Policy 
was decided on the basis of the perceived good of the country 
as a whole with the need to protect sectional interests 
diminishing in importance. 
37 38 
The Page Commission, in summa-
rizing transportation developments and, more especially, the 
extent to which railways had expanded, observed: 
'Broadly, it may be said that at the time of Union the 
industrial areas and the larger urban centres had been 
fairly well provided with railway communications, and 
from then on new construction was for the most part 
designed to serve agricultural areas and in particular 
those where irrigation schemes had made or were making 
closer settlement possible.' 
THE BEGINNINGS OF COMPETITION 
-------------
The Railways Administration initiated a road motor transport 
39 
operation as early as 1912. The aim of the service was 
to act as a link between outlying areas and railway lines. 
It was intended to be no more lhan a feeder service, either 
carrying persons or goods from a railway station to a more 
remote area or in the reverse direction. The use of road 
transportation in this way proved to be most advantageous to 
the Railways Administration. One important benefit was that 
uneconomic branch lines did not have to be built, because 
40 
8 
remote areas could be serviced in a much cheaper way. 
The beginnings of compelilion belween rail and privalely 
operaled road lransporl may be lraced lo lh• early 1920�s. 
The lechnological improvemenls made lo lhe inlernal combus­
lion engine during lhe Firsl World War no doubl played a 
major parl in lhe emergence of road lrsnsporlalion as a 
serious challenge lo lhe supremacy which rail transporlalion 
had enjoyed. 
41 42 
Van Biljon observes: 
'The developmenl of private molar carrier systems was 
pheno�enal during the ensuing five years (i.e. from 
1925), as a glance al the relevanl imporl slatislics 
clearly shows. Indeed, whereas it look lhe railroads 
lhirly five years (1860 - 95) �o supersede aniMal drawn
vehicles as the chief means of Inland locomolion, lhe 
four years, 1925 - 29, were adequale for lhe �olor 
carrier lo eslablish itself as a permanenl feature of 
lhe Soulh African transporlalion syslem.' 
The areas in which compelilion belween lhe lwo modes of 
lraasporlalion was mosl keen were: lhe conveyance of general 
merchandise, in which road transportation was far superior 
for shorler dislances; 
populaled urban areas; 
omnibus service• in lhe more densely 
lransportalion belween proximale 
lawn� wilh big populations; and the conveyance of black 
workers from localions on the outskirls of lowns lo lhe lawns 
43 
lhemselves. 
Agilation by lhe Railways Administralion againsl prJvale 
carriers began in earnesl in lhe 1925 - 26 Reporl of the 
General Nana1er. The complainl cenlred around the facl lhal, 
whereas railway larifrs were fixed, privale carriers could 
adJusl lheir tariffs al will. Laler criticism, which was 
linked lo calls for prolective legislalion, was based on lhe 
argumenl lhal lhe overriding molive of privale carriers 
(individual profit) was to the delrimenl of the communily as a 
44 45 
whole. Il was lherefore argued lhal lhe Governmenl: 
9 
' ..• should be empowered to control and regulate the 
introduction and operation of private road motor 
services so as to ensure that such undertakings are 
not allowed to operate indiscriminately and to 
cater for the same public needs as are already 
adequately met by the State's Railways.' 
As a result of these representations the Road Motor Competi­
tion Commission was appointed in 1929 under the chairmanship 
46 
of Mr JC Le Roux. Its terms of reference were to 
47 
investigate and report upon: 
1 {1) the whole problem of road motor competition and its 
bearing upon road motor and railway services of the 
South African Railway Administration having regard­
{a) to the fact that the main transport system of the 
country is State owned, in which vast sums of 
public money are invested, and 
(b) to the country 1 s needs for its economic development;
(2) all the measures, if any, which should be adopted for
better regulation, co-ordination, and control in the
public interest.'
The commission reported in December 1929. It recommended 
reasonable control and regulation of public road transport-
48 
ation, but expressed itself against a monopoly on the 
49 
ground that a measure of competition is healthy and desirable 
The Motor Carrier Transportation Act was passed as a result 
of the le Roux Commission's report. This legislation 
followed the recommendations contained in the report very 
closely and it provided for the control of motor carrier 
transportation within areas and on routes which were to be 
defined at a later stage. The sparsely populated areas were 
left untouched because there was no need for control in these 
50 
areas. The Act also did not apply initially to the 
conveyance of persons by motor car. which was defined as a 
51 
vehicle seating not more than eight persons. 
10 
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l)!tROt>UCTIQM 
The issue of state interference has always been one which has 
created heated debate. The regulation of transportation in 
South Africa is no exception. Craig, dealing with 
1 
governmental regulation in general 7 outlines the p�oblem: 
'�h!iher we decide to regulate at all, and if so 
h2�� is a question on which there can be 
considerable difference of opinion. Such 
divergence can be pa�tly the result of differing 
political perspectives, and partly the consequence 
of varying beliefs as to the efficacy of the 
particular type of regulatory device which has been 
chosen. ' 
The 'whether' of transport regulation will be examined below, 
2 
while the method of regulation will be dealt with later. 
Fi�st it is necessary to outline the way in which the South 
African Transport Services CSATS) function. The o�i g inal 
motivation £or regulation was based on the assertion that the 
then Railways Administration, because of the duties imposed 
on it by legislation, operated under special disadvantages 
while private carriers, in an unregulated environment, 
3 
experienced none. 
tIJ IHLQ&g�Hl�AI!Q!LAHQ_f�H�IlQHilfG or I�LIQ!!IH.._A[.&I�Ati 
TRANSPQRT SERVlC��........i�&I�l 
CAJ INTRODUCTION 
The historical process by which ownership of the South 
African railwway network came to vest in the State has been 
f explained above. Railway operations 1 by their very nature, 
5 
Because of their l tend to lead to monopolistic 9ituation.s. 
atrategic and developmental potential they a�e seen in many
countries as unsuited to private ownership; 
16 
'In most countries railways are operated as public 
enterprises since a private firm would have the 
potential to exercise its monopoly power to 
restrict output and raise prices and would be 
unlikely to provide socially desired services if it 
was unprofitable to do so.' (6)
South Africa is no exception in this regard. The state owned 
SATS is the central figure in the debate concerning the 
deregulation of transportation. Indeed, as has been 
explained, Railways Administration agitation was to a large 
degree the root cause of the promulgation of the Motor 
Carrier Transportation Act. The statute was primarily 
deaigned to protect rail transportation against uncontrolled 
7 
road transp ortation. Because of the importance of SATS to the 
regulation debate it is necessary by way of introduction to 
examine the body in more detail. 
CBJ THE ORGANIZATION OF SATS 
SATS, while being a separate entity to the Public Service, 
is nonetheless a department of state. It, along with the 
Department of Posts and Telecommunicationg, has always been 
treated as a sui generis organization, primarily because of 
8 
its entrepreneur ial function. 
The political head of SATS is a cabinet minister, the 
Minister of Transport Affairs. He is responsible for two 
independent departments: 
9 
SATS and the Department of 
Transport Affairs. The organization's control and 
administration is exercised by the Minister and a board of 
three commissioners. Its professional head is the General 
Manager, who is assisted by three deputy general managers and 
10 
eight assistant general managers. The railway network is 
divided into ten separate regions, each of which is run by a 
systems manager. These divisions are seen as necessary 
17 
because oC the size of the country and the extensive nature 
11 
of the rail system. 
[CJ THE FUNCTIONING OF SATS 
Wallis describes SATS as a multimodal organization 
which 'operates and provides a wide range of transport 
12 
services on a closely integrated and co-ordinat�d basis'. 
It provides the following services: a nationwide rail 
service, the running of harbours, the provision and 
functioning of pipeline� for the conveyance of crude oil, 
petroleum and related products, and the provision of an 
airline (South African Airways) which operates both 
13 
internationally and domestically. For present purpo5es 
the rail service of SATS is most important. Therefore the 
manner in which it functions will be dealt with below. 
As a state owned public enterprise SATS is given powers, 
and dutie� are imposed on it, by Parliament. Parliament, in 
this way, plays an important role in determining policy of an 
14 
overall (and fairly static) nature. This policy dates hack 
to the formation of the Union in 1910 and for present 
purposes has not changed. The legislature'� place for 
SATS in the transportation and economic life of the 
country is described in the following terms by Van 
15 
Biljon: 
'In the course of contempla ting the long-term 
railway transport policy, the National Convention 
agreed that the railway monopoly should be 
administered on business principle5 - using the 
term, no doubt, in reference to economy in 
expenditure, and at the same time sanctioning the 
practice of discriminatory monopoly {at which all 
monopolist• aim). But, recognising that cheap 
transport is indispensable for agricultural and 
industrial development, including the promotion of 
inland settlement and development which was 
18 
specially enjoined, it was also agreed that the 
railways and harbours are not to be operated as a 
profit making venture nor to be dependent on grants 
from the Central Government in order to ensure 
solvency; but, in order to avoid periodic tariff 
changes because of the effect on railway finances 
of seasonal or cyclical variations in traffic, 
revenue might be appropriated for the maintenance 
of a rates equalisation fund'. 
tDJ SATS TARIFF POLICY 
Tariff policy is based on four principles which will be 
briefly dealt with. These principles are: that the 
organization be managed on business lines, that the socio­
economic needs of the country be taken into account, the 
17 
'collective principle', and tariff differentiation. 
The injuction that SATS be managed on business principles 
has been taken to mean that 'an equilibrium between revenue 
18 
and expenditure must be attained in the long term'. In 
other words, it must balance its books without recour�e to 
19 
the State Revenue Fund. Two consequences flow from this 
interpretation: first, annual surpluses are transferred into 
a Rates Equalisation Fund and deficits are met from this 
Fund; secondly, cross subsidization is used whereby losses 
incurred on one service will be met by a subsidy from another 
20 
service which has been run at a profit. 
Wallis sees cross subsidization as being essential to the 
second principle affecting tariff policy: the need to take 
21 
into account the socio-economic needs of the country. 
aspect of transport policy is clearly indicated by the 
passenger service operated by SATS. The service is 
This 
offered at rates which do not cover its cost, despite a large 
subsidy which is given to SATS by the Government, out of 
22 
the State Revenue Fund. Surpluses from the more profitable 
19 
freight and harbours and pipelines services have therefore 
been used in the past to ma.ke up the shortfall on the 
23 
passenger service. 
Wallis outlines the third policy determinant, the 
24 
'collective principle' as follows: 
'According to the "collective principle tt the same 
rate per tonne/kilometre or passenger must be 
charged on traffic of the same class over the same 
distance and under the same conditions and 
circumstances notwithstanding the fact that 
different rates may be justifiable on similar 
traffic over different sections of lines due to 
say, differences in the density of traffic, empty 
running of trucks, standard of track, gradients and 
curves.' 
The adoption of the 'collective principle' also leads to 
cross-subsidization, but between different routes served by the 
25 
railway system. 
The final principle upon which tariff policy is based is that 
of tariff differentiation. This is of particular importance 
in the regulation debate because it creates an artificial 
picture of the cost of the service. The rationale of tariff 
differentiation is that the utilization of facilities will be 
stimulated and that total revenue will thereby cover total 
costs and the losses incurred in running unprofitable social 
services. It is thus based on 'charging what the traffic can 
26 
bear' rather than the cost of the service. To achieve the 
differentiation SATS has created a tariff scale which 
comprises of 15 classes which fall into two groups: 
tariffs 1 to 10 are high rated goods and tariffs 11 to 15 are 
27 
low rated. As a general rule,- high bulk and low value goods 
will fall into the low rate while low bulk and high value 
goods will fall into the high rate. SATS sees it as
20 
essential to convey as much high rated traffic as possible, 
since this is more profitable than the low rated traffic. 
This is precisely the area in which road transportation is 
suited. Road carriers are therefore seen to be taking the 
more profitable goods from SATS, which is left with the 
least profitable commodities, which are conveyed at prices 
28 
which do not reflect costs. 
[IIJ REGULATION 
[AJ COMPETITION IN TRANSPORTATION 
(1) Introduction
The place of transport in th� economy and its importance to a 
country has been expressed by Verburgh in the following 
29 
terms: 
'Via Vita: transport is the lifeblood of any form 
of activity, and therefore also of economic 
activities, whether they take place on a remote 
farm or in big mining or industrial concerns. 
Transport is vital, not as an end in itself, but 
becau3e no undertaking whatsoever can do without 
the services which only transport can give. There 
is no substitute for transport, it is absolutely 
essential. Although the same can be said for 
agriculture or other branches of activity the 
essentiality of transport is certainly different. 
Whereas an insufficiency in say local wheat 
production can be remedied by importation, a 
shortage of transport facilities cannot so 
easily and speedily be put right, especially where 
railway facilities are concerned.' 
Because of the factors which Verburgh has mentioned, wider 
issues are at stake than the individual's assertion that he 
should be able to pursue profit in whatever way he sees fit. 
Transport policy is seen as necessary to b�ing about a 
----------
balance between the desire of the individual to offer 
transportation services unhampered by restrictions on the one 
hand, and the needs of the country on the other, which demand 
21 
an effieient and effeetive transport network which caters 
·- --···- ---- -30···--
far wider needs e.g. one��hi�h takes into account socio-
economic and developmental factors. Transportation policy 
should therefore ensure 'that there is an efficient 
allocation of traffic between the different modes. This 
means that each mode should specialize in the carriage of 
those traffic flows in which it has a comp·arative cost 
31 
advantage '. 
The problem o! co•petition in transport would not arise i! 
the various modes of transport were perfectly complementary. 
In other words, no conflict of interest would emerge if, far 
instance, the sphere in which road transportation operated 
did not overlap with the sphere in which rail transportation 
32 
operated. This simplistic model is not found in any 
transport network: overlapping, and consequent intermodal 
competition, is found wherever roads and railway• operate. 
While road transportation is not suited to the conveyance of 
all goods which a train can convey and vice versa (for the 
reasons discussed below) the overlap, in general, occurs in 
that area which is most profitable to both modes: the 
conveyance of low bulk and high value freight. Before 
dealing with the pros and cons of regulation, it is therefore 
necessary to e�amine the spheres in which each mode is 
superior to the other, ths areas o! overlapping and the 
factors influencing the choice (if such exists) which the user 
must make in deciding on the mode of conveyance. 
(2) The Advantages and Disadvantages o! Road Transportation
The motor vehicle has a distinct advantage by virtue o! the 
fact that it is more mobile than-·� train. Verburgh 
says tha� while railway construction is of a uniformly high 
22 
standard, roads are often built to a standard which does not 
33 
meet a satisfactory technical level. This factor may reduce 
the overall efficiency of road tran�portation but at the same 
time South Africa•s road network is sufficiently developed to 
give motor vehicles access to most areas. Such vehicles are 
obviously re5tricted to the roads (unlike those modes which use 
f�eely availabl9 media such as water or air) but this doss 
not operate as a restricting factor to any �arked degree at 
present. Fenelon, speakin� of the English situation, may 
just as easily have been making an observation about the 
present day South Africa when he said that 'road transport 
""'-- ,.___ --•---••• •·-•·-" ,.,, ,, .• - -- or 
possesses the great advantage of flexibility, for in this 
._._..-,,... .... __  ,_,,.__.., .. 
-�..-.<-·r,..,�....._----_..,._.
,__, 
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country the road leads everywhere'. 
Indeed this flexibility gives rise to a second major 
advantage of the motor vehicle: it can go to the goods. It 
does not depend, as does rail transport, on the goods going 
to the means of conveyance. Hotor vehicles can therefore 
offer a door to door.s•rvice and are .able to pick up and 
35 
deliver goods under diverse conditions. This is well 
illustrated by the rapid growth of the express parcel 
delivery industry which sprang up as a result of the 
exemption contained in sl(2) (1) of the Road Transportation 
36 
Act. While the industry's development has been hampered by 
37 
the amendment of that section, its initiel success was 
based, in addition to its flexibility, on a third major 
advantage: the speed of service which road transportation is 
able to provide. Wallis explains this factor in general 
··�aa· � 
terms: 
'The main intermodal service difference is speed, 
with trucks bein� faster than trains on any given 
23 
arc since trains often have to colleet traffic .at 
intermediate points and may be slowed down by the 
periodic atops of other trains in the system, 
whereas trucks can carry smaller loads over the 
entire arc without any lengthy stops.' 
Related to the above, is the fact that motor vehicles do not 
39 
have to transload freig�t as often as trains. 
The size of motor vehicles (and consequently their carrying 
Whereas a train has 
to wait until its trucks are fully loaded before it can 
operate vith the potential of profiting, this process is 
shorter in the case of motor vehicles. A faster service can 
therefore be rendered without sacrificing profit potential 
because the yehicle's operatin& cost5 (and infrastructural 
costs) are proportionally smaller than that of a train. Thus 
Fenelon summarized the advantages of road transportation as 
40 
follows: 
'As compared with the railways, mechanical road 
haulage possesses distinct advantages for the 
transport of moderate loads where the distance to 
be covered does not exceed, say, 30 to 50 miles.
Where traffic is light, the road is the more 
economical form of transport, since a railway to 
achieve financial success require� a resular and 
fairly dense traffic, as otherwi5e �ufficient 
revenue will not be earned to meet the heavy 
capital cost involved.' 
Compared with the advantages of road transportation which 
have been outlined above, the disadvantages tend to be 
insi1nificant. Host of these have been dealt vith in passing 
but warrant specific mention: first, motor vehicles are 
restricted to movement on roads, which is a minor 
disadvantag• bearing in mind that the main competitor does 
not operate in a freely available media; secondly 7 �otor 
vehicles cannot convey tha variety of merchandise which 
24 
trains-can.._y:-.a.n_s_port. Although it may be physically possible 
for lorries to carry most types of freight, from an economic 
point of view it would be futile, for example, to engage in 
the conveyance of coal from mines in the interior to the 
coast. The physical limitation of motor vehicles (and no 
doubt, the technical specifications of roads) would not allow 
for such an undertaking. Time and cost factors would 
certainly make it foolhardy; thirdly, the potency of road 
transportation diminishes over long distances. The vehicle 
--
is limited i� ils travelling speed not only by its design 
specifications but also by laws which impose speed 
restrictions for the safety of other road users. The 
longer a vehicle is on the road, the costlier the conveyance 
becomes. Because of the large scale on which rail conveyance 
is undertaken, the cost of this mode increases at a slower 
41 
rate. Thus road transportation depends, to be viable, on 
a high turnover of freight, while rail relies more on the 
bulk (and value) of the freight conveyed. 
(3) The Advantages and Disadvantages of Rail Transportation
The following may be seen as general advantages of rail 
transportation: the size of the tranportation unit, the 
train, makes bulk transportation possible from both a 
physical and economic perspective; related to size is the 
low cost of conveyance which rail transportation can achieve 
42 
over long distances; trains operate on established networks 
which, while they are expensive to construct, are relatively 
43 
----
cheap to maintain� the rail network is built to a common 
high standard because 'for technical reasons there is not 
much scope for lower standards as is the case in road 
44 
construction'. The result is that traffic can be conveyed 
45 
25 
_j 
smoothly and speedily; finally the size of the rail service 
has led t;-s"'l:a.n-aar·arz·a-ttan:---- It is 'de.signed to satisfy the 
······ ., ... 46--- ---- - - -···-
largest number·of users.
Looked at from a different perspective some of the above may 
be seen as disadvantages. For instance, the fact that trains 
are confined in their operation to rails �hich are laid at 
great cost means that it is not as easy for the rail system 
47 
to spread out in the way in which the road system has. 
Related to this is the disadvantage that rail 
transportation is not as mobile as road transportation. It is 
-- - ·-·- 48
unable , on it_� - -��-�-' to p_rov i �e a � oo�-to-q9�r service. This 
means that it cannot cater for individual needs (hence t�e 
49 
standardization of its service) and that a greater 
number of transloadings are required when goods are to be 
transported by rail, Finally the size of the transportation 
unit can be a disadvantage. The train can only operate 
efficiently when all of its trllcks a.�e l.oaded and brought 
together. 
51 
free. 
In addition the line on which it operates must be 
(4) Intermodal Competition and Co-ordination
Ca) Competition 
Verburgh sees the essence of intermodal competition in 
52 
the following way:
'In the economic system we find that the various 
modes of transport such as railway, road, ship and 
air transport are each able to carry a variety of 
articles. In a technical sense each mode of 
transport can carry practically any kind of goods, 
in an economic sense, however, there are certain 
classes of traffic which can be carried more 
cheaply, more speedily or more conveniently by only 
one mode of transport. For a wide range of 
articles, however, the superiority of one mode of 
transport over the other is not big enough to 
26 
prevent other modes of lransporl from competing for 
lhis traffic. As will be seen later lhe 
characlerislica of lhe cosl and tariff structures 
of lhe various mddes of transport enable lhem to 
compete for a great variety of goods, instead of 
being compelled lo give a complementary service in 
line wilh lhe{r special function.� 
He says lhal even if road lransportalion was lhe only mode of 
53 
land conveyance, 'free competition' would break down. The 
reasons for lhis submission are lhe varied and localized 
services o£fered by road carriers, and lhe impossibility of 
54 
self-regulation. When rail lransporlalion is introduced 
into lhe model, lhe picture becomes more complex, mainly as a 
result of lhe tariff system used by SAIS which is based 
(unlike road lariff systems} on lhe value of the service 
55 
rather lhan lhe cosl of lhe service. 
land transporlalion: 
He concludes lhal in 
' .••• automatic regulation by lhe market mechanism 
of lhe competition between individual hauliers and 
between hauliers and the railways has never worked 
sufficiently because of the many imperfections in 
compelilive relationships. Neither has sel£­
regulalion on its own been able to bring about a 
£arm of workable compelilion in land lransporl.' (56} 
While Wallis, on lhe olher hand, recognizes the 
slruclural inequalities between road and rail lransportalion, 
he sees compelilion as a means of improving lhe efficiency of 
lhe transport syslem. If entry into the industry is 
unrestricted lhe user will be given a proper choice of which 
mode lo make use of, This in turn will be a slrong 
inducement for lhe suppliers of services lo improve their 
57 
compeliliveness in terms of cosl and quality. Il should be 
noted that he does nol favour deregulation without adjust­
ments (e.g. by means of road user charges) so lhal the resultant 
58 
competition reflects equality between the competing parties. 
27 
Various commissions of enquiry have examined competition 
59 
within the industry. The Le Roux Commission for instance 
found, as early as 1929 that most road transportation 
undertakings competed with (rather than supplemented} the 
rail service offered by the Railway Administration. It 
60 
r•ported: 
'The competition assail• mainly the higher-rated 
goods and the short-distance pa5senger traffic of 
the South African Railways; it, naturally also 
affects the traMway undertakings of certain 
municipalities and long-established public 
transport companies. The incidence of road motor 
competition has created A transport problem of 
considerable magnitude.' 
It saw a number of disadvantages in a system of free 
competition. Chief amcng the•e was the destabilizing effect 
of 'rate wars' (which, it s.aid, would be inevitable) in which 
ths survivors would increase rates in ordgr to recoup 
61 
previous losses. It also saw free competition as being 
62 
detrimental to development: 
'The tendency is for competition to increase in the 
more populous areas, most of whieh are already 
adequately served by the agencies which developed 
them - some are over-served - whereas new fields, 
which could be beneficially exploited, and in time 
with reasonable reward, are neglected.' 
63 
The Harais Commis5ion expressed itself in favour of 
'controlled competition' rather than 'free competition'. It 
defined the term to mean that real competition should exist 
wherever possible, but that the extent of the competition, or 
the number of competing suppliers in a given situation, 
should be controlled by being confined to a reasonable number 
of competitors. depending on th• demand or needs of the 
public. 
28 
It will be seen that the system of regulation embodied in the 
Road Transportation Act aims at 'controlled competition'. 
Entry into the industry and the operating practices of 
carriers are controlled by the regulatory machinery which the 
Act contains. Boards decide, in accordance with various 
factors (including the desirability in the public interest 
and the existing transport facilities) whether an applicant 
should be allowed to compete with other operators and 
64 
SATS. Once the application has been granted, the operator 
may only convey in accordance with the provisions of his 
65 
permit, including conditions that may he attached thereto. 
(b) Co-ordination
The co-ordination of facilities should be one of the main 
objects of transport policy. In other words, the co-
ordinating agency should endeavour to ensure that an 
efficient allocation of traffic between the different modes 
66 
is achieved. This proposition was enunciated by the Le Roux 
67 
Commission in the following terms: 
'Railway and road transportation each has its 
peculiar and different functions, and the object to 
he aimed at is to co-ordinate rail and road motor 
operation in such a manner that each form of 
transport will render service in the sphere of its 
greatest economic usefulness - in the sphere where 
it can render the greatest measure of useful 
service to the community at large. The one form of 
service should be complimentary to, rather than 
competitive with, the other, and every effort 
should be made to co-ordinate the two as far as is 
practicable, and to foster the development of 
each.' 
68 
The Van Breda Commission was aware of the difficulties of 
achieving the ideal division of traffic between the 
various modes and said that, because of the complexities 
29 
involved in the costing of transportation, this ideal was 
probably beyond reach. While regulation, the means adopted 
since 1930, was itself incapable of achieving perfect co-
69 
ordination the commission found that free competition would 
70 
not be able to attain the goal either. 
(c) The Aim of Regulation
Eckaus says that when market structures do not or cannot 
regulate themselves the necessity for imposed regulation (by 
71 72 
public economic policy) becomes essential. He says: 
'The rationale for regulation by the federal 
commissions is to avoid "chaotic competition ff , to 
maintain high standards of safety and to ensure the 
use of natural "resources ff , such as broadcast 
channels and airspace, in the public interest.' 
It is evident that in South Africa, the dominant approach to 
the transportation problem has been based on the above 
premise. Without exception the commissions of enquiry have
held that the industry cannot regulate itself and the fact that 
the largest provider of transport services, SATS, is state 
owned and required to provide developmental and social 
73 
services, necessitates control of some sort. It is against 
this background that the economic theories of regulation will 
be discussed. 
Phillips and Zecher have identified two theries of 
regulation: the market failure theory and the public choice 
74 
theory. They outline the two theories as follows: 
'The market failure theory provides an economic 
rationale for what regulation ought to do 
improve economic efficiency by correcting market 
failures - while the public choice theory provides 
an economic rationale for understanding why 
regulatory agencies and programs often do not deal 
effectively with the economic problem of 
inefficient allocation of resources.' 
30 
Market failure may occur in many ways. Perhaps the most 
striking example of such a failure is found when a natural 
monopoly comes into existence: in this instance the supplier 
of services is able to manipulate prices and production in 
such a way that;profits can be maximized. Deviations in price 
or production from those which would occur in a fully 
competitive market would be seen as a market failure, and 
would provide the justification for regulation in the public 
75 
interest: 
'It defines the most desirable state for securing 
the public interest as fully competitive prices and 
outputs; it provides means for assessing when 
market outcomes deviate substantially from 
competitive norms; it provides a set of regulatory 
goals against which the success of the regulatory 
program can be gauged; and it can provide for an 
ongoing assessment of the costs and effectiveness 
of the regulatory program.' 
It is evident from the commissions of enquiry into 
transportation that the rationale for state interference is 
based squarely on the market failure theory. Verburgh's 
analysis of goods transportation by road too is based on this 
theory: he says that regulation became necessary as defects 
in the working of free competition became evident, especially 
76 
when road and rail transportation competed. 
Unlike the market failure theory {which provides an economic 
rationale for interference) the public choice theory seeks to 
77 
explain how regulation actually works. 
78 
explain the latter as follows: 
Phillips and Zecher 
'The theory is based on the fact that every 
regulation reallocates resources and in the 
process makes some groups or individuals (the 
recipients) richer and others (the regulatory 
taxpayers) poorer. Naturally any proposed 
31 
regulation will attract the attention of both the 
beneficiaries and the payers, and they will express 
their support or opposition through political and 
economic channels. r
This theory therefore goes beyond the pure economic approach 
of the market failure theory: in addition to its economic 
79 
base it also draws on history, political science and law.
It sees regulatory programs ras a process in which 
individuals and groups express their preferences in a 
political-economic marketplace'. 
In terms of the public choice theory 'interest groups will 
form. These will express, through the available channels, 
opposition to or support for the proposed regulatory measure. 
The size and organization of the groups is of great 
importance. The content of the regulatory measure will depend 
on the relative strengths of the groups who oppose and 
support it. Seen in this light, regulation takes on a 
dynamic character, rather than the static model depicted by 
the market failure theory. Content changes in response to 
the changing strengths of the interest groups. The 
consequences of regulation as seen in terms of public choice 
are: public interest is of notional importance only because 
the strengths of the interest groups decide regulatory 
content; regulation will tend to work in favour of well 
organized relatively small groups at the expense of large 
81 
poorly organized groups. 
In applying this theory to the South African transport set 
up, it will be noted that the system will inevitably favour 
SATS although the picture is starting to change. SATS 
is a single organization. Its opposition to the alteration 
of regulatory content is well organized. Opposing it are a 
32 
great number of individual firms. Their interests may not 
always coincide and, to complicate the picture, there are 
firms who are within the regulatory system and those vho are 
trying to get in. Over recent years private carriers and 
commercial associations have been able to organize more 
effectively. This is evidenced by the slow (and piecemeal) 
82 
changes which were recommended by the Van Breda Commission 
and later embodied in the Road Transportation Act. 
(d) Factors Influencing Modal Choice
Wallis says that the main factors influencing modal choice 
are the value of the commodity, the length of haul, and the 
83 
density of traffic along the route. Making use of these 
factors he concludes that if the commodity has a high or 
medium value it should be conveyed by road if the density of 
the traffic is thin. If the density is thick, road 
transportation should be used for short hauls (less than 200 
kms) while rail transportation should be used for hauls of 
longer than 250 kms. If the value of the commodity is low 
then conveyance by road is again appropriate for thin traffic 
densities and, where dense, for short hauls of up to 50 kms. 
84 
For hauls of over 75 kms a train is more suitable. 
85 
Wallis 5ounds a word of warning. He says: 
'The considerations reflected in this decision tree are 
usually taken into account by Governments in 
regulating intermodal competition in the transport 
sector. A problem with this approach, however, is that 
it is difficult to prescribe general rules to assist in 
the rational allocation of traffic since the 
circumstances in which a modal choice decision is made 
will not only vary between shippers but also over time.' 
33 
CB] THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF REGULATION 
The arguments in favour of regulation have emanated primarily 
86 
from SATS. They have, by aod large, been accepted by the 
various commissions of enquiry, all of which have agreed upon 
the need for regulation. 
The most important argument in favour of regulation is based 
on the special position of SATS in the transportation network 
of the country.·· -Legislation has 5et out its objectives and 
operating p-r-actTces. Not only is it an organi.zation devoted 
to conveying persons and goods but also one which must take 
account of, and work towards, the economic development of the 
country. This socio-eeonomio object (embodied in its tariff 
structure) places it in a disadvantaged position vis-a-vis 
privatQ road carriers. In 1927 the General Manager of the 
Railways Administration was forthright in his attack on 
87 
private carriers: 
'It should be realized that private road motor 
services are conducted by persons whose only 
concern is that the returns are profitable -
returns which benefit but the pockets of a few 
individuals lo the detriment of the community as a 
whoie. • 
It has thus been argued that regulation is essential to 
protect SATS. Its tariff structure is devised in such a way 
that the cost of the service is not reflected but rather the 
88 
value of the service (or what the market can bear). This 
allows private road hauliers, whose tari£fs reflect the cost 
of the service, to operate at an advantage, especially with 
89 
regard .lo low bulk, high val�e goods. 
" . ,. ·•-
- .,. 
SATS requires this 
type of freight to supplement the deficit incurred in 
fulfilling its developmental obligations e.g. in the 
conveyance of such goods as mineral ores and agricultural 
34 
produce. To allow private hauliers to skim the cream off the j 
top therefore results in SATS being left with all of the 
···--·-�- .. 
disadvantages while road transporters enjoy all of the
----··  
advantages. Regulation is seen as a means of rectifying the 
---------� 
distorted relationship which uncontrolled·-competition would 
produce. 
Infrastructural inequality is another argument used by 
proponents of regulation. Wallis sees this as perhaps the 
90 
most important factor. He says: 
'The main argument against unrestricted intermodal 
competition is that there is considerable 
inequality in the structural, institutional and 
legal conditions affecting each mode. For example, 
railway interests often argue that railways have to 
meet their infrastructural costs whereas road 
hauliers can make use of publicly provided road 
infrastructure.' 
The infrastructural inequality of the two modes of 
transportation has a profound impact on the costs of 
conveyance by road and by rail. If this inequality is not 
remedied by regulation or some other means a distorted 
picture emerges of the cost of the services offered. Once 
again if no regulation exists, road transportation would 
enjoy an unfair advantage. Advocates of regulation argue 
that the overall cost of rail trangportation (which includes 
both fixed and mobile plant) is the true reflection of the 
value of the service. For competition to he fair, the 
overall cost of road transportation must be reflected in the 
pricing of private carriers i.e. infrastructural costs must 
be levied on individual road users in a more effective way. 
Until that is achieved regulation will be necessary to 
91 
protect SATS from unfair competition. 
35 
A third major argument in favour of regulation revolve� 
around the purpose of each mode. While this argument was 
used extensively in the year5 leading up to the promulgation 
of the Motor Carrier Transportation Act, it has not been used 
much .since then. In terms of this Justification, it is 
said that the state owned railway system is the cornerstone 
of the country�• transportation network. Because rail 
conveyance i.s the primary mode of transportation, it should 
·- - ____ , --·-92
be placed in a privileged position. Road transportation can 
then be used as an acc•ssory or feeder service. Regulation 
in this context is seen as a means of apportionin� spheres to 
each mode, rather than as a method of realligning 
inequalities in the competitive relationship between the 
modes. 
The arguments in favour of regulation are all based on the 
requirements of the public as a whole (as perceived by those 
in favour of regulation). It is assumed that regulation is 
necessary because uncontrolled competition cannot adequately 
take into account the developmental, social and economic 
94 
needs of the country as a whole. In order to do this, a 
global view of transportation is needed as well as a 
transp�tatioo policy which can allocate resources where 
nece&sary. The aim of this is to provide for the stable and 
rational development of a transportation network suited to 
95 
the needs of the country. 
[CJ THE AR.GUMENTS AGAINST REGULA! ION 
The arguments against re�ulation are premised to a greater or 
lesser extent on the alleged efficiency of the free 
enterprise system. Consequently any attempt at regulation 
36 
will carry with it inefficiency because it will protect the 
96 
beneficiary from the competition necessary for efficiency. 
97 
Wallis says: 
'lntermodal competition may improve the efficiency 
of the transport system as a whole if it is 
unrest�icted since it will enable the user to 
choose that mode which offers the most prefered 
services in terms of cost, speed, safety, 
reliability and traffic utility. There will thus 
be a strong inducement for the different modes to 
improve their competitiveness in terms of the cost 
and quality of their services.' 
The proponents of deregulation accept that each mode has 
certain spheres in which it can operate more effectively e.g. 
the express parcel delivery service can be handled better by 
road transportation �hile the long distance conveyance of 
bulk goods falls squarely into the domain of rail 
98 
tranportation. Each �Q�e, in an unregulated system, will 
,-
naturally gravil�l� lo those areas in which il operales al an 
advantage. Again, this will serve to enhance the efficiency 
of th·e --transportation network. Thirdly, free enterprise is 
based on individualism. In the transportation sphere, it is 
argued that the decision as to the mode of conveyance should 
be left to the user. In other words the person who is to 
pay for the SErvice should be given a free choice i.e. no 
restrictions should be imposed in allowing the user to decide 
on the mode of conveyance. Many factors will be taken into 
account in this decision e.g. the speed, the cost, the number 
99 
of transloadings, the safety, the chance of damage or theft. 
Any att�l!IJ:)_1:._ to interfere with this process by artificially 
making one mode more attractive than the other will have an 
adverse effect for the consumer of the service. 
It is often argued that deregulation would leave 
37 
smaller communities and the more isolated parts of the 
country without transport. This would, frorr � developm���al 
perspective, be disastrous to those communiti as and areas 
The massive losses incurred by SATS in running uneconomic 
branch lines or transporting agricultural produce is pointed 
100 
to. Advocates of deregulation aver that in a free enter-
prise system market forces will determine whether outlying 
areas are worth exploiting. They also point to the American 
101 
experience after the deregulation of the airline industry: 
'Prior to deregulation, small communities had been 
receiving subsidised service. The study concluded 
that instead, in some important ways, the air 
service network has become more integrated as a 
result of competition and that small communities 
are not being abandoned. Instead, commuter 
airlines have replace trunk and local airlines to 
small cities.' 
CIVJ �!REGULATION 
CAJ INTRODUCTION 
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The Van Breda Commission expressed itself in favour of 
gradual deregulation but the resulting legislation did not 
103. 
reflect this policy shift. It is clear that the 
deregulation of road transportation will not come easily and 
it will not be achieved by simply repealing the Road 
Transportation Act. Any attempt to lift controls must 
address itself to the removal of competitive inequalities as 
104 
a prelude to free competition in trans�·t.ation. Another 
problem that would have to be faced is a means of 
ensuring minimum standards of safety. While it has been 
argued that safety issues are best left to private 
105 
enterprise, such assertions should, it is submitted 7 be 
treated with a degree of scepticism. 
38 
Wallis says that 'the evolution of the transport policy of 
the SATS can be traced through a number of stages each of 
which arose from the policy commitments in the previous 
106 
stage'. The initial stage was the most important because, 
in an era when rail enjoyed a virtual monopoly in inland 
conveyance, policies were adopted which were to make rail 
transportation vulnerable to competition from the road e.g. 
the policy of charging 'what the traffic can bear' which 
necessitated differential rates. In order to allow the 
Railways Administration to continue to cross-subsidize and so 
provide social and developmental functions, regulation was 
seen as necessary. Wallis says that protection of the 
railways was justified in 1930 on two grounds: first, the 
road system was relatively underdeveloped and was incapable 
of handling a large increase in freight; and secondly, it was 
considered economically sound to favour the existing rail 
infrastructure rather than to allow traffic to be diverted to 
107 
the road. 
In the years that followed, circumstances changed and factors 
favouring regulation waned in importance: roads improved, 
some rail routes became congested and it appeared that the 
railways could not deal effici�ntly or speedily with the 
traffic available to it. The wisdom of regulation began to 
be questioned, especially in the 1960's when the railways 
were considered by many to be an inhibiting factor in the 
-------- - - �- -1 o.a. ..... ..
rapid economic growth of the country. It was in this 
environment that the first commissions of enquiry to give 
consideration to deregulation operated. 
109 
The Marais Commission heard evidence from a number of 
110 
bodies who argued strongly in favour of deregulation. While 
39 
it found that it was necessary to regulate transportation at 
the time, it granted that future developments could well 
111 
eradicate this need! 
'The Commission recommends that, while a greater 
measure of freedom for the transport user should 
gradually develop, a form of controlled competition 
should remain. Such control should be dynamic, 
however, and should be reviewed from time to time 
to ensure efficient and economic services to the 
public.' 
1-12
The Van Breda Commission also considered deregulation and, 
while it accepted that South Africa had reached a stage in 
its economic and industrial development when it should move 
113 
towards freer competition
__, 
___ the resultant legislation 
maintained the original framework with some relaxations of 
regulatory measures. Wallis sums up the current situation 
114 
in the following terms: 
'However the deregulation that has taken place has 
been essentially piecemeal in character and has 
largely arisen as an �g h2£ reaction to the fact 
that the system of regulatory controls had become 
outmoded due to the industrial and economic 
development which has taken place since their 
introduction.' 
Since the promulgation of the Road Transportation Act, the 
pressure on the government to deregulate has become more 
intense. Not only has the means of control (the permit
system) been critici�ed, but the concept of regulation itself 
is seen increasingly as a means of fostering alleged SATS 
115 -:--
inefficiency through protection. 
[BJ PRECONDITIONS FOR DEREGULATION 
Deregulation wo�l� not be a simple and painless process. It 
cannot effectively be achieved by simply repealing the Road 
Transportation Act, The Marais Commission speculated on 
40 
the disastrous effect of such a step and, while it reported 
in 1969, the tenor of its findings in this regard are no 
116 
doubt valid today: 
'In considering the specific example, it was 
assumed that all restrictions on the distance of 
operation by road hauliers had been lifted while all 
other provisions of the present legislation 
remained unchanged. The results for this extreme 
case indicated that 3 154 million rail ton-miles 
would be diverted to the roads and that an 
estimated 10 000 heavy road vehicles would be 
required to transport this diverted goods traffic. 
These heavy vehicles would travel about 263 million 
vehicle miles in relation to an estimated 3.2 
million vehicle miles travelled by heavy road 
vehicles in 1965. The loss of goods traffic to the 
Railways would mean an annual decrease of 
approximately R145 million in income, This amount 
is 31 per cent of the income reflected in the the 
Revenue Account of the Railways for the year ended 
31 March 1965. Unfortunately it was not possible, 
from the available data, to make estimates of the 
congestion and the decrease in road life which 
could possibly follow on the deviation of rail 
goods traffic of this order of magnitude to the 
road system.' 
� 
It is clear therefore that certain preconditions to 
deregulation must be brought about. The Marais Commission 
considered two factors to be of importance in determining 
whether control of road transportation would be necessary in 
the future: first, if the fuel used by rail and road became 
substantially similar, strategic and foreign currency 
considerations would become irrelevant; secondly if, as has 
been recommended, railway tariffs were alligned more with the 
cost of conveyance than the value of service the need to 
protect SATS would fall away. 
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The Van Breda Commission, 
while it said that some form of regulation would always be 
necessary, set out three preconditions for deregulation. 
These would enable SATS to compete on equal terms with 
119 
private road operators. They are: 
41 
(b) 
(c) 
The Railways must be relieved of the financial 
burden of providing social services; 
the Railways must he placed on the same 
footing as road carriers as regards the cost 
attached to the provision of infrastructure; 
and 
the Railways must amend its tariff structure 
so that its tariffs are brought closer to 
the actual cost of providing the service.' 
It was on the basis of the profound effect which the 
adjustment of tariffs (especially the lower tariffs) would 
have on the country's economy that the commission opted for 
120 
gradual 'qualified deregulation'. 
[CJ THE EFFECT OF DEREGULATION 
The dangers of deregulation unaccompanied by competition 
equalizing have been pointed out above. Even if the 
preconditions enumerated by the Van Breda Commission are 
met, deregulation will have an effect on a number of facets 
of economic life which require transport facilities. The 
impact of deregulation on four issues will he briefly 
discussed. 
(1) SATS Rating Policy
The rating policy of SATS is at present dictated by two 
factors: its protection from intermodal competition and its 
obligation as a common carrier, necessitating the continued 
operation of unremuneralive lines. In a deregulated system 
it would have to adjust its rates to reflect cosls. In olher 
words a policy change from charging 'wha� the traffic can 
bear' to the cost of conveyance would become necessary if 
SATS wished to compete with road hauliers in an unconlrolled 
environment. 
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way: 
121 
Wallis sees the result in the following 
42 
'This may be a factor promoting more efficient 
intermodal coordination in the transport sector. 
If the prices charged by the different modes of 
transport reflect the opportunity costs of 
providing them, then it is likely that consumers 
will choose the mode which can provide a particular 
transport service at the lowest cost. As a result 
the different modes of transport are likely to 
specialize in the provision of those services in 
which they have a competitive advantage.' 
(2) Industrial Decentralization
At present rebates on outgoing traffic are granted to firms 
which have been established in industrial development points. 
SATS, as a common carrier, is obliged to convey goods from 
these areas and such conveyance, at low rates, is usually 
unremunerative. In a deregulated system SATS would not be 
obliged to convey this freight at all and, if it did, it 
would charge competitive rates. The impact of this on the 
policy of industrial decentralisation would no doubt be 
disastrous. To overcome the difficulty, Wallis has 
-- " 
/ suggested that Regional Transport Authorities be set up as a 
means of 'reconciling conflicting regional and efficiency 
123 
objectives'. These bodies could be charged with developing 
an overall regional development strategy and be granted 
funds, for the. furtherance of this aim, with which to 'offer 
financial compensation to any transport operator which 
carries traffic at special rates from underdeveloped areas'f 
The result of such an undertaking would, in essence, be to 
relieve SArs of its developmental obligation allowing it to 
pursue a __ �omp_�_t_itive pricing policy. At the same time the 
124 
responsibility for equalizing regional inequalities (in terms 
of the decentralization policy) will be dealt with by a more 
125 
appropriate body. 
43 
Responsibility for the promotion of regional development on 
....__\ the part of SATS is in direct conflict with the aims of 
deregulation. SATS could not be expected to operate 
unremunerative lines and compete with private road hauliers. 
At the same time it is clear that- abandonment of 
underdeveloped regions is not a viable alternative 
and runs against government policy, which is to promote 
126 
industrial decentralization. 
Two possible complementary solutions present themselves: 
first, the risk of operating losses can be shifted to the 
parties who will benefit from the rail link. This is not a 
radical concept because at present a limited policy of 
'guaranteed lines' is followed by SATS, whereby the 
organization agrees to construct and operate a line if the 
beneficiaries guarantee against losses; secondly, the 
responsibility for regional development may be shifted from 
SATS to a government department e.g. a Regional Transport 
127 128 
Authority. Wallis concludes: 
'Apart from being a vehicle for stimulating 
intermodal competition within a region, it can be 
argued that RTAs will also be able to integrate 
transport and regional policy objectives in a more 
effective way since they will be in a position to 
treat transport as only one factor to be taken into 
account in an overall regional development 
strategy.' 
(4) Social Services
The Van Breda Commission 
129 
said that if deregulation was to 
be achieved, one of the preconditions was that SATS had to be
relieved of its obligation to provide unremunerative social 
services. If SATS is to be expected to provide these 
services a method of compensation (apart from intermodal 
44 
protection) must be devised. Perhaps the most obvious means 
of maintaining such services is by way of state subsidies to 
SATS. While this is probably the most practical way of 
resolving the problem, Wallis points out a number of 
difficulties: it may result in initially painful structural 
readjustments for SATS; difficulties may be experienced in 
separating SATS's accountability for social and purely 
economic functions; further pressure will be placed on the 
Treasury; and such a solution conflicts with the trend to 
130 
reduce government spending, especially on social program. 
[DJ CONSEQUENCES OF DEREGULATION 
This discussion on the consequences of deregulation is 
premised on the assumption that SATS will reallign its rates 
to reflect the cost of the service offered. If it does so it 
will be in a better position to compete with private road 
carriers. It will nonetheless have to alter its approach to 
the services which it provides on at least two fronts: it 
will have to concentrate on reducing inefficiency and it will 
have to move towards specialization. 
Wallis says that a large public monopoly like SATS, 
which has its survival guaranteed by statutory protection, 
will have less motivation to curtail operating inefficiency 
than a firm which is exposed to competition. Inefficiency 
can arise in at least two ways: within the organization 
through employees shifting responsibility or through the 
organization not making use of the most cost effective 
131 
equipment or techniques. As a result of SATS losing high 
rated traffic in recent years measures have been introduced 
132 
to improve efficiency. Wallis says in this regard that: 
45 
' ... it is clear that deregulation of the 
transport sector would result in the Railways being 
exposed to a greater intensity of intermodal 
competition and therefore a greater pressure to 
implement measures which increase operating 
efficiency and service quality, than it presently 
has to face, ' 
Closely linked to the improvement in efficiency is a need on 
the part of SAIS to specialize in those services in which it 
has a competitive advantage. The need for specialization 
(e.g. medium and long hauls and the conveyance of bulk loads) 
133 
was recognized by the Marais Commis5ion as an essential, 
even in a regulated environment. The ability of SATS to 
compete with road transportation would be severely hampered 
if it also handled goods in which rail was a relatively 
134 
inefficient mode of conveyance. 
A third, and major, consequence of deregulation would be that 
135 
the choice would be made directly by the user of the service. 
Consequently transport users are likely to choose that mode 
'which meets their quality and service requirements at the 
136 
1 owe st cost'. This freedom of choice will be a further 
incentive for SATS to seek ways of improving efficiency and 
137 
quality. 
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The Kotor Carrier Transportation Act was the first attempt 
to regulate and control transportation in South Africa. It 
was passed as a result of the recommendations of the Road 
Motor Competition Commission under the chairmanship of 
Mr JC Le Roux. The commission reported in 1929 and most 
2 
of its recommendations were given effect to. 
[AJ THE LE ROUX COMKISSION'S RECOMMENDATIONS 
The chief recommendations of the commission may be loosely 
categorized as follows: those relating to regulation, 
those relating to co-ordination and those relating to cost. 
(1) Regulation
Some witnesses argued strongly that a monopoly of public
transport provided the best solution to the problem created
by competition between road and rail transportation. The
commission disagreed with this view, expressing the opinion
that a measure of competition was both healthy and desirable.
In order to achieve reasonable control and regulation, the
formation of an independent, representative and apolitical
4
regulatory body was proposed. It would have the power to
5
prescribe 'transportation areas' and 'transportation routes'
and hear appeals (its decision being final) from decisions of
6
subsidiary bodies.
In order to participate lawfully in transportation, 
operators, it was suggested, should be required to possess 
7 
'public service licences'. Applications for such 
authorities were to be dealt with by the subsidiary bodies as 
8 
tribunals of first instance, due regard being given to all 
55 
4 
relevant factors such as the sufficiency and efficiency of 
9 
existing facilities and lhe reasonableness of lhe lariffs. 
Il was further recommended that the regulalory body should be 
entrusted wilh formulating conditions and regulations in 
respect of such diverse aspecls as the slandards of vehicle 
construction, safety devices, the examination of vehicles, 
lhe prescribing of routes, the scheduling of fares, the 
approval of time-tables, lhe control of lhe type of vehicle 
lo be used for goods and passenger conveyance and the 
selting of wages and hours for staff employed by operators. 
(2) Co-Ordination
The commission emphasized the need for lhe co-ordinalion of
10 
the transportation facilities of the counlry. With lhis end
in mind it recommended the promulgation of uniform motor laws
11
and uniform motor taxation, the co-ordination of the various 
transportation modes as well as rail and road systems, 
13 
12 
the 
formulation of a national road policy and lhe crealion of a 
14 
Nalional Road Board. 
(3) Coat.
The commission was of the opinion thal lhe cost of road
construction and maintenance should not be borne by motor
vehicle owners alone. The benefits of road transportation
were such that lhe general taxpayer should also be called
15
upon lo contribute. Revenue from direct taxation of road
users should, the commission felt, be used for road purposes.
In addilion, the Governmenl, as lhe general laxpayers'
representative should make annual grants for the same
17
purpose.
[BJ THE FATE OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS 
56 
16 
Most of lhe recommendations which dealt with lhe regulation 
of lransporlalion were adopted in lhe resulting legislation. 
The Acl as a whole followed lhe tenor of lhe commission's 
findings, being premised on the need for regulation and co-
18 
ordination. The Nolor Carrier Transporlalion Act remained in 
force until 1977, when il was replaced by the Road 
Transportation Act. The new slalule is perhaps lillle more 
19 
than a refinement of lhe old one, although some significant 
20 
changes were made. Despite these changes lhe underlying 
assumptions and philosophy, as propounded by the 1929 
commission, remain inlacl. 
CIIJ MAJOR AMENDMENTS_IQ_IHE 1930 ACT 
[AJ INTRODUCTION 
The workings of lhe Acl will nol be dealt with in any great 
detail because il was so similar lo the 1977 Acl which is 
21 
summarized below. Suffice it lo say lhal lhe cornerstone of 
lhe Acl was lhe definition of 'molar carrier transportation'. 
If an undertaking fell within lhe definition, lhe provisions 
of lhe legislation applied. The undertaking was unlawful in 
terms of s9, unless il was authorized by a certificate 
granted either by lhe Central Board (now lhe National 
Transport Commission) or a local board. The Act set oul 
factors lo be taken into account by lhe deciding tribunal as 
well as facts which had lo be proved by the applicant. The 
regulatory bodies had power lo slipulale conditions relating 
lo tariffs and lime-tables. The operator could nol alter 
these without permission. Thus, after a successful 
application, lhe operator's undertaking was subject to 
control by lhe institutions which lhe Acl created. Failure 
57 
to adhere to the provisions of the Act or the terms of 
conditions was an offence. 
The principal Act 
22 
was amended thirteen times between 1932 and 
1976. In addition its content was affected 
23 
by the Road 
Transportation Boards Services Act, the Transport (Co-
25 24 
ordination) Act, the Native 
26 
General Law Amendment Act. 
lBi THE AMENDMENTS
(1) Act 31 of 1932
Transport Services Act, and a 
The first amendment to the Act was effected by Act 31 of
1932. Its promulgation resulted from an allegation made by
the Central Board in its first report that traders and
industrialists were increasingly turning to the conveyance of
their own goods. Furthermore, the Board expressed
dissatisfaction at vehicle owners letting their vehicles to
the owners of goods for the conveyance of those goods. This
27
was seen as an evasion of the Act. Parliament amended the
definition of 1 motor carrier transportation 1 to include, in
addition to the carriage of persons and goods for reward, the
carriage of persons or goods, whether for reward or not, in
the course of any industry, trade or business, and the
carriage of persons or goods in a motor vehicle the use of
28
which had been obtained for reward.
To ameliorate the harshness of the new definition, a number 
29 
of exemptions were enacted. They excluded from the 
operation of the Act the conveyance of persons by means of a 
motor car (i.e. a vehicle designed to seat not more than 
seven passengers) unless the car was used regularly on a 
route already sufficiently served, the conveyance by farmers 
co 
of their ovn produce and farming requisites in their own 
vehicles, and the transportation operations of some so-called 
30 
ancillary users. An ancillary user is a producer, manufac-
turer or distributor who uses his own vehicle for the conveyance 
31 
of his goods. 
(2) Acts 20 of 1934 and 15 of 19J7
The next two amendments to the Act tackled the same problem
in different ways. The first, contained in Act 20 of 19J4,
was aimed at alleviating certain hardships which were
adversely affecting trade and industry. It empowered the
Governor-General to suspend the operation of any provision of 
the Act in relation to any area or any class of transport.
The new provision was only used on one occasion. It was
invoked to exempt trolley-buses from the operation of the
Act, because prima facie they fell within the definition of a
J2
�motor vehicle. ' The second related amendment, Act 15 of
19J7, altered the definition of a 'motor vehicle' to overcome
the unsatisfactory position created by the previous
amendment. It attempted to exclude trolley-buses from the
definition only when they were used on approved routes. The
Page Commission was of the opinion that, far from solving the
33
problem, ·the Legislature had merely created an absurdity:
'To provide that a trolley-bus is a motor vehicle 
when it is travelling in one street but is not a 
motor vehicle when it is travelling in another may 
be legally effectual but is factually absurd.' 
{ J > Act 15 of 1941 
In its report for the year ended Jlst March 19J9 the Board 
took cognizance of various criticisms of the Act and included 
its own observations regarding problem areas. Its 
recommendations were, by and large, accepted by Parliament in 
59 
CIIIJ 
the form of Act 15 of 1941. The provisions of the statute 
34 
dealt with: problems in relation to transportation routes; 
an amendment to the definition of 'motor carrier 
transportation' which tightened the meaning of conveyance in 
35 
the course of any industry, trade or business; the deletion 
of the proviso excluding motor care from control if they did 
36 
not convey persons regularly on a fixed route; the 
empowering of boards to require applicants or objectors to 
deposit up to 100 pounds from which costs could be awarded to 
37 
successful parties; and provisions for the better co-
38 
ordination of existing services. 
THE CREATION_QLI��-HaIIQMa�_TRANSPORT COMMISSION 
The Transport (Co-ordination) Act was passed in 1948. It 
amended the Motor Carrier Transportation Act by abolishing 
the Central Road Transportation Board. This body had 
functioned as an appellate tribunal for local boards and was 
entrusted, in addition, with co-ordination functions. The 
Transport (Co-ordination) Act created a new body, the Natio-
39 
nal Transport Commission. Its object was, (and still is) to 
promote and encourage the development in the Union and, where 
necessary , to co-ordinate various phases of transport in 
order to achieve the maximum benefit and economy of transport 
40 
service to the public. 
The Commission's function therefore was not limited to road 
transportation, but extended to all modes of transportation. 
Indeed, it took over the powers, functions and duties of the 
Central Road Transportation Board, the National Road Board 
41 
and the Civil Aviation Council. It is interesting to note 
that one of the few recommendations made by the Le Roux 
60 
[!VJ 
Commission which was not accepted was that the Central Road 
Transportation Board and the National Road Board should be 
merged into one body, which would be entrusted with 
regulatory powers. 
MAJOR AMENDMENTS TO THE 1930 ACT AFTER 1948 
------------------- ---------------
[Al INTRODUCTION 
The passing of the Transport (Co-ordination) Act may be 
seen as a watershed. The formation of the National 
Transport Commission as an umbrella body for the regulation 
of, and policy making in relation to, all forms of 
transportation integrated the South African transportation 
structure to an extent which was not possible prior to 
1948. The amendments passed from then until 1976 may be 
classified under two heads: those which were ad hoc 
reactions to what the government perceived to be unsatis­
factory Judicial decisions and those of a more substantial 
nature by which changes were made to the fabric of the Act. 
[BJ THE AMENDMENTS 
(1) Act 50 of 1949
Act 50 of 1949 made three major changes to the original
Act. Firstly it created a new offence, now contained in
s32 of the Road Transportation Act viz entering a vehicle
to which a permit relates despite objection by the person
in charge. The Act made provision for the forcible removal
of such a person and also provided a defence for the permit
holder, who committed an offence by conveying a disquali­
fied person. The permit holder could avoid conviction if
he could show that the person was conveyed without the
knowledge of the driver or conductor, or in defiance of a
61 
43 
request to leave the vehicle. 
The 1949 amending Act also enacted a new s13(bis). This 
section gave the Minister power to initiate a public enquiry 
by the Commission when he had reason to believe that it may 
be expedient in the public interest to withdraw a permit. 
The procedures to be followed in setting up the enquiry, in 
withdrawing a permit and in compensating the ex permit 
44 
holder were prescribed. 
Thirdly, the matters to be considered by a board in dealing 
with an application for the grant, renewal or amendment of 
45 
a permit were amended and amplified. This section 
corresponds to the present s15 which deals with public 
46 
permits. 
(2) Act 44 ot 1955
(a) 
The thrust of Act 44 of 1955 was twofold: it was used 
to nullify the decision of the Appellate Division in 
47 
!�XQe v Ermelo_Local_Road_TransEortation Board and 
it made some substantial changes to the principal Act in 
relation to exemptions, appointments to boards and the powers 
of boards. 
Race Policy and the Act 
48 
In Ta,rob's case a decision by a board refusing an 
application for the renewal of a permit was set aside. The 
application, by an Asiatic, was for the renewal of a permit 
to operate a first class taxi (i.e. for the conveyance of 
'Europeans'). The board's decision was based on a rigid 
policy that operators should convey persons belonging to 
the same race group and it was, for that reason, held to be 
62 
invalid. The amendment empowered a board to take into 
consideration the class of persons to which the applicant 
belongs and the class or classes of persons to which those 
49 
sought to be served belong. Similar provisions applied to 
other forms of public transportation: for example, boards 
were given the power to specify portions of vehicles which 
50 
could be set aside for members of particular classes. 
Cb) Other Amendments 
The remaining amendments dealt with the following: a more 
detailed list of the forms of conveyance which were
excluded from the provisions of the Act; the method of 
appointing members of boards (the Minister was required to 
consult the Provincial Administration and municipalities 
befor� making appointments); the appointment of experts, 
in advisory capacities, to boards; the power of boards to 
cancel permits if circumstances materially change and to 
vary conditions or requirements; the establishment of a 
Native Transport Services Account for subsidizing or 
lending money to persons conveying Blacks; and the power 
of the court to order that a vehicle used to contravene the 
51 
Act be forfeited to the State. 
(3) Act 42 of 1959
The most important change brought about by Act 42 of 1959
52
was the result of the decision in� v Kisten and Others.
S7(1) Cc) provided that any permit issued by a board had to
specify the nature or class or classes of persons which
could be conveyed. A proviso said that if a permit
excluded an operate� from conveying persons of a particular
class he nonetheless had a duty to do so if any other law
placed such an obligation on him. Kisten was charged
63 
because, while he was only allowed to convey 'non-Europeans', 
he had conveyed 'Europeans'. He argued that a by-law in 
force in Durban placed an obligation on all unoccupied 
taxi-drivers to accept as a client any person who wag sober 
and clean. The Crown argued unsuccessfully that the by-law 
was ultra vires because it was repugnant to the general 
policy of the law requiring separation of races on the 
basis of colour. The Act was amended as a result of the 
53 
decision by deleting the proviso in its entirety. 
(4) Act 15 of 1966
A major amendment in Act 15 of 1966 dealt with the substi-
tution of defective vehicles. Prior to 1966 the conveyance 
of the defective vehicle for repair, along with its 
passengers, was exempted from the provisions of the Act. 
The amendment altered thi-- The exemption only applied if 
the defective vehicle had been used for road transporta-
tion. Thus, as Nienaber observed, the exemption would not 
apply to the conveyance for reward or in the course of 
trade or business of a pirate taxi which had broken down. 
A second major change altered a provision dealing with 
conveyance in the course of trade or business of a kind 
54 
previously exempted. The exemption fell away, in terms of 
the amendment, if a general dealers licence was required 
55 
for the trade or b�siness. Schutz submitted that this 
amendment resulted from long standing friction between the 
owners of 'concession stores' on mining ground and 
neighbouring general dealers. It was aimed at preventing 
the latter from conveying bus loads of miners to their 
stores on pay-days, thus allowing the miners to circumvent 
56 
64 
the monopolies enjoyed by the 'concession store' owners. 
(5) The General Law Amendment Act 80 of 1971
Act 80 of 1971 added two sub-sections to s14 of the Hotor
Carrier Transportation Act. It provided that if any person 
acquired a controlling interest in a company after the 
issue or renewal of permits the approval of a board or the 
57 
Commission was required. This provision is now contained 
58 
in s29{3) (a) of the Road Transportation Act. 
(6) Act 23 of 1974
The government's concern at the fuel shortage experienced
by South Africa in the 1970s was, in part, expressed by an
amendment to the Hotor Carrier Transportation Act. Act 23
of 1974 excluded lift clubs (as defined in the Compulsory
59
Hotor Vehicle Insurance Act) from the definition of motor 
carrier transportation. Schaffer cites lhe following 
60 
reason for this provision: 
'The amendment excludes lift clubs from the provi­
sions of the Act in the hope that this will 
encourage the use of private motor vehicles for this 
purpose, thereby saving petrol and alleviating 
heavy traffic in the cities.' 
Lift clubs are still excluded from the definition in terms 0£ 
61 
s1(2) (h) of the present Act. 
CVJ IHLRQAILIRANSEQRI�I!QfLBILL 
CAJ INTRODUCTION 
In its amended form the Motor Carrier Transportation Act 
served as a blueprint for its successor, the Road Transporta­
tion Act. Prior to the enactment of the latter, the bill was 
scrutinized by a select committee under the chairmanship of 
Mr A. Van Breda HP. This committee was later appointed as a 
65 
62 
commission of enquiry. Its findings are discussed below. 
[BJ THE FINDINGS OF THE VAN BREDA CONMISSION 
The commission said that transportation legislation could not 
be viewed in isolation. It had to be examined in the light 
of transportation policy which in turn is closely linked to 
63 
the level of development of the country's economy. In 
64 
recommending gradual deregulation the commission said: 
'However, as countries developed economically and 
industrially, the need for very 5trict control 
measures began to diminish and in most countries an 
evolutionary process of deregulation followed. The 
Republic of South Africa has now reached such a 
stage of economic and industrial development that 
the country should also move towards a freer 
competition in transportation.' 
The bill was, to a large extent, a neater and more compact 
version of the Motor Carrier Transportation Act. At the same 
time it must be conceded that innovations and improvements 
65 
were included. These may be classified in two broad 
categories: first, those aimed at allowing freer competition 
within the existing framework; and secondly, those 
provisions which were based on new principles. 
categories will be discussed below. 
<1> N•w Praviaiona Within th• Existing Framework
These 
While the commission said that the bill was to serve as a
blueprint for deregulation, it conceded that it was not the
final word. Therefore it did not feel itself able to
recommend sweeping changes but was of the opinion that
certain steps could be taken to achieve the goal of freer
competition within the existing framework. It consequently
excluded from the definition of road transportation certain
types of conveyance, the aim being to create a more
66 
flexible system and to eliminate a great deal of red tape 
66 
for the operator. 
The most important concessions made in this ,way were the 
following; the conveyance of products by decentralized 
67 
industries; the conveyance by any business of its own 
goods in a vehicle with a carrying capacity not in excess 
68 
of 1 000 kilograms; the conveyance by a business of its own 
goods within a radius of 80 kilometres of its place of 
69 
business; the unregulated conveyance of goods by a 
70 
carrier within exempted areas and within a 40 kilometre 
71 
radius of the carrier's place of business; 
72 
the unrestric-
ted conveyance of exempted goods; and the conveyance of 
persons or goods, by means of a motor car, in the course of 
any industry, trade or business, provided that no reward is 
asked, and the passengers are not the conveyor's employees 
in the process of being conveyed between their place of 
73 
work and places of residence. 
(2) New Principles Embodied in the Bill
The new principles which the commission recommended are
aimed chiefly at the more efficient working of the
regulatory machinery and at better co-ordination of trans­
portation facilities.
Thus, for example, provision is made for independent cost 
investigations when applications are made for tariff 
74 
increases in bus services, fairer and clearer requirements 
are laid down which an applicant must establish when a 
transportation service already operates (thus allowing 
75 
easier entry into the field} and provision is made for 
the withdrawal or amendment of permits when a railway 
67 
76 
service is introduced. 
Easier access by foreigners into the South African 
77 
transport system is ensured by s43 and s44 and more uni-
formity with provincial ordinances has been achieved by 
78 
amendments to the definitions of 'motor car 1 and 1 owner 1 • 
A BRIEF OUTLINE OF THE ROAD TRANSPORTATION ACT 74 OF 1977 
. . 
Before dealing with the regulatory machinery set up.by the 
Road Transportation Act, it is convenient at this stage 
to summarize its workings. A detailed discussion of 
amendments will not be undertaken, because these have been 
dealt with below, where necessary. 
Powers to act in terms of the statute are vested in the 
Minister of Transport Affairs, the National Transport 
Commission, the local road transportation boards and the 
State President. 
The object of the Act is to 1 provide for the control of 
certain forms of road transportation and for matters 
79 
connected therewith 1 • To attain this object the Act 
80 
defines road transportation. This endeavour must be 
undertaken in accordance with the statute. Non compliance 
is punishable in terms of various penal provisions. 
81 
Penalties for contraventions of the Act are specified and 
in certain circumstances forfeiture of the vehicle used for 
82 
the contravention may be ordered. If an endeavour 
constitutes road transportation as defined there are two 
ways in which it will be rendered lawful: first, s1(2) 
excludes a number of activities or situations from the 
definition, which prima facie fall within it; secondly, the 
68 
undertaking will be in accordance with the Act if a permit 
has been granted and issued to the conveyor. 
Permits fall . into three categories; public permits, 
83 
private permits and temporary permits. The appropriate 
type of permit required by a person who wishes to convey 
will depend on the purpose of the conveyance. In order to 
be granted a permit, certain requirements must be met. 
84 
These relate to the form of the application, 
85 
the hearing 
of interested parties and certain other factors which must be 
86 
considered prior to a decision. The local road transpor-
tation boards have power to hear applications and to grant 
them in full, in part, in full or in part but subject to 
87 
conditions or to refuse them. Prior to reaching a 
decision the board must consider a number of prescribed 
factors which are laid down by s15 in the case of public 
permits, s18 in the case of a private permit and s20 in the 
case of temporary permits. For example, the board must 
apply its mind in terms of s15(1) (a} to the extent to which 
the transportation to be provided is necessary or desirable 
in the public interest. 
The Minister has certain powers granted to him in terms of 
s2. These powers are general in nature and he may only act 
upon the recommendation of the National Transport 
Commission. In order to bring such an act into effect it 
must be published in the Government Gazette. An example of a 
power which the Minister may exercise in terms of s2 is the 
power to declare any area to be a local road transportation 
area. Furthermore, in terms of s30 the Minister may make 
regulations. The regulations are of a varied nature but, in 
69 
general, provide the details to enable the proper applicalion 
of lhe Acl. For example, lhe Minisler may make regulalions 
with regard to the information to be submitted with any 
88 
application 
89 
made. 
or the payment of fees when an application is 
A local road transportation board is created for every 
90 
local road transportation area. Boards are created by s4 
which also specifies the membership of the board. A board 
91 
consists of a chairman and two other members. It has 
powers to investigate any matter falling within the scope 
of the Act within its jurisdiction, to make recommendations 
lo the Commission, to consider and decide on applications 
made lo it or referred lo it by the Commission and to issue 
92 
permits granled in terms of the Acl. 
The National Transport Commission was created by the 
Transport (Co-ordination) Act. Its object is to promote 
and encourage the development of transport in lhe Union 
and, where necessary, to co-ordinate various phases of 
transport in order lo achieve the maximum benefit and 
93 
economy of transport service to the public. 
This body's powers and functions extend beyond road 
transportation and it is thus an important policy-maker in 
the general transportation sphere. With special reference 
to road lransportation, one of its functions is to advise 
and direct local boards in lhe exercise of their powers and 
94 
the performance of their duties. The specific powers 
entrusted to the Commission include the following: the 
investigation of any matters related to road 
transportation; lhe consideration of and deciding on 
70 
applications for the grant, renewal, amendment or transfer 
of permits; dealing with applications referred to it by 
boards, referring matters to boards £or consideration and 
decision and. instituting enquiries into the financial 
95 
circumstances and operating practices 0£ permit holders. 
In many respects the Commission's most important function 
is to deal with appeals aginst acts, directions or 
decisions of boards. This power is granted in terms of s8 
o( the Act and is an appeal in the widest sense. 
96 
In other 
words it is a complete rehearing. 
South A£rica's transportation network does not exist in a 
vacuum and obviously conveyance must take place which cross 
borders. This situation is further complicated by the 
implementation of the so-called homelands policy which has 
created £our 'independent' states to date and a number of 
'sel£ governing' territories. To meet the problem the 
State President has been granted power, exercised by means 
of proclamations, to bring conveyance to or from countries 
or territories bordering the Republic within the ambit of 
the statute. 
by s43. 
This power to issue proclamations is granted 
The effect of the Act may be summarized as follows! 
wishes to convey either persons or goods and such 
if X 
conveyance constitutes road transportation, he may only do 
so in accordance with the Act. Unless an exemption in 
terms of s1(2) applies, X will have to apply for a permit. 
The correct tribunal to apply to is a local road 
transportation board. An appeal may be brought against the 
board's decision. The body which hears the appeal is the 
National Transport Commission. This body is the final 
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arbiter, although the Supreme Court has an inherent power 
to review proceedings at any stage. If Xis granted a 
permit, his ac~ivities must comply with the relevant pro-
visions of the Act and any conditions which the hoard or 
Commission may, in its discretion, attach to the permit . 
. 
Failure to comply will constitute an offence. If the 
permit is not granted, X may not undertake road 
transportation at all. If he does convey person or goods 
he will be liable to conviction under the Act. 
Thus the Act may be seen as a means of doing two things: 
first, to regulate and control transportation on an 
external basis i.e. by restricting the number of operators 
and thus regulating competition. In this way many paten-
tial carriers are simply excluded from competing because 
they do not have permits; secondly, the act regulates the 
transportation industry on an internal basis i.e . the 
carriers who have been allowed to compete are restricted in 
running their undertakings because they are subject to the 
provisions of the Act and any conditions which have been 
attached to their permits. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Road Transportation Act is designed essenti ally to 
regulate competition between road transportation. which is on 
the whole, private ly run, and rail transportation which is 
provided by SATS. Its first aim is to balance the 
requirements of t he country as far as transportational needs 
and development is concerned against those of the state-owned 
railway system and the private carriers. The second aim i s 
t he rationalization of transportation f acil ities through the 
control of entry into the industry. Internal competition is 
to be regulated in thi s way with the object of avoiding t he 
1 
unnecessary duplication of resources. 
In order to achieve the main object of the Act, local road 
t ransportation boards {boards) and the National 
Transportat ion Commission (the Commi ssion) exist . The 
functions of bot h centre mainly around the regulatory aspect 
of road transportation. The inter-relationship between the 
boards and the Commission is an interesting one. The latter 
is an umbrella body which co-ordinates all forms of 
transportati on and formulates policy in i ts fie ld. It is to 
the Commission that the boards look for guidance in relation 
to road transportation matters. These bodies, which are 
formed for each transportation area, are t r ibunals of first 
instance for applications for the grant of permits. The 
Commission has been given wide appellate powers and has 
ul t imate power to decide on the merits of -cases before it. 
Its deci s ions are subject to review by the courts. Friedman 
2 
J described the regulatory machinery in the foll owing terms: 
' What emerges from an analysis of these two Acts is that 
the scheme envi saged by the Legi slature was one whereby 
the Commission was to be charged with the administration 
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CIJ 
and control of transport services throughout the 
Republic. The entire transport services function, as it 
were, under the umbrella of the Commission. In carrying 
out its objects the Commission does not operate in 
isolation, it operates in conjunction with local 
boards.• 
~he qualifications for membership of a board or the 
3 
Commission are general in nature. This raises the question 
of the desirability of the chairman (or at least one member) 
of boards and the Commission have a legal training. 
Prior to and during the decision-making process boards and 
the Commission are often called upon to decide complex legal 
issues. Examples which spring to mind include questions of 
jurisdiction, the standing of parties and the powers of the 
tribunal itself, Lawyers frequently appear before boards and 
the Commission and technical matters are often argued before 
4 
the merits are dealt with. Thirdly: 
•Lawyers are probably more likely to ensure the 
observance of principles of fairness, and they will 
probably avoid being influenced by irrelevant and 
unreliable evidence, since these skills are fundamental 
to their training and experience.' 
It is suhmitted that the appointment of a lawyer, either as 
chairman or as a member, to each board would not be unduly 
problematic. Very little structural alteration to the 
legislation would be required. A more complex amendment 
would he necessary to provide the Commission with legal 
expertise because it often sits simultaneously and at 
different centres around the country. The answer, if it is 
accepted that legal expertise is necessary, is to form a 
panel of lawyers from which members can be drawn for 
individual sittings. 
LOCAL ROAD TRANSPORTATION BOARDS --------------
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CAJ CREATION 
The Minister is empowered, in terms of s2(a) to declare any 
area to be a local road transportation area. In order to 
exercise this power properly he must act on the recommenda-
tion of the Commission. The defined area will become a 
transportation area on notice being published in the 
Government Gazette. S4(1) provides that a board be 
established for each transportation area. 
[BJ MEMBERSHIP AND APPOINTMENT 
A board consists of a chairman and two other members. They 
are appointed by the Minister and are required to possess 
wide experience of, and to have shown ability in, transport, 
industrial, commercial or financial matters or public affairs 
5 
generally. 
Prior to the promulgation of Act 8 of 1983 the procedure for 
the appointment of the two ordinary members vas laid down in 
s4(3). This section provided that one ordinary member had to 
be appointed after consultation with the appropriate 
Provincial Administrator . The second appointment was made 
after consultation with the councils of those municipalities 
within the transportation area having populations in excess of 
20 000 people~ If the transportation area did not have a 
municipality of the required size, the Minister was empowered 
to appoint a person vho, in his opinion, possessed a thorough 
knowledge of the transportation requirements of the 
particular area. 
The amending legislation simply deleted s4(3) . As a result, 
the Minister is not obliged to consult before making the 
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appointments, being guided solely by the criteria laid down 
in s4(2). This change in the appointment procedure was the 
subject of debate in Parliament. Opposition speakers argued 
that the amendment gave the Minister 'unfettered' power to 
make appointments and that this would not enhance the status 
6 
- of the boards. Mr G.S. Bartlett MP said that boards had 
been criticized in the past for displaying bias towards SATS. 
With the removal of the safeguard offered by consultation, 
it would be more difficult to argue convincingly that, 
despite SATS and the boards being part cf the same government 
7 
department, the latter were nonetheless unbiased. The 
Minister argued that the duty to consult rendered the 
appointment of a member a practically impossible task: in 
order to appoint a member for Durban, consultation with six 
municipalities was required. He gave his assurance that as 
far as was possible, relevant bodies would be consulted even 
though the need to do so did not form part of the legislation. 
The Act also makes provision for the co-option of members 
S4(4) (a) provides that a board may co-opt one or more members 
at the request of the Minister during the Minister's 
pleasure. Co-opted members have the same powers as original 
members and so may participate in, and cast votes at, 
meetings of the board. 
In the event of the resignation, removal or temporary absence 
of a member the Minister may appoint a replacement to act for 
9 
a period not exceeding twelve months. Members who are full-
time state employees hold office subject to the Minister's 
pleasure, while the appointments of other members last for a 
10 
period not exceeding two years. Different periods of 
appointment or conditions may be set down for various members 
1 1 
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8 
[c] 
of the same board or of different boards. All members are 
eligible for re-appointment on the expiry of their terms of 
12 
office. 
Under normal circumstances, when the Minister makes an 
appointment, prior consultation with the Commission is re-
13 
qu ired. The need for consultation falls away in two 
situations: when the Minister appoints a replacement 
for a member who has vacated his office, has been removed or 
14 
is temporarily absent, and when an appointment is made 
15 
pursuant to the recusal of a member. 
MEETINGS AND DECISIONS 
16 
Two members form a quorum for any meeting of a board. 
Subject to the proviso mentioned below, the decision of any 
two members present at a meeting constitutes a decision of 
17 
the board. S6(2) provides , however, that if one or more co-
opted members take part in proceedings, the decision of the 
majority, including the co-opted members, shal 1 be the 
18 
decision of the board. In the event of an equality of 
votes, the chairman may exercise a deliberative and a casting 
19 
vote. 
[o] THE CHAIRMAN 
When the Minister appoints members of a board, he makes a 
specif ic appointment of a chairman. This person may be the 
20 
chairman of any other board. If the chairman is unable t o 
attend a meeting he may appoint any member, including one 
appointed in terms of s4(7) and s4(7A), to act as chairman 
21 
for the meeting. S4(8} provides for the ·appointment of a 
member when the chairman has resigned, been removed, is 
temporarily absent or has recused himself . S4{8)(a) deems a 
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person appointed to replace a chairman in terms of s4(7) to 
be the chairman of the board or boards specified by the 
Minister. Similarly s4(8) {b) deems the appointee in terms of 
s4(7A) to be the chairman of the board for the matter in question 
CEJ REMUNERATION 
Remuneration and other conditions attached to appointments 
is determined by the Minister with the concurrence of the 
22 
Minister of Finance. 
[IIIJ THE NATIONAL TRANSPORT COMMISSION -----~----------------------
CAJ CREATION 
The National Transport Commission was established, as a body 
corporate capable of suing and being sued, by s3 of the 
Transport (Co-ordination) Act. Its mandate is to promote 
and encourage the development of transportation and to co-
ordinate various phases of transportation with the object of 
23 
deriving maximum benefit and economy. The creation of the 
Commission was motivated by a desire to rationalize the 
control of all forms of transportation under the auspices of 
an all-embracing body. It took over the powers and functions 
of the National Road Board, the Central Road Transportation 
Board and the Civil Aviation Council, all of which were 
abolished by the Transport (Co-ordination} Act. The 
Commission is deemed to be the successor to these bodies for 
24 
all purposes, 
[BJ MEMBERSHIP AND APPOINTMENT 
The Act grants the State President the power to appoint the 
members of the Commission. The chairman is the Director 
General: Transport. The members may not total more than 
ten, excluding the chairman. Of that number the President 
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25 
may only appoint a maximum of four public service employees. 
From among the members of the Commission he must appoint 
commissioners for the following portfolios; road transporta-
26 
tion, civil aviation, national roads and urban transport. 
Of the remaining members one must possess, in the opinion of 
the State President, a thorough knowledge of aviation 
matters. This person is appointed after consultation with 
27 
the Civil Aviation Advisory Committee. Another member 
requires, in the State President's opinion, a thorough 
knowledge of railways matters. This appointment is made 
28 
after consultation with the General Manager of SATS. If 
this member is a servant of SATS he may not be present at, or 
vote at, meetings of the Commission or take part in 
discussions of the Commission which deal with either the Road 
29 
Transportation Act or the Aviation Act. Neither may he 
attempt to influence the vote or opinion of any other member. 
The remaining members of the Commission must possess wide 
30 
experience of, and have shown ability in, transport or aviation 
31 
or in the conduct of public affairs. 
Members of the Commission (excluding those who are public 
servants or employees of SATS) may be appointed for up to 
five years, subject to any conditions imposed by the State 
President. Individual members may be appointed for different 
32 
periods of time and upon different conditions. In addition 
to his other powers of appointment the State President may 
33 
appoint a person nominated by the Minister of Defence. This 
appointee may take part in proceedings but has no right to 
34 
vote. 
[CJ MEETINGS AND DECISIONS 
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Meetings of the Commission take place when and where the 
35 
chairman decides. Gen~rally a quorum consi sts of three 
members. In certain circumstances the Minister may direct 
that, when dealing with matters specified by him, a quorum 
shall consist of either four or five members. When the 
majority of those present at a meeting are members of the 
public service a quorum will only exist if the chairman is 
satisfied that the members from the private sector who are 
36 
absent are unable to attend the meeting. The Defence Force 
representative may not be regarded as a member for the 
37 
purpose of determining whether a quorum exists or not. 
Decisions of the Commi ssion are decided by majority vote, the 
decision of the majority being the deci sion of t he 
Commiss ion. The chairman has a casti ng vote in addition 
38 
to a deliberative vote . 
fo1 THE CHAIRMAN • .l 
It has been noted that the chairman of t he Commission is 
39 
the Director General: Transport. Provision is made for 
the appointment of an acting chairman or chairmen: the 
chairman may, for some reason, not be able to attend a 
meeting and more than one meeting of the Commission may 
40 
take place simultaneously. Therefore s4(7) empowers the 
chairman to appoi nt any other member to act in his place or 
any other members to act for t he purpose of additional 
meetings. As the post of chairman is filled automatically 
by a particular official, there can be no question of a 
temporary appointment on the death, resignation or removal 
of the chairman. The new Director General: Transport 
fills the position automatically. Such a person would be 
chairman , as opposed to acting chairman, even if he was 
84 
acting Director General. 
[EJ REMUNERATION 
[IIIJ 
The remuneration of members, excluding lhose who are public 
servants or employees 0£ SATS, is determined by lhe 
Minister in consullation wilh the Hinisler 0£ Finance. 
41 
Payment is made out 0£ the Consolidated Revenue Fund. 
Members who are public servants or SATS employees are not 
entitled lo any remuneration apart from their salaries. 
Furthermore lhey may nol be given lravel and subsislence 
allowa nces which are mo re than they would be entitled to 
42 
from lheir employers. 
U!~UAL!FICATION_[&QILAfeQ!HittlHI_IQi-.Q&_r~Qtt_ttlttB!&~liIP 
Q[_IHg_kQtffllSS!QILQR_A_~Q~RQ 
[AJ INTRODUCTION 
The attributes 0£ compelence and fairness are a s important 
in lhe adminislralive process as they are in lhe judicial 
process. The Transport (Co-ordination) Act and the Road 
Transportation Act have sought to provide for lhese 
qualities in lwo complementary ways : first, by prescribing 
qualifications of a general nalure and secondly, by 
excluding from eligibility certain categories of persons. 
These devices are aimed at achieving a level 0£ competence, 
a degree of impartiality <which nonetheless allows for the 
appointment 0£ experts) and a measure of credibility. 
(BJ THE GROUNDS 
<1) The Commission 
The Slale President may not appoint as a member 0£ the 
Commission persons who £all into al leasl one 0£ the 
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categories discussed below. Similarly, if a member becomes 
subject to one of the disqualifications he may not continue 
43 
to serve as a member. 
(a) Unrehabilitated Insolvents and Person Convicted of Offences 
in Certain Circumstances. 
Unrehabilitated insolvents as well as persons convicted of 
crimes and sentenced to imprisonment without the option of 
44 
a fine are disqualified . The principles relating to the 
45 
former class are set out in the Insolvency Act. With 
regard to the latter class, it is clear that a prison 
sentence ordering actual incarceration unaccompanied by the 
option of a fine will be a disqualification . It is 
established too that the fact that such a sentence was 
either wholly or partly suspended is irrelevant. 
46 
It was 
held, in f~g~ v Donges_N.O._and Another that the term 
'sentenced to imprisonment' included a sentence either 
wholly or partly suspended. The court's reasoning (per 
Centlivres JA) was that a sentence of imprisonment , the 
whole of which i5 suspended on a specific condition, is as 
much a sentence of imprisonment as a sentence of imprison-
47 
ment none of which is suspended. The issue is not the 
severity of the punishment but its nature. 
48 
case involved the deportation of immigrants, it is sub-
mitted that the same reasoning would apply in deciding on 
the disqualification of a member of the Commission. There 
are two reasons for this submission: first, from the 
wording of the Act it is clear that the nature of the 
punishment is the decisive factor; secondly, any other 
interpretation would introduce a test involving questions of 
degree which would be impractical and unworkable. 
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Cb) Persons Having a Financial or Other Interest 
A person who has a financial interest in, or who is 
involved in any activity connected with road transporta-
tion, the manufactura or sale of aircraft or the operation 
of an air service is disqualified from appointment to, or 
membership of the Commission. The section provides, 
furthermore, that if a near relation of a proposed 
appointee or member has such an interest, this too will be 
a ground for disqualification. In both of these situations 
the bar to appointment or membership is not absolute: it 
only operates if the State President is satisfied that the 
person's involvement in the undertakings will interfere 
49 
with the impartial discharge of his duties. 
The same section allows for the member of the Commission 
appointed after consultation with SATS to be one of its 
employees . It does so by exempting him from the provisions 
of s4(1) (d) (i) (financial interest) and s4(1) (d) (ii) (other 
interest). If he, in his personal capacity, or a near 
relation has a pecuniary or other interest in one of the 
undertakings mentioned in s4(1) Cd) he will be subJect to 
disqualification. 
C2> Boarda 
SS(l) of the Road Transportation Act deals with the grounds 
which disqualify persons from being appointed to a board. 
S5(2) provides that if a member becomes subject to a dis-
qualification mentioned in subsection 1, he shall vacate 
his office . 
The grounds for disqualification are substantially the same 
as those contained in the Transport (Co-ordination) Act. 
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Included in identical terms are the disquali£ications 
relating to unrehabilitated insolvents and persons 
convicted of offences and sentenced to a term of imprison-
50 
ment without the option of a £ine . 
The remaining provisions of the subsection manifest two 
major differences to the corresponding section of the 
Transport (Co-ordination) Act: s5(1) Cd), which deals with 
financial or other interests, is not as wide as s4(1) (d) of 
the Transport (Co-ordination) Act. It only disqualifies a 
person i£ he, or a near relation has a financial interest 
in, orig engaged in any activity connected with road 
transportation which, in the Minister's opinion, will 
interfere with the impartial discharge of his duties. 
Secondly, s5(1} (c) says that no employee of SATS may become 
a member of a board. I£ a member becomes an employee of 
that organization s5<2> (a) imposes a duty on him to resign 
from the board. This contrasts sharply with s4Cl) (d) of 
the Transport (Co-ordination) Act which specifically 
enables such a person to become a member of the Commission. 
(3) The Validity of Decisions in which Disqualified Persons Took 
Part 
S4(2) of the Transport (Co-ordination) Act and s6(J) of the 
Road Transportation Act provide that no act, direction or 
decision of a board or the Commission shall be invalid 
simply because a person who falls into one of the 
51 
disqualified categories participated in it. 
The effect of these sections and the changes, if any, which 
52 
the Acts make to the common law will be dealt with below. 
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[Al GENERAL 
A positive duty is placed on a member of either a board or 
the Commission, who becomes subJeet to any disqualication, 
53 
to vacate his office forthwith. In addition, a member may 
54 
resign from office by giving the Minister written notice . 
[BJ REMOVAL FROM THE COMMISSION 
The State President has the power to remove members of the 
Commission from office . Three grounds for removal are s e t 
out in the Transport (Co-ordination) Act. These grounds are: 
(1) where a member has failed to comply with a condition of 
55 
his appointment; (2) where he has, in the State President's 
opinion, been guilty of improper conduct or habitual neglect 
56 
with respect to his duties; and (3) where he is, in the 
State President's opinion, unable to perform the functions of 
57 
his office efficiently. 
CC] REMOVAL FROM A BOARD 
The terms of the Road Transportation Act are virtually 
identical to the above but two differences warrant mention: 
s5(2) (b) uses wider and, it is submitted, clearer language 
than that of s4(3) (b) of the Transport (Co-ordination) Act. 
The former section says that a member shall vacate his 
office if he dies or is removed from office under subsection 
3 or resigns by notice in writing addressed to the 
Minister. Subsection 3 sets out the grounds for removal. The 
grounds for removal are identical in both acts save for the 
fact that in the Road Transportation Act the Minister, as 
opposed to the State President, is given the power to remove 
58 
members . 
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!HiftODUCilQH 
In order to achieve the aims of the legislation, powers in 
terms 0£ the Road Transportation Act and the Transport (Co-
ordination) Act are vested in four functionaries: the 
National Transport Commission, the various local road 
transportation boards, the Minister of Transport Affairs and 
the State President. The above bodies are given a wide 
variety of functions to which their powers relate. Generally 
a separation of functions exists (apart from 
consultation in many instances) but a certain amount of 
overlapping is found in the functions of the Commission and 
the boards. This is in keeping with the purpose of the 
Commission as both an overall policy-maker and an appellate 
tribunal. The powers and £unctions of the above· function-
aries will be discussed separately in this chapter. 
[IJ IHLPOWERS AND FUNCTIONS O[_!HE BODIES 
CAJ THE NATIONAL TRANSPORT COMMISSION 
(1) Introduction. 
The £unctions 0£ the Commission are not restricted to road 
transportation. It plays a central role in the formulation 
of transportation policy in that it has powers in relation to 
civil aviation and national roads, in addition to road 
1 
transportation. Its object is to 'promote and encourage 
the development of transport in the Union and, where 
necessary, to co-ordinate various phases of transport in 
order to achieve the maximum benefit and economy of 
2 
transport service to the public'. 
In general terms, the functions of the Commission, with 
special reference to road transportation, include the 
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following: considering, in the performance of its tasks, 
3 
existing and contemplated transportation facilities; 
advising and directing boards in the exercise of their powers 
4 
and the performance of their functions; and generally 
promoting the development of transportation with an eye to 
5 
securing the greatest public benefit. So, in addition to 
adjudicative functions, th~ Commission regulates the boards 
which fall under it, and wields great influence on a national 
6 
level in its special field. 
The powers and functions of the Commission will be dealt with 
under three heads: those of an investigatory nature, 
those of an adjudicatory nature and those of a delegatory 
nature. The general powers of the Commissio~s are contained 
in s3 of the Road Transportation Act. 
(2) Investigatory Functions 
The Commission has been granted investigatory powers relating 
to road transportation in terms of which it may make 
investigations either on its own initiative or at the request 
of the Minister. In the first instance its powers are widely 
framed: it may investigate 'any matter relating to road 
7 
transportation in the Republic'. In the second it may, at 
the request of the Minister, investigate 'any other matter 
8 
falling within the scope of this Act'. In both instances the 
Commission must report to the Minister on its findings. It 
should be noted that in the annual report submitted by the 
chairman special mention must be made of any recommendations 
made by the Commission, in terms of s3, which have not been 
9 
acted upon. In addition the Commission has far reaching 
powers to enquire into the financial affairs and operating 
practices of holders of permits authorizing the conveyance of 
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persons by means of a bus. If the holder is a company the 
enquiry may look into the affairs of any company in the same 
10 
group or any subsidiary company of the holder. S3 < 1 > Cf> 
grants a wide power to take any steps deemed necessary for 
the proper administration of the Act. The approval of the 
Hinister is required before such steps may be taken. The 
Hinister may cause a public enquiry to be instituted if he 
believes that the withdrawal of a permit or permits will 
11 
bring about an improvement in transportation facilities. 
This, as in the case of an enquiry instituted by the 
Commission under s3(1) (g), is undertaken by the Commission or 
12 
a member thereof. Certain procedures must be followed: 
notice of the enquiry must be given in the prescribed manner; 
13 
all interested parties must be heard; and due regard must 
be taken of s15(1), which deals with the matters to be taken 
into account when dealing with an application for a public 
14 
permit. On completing the enquiry the Commission or the 
member of the Commission appointed to make the enquiry must 
submit a report to the Hinister. He may then direct that the 
permit be withdrawn or that it be withdrawn and others be 
issued to another person or persons in lieu thereof. The 
Minister has the power to determine the date upon which the 
direction will come into effect, provided that it is more 
than a month after the affected person is notified, but less 
15 
than a year after notification. 
(3) AdJudicatory Functions 
Ca> As a Tribunal of First Instance 
S3(1) (c) contains provisions which vest what may be termed 
adjudicatory functions in the Commission. It acts, in such 
cases, as a tribunal of first instance. The section gives 
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the Commission the power to consider and decide on (or other-
wise deal with) any application for the grant, renewal, 
amendment or transfer of a permit, as well as any application 
referred to it by a board in terms of s7(2). 
It is submitted that a clear distinction is envisaged between 
ss3(1)(c)(i) and Cii) on the one hand and s3(1)(c,}(iii) on the 
other. In the first case, the Commission may deal with 
applications brought directly to it, while in the second, the 
Commission has directed the application to be referred to it 
by a board. In terms of a policy decision the Commission has 
decided that it alone should hear applications for permits 
16 
which relate to the touris~ industry. Thus a tour operator 
will be able to approach the Commission directly. If on the 
other hand the tour operator first approached a board, the 
matter would be referred to the Commission in terms of s7(2). 
The reason given for the different treatment of applications 
for permits to convey tourists is the necessity for high 
standards to be maintained in the industry. If the 
Commission deals with all such matters a uniform standard can 
be maintained. A second possible reason is that many tour 
operators would want a very wide authority, covering a large 
area of the country. The Commission, as an umbrella body for 
all types of transportation, will be best able to assess 
needs in this regard and to co- ordinate services, 
When the Commission exercises its powers in terms of s3(1) (c) 
it must do so in accordance with the provisions of the Act. 
la other words, it must adhere to the procedure provided by 
s9 1 complemented by the audi alteram partem ~ule, 
18 
17 
publish 
the required particulars in the~~~~~£~ and take into 
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consideration, in making its decision, those matters 
contained in s!S (if the application is for a public permit). 
It is bound by the same rules that a board in a similar 
situation would be bound by. Its decision can be attacked on 
review on the same grounds on which a board's decision may be 
19 
challenged, 
Action by the Commission in terms of s3(1) (c) has an effect 
on the applicant's remedies: the right to an appeal falls 
away. This point is well illustrated by the case of 
Roberts v Chairmani_Local Road Transeortation Board and 
20 
Other.!! (2), in which the application of the audi alteram 
partem rule to a direction by the Commission in terms of 
s7(2} was in issue. It was argued that a right to a hearing 
existed in relation to the exercise of power because, inter 
alia, it had deprived Roberts of the 'two tiered procedure' 
which the Act provides i.e. instead of a hearing and an 
appeal, Roberts, because the Commission decided to hear the 
matter itself, was only given a hearing. Friedman J held 
that the deprivation of an appeal was intended by the 
21 
legislature: 
'The right of appeal granted by sB is one which 
comes into operation only when a ~Q~~~ has given a 
decision. The Act envisages that, before a board 
gives a decision, the matter may be referred to the 
Commission. When that occurs sB no longer applies. 
When a person makes an application to a local 
board, he does so subject in every case to the 
provisions of the Act. One of these provisions 
entitles the Commission to direct that the 
application be referred to it.' 
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It is clear from the above that, when the Commission acts 
as a tribunal of first instance, important, and possibly pre-
judicial consequences for applicants and objectors follow. 
The power should accordingly be used in exceptional 
circumstances only and with the utmost circumspection. 
Finally, s3(1)(e) grants the Commission the power to issue any 
permit granted, renewed, amended or transferred by it. The 
power to grant applications is closely linked to the power to 
issue permits. Indeed, at first blush these powers may 
appear to be inseparable but, it is submitted, a clear 
distinction exists. Thus in Reddy v African National Bus 
22 
Transport Co (Pty) Ltd, De Wet J held: 
1The granting of a certificate is a matter of 
discretion. That function the Commission cannot 
delegate in such a way as to order the Local Board to 
grant and issue a certificate for and on behalf of the 
Commission. But where the Commission has already 
granted the certificate in other words, where it has 
authorized the issue of a certificate - then the mere 
issue of it is a matter of a purely mechanical nature 
and is one which the Commission may very well delegate 
under s5{2). 1 
(b) As an Appellate Tribunal 
The Commission 1 s most important adjudicatory function is as 
an appellate tribunal from decisions of boards. In terms of 
s8, persons who have applied for the grant, renewal, 
amendment or transfer of permits, holders of permits and 
those who have supported or opposed applications may appeal 
against any act, direction, or decision of a board which 
affects them. Such an appeal is ari appeal in the fullest 
23 
sense. In other words it is a complete rehearing. Holmes 
JA pointed out in National Transport Commission v Chetty 1 s 
4 
Motor Transport (Pty) Ltd that the issue on appeal is not 
whether the board was right or wrong because the Commission 
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25 
comes to its own decision: 
'The Legislature has appointed it as the final 
arbiter in its special field and right or wrong, 
for better or worse, reasonbale or unreasonable, 
its decision stands'. 
(4) The Commission's Powers to Delegate 
(a) Delegation in General 
Steyn expresses the general rule embodied in the maxim 
26 
delegatus non delegare potest in the following terms: 
'Waar die wetgewer iemand met 'n mag beklee by die 
uitoefening waarvan 'n gesonde oordeel of 'n mate van 
oordeelkundigheid van belang is, of deur die 
wetgewer, blykens die betrokke wetgewing, van belang 
geag word, kan die persoon wat deur die wetgewer vir 
die taak aangewys is, nie daardie mag deur iemand 
anders laat uitoefen nie'. 
While it is true that when a power has been delegated with 
no authority to do so, the resulting act will be ultra 
27 
vires, the maxim does not represent a hard and fast 
rule against delegation. Rather it should be seen as a 
presumption to the effect that the legislature intended 
only the indicated body or official to exercise the power 
28 
in question. The reason for the maxim is stated by 
29 
Baxter as follows: 
'The recipient of the power has presumably been 
chosen for a purpose - for his accountability, 
expertise, seniority or advantaged position in 
exercising the power. Should he allow the power to 
be exercised by someone who was not chosen he will 
effectively have abdicated his own power and will 
not have complied with the legislation'. 
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Practical considerations dictate that powers should, in 
certain circumstances, be delegated. While the courts tend 
to interpret such powers restrictively, it is clear that if a 
statute expressly or impliedly authorizes delegation, the 
30 
resulting act will be intra vires. 
(b) Delegation in Terms of the Road Transportation Act 
The Commission has been granted wide powers of delegation. 
These powers are expressed in the clearest possible ·language 
so little doubt can exist as to the Commission's competence 
to delegate, the manner in which the delegee must act or who 
may exercise the power in question. 
S3 contains two delegation clauses. The first, found in 
s3(1) (d), enables the Commission to refer any application, 
made directly to the Commission, to a competent board. The 
board will then consider and deal with the application in 
accordance with the Act. It is submitted that in such a 
situation the appropriate board makes the decision : it does 
not act on behalf of, or in the name of, the Commission. 
Clearly too, an appeal would lie from the board to the 
31 
Commission. It should be noted that the Commission is 
limited, in terms of sJ(l) (d), as to which board it can refer 
the matter to. It must delegate to a competent board i.e. 
32 
one with jurisdiction. 
The second delegation clause is contained in s3(2). 
very wide. The section reads: 
It is 
'The commission may delegate to a board any of the 
commission's powers under this Act in regard to any 
matter in the transportation area for which such board 
was established or in any area outside that 
transportation area.' 
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It is submitted that this section is intended to cover all of 
the Commission's functions with the exception of those 
functions which only the Commission can perform i.e. a 
purported delegation of the Commission's appellate 
jurisdiction would be ultra vires because that is a function 
specifically entrusted to the Commission by virtue of its 
expertise and seniority in the hierarchy. Similarly it may 
not delegate its power to advise and direct boards in the 
exercise of their powers and the performance of their 
33 
functions. Two reasons are advanced for this submission: 
first, this advisory function is granted to the Commission 
by the Jransport (Co-ordination) Act and not the Road 
Transportation Act; and secondly, it is a function which is 
peculiar to the Commission. As with its appellate powers, 
the advisory powers are unique to the Commission by virtue of 
its position as a co-ordinator and would be inappropriate in 
the hands of a board. In the light of the above, it is 
submitted that the powers that may be delegated in terms of 
s3(2), despite its wide terms, are restricted to such matters 
as investigations, enquiries, the referal of applications, 
the issue of permits, the making of recommendations and 
reporting to the Minister. 
CB) THE LOCAL ROAD TRANSPORTATION BOARDS 
(1) Introduction 
After arriving at the conclusion .that regulation of road 
34 
transportation was necessary, the Le Roux Commission 
turned its attention to a regulatory system. It recommended 
that a body, known as the Road Transportation Board be 
35 
established. This body would be charged with deciding the 
•extent to which competition is desirable in the public 
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interest'. ·The Road Transportation Board's functions were 
later taken over by the National Transport Commission. The 
Le Roux Commission felt that it was necessary to create 
37 
subsidiary bodies because: 
'if the regulatory body were charged with the duty of 
dealing, in the first instance, with all applications 
for certificates - many of which will emanate from 
remote centres - delays would be unavoidable and the 
expense involved in travelling considerable.' 
The recommendations of the commission of enquiry were given 
effect to by the Motor Carrier Transportation Act and the 
subsidiary bodies which were cre~ted were called local road 
transportation boards, S4 of the Road Transportation Act 
makes provision for the creation of boards: it says that a 
board shall be established for every transportation area. S7 
sets out the general powers of boards. 
In the discussion below on the powers and functions of boards 
the following outline will be adhered to: the investigatory 
functions, the adjudicatory functions, the jurisdiction of 
boards and a board's obligation to refer matters to the 
Commission when requested to do so. 
C2l Invest!ga~ory Func~!ons 
S7(1) (a) and s7(1) (b) contain provisions dealing with the 
investigatory functions of boards. In terms of the former, a 
board may investigate any matter falling within the scope of 
the Act and within its territorial jurisdiction i.e. within 
the transportation area under its control. When it has 
completed the enquiry, it may submit recommendations to the 
Commission. S7(1)(b) empowers a board to investigate any 
matter in any area, at the request of the Commission. It 
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must report to the Commission on its findings when this 
process has been completed. It is clear that the second of 
the functions indicated above is wider than the first: the 
board is not limited to its area of jurisdiction and it may 
investigate any matter referred to it. On the other hand it 
is reliant on a prior grant of authority by the Commission in 
the second case whereas it may initiate the process in the 
first. 
(3) AdJudicatory Functions 
The exercise of adjudicatory powers is perhaps the most 
widely used function which boards exercise. The Act grants 
boards the power to consider and decide on, or otherwise deal 
with, any application made to it within the following 
38 
limits: 
'(i) for the grant of a permit authorizing road 
transportation within the transportation area for 
which such board was established; 
(ii) for the grant of a permit authorizing road 
transportation which commences in the said 
transportation area and terminates but does not 
commence at any place or in any area outside that 
transportation area; 
(iii) subject to the provisions of subsection (3), for 
the grant of a permit authorizing road 
transportation which commences in the said 
transportation area, irrespective of where such 
transportation terminates; 
(iv) subject to the provisions of subsection (3), for 
the renewal, amendment or transfer of any permit 
granted by it.' 
In exercising its powers under s7(1) Cc) a board acts as a 
tribunal of first instance. In other words an appeal lies 
{ 
from any act, direction or decision of a board to the 
39 
Commission in terms of s8, 
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The parametres set by s7(1) (c) confine the board's exercise 
of power to a territorial Jurisdiction, and so, if a board 
purported to act outside of the area defined by the statute 
40 
it would act ultra vires. Provision is made for a board to 
function outside of its eransportation area. This power is 
granted by s7(1} (d). It authorises a board to consider and 
decide on, or other~ise deal with, any application which has 
been referred to it by the Commission acting in terms of 
s3(1)(d). So, in order to act intra vires and outside of its 
territorial Jurisdiction, a board must be able to point to an 
enabling direction from the Commission. The board would be 
acting as a tribunal of first instance, so an appeal will lie 
41 
to the Commission. This procedure is the reverse of that 
contained in s7(2). Finally, the board has power to issue 
any permit which it has granted, renewed, amended or 
42 
transferred. 
Boards must obviously deal with applications in accordance 
with the provisions of the Act. Thus while a large measure 
of discretion is granted to boards, they are required to take 
a number of factors into consideration when reaching a 
43 
decision e.g. 'the extent to which the transportation to be 
44 
provided is necessary or desirable in the public interest'. 
So, while the legislature has prescribed the regulatory 
content, a discretion nonetheless exists when boards apply 
the provisions of the Act: the boards themselves must decide 
whether transportation is 'necessary or desirable'. This 
45 
allows for flexibility as regional needs may differ. 
(4) The Territorial Jurisdiction of Boards 
No jurisdictional problems arise when the transportation 
which is the subject of an application is to take place 
105 
exclusively within one transportation area. The situation is 
more complicated if it crosses into another area at any 
stage. The Act grants territorial jurisdiction (except in 
cases in which the Commission has extendeq a board's 
jurisdiction) to the board presiding over the transportation 
area in which the road transportation in question 
46 
commences. 57(4) says that, for the purposes of s7: 
road transportation shall be deemed to commence 
at any place where goods are loaded onto or persons 
board any motor vehicle by means of which such road 
transportation is effected, for the purpose of being 
conveyed to any other place, and to terminate at such 
other place.' 
In an effort to prevent jurisdictional problems arising, the 
Act embodies the following provision: Ca) a board has 
jurisdiction if the entire transportation operation takes 
47 
place in its transportation area; (b) a board has 
jurisdiction if the conveyance commences in its 
transportation area and terminates (without commencing again) 
48 
in another area; (c) a board may not deal with an 
application in which the proposed transportation commences in 
its area and that of another board without obtaining the 
concurrence of that other board. This provision is subject 
to the exception contained in s3(2), in terms of which the 
Commission is authorized to delegate any of its powers to any 
49 
board, irrespective of territorial Jurisdiction. 
(5) The Referral of Matters to the Commission 
Ca) The Provisions of s7(2} 
S7(2) gives the Commission the power to order a board to 
refer any application to it for consideration and decision. 
The Act draws a distinction between two specific situations, 
106 
I 
' 
both of which fall within the scope of s7(2). On the one 
hand the Commission may order the referral of a particular 
application to it and, on the other hand, it may order the 
referral of an application for 'any permit belonging to a 
category indicated by the commission'. A referral in the 
first sense will be dealt with below, while an example of a 
referral in the second sense was given above: if an 
application to convey tourists is made to a board, it must, 
in accordance with a policy decisio~ taken by the Commission, 
50 
refer the matter to the Commission. The importance of s7(2) 
from the perspective of an applicant is that it circumvents 
the 'two tiered' procedure of the Act: instead of having a 
right to a hearing and an appeal, the applicant, after s7(2) 
has been invoked, only has the right to a hearing. 
(b) A Discussion of s7(2) 
Certain key issues involving s7(2} were dealt with in the 
cases of Roberts v Chairman, Local Road Transportation Board 
51 
and_Others(2) and South African Trans2ort Services v 
£~~i~~~~~ Port Elizabeth_Local Road Trans2ortation Board and 
52 
Others. 
SJ 
objectors to a bus fare increase had 
challenged the jurisdiction of the board. With review 
proceedings pending, the Commission exercised its powers in 
terms of s7(2) after a meeting between the chairman and the 
bus company's managing director. The validity of the 
Commission's exercise of power was challenged. Two of the 
six grounds of review will be dealt with here. 
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It was argued that the proceedings before the board were sub-
judice because review proceedings were pending. Friedman J 
held that the Commi ss ion had not been in contempt of court by 
ordering that the matter be referred to it: dolus was an 
54 
~lement of contempt of court and was absent in this instance. 
He went on to hold that, i n any event, the pending review 
proceedings did not ' serve to freeze the situation in the 
sense that none of the parties were entit led t o· do anything 
that would have t he resu lt of stultifying the contemplated 
55 
proceedings' . 
Secondly, it was argued that the Commission was not entitled 
to reach its decision to exerc ise power under s7(2) without 
affording the objectors an opportunity of being heard. It 
was held that the act in question was an administrative act 
and not a quasi -j udicial act. Consequently the audi alteram 
56 
partem rule did not apply. 
This dec ision has been criticized, not least for the formal 
use of the classification process whi ch plagues South African 
administrative law. The learned judge, in deciding that 
natural justice did not apply, concerned himself more with 
the form of the Commission' s proceedings rather than the 
57 
nature of the deci s ion. The fact t hat the deci sion was 
preliminary and that natural justice would apply at the later 
hearing does not detract from the need for a hearing prior to 
58 
the s7(2) order , for in the words of Baxter: 
'a tariff-increase hearing before the NTC itself would 
have been considerably more expensive for objectors than 
would have been a hearing before a local board. 
Besides, the court failed to place significance upon the 
fact that the effect of the order was to deprive the 
objectors of a potential right of appeal . While the NTC 
no doubt had the power to take the decision, it should 
have heard informal representations from the objectors too. 
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In the South~African_Transecrt_Services case, the 
Commission had refused to exercise its powers under s7(2) 
despite being approached to do so by the applicant. The 
board had, for some time, issued temporary permits to the 
second respondent for the conveyance of lead acid cells. 
Late in 1982, the latter successfully applied to the board 
for six public permits. The applicant (SATS) lodged an 
appeal and at the same time applied for, and obtained, a 
directive from the chairman of the Commission (in terms of 
s8(3) (bl) suspending the operation of the permits pending the 
outcome of the appeal. Despite the suspension of the public 
permits, the chairman of the board continued to grant 
temporary permits to the second respondent, 
The applicant, after trying unsuccessfully to persuade the 
Commission to interfere by using its powers under s7(2), 
approached the court. It sought an interdict prohibiting the 
further granting of temporary permits to the second 
respondent on the grounds that such grants flew in the face 
cf the suspension under s8(3) (b) and that the grants 
constituted an abuse of s20 (which governs the granting of 
temporary permits) , 
Counsel for the applicant conceded that situations may arise 
where the second respondent should be issued temporary permits 
for the conveyance of the lead acid cells. He argued, 
however, that because the board had granted the permits on 
the same grounds as the public permits, the board should be 
interdicted from granting any more temporary permits until 
after the hearing of the appeal, Jennet AJ observed that 
this would in effect mean that if the second respondent 
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wanled a lemporary permil il would have lo approach lhe 
Commission. In olher words, lhe applicanl was asking lhe 
courl lo order lhal the Commission hear the malter despite 
its prior refusal lo utilize its powers under s7{2). In 
holding that the interdict should not be granled, the learned 
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acling judge said; 
'I consider that I should be loth to make an order which has 
the effect of overruling the National Transport Commission's 
decision, if such it may be called, not to invoke the 
provision5 of s7(2) of the Act unless there are clear grounds 
for me so doing.' 
[CJ THE MINISTER OF TRANSPORT AFFAIRS 
(1) Introduction 
The Minister of Transport Affairs is the political head of 
61 
the Department of Transport Affairs and SATS. He is 
expected to co-ordinate the operations of the two bodies bul 
62 
as Verburgh poinls out: 
'It is clear thal this kind of co-ordination, which 
is largely adminislralive in character, cannot be 
expected to do much in the line of co-ordinating 
the actual rail and road transportation systems. 
This can only be achieved when measures are taken 
to ensure lhat lhe traffic goes to the transport 
form which can handle the lraffic al the right 
time, al lhe required speed, conveniently and 
safely at the lowest cost.' 
The Minister may find himself in potentially difficult 
situations because of his position in relation to the two 
bodies: as chairman of the board of SATS he takes parl in 
policy decision-making and as head of the Departrnenl of 
Transport Affairs he has broad powers vested in him by 
the Road Transportation Act. 
below. 
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These powers will he discussed 
(2) General Powers 
The Minister has been granted general powers which are 
contained in s2. These include the following: the power to 
declare transportation areas, exempted areas, decentralized 
industrial areas, exempted goods and transportation routes; 
the power to prohibit the conveyance of goods in certain 
circumstances e.g. the conveyance of a 'specific processed 
farm product• or a 'specified kind or category of.processed 
farm product'; the conveyance of any goods or kind or 
category of goods on a specified day or at specified times in 
certain areas or over certain routes; and the conveyance of 
goods which are loaded in a specified manner. 
In addition the Minister may appoint a committee for the 
63 
purposes of s27. Such a committee is formed when a railway 
service is to be introduced which will take over the 
conveyance of passengers from bus servic~s already operating. 
Its function is to consult with the holders of permits in the 
area as well as other interested parties and generally to 
oversee the change-over from road transportation to rail 
64 
transportation. 
The Minister may not exercise powers in terms of s2 on his 
own initiative. 
the Commission. 
He may only do so on the recommendation of 
In order to bring the declaration or 
prohibition into effect, a notice must be published in the 
Gazette. 
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way. 
He may amend or withdraw any notice in the same 
1 1 1 
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<3> The Power t.o Nake Appointment.a 
While members of the Commission are appointed by the State 
President, members of boards are appointed by the Minister. 
67 
This power may only be exercised after consultation with the 
Commission except in cases where a member of a board has 
vacated his office, been removed therefrom or recused 
68 
himself. The Minister also has power to remove members from 
office, but the grounds for doing so are prescribed. They 
69 
are: failure to comply with conditions of appointment or 
co-option; improper conduct or regular neglect of duties; 
and inability to perform duties efficiently. 
(4) The Power to Institute Enquiries aod to Take Action 
Purauant. Thereto 
The Minister's power to appoint a committee for the purposes 
of s27 has been dealt with above. In addition, he may cause 
a public enquiry to be held when he has reason to believe 
that it may be expedient in the public interest to withdraw 
certain permits completely or withdraw them and issue permits 
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to different holders. The enquiry is conducted by the 
Commission or a member thereof. A report must be made to 
the Minister who is empowered to take action either by 
directing that the permit in question be withdrawn or that it 
be withdrawn and one or more permits be issued in its place. 
He may not make this direction unless adequate provision has 
been made for the compensation of the holder who has lost his 
permit. 
In terms of s3, the Minister has general powers to direct the 
Commission to investigate matters. He may ask it to 
investigate any road transportation matter and report thereon. 
112 
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(5) The Power to Make Reaulations 
(a) General 
The Minister enjoys legislative power, contained in s30, 
which enables him to make regulations dealing with a wide 
variety of topics. In addition to the powers to make these 
regulations, he may prescribe penalties for contraventions 
72 
of, or failure to comply with, any regulation. 530{4) 
widens the Ministers powers. It says: 
>Different regulations may be made under sub-
section Cl) in respect of different permits, areas, 
places, classes of motor vehicles, forms, classes 
of road transportation, circumstances in which, 
times during which or purposes for which any motor 
vehicle is used in road transportation.' 
The empowering provisions of s30{1} are very wide as regards 
their subject matter and so no purpose will be served by 
enumerating every aspect. Instead an effort will be made to 
give a general view of the areas in which the Minister can 
legislate. 
Firstly, he may bolster the provisions of the statute by 
adding detailed requirements for the information which is to 
accompany applications and appeals, as well as the procedure 
which the Commission or board must follow when dealing with 
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applications or appeals. 
Secondly, he may legislate on the payment of fees in 
connection with applications, appeals, the issue of permits, 
74 
distinguishing marks or other documents, annual levies in 
75 
respect of permits granted for longer than a year and the 
payment of fees to witnesses who appear before a board or the 
76 
Commission. S30(2) qualifies this power. It says: 
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'The Minister shall not under subsection (1) (b) , (c) 
or (n) prescribe any fee or allowance or any 
circumstance in which any fee shall or may be 
refunded or the amount of any refund, except with 
the concurrence of the Minister of Finance.' 
Thirdly, he may prescribe certain powers in relation to boards 
77 
or the Commission (e.g. the circumstances in which a 
distinguishing mark or duplicate may be issued without 
charging a fee} and requirements in relation to permit 
78 
holders (eg specifications and requirements of motor 
vehicles to which permits relate). 
Fourthly, he has power to make regulations in relation to 
79 
authorized officers, inspectors and the South African Police. 
In terms of these provisions he may, for example, make 
regulations prescribing the powers and duties of authorized 
officers, including the manner in which, and the conditions 
upon which, motor vehicles that are locked or sealed, may be 
forced open by authorized officers in order to inspect the 
80 
load. 
Finally, s30(1) (p) is a general provision which empowers the 
Minister to make regulations for the 'better carrying out of 
the provisions and objects of this Act'. 
(b) The Ultra Vires Doctrine and Regulations 
The power to make regulations derives, as has been seen, from 
s30 of the Act. Consequently when the Minister acts, his 
purported exercise of power must fall within the enabling 
provisions of the statute. Any enactment which does not, 
81 
will be held .to be invalid. Thus in~ v Grindrod_TrarrsEor~ 
82 
iEt~> Ltd and Others, the Minister promulgated a regulation 
which purported to restrict hauliers to only one of two 
83 
exemptions which the Act contained. In a prosecution based 
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on the alleged contravention of the regulation, its validity 
was challenged. The court held that the Minister had 
exceeded his authority because he had tsought to amend the 
84 
Act by regulationt which he was not empowered to do. The 
85 
regulation in question was accordingly held to be invalid. 
(6) The Power to Enter into Agreements 
The present government's apartheid policy has created four 
so-called independent homelands to date and, if the policy is 
maintained, more will come into existence in the future. The 
scheme envisages present day South Africa consisting of over 
ten separate states. In the absence of legislative 
interference this situation would create immense problems and 
multiply the red tape involved in permit applications, 
especially in cases where more than one border is crossed. 
To overcome these problems, s44 has been enacted. It 
empowers the Minister to enter into agreements with the 
governments of other countries or territories in relation to 
permit applications by inhabitants of those countries or 
territories, the procedure to be followed by boards or the 
Commission on receiving such applications and the 
circumstances in which, and conditions on which, permits may 
86 
or shall be granted. When an agreement has been reached all 
applications contemplated by the agreement must be dealt with 
in terms of it, despite any contrary provision contained in 
the Act. 
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<D> THE STATE PRESIDENT 
(1) Introduction 
The State President wields powers of two kinds under the 
87 
Acts: the power to make appointments to the Commission (and 
to remove members), and the power to issue proclamations in 
relation to trans-border transportation. 
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(2) The Power to Hake Appointments 
The State President has the power to appoint the members of 
the Commission. He is not responsible for the appointment of 
the chairman: that post is automatically filled by the 
89 
Director General: Transport. From among the ten appointees 
the President must designate four of them as commissioners 
for road transportation, civil aviation, national roads and 
90 
urban transport. Of the other ~embers two must be appointed 
after consultation with the Civil Aviation Advisory Committee 
91 
and the General Manager of SATS. In addition he may 
appoint an extra member who is nominated by the Minister of 
92 
Defence. 
The President may remove commissioners from office on three 
93 
grounds: failure to comply with conditions of appointment, 
improper conduct or habitual neglect of duties and 
inefficiency, 
(3) The Power to Issue Proclamations 
The President's powers to issue proclamations, and the 
limits of those powers, are contained in s43 of the Road 
Transportation Act. To come into effect, a proclamation 
issued in terms of this section, must be published in the 
§~=!ii~ The powers conferred by the Act may loosely be 
categorized into two groups: the power to authorize 
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provisions of the Act to apply to cross-border conveyance in 
cases where it would have no application, and ~he power to 
prohibit provisions of the Act being used in cases where it 
would apply. 
{a) The Power of Authorization 
S43(1} (a) empowers the Presi dent to declare that the 
provisions of ssl7 and 18 apply to any application (for a 
private permit) by a person who carries on an industry, trade 
or business in a country or territory which borders on South 
94 
Africa. He may specify 'additions, exceptions, amendments 
and adjustments' and proclaim that the grant be subject to 
conditions or requirements. Furthermore, the proclamation 
may be general in the sense that it applies to any industry, 
trade or business, or specific in that it applies to a 
particula r class or category of industry, trade or business. 
543(1) Cb} empowers the President to direct a competent board 
95 
or the Commission to grant an application for a public or 
96 
temporary permit for the conveyance of persons or goods 
despite the provisions of the Act. The conditions which must 
exist for this exercise of power are: the route must be 
speci£ied in the proclamation, the conveyance must take 
place between a specified railway station inside South Africa 
and a port of entry as defined in the Admission of Persons to 
97 
the Republic Regulation Act, and in the case of the 
conveyance of persons, the persons must be proceeding to or 
from the neighbouring country or territory while in the case of 
the conveyance of goods, the goods must be destined for or be 
emanating from that country or territory. The grant of a 
permit in such a case is subject to such conditions or 
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[II] 
requirements as the proclamation may contain or those which 
the board or the Commission decides to impose. 
(b) The Power of Prohibition 
The President has power to prohibit a competent board or the 
Commission from considering any application for a permit 
for 'the conveyance of persons, goods or a category of goods 
to or from a specified place or area or between specified 
98 
places or areas as specified in the proclamation 1 • In the 
same way he can prevent a permit holder for conveying persons 
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or goods despite authorization in the permit. The powers 
of prohibition granted to the President are very wide indeed: 
he may exercise them despite the fact that the resulting 
proclamation conflicts with the Act. In this situation, the 
provisions of the proclamation are superior to those of the 
Act. Consequently any right grant ed under the statute can be 
rendered meaningless by the issue of a proclamation. It 
should be stressed, however, that the exercise of the 
President's powers are subject to the principle of legality, 
which applies to all administrative action. 
ASPECTS OF NATURAL JUSTICE WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO 
BOARDS AND THE COMMISSION 
[ A] INTRODUCTION 
The common law contains principles which are aimed at 
achieving as high a degree of impartiality and fairness as 
possible, not only in courts but also in administrative and 
domestic tribunals. These principles are collectively known 
as the rules of natural justice and are expressed by the 
maxims nemo judex in sua causa and audi alteram partem 
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(Bl NEMO JUDEX IN SUA CAUSA 
The often quoted dictum of Lord Hewart CJ that 'justice 
should not only be done, but should manifestly and 
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undoubtedly be seen to be done' is central to the rule 
that no rnan may be a judge in his own cause. It is possible 
that a person may judge a matter fairl y despite having a 
pecuniary or other interest in the outcome, but in terms of 
the rule, the end result is immaterial. The decision will be 
struck down simply because he had an interest and should not 
101 
have heard the matter at all. The reason for this 
seemingly harsh approach is perhaps best expressed by Lord 
Denning MR who said that 'justice must be rooted in 
confidence and confidence is destroyed when right minded 
102 
people go away thinking : ttthe Judge was biased"'. 
{!) Financial Interest 
A distinction is drawn between a pecuniary interest and 
103 
bias. Any direct pecuniary interest is sufficient to 
disqualify a decision-maker from taking part in an enquiry. 
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The size of the interest is irrelevant. Failure by a person 
to recuse himself when he has an interest in a matter is a 
105 
reviewable irregularity. The courts will set the decision 
106 
aside irrespective of its merits. 
The case of R£�� v Johannesburg_Local Road_Trans�ortation 
107 
provides an example of a pecuniary interest by a 
person entrusted with decision-making powers. In this case 
the interest was obvious and, no doubt, substantial. The 
chairman of the board was a director of three companies 
belonging to the Alpha Group, which opposed Rose's 
application. This financial interest disqualified him. 
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(2) Bias
When bias (or prejudice), as opposed to a financial interest, 
is alleged the question is one of degree. Only certain types 
108 
of bias are sufficiently serious to merit disqualification. 
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Rose-Innes says in this regard : 
'Two questions are to be asked in every case. The 
first, whether the member had an interest in the 
proceedings and so was biased. The second, whether 
there was a real likelihood of bias, that is to 
say : were there circumstances affecting him that 
might reasonably create a suspicion that he was not 
impartial? If the answer to either of these 
questions is in the affirmative, he is disqualified 
from taking part in the proceedings, and if he does 
there is a reviewable irregularity.' 
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Rose v Johannesburg Local Road Transportation Board was a 
case in which these principles were applied. It will be 
remembered that the chairman of the board was disqualified on 
the basis of his financial interest. In dealing with the 
remaining members, Lucas AJ decided that they too should not 
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have heard the matter: when the issue of the chairman's 
eligibility arose they manifested strong feelings against the 
applicant, thus giving the impression of partiality. 
In City and Suburban Transport (Pty) Ltd. v Local Road 
112 
Transportation Board, Johannesburg, Greenberg J held 
that the test to be applied in such cases is whether the 
member whose eligibility is challenged 'so associated himself 
with one of the two opposing views that there is a likelihood 
of bias or that a reasonable person would believe that he 
113 
would be biased'. 
In determining the degree of bias required to necessitate 
disqualification, a considerable amount of stress is placed 
114 
on the need for decisions to appear to be just. Three tests 
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have been used: the 'mere suspicion' test, the 'reasonable 
suspicion' test and the 'real likelihood' test. The first 
has never met with general acceptance because it sets too 
high a standard. It is submitted that there is no real dif-
ference (save in terminology) between the remaining two 
tests, but it has been suggested that the former is more 
appropriate when bias is alleged against an untrained 
115 
judicial officer. It is interresting to note that in the 
latest South African case on point, Omega_Freight Services 
(Edms)_Bek v Voorsitter Nasionale Vervoerkommissie en 'n 
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Fagan J applied the 'reasonable suspicion' test. 
(3 > Does St.at.ut.e Rea,t.rict. the Common Law Rule'? 
(a) Introduction
S4(2) of the Transport (Co-ordination) Act provides: 
'Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section 
(1) no act, direction or decision of the Commission
shall be invalid solely by reason of the fact that
any member of the Commission was by virtue of the
said sub-section disqualified from serving on the
Commission.' (117)
Wade points to the strict appli9ation of natural justice 
as one reason for the enactment of provisions of similar 
effect in England. He says that justices of the peace often 
had more than one public function and so found themselves 
disqualified because of this increased involvement. Statu­
tory validity clauses were used to prevent undue interference 
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with the adjudicatory function of justices. Whether these 
considerations are relevant to transportation regulation is 
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doubtful. At the same time it must be conceded that the 
relevant sections would have the effect of contributing 
towards the quicker and, perhaps, smoother operation of 
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boards and the Commission. Not all of the grounds of disqua-
lification go to the impartiality of the members. For 
example the fact that a member is an unrehabilitated insol-
vent will not affec~ his competence to decide, or his 
impartiality. S4(2} will thus prevent litigation on the 
validity of acts, directions or decisions to which such a 
person was party. 
While this is undoubtedly an advantage in relation to the 
functioning of the Act, the wide terms of the provision are 
worrying, especially when the disqualified member has~ 
financial or other interest. In other words, in ~ituations 
where the rules of natural Justice are most needed, the Act 
may succeed only in allowing irregularities which, under 
normal circumstances, would be set aside. In order to 
ascertain whether natural justice is excluded by s4(2) it is 
necessary to examine the treatment of similar provisions by 
the English courts because there is no South African case law 
on the effect of a validity clause. 
(b} The English Law 
The approach taken by the English courts to a provision which 
validates a decision made by a disqualified member of a 
tribunal is well illustrated by the case of K v ~~~~~t~~ 
Licensing_Juslices:_ex_~arte_Barnsle~_and_District_Lice~sed 
!£Q 
Yi£~~~!lers Association and Another. 
In this case, a spirits licence was granted to a co-operative 
society by seven licensing justices. Six of them were 
members of the society and the seventh was the wife of a 
member. The validity of the decision was attacked on the 
basis of the pecuniary interest which the justices had in the 
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society: members were entitled to a 'dividend', the size of 
which was dependent on the value of their purchases. <The 
court found that the 'dividend' constituted a pecuniary 
interest.) S48(4) of the Licensing Act 1953 said that no 
justice could act in a case which concerned any premises if 
he had an interest in the profits of those premises (except 
as a trustee), but s48(5) provided for the validity of such 
act. It read as follows: 
'No act done by any justice disqualified by this 
section shall be invalid by reason only of that 
disqualification. ' 
In interpreting s48(5), the court held that it did not oust 
the rules of natural justice completely. The sub-section was 
limited in its application to only those disqualifications 
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contained in the Act. Lord Evershed MR concluded that: 
'It comes back then to this, as I see it: If the 
disqualification is limited to a disqualification 
according to the terms of one or other of the 
subsections, and nothing more, then that alone will 
not invalidate the licence which has been granted. 
Applying that conclusion to the facts in this case 
it follows, in my judgement, that, if the only dis­
qualification is that these justices had in fact an 
interest in the profits of the business carried on 
or intended to be carried on at this particular 
drug store, that fact alone would not be sufficient 
to invalidate the licence. But if it was shown 
that in addition to having that interest in the 
profits there was evidence of a real bias, the 
matter might go the other way.' 
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The court based its decision on R v I�filP��i which dealt 
with the predecessor of the Act under consideration. The 
123 
ratio of the court in the Tempest case was that the 
validity clause contained in the statute was of no relevance 
124 
in cases in which 'actual bias' was raised. 
In a concurring judgement in ft v Barnslex Licensing 
123 
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Justices, Lord Ormerod examined the effect of s48(5) on the 
126 
principle laid down in RV R��e, a case which held that 
any direct pecuniary interest in a matter, however small, was 
sufficient to disqualify a person from judging the matter. 
The learned Lord Justice held that if the justice had a 
pecuniary interest in the premises under consideration, other 
than an interest in the profits of the premises, s48(5) would 
127 
not be relevant and the principle in R v R2�Q 
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would 
apply. -On this approach therefore, the court will only turn
its back on natural justice if the legislature makes it 
abundantly clear that natural justice is excluded. Further-
more, the common law will only be held not to apply to the 
extent that the legislature has indicated in the clearest 
possible terms. This restrictive interpretation is, it is 
submitted, in accordance with the principles of statutory 
interpretation: statutory provisions should be interpreted 
in such a way, and where doubt exists, so as to affect the 
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common law as little as possible. 
In Lord Devlin's judgement, the test to be applied, in 
deciding whether the decision was invalid, was set out. The 
learned Lord Justice held that the applicant was required to 
satisfy the court that a real likelihood of bias was 
130 
present. While he acknowledged that the matter before the 
court was a borderline case, he held that bias was not 
present, a conclusion which was also reached by the rest of 
131 
the court. 
In conclusion, the principles which emerge from the §��a�l�X 
132 
Licensing_Justices case may be summarized as follows: the 
principles of natural justice are not completely inconsistent 
with a validity clause; natural justice is only excluded to 
the extent to which it is inconsistent with the statutory 
provision; certain types of bias, but not all, are excluded 
from review; the court is able to test the validity of a 
decision where a real likelihood of bias, which falls outside 
the scope of the statute, is alleged. 
(c) The Suggested South African Position
133 
is of no assistance in interpreting the 
validity clauses in the Transport (Co-ordination} Act and 
the Road Transportation Act. 
134 
They were inserted as a result 
of that decision. An interpretation will be ventured here 
135 
using the Barnsley_Licensing_Justices case as a guide. 
If a member who was an unrehabilitated insolvent took part in 
a decision of the Commission, it is clear that s4(2) would 
provide for the validity of that decision. If, on the other 
hand, the same member associated himself with a party to an 
application to a degree which the common law does not 
countenance, the decision will be set aside. It is clear 
that s4(2) has no application: the validity of the decision 
is being attacked, not because the member is an unrehabili­
tated insolvent, but because a real likelihood of bias or 
actual bias is alleged. The same considerations will apply 
to the second category of disqualified persons viz those 
convicted of offences and sentenced to a term of imprisoment 
without the option of a fine. 
It is submitted that the same reasoning applies to the third 
and fourth categories. If a member of a board is an employee 
of SATS, that alone will not invalidate a decision in which 
he has taken part. If, in addition to being so employed the 
member showed bias, or a reasonable likelihood of bias (apart 
from that which may be inferred from his employment) could be 
shown, the technical validity provided by the Act will be of 
136 
no application. 
In the case of a member disqualified by virtue of a financial 
or other interest, the distinction between the permitted 
statutory bias and that which the common law disallows is 
perhaps not as clear. Despite this difficulty, it is sub­
mitted that certain decisions will be invalid. The facts in 
137 
may be used by way of illustration: Huddle, 
the chairman of the board was disqualified, and the board's 
decision was set aside, because Huddle was a director of the 
Alpha Industrial (Exploration) Company which was the largest 
taxi operator in Johannesburg. Huddle therefore had a 
financial interest in road transportation. An application of 
s6(3) of the Road Transportation Act would, it is submitted, 
have the following result: the board's decision would not 
be invalid solely because Huddle had an interest in road 
transportation; if he showed actual bias (eg by alligning 
himself with one of the parties) or, apart from his interest, 
a real likelihood of bias could be established, the decision 
would be set aside. S6(3) would have no application because, 
wide as its terms are, they do not extend to validating 
actual bias or apprehended bias which the common law 
recognizes as unlawful. In short, on this approach, the 
court will say to the disqualified person: 'You may have an 
interest which would normally invalidate the decision without 
further ado, but in this case we will only invalidate the 
138 
decision if you let that interest affect your decision'. 
[CJ AUDI ALTERAM PARTEM 
1 ? f-
In terms of the maxim audi alteram partem, a duty is cast 
·upon a decision-maker to hear all parties to a dispute. The
purpose served by this aspect of natural justice is two-fold:
in the first place, it leads to a greater possibility of
fairness, and in the second, it increases the possibility of a
'correct' decision being made because the decision-maker has
been presented with all sides of the issue. It is therefore 
139 
as much a part of justice as of good administration. 
(1) Conceptualism and Fairness
It has been pointed out above that when our courts are called 
upon to decide whether the audi alteram partem rule applies 
they classify the function in question. If it is held that 
the function exercised by the administrative official or 
tribunal was quasi-judicial then the rule applies. If the 
function is held to be administrative, no obligation rests on 
the deciding authority to hear the other side. Despite the 
warning sounded by Schreiner JA in Pretoria North Town 
140 
Q2�n£!! v Al_Electric_Ice_Cream_Factory_(Pty) Ltd, that 
care should be taken not to 'ellevate what may be no more 
than a convenient classification into a source of legal 
rules', our courts have tended to do just that. 
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of Baxter: 
In the words 
'But South African courts still insist that 
administrative acts should qualify for membership 
of the mysterious "quasi-judicial" club before they 
will require these acts to comply with the 
principles of natural justice. They search for the 
trappings of a court in order to identify "quasi­
judicial" acts. They have even called 
administrative acts of devastating effect, such as 
expropriation, "purely administrative .. , thereby 
relieving the expropriators of the duty to comply 
with natural justice.' 
The English courts and the courts in other Commonwealth 
◄ ('\.., 
countries have moved away from the conceptualism which is 
found in the South African decisions. They have done so by 
using the 'duty to act fairly', a doctrine which has been 
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further developed since the case of Ridge v Baldwin. The 
doctrine ignores the classification process: the enquiry 
revolves around whether the official or body in question acted 
fairly. The duty to so act always exists but the content of 
the duty will vary with the circumstances. Lord Ormerod 
equated natural justice and fairness in the following terms: 
'Natural justice is but fairness, writ large and 
judicially. It has been described as "fair play in 
action". Nor is it leaven to be associated with 
judicial or quasi-judicial occasions.' 
The high water mark of the fairness doctrine was perhaps 
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the case of In Re_H_K_(An_infant). In this case, entry 
into Britain was refused to a boy who claimed to be 
under the age of sixteen, and thus automatically allowed 
to enter with his father. The immigration officer 
refused to allow the boy in because he was clearly older 
than sixteen. In holding that the nature of the 
function exercised by the officer was irrelevant, Lord 
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Parker CJ went on to say: 
'This is not, as I see it, a question of acting or 
being required to act Judicially, but of being 
required to act fairly. Good administration and an 
honest or bona fide decision must, as it seems to 
me, require not merely impartiality, nor merely 
bringing one's mind to bear on the problem, but 
acting fairly.' 
(2) The Second Roberts Case and Fairness
One of the major issues before the court in R££���� v 
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Chairman
i
_Local_Road Transeortation Board and Others(2) was 
whether the Commission was under a duty to act fairly, even 
1?R 
if the act in question was an administrative function. It is 
encouraging to note that the court appeared to accept that 
the Commission was under such a duty. 
much time was devoted to the question. 
Unfortunately not 
In view of the 
improvements which the fairness doctrlne has made to English 
and Commonwealth administrative law this omission must be 
seen as a lost opportunity. Furthermore, the authority of 
the case for the proposition that administrative bodies are 
under a duty to act fairly is doubtful: after accepting that 
the duty exists, Friedman J proceeded to classify the 
function exercised by the Commission. 
It is submitted that a proper application of the fairness 
doctrine may well have resulted in a different outcome in 
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Roberts (2). It would have meant that the Commission was 
duty bound to hear representations as to why the board should 
have heard the application. These could have been as 
convincing as the reasons given by the representative of the 
bus company. Even if the Commission had decided, after 
considering the representations, that it should nonetheless 
exercise its powers in terms of s7(2), procedural fairness 
would have been observed. Consequently the possibility of 
its decision being a correct one would have been greatly 
148 
enhanced, for as Baxter has aptly pointed out: 
'In John v_Rees Megarry J said that natural justice 
would ensure accurate results, and that "those with 
any knowledge of human nature who pause to think 
for a moment" would not be "l.ikely to under­
estimate the feelings of those who find that a 
decision against them has been made without their 
being afforded any opportunity to influence the 
course of events".' 
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The aim of the Road Transportation Act is to regulate and 
control the conveyance of persons and goods. To achieve this 
aim, sl(l) of the Act defines the term 'road transportaion' 
as: 
1 
'(a) the conveyance of persons or goods on a 
public road (3) by means of a motor vehicle (4) 
for reward (5); 
(b) the conveyance of persons or goods on a public
road by means of a motor vehicle in the course of any
industry or trade or business; (6)
(c) the conveyance of persons on a public road lby
means of a hired bus; (7)
(d) the conveyance of goods on a public road by
means of a hired motor vehicle; (8)
This definition sets out the types of conveyance which the 
Act is designed to regulate. If the undertaking in question 
falls within the definition, the provisions of the Act apply 
to it. To convey lawfully the conveyor must do so in 
accordance with the terms of a permit granted in terms of ss 
13, 18 or 20 and issued in terms of s21,. A failure to do 
so will entail criminal liability in terms of s31. 
CIJ THE REASONS FOR EXCLUDING CERTAIN FORMS OF TRANSPORTATION 
------------- -��=-----........ ------------------------
There are a number of situations or activities which, on the 
face of it, fall within the definition of road transport­
tion, but· which have been excluded by s1(2). The �ffect of 
this section is either to provide a complete exemption or to 
exclude the undertaking in question from the provisions of 
the Act when stipulated requirements have been met. The Van 
Breda Commission, referring \o the policy behind the then 
Road Transportation Bill, said that it was a blueprint for 
gradual deregulation. In keeping with this policy of moving 
towards freer competition, the exemptions contained in s1(2) 
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are designed to make road transportation flexible and adapt­
able and to eliminate a great deal of red tape. 
The reasons for excluding forms of transportation from the 
10 
definition of road transportation are varied: decentralized 
industries operate far from markets and sources of supply 
and so a relaxation of the Act is seen as an essential 
11 
encouragement; farmers too should be given easy 
access to their markets and the relaxations are offset by the 
fact that vehicles used for conveyance may be limited in 
their utility by seasonal demands (i.e. a natural advantage 
12 
exists in favour of state transportation services}; 
seen as advantageous for educational development that 
unrestricted use of vehicles be allowed to schools, 
13 
it is 
technicons and universities; and restrictions on vehicle 
use by local authorities is regarded as being detrimental to 
the 'primary function of a local authority and would not be 
14 
in the interests of the ratepayer. ' 
IHI_EXTENT TO WHICH RQaD TRANSPORTATION IS &EGULATED 
It has been explained above that any form of conveyance 
which falls within the definition of road transportation 
requires the authorization of a permit, in order to avoid 
criminal consequences embodied in the Act. On the face of 
it, the definition is wide, including not only conveyance for 
15 
reward but also so-called conveyance on own account and 
conveyance by means of a hired motor vehicle. S1<2>, 
however, contains a list of thirty exceptions to the 
definition. Consequently, no permit is required if 
16 
conveyance falls within the terms of this section. 
Statistical evidence regarding the volume of conveyance which 
138 
is exempted in this way is difficult to find and those 
figures which have been put forward have been questioned. It 
would appear from the findings of the National Transport 
Policy Study that most of the South African road 
transportation industry is not regulated. This body places 
the figure of transportation which is controlled by the 
17 
permit system at between 15 and 20 percent. It 
should be noted that this will include most long 
distance conveyance i.e. conveyance which ventures beyond the 
bounds of exempted areas and the prescribed radii within which 
no permits are required. It is therefore the type of 
transportation which is in direct competition with SATS, and 
the hardest hit by vehicle under-utilisation (such as empty­
leg journeys). 
CIIIJ THE_EXCLUSIONS 
[AJ FARMING OPERATIONS AND FARM LABOUR 
Farmers are excluded from the provisions of the Act with 
regard to the conveyance of unprocessed farm products. 
exemption only applies if two requirements are met: the 
conveyor is the producer of the goods and the conveyance 
18 
takes place in a vehicle owned solely by the farmer. 
This 
Similarly a farmer who conveys his farming requisites to a
place within the Republic where he farms or intends using the 
equipment is deemed not to be undertaking road transport-
ation. Once again the farmer must be the sole owner of the 
19 
vehicle by which the conveyance is undertaken. 
In respect of the conveyance of farm labourers, a farmer does 
not require a permit in tha following situations: when 
transporting labourers from the place of recruitment to their 
20 
place of work; from their place of employment in his farming 
139 
operations to any other place for the farming purposes of the 
employer or any other farmer, or to the place where they were 
21 
recruited; between any place of employment and the most 
convenient railway station or bus stop for conveyance to any 
22 
other place or place of employment; conveyance to and from 
any place for the purposes of shopping, attending church 
services, funerals or any sporting or recreational meetings, 
and between the place of recruitment and the most convenient 
24 
rail or bus stop for conveyance to any place. For the 
purpose of this section a partnership or company carrying on 
farming operations is afforded the same exemption as an 
individual farmer. Farm labourers are deemed to include 
23 
labourers employed by a co-operative society of which the 
farmer is a member and prisoners who either are employed, 
have been employed or are to be employed by the farmer in his 
25 
farming operations. 
[BJ LOCAL AUTHORITIES, PRISONERS AND STATE EMPLOYEES 
The conveyance of persons or goods, other than.for reward, by 
a local authority by means of a vehicle owned by that 
authority does not fall inside the definition of road 
transportation. This exemption applies within the area of 
jurisdiction of a local authority, between that area and any 
other area controlled by it or where it provides any public 
26 
service or carries on any undertaking. Similarly excluded 
from the definition is the conveyance of prisoners who are, 
27 
have been, or are to be employed by the local authority. 
If an employee of the State, a State aided body or a local 
authority uses his own vehicle in the performance of his 
duty, to convey any person, he falls outside the ambit of the 
28 
Act, despite being entitled to a reward from the employer. 
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(CJ PATIENTS, COFFINS AND CORPSES 
The conveyance of a patient to a place where that person is 
29 
to receive medical attention or the conveyance of any corpse 
or coffin does not require the authority of a permit except 
where the purpose of the conveyance of coffins is to 
30 
supplement stock. 
CDJ CONVEYANCE OF HOTEL GUESTS, SCHOOL CHILDREN, MEMBERS OF 
LIFT CLUBS AND RECIPROCAL CONVEYANCE AGREEMENTS 
Conveyance for reward includes the situation where a carrier 
does not specify the charge for conveyance but it is part of 
31 
an all inclusive charge for services rendered. Such a
situation would normally arise when a hotel conveyed guests 
and their personal effects to or from the nearest or most 
convenient railway station, airways terminal, airport or 
port. S1(2} (j} excludes such conveyance if the motor vehicle 
concerned is 'identified in the manner prescribed by 
regulation' and the hotel is the sole owner thereof. Reg 
2(1} requires the following information to be painted orito 
both sides of the vehicle in a colour that shows up clearly 
against the colour of the background: the full registered 
name or style of the hotel and the full business address, 
32 
which may not be a postal address. 
The conveyance of school children and teachers to and from 
school as well as for sporting, recreational, holidaying, 
sightseeing or educational purposes would normally also fall 
within the 'inclusive charge' trap and constitute conveyance 
for reward but s1(2) (n} excludes this from the definition of 
road transportation if the school is the sole owner of the 
bus or the bus is, in terms of an agreement, set apart for 
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the use of the school. S1(2) (nA) provides the same exemption 
for the students and staff of educational institutions which 
include universities, technikons, technical colleges and 
teachers' training colleges. This exemption only extends to 
conveyance for educational, cultural or sporting purposes. 
Where the use of the bus is based on an agreement, a document 
must be carried in which an authorized official of the 
institution confirms that the passengers are either enrolled 
students of, or staff attached to, the institution. 
A 'lift club' as contemplated by sl(l) of the Compulsory 
33 
Motor Vehicle Insurance Act would normally fall within the 
ambit .of conveyance for reward. S1(2) (h), however, excludes 
34 
'lift clubs' from the scope of the Act. A 'lift club' for 
the purposes of the Act means any club of which: 
'(a) every member shall have a turn to convey or cause to be 
conveyed by means of a motor car the members of such 
club or other persons designated by such members to or 
from a specified place for a specified purpose; or 
Cb} every member is the owner of a motor car and of which 
one or some of it's members shall by means of a motor 
car of which he is the owner or they are the owners as 
the case may be, convey or cause to be conveyed the 
members of such club or other persons designated by 
such members to or from a specified place for a 
specific purpose.' 
S1{2) (g) excludes reciprocal conveyance situations. 
Reciprocal conveyance occurs when A conveys B's goods in a 
vehicle owned by A in return for B either having carried A's 
goods or undertaking to do so in a vehicle owned by B. This 
set-up is exempted if the vehicle is owned by the conveyor 
and, if undertaken by either party in respect of that party's 
own goods, would not constitute road transportation. 
[EJ SUBSTITUTION OF VEHICLES 
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<1> Conditiona to h@ Compli@d With
A vehicle in respect of which a permit exists may be 
substituted by a vehicle for which no permit has been issued 
The conditions which must be complied with to render the 
35 
substitution lawful are: (a) the conveyance by the defective
vehicle must have constituted road transportation as defined; 
(b) the conveyance undertaken by the defective vehicle must
have been authorized by a permit; (c) the conveyance must
have been in accordance with the provisions of the permit; 
and (d) the permit must be carried on the substituted 
vehicle for production on demand. 
In the context of s1(2) (f) the term 'conveyance' includes 
the towing of the defective vehicle to a place for it's 
repair or storage. Persons or goods may be conveyed in the 
substitute vehicle to the place of storage or repair or to 
any other place. Thus the substitute vehicle may not carry 
on the work of the defective vehicle, except in so far as it 
conveys the load of the latter to it's destination. If, for 
instance, it picked up another load and returned with it to 
36 
it's base, the owner would fall foul of s31(1) (a). 
S7(1) Cd) of the Motor Carrier Transportation Act provided 
for the substitution of vehicles. The conditions under which 
the substitution could take place were different to those 
contained in the 1977 Act. S7(1) (d) provided for 
substitution without any formalities except in cases where 
the seating capacity or carrying capacity of the substitute 
vehicle exceeded that of the defective vehicle by more than 
20 percent, or if the substitution was to last for more 
than seven days. In both cases the prior written consent of 
a board or the Commission was required. Failure to 
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• 
substitute in accordance with the terms of s7(1) (d) 
37 
constituted a contravention of s9(1). 
(2) The Applica�ion of S1(2) (f)
The application of s1(2) (f) is illustrated by the case of S
38 
v Everson. A vehicle, OKC 12241, which belonged to the 
appellant, was stopped by an inspector on the Richmond­
Hanover road. The driver showed the inspector an annexure to 
a permit which was issued in respect of vehicle SW 15568, which 
had broken down en route from Bellville to Nigel. Vehicle 
OKC 12241 had been sent to the scene of the break-down and had 
conveyed the load of the defective vehicle to Nigel. It was 
in the process of conveying goods back to Bellville when it 
was stopped. Jacobs JP held that the substitution, which had 
not been carried out in accordance with s1(2} (f), was a clear 
contravention of s31(1) (a) because the appellant had not 
proved on a balance of probabilities that the permit 
authorized the conveyance in question. Thus the permit which 
was issued in respect of vehicle SW 15568 could only 
authorize the conveyance by vehicle OKC 12241 if the 
provisions of s1(2) (f} had been complied with. 
CFJ OWNERS OF INDUSTRIES, TRADES AND BUSINESSES WHO DO NOT 
CONVEY FOR REWARD 
The owners of industries, trades or businesses are exempted 
from the necessity of obtaining permits in respect of the 
conveyance of persons or goods by means of a motor car if no 
39 
reward is received. This exemption does not extend to the 
conveyance of employees from their places of residence to the 
place of work. If an employer was to convey employees in 
this way without the authority of a permit this would, it is 
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submitted, constitute a prohibited type of road 
transportation namely, conveyance in the course of industry, 
40 
trade or business. The conveyance of employees from any 
place of work to any other site for work purposes, may be 
undertaken by the employer without the authority of a permit 
provided that the employer is the owner of the vehicle in 
41 
which the conveyance is undertaken. 
A similar exemption exists to allow the owners of industries, 
trades or businesses to convey goods. S1 (2) <lA) enables 
such an owner to carry his own goods or goods which he has 
undertaken to maintain, clean, renovate, repair or alter for 
any other person in the course of such industry, trade or 
business. S1(2) (lA) only applies if the mode of conveyance 
(which may not be a trailer) has a gross vehicle mass which 
does not exceed 2 500 kilograms. The owner may also convey 
his spare parts, tools or defective parts to a workshop for 
repair in a vehicle which conforms to the specifications 
42 
mentioned above. 
CGJ VEHICLES WITH CARRYING CAPACITIES NOT IN EXCESS OF 1 000 
KILOGRAMS 
(1) General
Originally s1(2) Cl) excluded from the definition of 
road transportation the conveyance of goods on or in a goods 
vehicle having a carrying capacity not in excess of 
1 000 kilograms. The legislature obviously intended to 
phase out this exempted category by adding to the sub-section 
the provision that such vehicles would be issued with public 
permits if the owner satisfied the Commission in writing 
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within one month of the commencement of the amending Act that 
the vehicle concerned was in use on 1 April 1979 and still 
operated on 4 July 1979 (the date of commencement of the 
43 
amending Act). The amendment had the effect of creating a 
type of public permit distinct from that issued in terms of s 
13. It differed from the latter in one respect: it was not
44 
transferable. 
(2) The Amendment of S1 (2) (1)
45 
S1(1) of the Road Transportation Amendment Act provided 
that a permit issued in terms of s1(2)(1) could not be 
renewed, amended or transferred from one person to another. 
Furthermore, it abolished altogether special permits for 
vehicles with carrying capacities of not more than 1 000 
kilograms, as from 31 December 1983. From that date owners 
of vehicles which formerly operated under the authority of 
s1(2)(1) permits, were required to apply for public permits 
as contemplated by s13. 
The amendment of s1(2){1) led to a fiery debate in 
Parliament. It is clear that the new provision is a move 
away from the policy of gradual deregulation recommended by 
46 
the Van Breda Commission. Government speakers cited three 
reasons for the amendment: that operators had abused the 
'privilege' by derating vehicles with bigger carrying 
47 
capacities (e.g. by reducing the axle size); that operators 
were using the exemption for purposes that Parliament never 
intended, the most important being the so-called express 
48 49 
delivery service; and to protect SATS. The businesses, 
such as the express parcel services threatened the hold that 
50 
SATS enjoyed in this field. Opinions were expressed by 
Opposition speakers that persons operating express delivery 
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services were in fact providing what had become an essential 
51 
service for commerce and industry. Furthermore it was 
important that these operations carried on because SATS was 
52 
not able to provide an equivalent service. Operators now 
have to apply in the normal manner, and overcome the hurdle 
53 
of s15, in order to continue. 
(3) The Meaning of Carrying Capacity
The term 'carrying capacity' appears, not only in s1(2) {1), 
but in a number of other sections of the Act. Problems have 
arisen in relation to its meaning. Didcott J saw the 
54 
difficulty in the following terms: 
'What in essence does one mean by the physical 
ncarrying capacity" of a vehicle? Does one mean the 
maximum weight which it can bear and still move at all? 
If so, does one measure movement uphill, downhill, or 
on the level? Does one take any account of the speed 
or lack of it, with which the vehicle can move with 
that load? Or does one postulate the maximum load it 
can bear, whilst stationary, without collapsing in some 
sort of way, and, if so, in what particular way?' 
Other judges have not experienced the same difficulties with 
the interpretation of the term. In the case of Metro 
55 
TransEort_(Pt�)_Ltd vNational TransEort_Commission� F S 
Steyn J first looked to the definitions of 'tare' and 'gross 
vehicle mass' in terms of sll(l) of the Transvaal Road 
56 
Traffic Ordinance. 'Tare' was defined as the mass of the 
vehicle when ready to travel on the road, including such 
additions as spare wheels, accessories, standard equipment 
supplied by the manufacturers, permanent structures and 
structural alterations of a permanent nature. Not included 
are the weight of fuel and any other load. 'Gross vehicle 
mass' means the maximum mass of the vehicle and it's load, as 
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specified by it's manufacturer, or in the absence of such 
specification, as determined by the registering authority. 
The learned judge concluded that the maximum load which a 
vehicle could carry in terms of its specification was the 
difference between the 'gross vehicle mass' and its 'tare'. 
In deciding whether this could be said to be the 'carrying 
57 
capacity' of the vehicle the learned judge held: 
'Wet 74 van 1977 is in Afrikaans onderteken en daar 
bestaan na my mening geen twyfel dat draagvermoe slegs 
verwys na die maksimum gewig van die vrag wat 'n 
vragvoertuig kan dra in terme van sy vervaardiger se 
spesifikasie of die vasstelling deur die 
registrasie-owerheid en dat die woord so deur die 
Wetgewer verstaan is soos deur alle gewone 
Afrikaanssprekendes.' 
James JP came to the same conclusion in National_Trans�ort 
�� 
Commission v Airoadex�ress_(Pty)_Ltd. He held that the term 
'carrying capacity' simply meant the heaviest load which the 
vehicle could carry under the normal operating conditions for 
which it was built. For reasons of practicality, simplicity 
and certainty this should be arrived at by deducting the mass 
of the vehicle's tare from the gross vehicle mass. The case 
was remitted to the Commission for reconsideration because 
that body had not based it's decisions on the method the 
court set out. Instead the Commission had adopted an 
arbitrary practice of refusing s1(2) (1) permits in 
respect of vehicles with a gross vehicle mass of over 4 000 
kilograms, claiming that such vehicles, in the practical 
experience of the Commission, had carrying capacities of over 
59 
1 000 kilograms. 
CHJ EXEMPTED AREAS AND THE 40 KILOMETRE RADIUS 
S1{2) (w) exempts from the definition of road 
148 
transportation the conveyance of goods solely within an 
60 
exempted area. An exempted area is an area declared to he 
such by the Minister, acting in terms of s2(b). Notice of 
such a classification is published in the Government_Gazette. 
A further exemption applies to conveyance of goods for reward 
within a 40 kilometre radius of the carrier's business 
address, provided that the place of loading and the final 
destination are within the 40 kilometre radius, or the 
conveyance is to a railway station within the prescribed 
61 62 
area. In S v Grindrod Transeort_(Pt�)_Ltd_and_Others the 
validity of a regulation, promulgated under s30, was 
challenged because it purported to restrict carriers 
conveying goods in terms of s1(2) (x) to that exemption only. 
The first appellant was the holding company of the second 
appellant. Both occupied business premises in Stanger. The 
charge arose out of the conveyance of goods from Mandini to 
Pinetown. Mandini is within 40 kilometres of Stanger. It is 
not in the exempted area of Durban. Stanger falls inside the 
exempted Durban area as does Pinetown. Pinetown, however, is 
further than 40 kilometers from Stanger. Reg 2(5) stated 
that a carrier wishing to convey goods in terms of s1(2) (x)
could only do so exclusively within a 40 kilometre radius 
of his place of business. As Stanger lay within 
40 kilometres of Mandini and within the Durban exempted area, 
the first and second appellants registered their vehicle 
Jointly in Stanger and employed a driver whose function was 
as follows: to convey for the first appellant from Mandini to 
the border of the exempted area, to convey jointly thereafter 
until he reached a point 40 kilometres from Stanger and 
thereafter to convey for the second appellant in terms of 
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s1{2)(w). 
The court held that the regulation was ultra vires because it 
purported to deprive persons of a protection enjoyed under 
another provision of the Act. It amounted to an attempt by 
the Minister to amend the Act by regulation, which he was not 
empowered to do. In terms of the decision, it was 
unnecessary for the appellants to use the stratagem they 
resorted to. In other words in a journey from 
Mandini to Pinetown, s1(2) (x)· applies up to the 40 km limit. 
Thereafter sl (2) (w) applies. 
CIJ THE 80 KILOMETRE RADIUS 
S1(2) {y) exempts from the definition of road 
transportation the conveyance by a carrier of his own goods 
within a radius of 80 kilometres of his place of business if 
the conveyance is in the course of his industry, trade or 
business, or 'the conveyance is of goods which he has 
undertaken to maintain, clean, renovate, repair or alter for 
any other person in the course of such industry, trade or 
business'. The conditions upon which the exemption operates 
are that the carrier is the owner of the vehicle, it is
registered within the area and it is identified in the manner 
prescribed by regulation. These conditions, it should be 
noted, apply to exemptions under s1(2)(x) as well. 
CJJ EXEMPTED GOODS 
S1(2) (z) and s1(2) (zA) deal with the conveyance of exempted 
63 
goods. This category of goods consist of any goods declared 
to be exempted by the Minister in terms of s2(d}. S1(2) (z) 
deals with the conveyance of such goods by means of a vehicle 
registered in South Africa, which is owned by a person 
150 
domiciled in the country, and which is identified in the 
prescribed manner. If the owner of the vehicle is a company 
it must be registered in the Republic. The place of busines 
of the owner must be within the country too. S1(2)(zA) 
extends this protection, under the same conditions, to 
carriers from countries which are members of the Customs 
Union Agreement or of 'any of those countries or territories 
which have entered into an agreement with the Republic with 
regard to the conveyance of exempted goods. 1 
[K] DECENTRALIZED INDUSTRIES
Decentralized industries have been granted special transport
64
concessions. Subject to conditions laid down by regulation,
an undertaking proclaimed to be a decentralized industry
may, without a permit, convey goods by means of a single
vehicle, or trailer, the gross vehicle mass of which does
not exceed 26 000 kilograms, 18 000 kilograms 
respectively. The industry must be the owner of the 
vehicle. The Minister has power, granted by s2(c), to declare 
on the recommendation of the Commission, any area to be a 
65 
decentralized area. 
[L] WITNESSES AND SOLDIERS
Ss1(2)(s), 1(2)(t) and 1(2)(u) deal with the conveyance for
reward of witnesses in criminal cases, persons summoned to
give evidence before commissions and persons proceeding to or
from places where they are to undergo, or have undergone,
military service. The conveyor in each of the above cases
does not require a permit.
FOOTNOTES
1. See S v Julies 1971 (2) SA 525 (E);
S v 'Chetty 1975 (3) SA 980 (N) and Ch 14, below, at 369.
2. TConveyance of goods' was held to connote 'the
conveyance of something separable from the instrument
151 
of conveyance' in R v Van Eck 1941 EDL 223, 226. In 
- --- ---
that case, when a boring machine had been built onto an 
undercarriage so that the two formed a separate unit, 
the undercarriage was held not to be the vehicle 
conveying the boring machine. 
3. See Flying_Lotus_(Pty)_Ltd v Chairman_National
TransQort_Commission_and_Another 1982 (4) SA 253 (D}
and Ch 14, below, at 370.
4. See R v Fletterman 1953 (4) SA 163 (T);
R v K�e��i 1960 (2) SA 163 <SR> and Ch 14 below at 371.
5. See Ch 14 below at 374 and the cases cited
therein.
6. See R v ��ge�i� 1958 (3) SA 433 (T).
7. See Ch 14 below at 378.
8. See South_African_Railways_and_Harbours v Chairman
BoQhuthatswana_Central_Road_Transportation_Board_and
A�Qth�� 1982 <3> SA 629 <B> and Ch 14 below at 379.
9. See Ch 3, above at 66.
10. See generally Page Commission, para� 50-6
and 367-389; Marais Commission paras 57,
309-315, 338-344.
11. See Marais Commission, paras 312, 313.
12. Marais Commission, para 339.
13. Marais Cornrni ssi on, para 334.
14. Marais Commission, para 344.
15. See Verburgh, 18, for a definition of conveyance on
own account.
16. See below.
17. SuQglement_to_the_Financial_Mail 'Trucks and Transport'
Oct 1 9 , 1 9 8 4 , 1 7 • 
18. S1<2>(a).
19. S1(2)(b>.
20. S1(2)(b)(i).
21. S1(2)(b)(ii).
22. Sl (2) Cb) (iii>.
23. Sl (2) (b) (iiiA).
24. S1(2)(b}(iv).
25. Sl (2) (b).
26. S1<2>(c}.
27. S1<2>Cd).
28. S1<2><m>.
29. S1(2)(e).
30. S1 <2) Co).
31. WE Cooper and B R  Bamford South_African_Motor_Law
681.
32. Reg 2(2) sets out the height, width and breadth of
stroke to which figures and letters must comply, as
well as the size of spaces between successive figures
or between words on the same line.
33. No 56 of 1972.
34. See Maree_and_Others v SAA_Mutual_Insurance_Association
Ltd_and_Another 1970 (4) SA 717 CT).
35. S 1(2)(f)
36. § v �����Qrr 1980 <2> SA 913 <NC>.
37. § v ���e 1978 < 1 > SA 1063 rn>, 1066B.
38. � v �Y���Qrr supra.
39. Sl (2) <k>
40. See R v �rrge�ie 1958 (3) SA 433 <T>, 436C-D.
41. S1(2)<kA>.
42. S1<2)(1B>.
43. Road Transportation Amendment Act 93 of 1979, sl(b).
152 
44. 
45. 
46. 
47. 
48. 
49. 
50. 
51. 
52. 
53. 
54. 
55. 
56. 
57. 
58. 
59. 
60. 
61. 
62. 
63. 
64 
65. 
See SA_Warehousin�=Services.,.{Pti>_Ltd v National 
Transeort_Commission 1982 (3) SA 840 (A), 846 B-D. 
No 93 of 1979 
See Ch 3, above, at 66. 
Hotise of Assembly Debates 1983 col 1011. 
Ibid col 1017 
Ibid col 1014 
Sueelement_to_the_Financial_Mail 'Trucks and Trucking' 
21 Oct 1983, 40. 
House of Assembly Debates 1983 col 1018. 
Ibid cols 1009 and 1011. 
For detailed treatment of s15, �ee Ch 8 below. 
National_Transeort_Commission v Airoad exeress ) 
1flyt_itg1981 (3) SA 109(N). The above passage 
from Didcott J's judgment in· the court a quo was 
quote# by James JP whti heard the appeal. The judgment 
-of.the court a quo Js not reported.
1981 (3) SA 114 (W)
No. 21 of 1926.' The definitipns of 'tare' and 'gross
vehicle mass' are identical ih the Road Traffic
Ordinances of all four provinces.
At 122 C.
1981 (3) SA 109 (N) 
For a more recent example of a similar mis-direction
see Ratner and Collett Agencies_(Pty)_Ltd v Chairman�
National_Transeort_Commission_and_Others TPD 20 March
1985 (case 22195/83) unreported.
For a list of the exempted areas see GN No 1268 in
Government Gazette No 19268 of. 22 June 1984.
Sl <2"> <x>.
1980 (3) SA 978 <N>
For a list of exempted goods see GN No 1267 in
Government Gazette No 9268 of 22 June 1984 and GN No.
2790 in Government Gazette No 9532 of 21 December 1984.
S1(2) (v); for a list of decentralized industrial areas
see GN No 893 in the Government_Gazette of
29 April 1983.
S1(1) of the Act defines a dece�tralized area.
,· 
PART THREE 
THE REGULATORY SYSTEM 
INTRODUCTION 
�HAfIIILI 
THE PERMIT SYSTEM 
[IJ THE TYPES OF PERMITS AND THEIR FUNCTIONS 
[AJ PUBLIC PERMITS 
[IIJ 
[AJ 
[BJ 
[BJ PRIVATE PERMITS 
[CJ TEMPORARY PERMITS 
FEATURES OF THE PERMIT SYSTEM 
THE PERMIT AS A FORM OF PROPERTY 
THE TRANSFERABILITY OF A PERMIT 
(1) The Legislative Provisions
(2) The Right to Transfer a Permit is a Right Dependant
on Permission
(3} The Effect of the Alienation of a Permit if Transfer
is not Granted
(4} The Relationship Between the Permit and the Vehicle
to Which it Relates
[CJ THE VALIDITY OF AGREEMENTS TO MAKE PROTECTIVE APPLICATIONS 
CIIIJ CRITICISMS_Qf_Ifig_PERMIT SYSTEM 
[AJ HIGHER OPERATION COSTS 
[BJ THE STIFLING OF COMPETITION 
[CJ THE SALE OF PERMITS 
[DJ CONCLUSIONS 
[IVJ THE POSSIBLE REFORM OF THE PERMIT SYSTEM 
154 
INTRODUCTION 
The issuing of permits to authorize some form of economic 
activity is a well recognized regulatory technique. Indeed 
the 'privileges' conferred in this way may be so far reaching 
1 
that Baxter says: 
'These "priviliges" are as important to daily existence 
as any rights; they have become a new form of 
"property". The result has been a demand for greater 
procedural and substantive protection for individuals 
when public authorities exercise their powers in 
relation to these benefits and concessions.' 
In the leading case of Ta�ob v Ermelo Local_Road 
£ 
Trane.E.ortation Board
L 
Centlivres CJ rejected the notion 
that the granting of a permit amounted to no more than the 
granting of a privilege, a suggestion made by the chairman of 
3 
the Commission when it rejected the appellant's appeal: 
'It almost amounts to saying that the granting of an 
exemption is in the gift of the Commission or a local 
board. This is a wrong approach to adopt by a 
statutory board which is empowered by Parliament to 
grant permission to carry on a trade. It is not an 
exceptional privilege or a monopoly which depends on 
the issuing of the permission. Even the humblest 
citizen has the right to approach such a board and he 
is entitled to get the permission he requires unless 
there are sound reasons to the contrary.' 
The word 'permit' is defined in the Concise_Oxford_Dictionar� 
as a •�ritten order giving permission'. In the context of 
the Road Transportation Act, the permit system is central to 
the method of regulation. If an undertaking falls within the 
4 5 
definition of road transportation and outside s 1(2), a 
permit is required to authorize that endeavour. The aim of 
the permit system in road transportation is twofold: it is a 
technique designed to control the volume of traffic which 
takes to the road and a means of protecting SATS from certain 
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forms of private competition. The justification for 
regulation is usually said to be the protection of the public 
7 
interest: 
'Na my mening was dit nie die doel van die Wetgewer om 
bestaande besighede te beskerm nie. Die enigste 
oorweging en doel voor oe was om openbare belang te 
bevorder en soos Murray HR, se dit is die 
grondleggende doel van die Wet en die uitskakeling van 
moontlike kompetisie 11 is only an element in the former! 
(I] THE TYPES OF PERMITS AND THEIR FUNCTIONS 
S1(1) of the Act defines a permit as 'a public permit, 
private permit or temporary permit'. When the Motor Carrier 
Tranportation Act was originally passed it only made 
provision for one type of permit. This permit was required 
to authorize conveyance for reward. It soon was seen as 
necessary to widen the scope of the protection that the Act 
provided for the Railways Administration. Thus while the 
permit system was not changed, the definition of 'motor 
carrier transportation' was altered to include conveyance 'on 
own account' i.e. conveyance in the course of any industry, 
trade or business. The considerations which are relevant to 
conveyance of this type are different to those which apply to 
conveyance for reward e.g. the purpose of the conveyance 
differs, the transport user is different and so is the nature 
of the competition. The Road Transportation Act formalized 
these areas of divergence by creating public permits and 
private permits as well as a third category, temporary 
permits. 
(Al PUBLIC PERMITS 
A public permit is defined in sl(1) of the Act as 'a public 
road carrier permit granted under section thirteen'. It is 
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6 
8 
9 
intended to authorize permanent conveyance of persons or 
10 
goods for reward. In other words, it is the type of 
permit which an operator who conveys professionally requires, 
unless his operations are restricted to the conveyance of 
exempted goods, limited in scope to exempted areas or fall 
within another exemption contained in sl(2). Most long 
distance conveyance will therefore require the authorization 
of a public permit. Such a permit may be issued for a 
specified period or for an indefinite period. 
[BJ PRIVATE PERMITS 
11 
A private permit, in the words of sl(l) of the Act is 'a 
private road carrier permit granted under section eighteen'. 
Such an authorization is required by a person who carries on 
any industry, trade or business and who: 
'Ca) wishes to convey, in the course of such industry, 
trade or business, goods acquired or sold or 
otherwise disposed of by him, by means of a motor 
vehicle of which he is the owner, between any 
places where he carries on such industry, trade 
or business and any place situated outside any 
exempted area mentioned in section 1(2) (y); 
(b) wishes to convey any goods which he has
undertaken to maintain, clean, renovate, repair
or alter for any other person in the course of
such industry, trade or business, by means of a
motor vehicle of which he is the owner, between
any place where he carries on such industry,
trade or business and any place where he collects
those goods in order so to deal with them or
delivers those goods having so dealt with
them. ' (12)
The chief difference between a public and private permit is 
that the latter is required for the transportation 
requirements of the holder in the course of his business, 
while the former would be required when a public transport 
facility is offered by an operator. 
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[CJ TEMPORARY PERMITS 
A temporary permit is 'a temporary road carrier permit 
13 
granted under section twenty.' This section enables any 
person who wishes to undertake transport of a temporary 
nature to apply for a permit, the currency of which lasts 
14 
for a maximum of fourteen days. Such a permit may be 
granted in relation to transportation upon a particular date 
15 
or in connection with a particular occurrence. It is 
interesting to note that more temporary permits are issued 
than other types. In the 1983 fiscal year, for instance, 
while 43 488 public permits and 7 016 private permits were 
issued, 62 921 temporary permits were issued. In the 
16 
previous fiscal year 79 553 temporary permits were issued. 
There appear to be two reasons for the large difference 
between the number of public permits and temporary permits: 
first, it would appear that a substantial number of 
transport undertakings have developed which operate solely on 
temporary permits. They were 'allowed' into the transport 
system when SATS was unable to handle all of the traffic and 
in times of economic prosperity. The drought and the harsher 
economic climate no doubt accounts for the drop in the number 
17 
of temporary permits issued in 1983: secondly, boards 
frequently issue temporary permits to an operator after they 
have granted an application for a public permit but prior to 
18 
the outcome of an appeal lodged by an objector. The 
Director-General: Transport has, however, sounded a warning to 
19 
those operators who rely on temporary permits: 
'Temporary permits were introduced to fulfil a special 
requirement in the industry. It was never, and I 
stress never, the intention to allow prospective 
carriers to start and develop a road transport business 
on the strength of temporary permits. To allow a freer 
basis of issuing temporary permits would be to the 
detriment of existing carriers.' 
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CIIJ F!ATUR!S..QF_IH!_PERMIT_SYSTEM 
[AJ THE PERMIT AS A FORM OF PRO PERTY 
The nature of road tranportation permit was examined in 
20 
Ramdaie v Ganesh and Other in which the applicant sought an 
order setting aside the attachment of a permit and its sale to 
the second respondent. It was argued that the attachment was 
invalid because the permit was not a 'merchantable article': 
the permit and the vehicle to which it related, it was 
contended, constituted an indivisible entity and so the 
former was incapable of attachment, sale or transfer without 
the latter. 
Jansen J held that a permit consitutes a res. The fact that 
permission to transfer it is required does not alter this 
fact. Furthermore the period of validity of the permit is 
irrelevant because 'there are undoubtedly valuable things that 
21 
have the status of res despite the shortness of their lives.' 
The learned judge accordingly held that the permit was 
capable of attachment (seperately from the vehicle) and sale 
22 
in execution. A similar view was expressed by Fannin Jin 
23 
Laloo v De�uty Sherrif Durban and Another in which the court 
held that, as a permit is a document which evidences the 
existence of rights, conferred by virtue of the Act, it can 
24 
be attached in execution. 
25 
Van Zyl JP, in �QiQfilQrr v 
R�gistrar of Deeds,. was dealing with a licence issued iq 
26 
terms of the Liquor Act but it is submitted, his 
observations apply equally to road transportation permits 
when he said that 'a liquor licence is not merely a privilege 
but is a right of a potential commercial value which may 
sometimes be very considerable, and a right which is 
27 
alienable and can be sold.' 
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28 
The issue in Solomon's case was whether the liquor licence 
in question could be hypothecated. The Registrar of Deeds 
had refused to register a notarial bond over the licence and 
Solomon had sought an order directing him to register it. 
The court granted the order in accordance with the rule that 
'whatever admits of purchase and sale also admits of pledge.' 
That the same principle applied to road transportation 
permits is clear from Ramdaie's case, 
31 
30 
and Durmalingham v 
in which one Maharaj had passed a notarial bond
hypothecating a Henschell bus and its permit in favour of the 
respondent. The competence of Maharaj to pass such a bond 
was not questioned, the issue being whether the bond could be 
rectified after the Henschell bus had been replaced by an 
International bus. 
It is clear too that a permit is an asset in an insolvent 
32 
29 
estate. Jansen J, in Ramdaie's case, held that as a document 
evidencing rights which are to be regarded as property, a 
permit must be disclosed by an insolvent holder. 
[BJ THE TRANSFERABILITY OF A PERMIT 
The permit system prescribed by the Road Transportation Act 
is vehicle based. A permit is issued in respect of a 
particular vehicle and it authorizes the conveyance of 
specified goods (or passengers) on a route which is set down. 
Other conditions may be attached too, and a failure on the 
part of the holder (or his servants) to comply with the terms 
34 
of the permit or its conditions is a criminal offence. 
Public permits are transferable but a transfer is dependent 
35 
on the prior permission of a board. As a result of this 
36 
quality, permits have acquired immense commercial value. 
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Bruce NO -----
(1) The Legislative Provisions
S7(1) (c) (iv) confers on a board the power to consider and 
give a decision on applications for the renewal, amendment or 
transfer of any permits granted by it. S12(3} says that any 
person wishing to take transfer of a permit must apply in 
writing, in the manner prescribed by regulation, to the 
appropriate board or the Commission for such a tranfer. In 
addition, the written consent of the holder must be 
submitted. This last requirement must be read subject to 
qualification: if the holder is insolvent, the trustee of 
the insolvent estate will be the person required to give 
37 
consent, and where, as in Ramdaie's case, a permit has been 
attached and sold in execution, the Deputy Sheriff can give 
the necessary consent. Finally, reg 3(4} provides that when 
an application for transfer has been granted, the board must 
issue a new permit to the applicant and inform the transferor 
of its decision. The latler must return the old permit to 
the board within 10 days of receiving the notification. 
(2) The Right to Transfer a Permit is a Right Dependant on
Permission
The cases dealing with the transfer of an authority to engage 
in an economic activity stress that while the transferor has 
a right to alienate the authority, that right derives from, 
and is subject to, the provisions of the Act which created 
38 
it. Thus, in Laloo v De�utz_Sheriff
i
_Durban_and Another
i 
Fannin J held that while a contract for the transfer of a 
permit is not illegal, the provisions of the Act must be 
complied with because no transfer can occur without 
the board's consent and the person claiming to be 
the transferee would have committed an offence if he undertook 
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road transportation without a proper transfer of the permit. 
Consequently where Laloo had bought a number of permits and 
vehicles from Local Passenger Services (Pty) Ltd, but had 
not applied to the board for the transfer of the permits, he 
was unsuccessful in his attempt to prevent the sale of the 
permits pursuant to the execution of a judgment debt against 
Local Passenger Services. 
40 
Similarly in Ei£k v Woolcott and Ohlsson's Breweries which 
involved a licence issued in terms of the Transvaal Liquor 
41 
39 
Ordinance, Innes JA pointed out in relation to the transfer 
42 
of a licence that: 
' ..• the privilege which he enjoys is purely personal; 
it involves the exercise by the authorities of a 
delectus_QersonaeL so that he would have no power 
to assign his licence, were there no statutory 
provisions for is transfer. He can only deal with it 
in such a manner as the Ordinance prescribes.' 
Van Zyl JP expressed himself in almost identical terms in 
43 
�QlQ�Q� v Registrar_of_Deeds when he said that the licensee 
himself has no power to transfer the licence 'because that is 
44 
the sole prerogative of the Licensing Board.' In short a 
holder has a right to sell, but the sale is subject to 
45 
transfer over which he has no real control. 
(3) The Effect of the Alienation of a Permit if Transfer is
Not Granted 
46 
that the fact that the 
transfer of the permit is beyond the control of the purchaser 
and the seller is irrelevant to the question of whether it 
can be alienated. The learned judge held that the purchaser 
accepts the risk that the application will not be granted, as 
47 
he does in the purchase of anything of a speculative nature. 
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Jansen J held in Ramdaie's case 
48 
In Laloo v De�uty Sherrif, Durban and Another, where the 
applicant had not applied for transfer, Fannin J held that 
his position was similar to that of a purchaser who has not 
yet received delivery of the subject matter where ownership 
49 
passes by delivery: 
'He has, in my view, at least, a personal right against 
the judgment debtor to compel him to take the 
necessary steps to transfer the certificates to him, 
but, until that is affected, he has no such rights as 
are conferred by the certificates themselves.' 
(4} The Relationship Between the Permit and the Vehicle to 
Which it Relates 
There is-obviously a very important connection between a
permit and the vehicle to which it relates, but as the court 
50 
held in R��g�i� v Ganesh and Others, there is no reason why 
a permit cannot be attached and sold in execution (or indeed 
simply sold} in isolation from the vehicle. 
A permit confers the right to undertake road transportation 
in accordance with its terms and with the vehicle specified. 
It also.confers the right to substitute the vehicle (in 
accordance with the provisions of the Act} and the right to 
allow another to apply for the permit as a transferee. The 
continued existence of these rights does not depend per se on 
the possession, ownership or continued existence of the 
vehicle. The vehicle is merely the means by which the right 
to undertake road transportation is exercised. If the means 
_/ 
fails, the holder can apply for substitution or simply 
51 
substitute the vehicle in very limited circumstances. The 
purchaser of a permit acquires the right to apply for transfer 
and, it is submitted, the right to require the transferor to 
163 
give his written consent to the transfer. As the vehicle 
specified in the permit will not be available to a transferee 
who has only acquired the permit, he will also have to apply 
for the amendment of the permit to reflect its relationship 
to the vehicle with which he intends undertaking road 
52 
transportation. 
[CJ THE VALIDITY OF AGREEMENTS TO MAKE PROTECTIVE 
APPLICATIONS 
The making of protective applications is a widely used 
53 
strategy in road transportation. When a newcomer applies 
for a permit to operate in an area, existing operators 
outside of the area, together with those operating within the 
area band together to oppose the application, thus putting up 
a strong protective shield to protect their interests. In 
54 
such an application was 
made by the respondents to aid the most directly affected 
operator, Ramnarain, to oppose an application brought by one 
Ramroop. An agreement that the respondents would withdraw 
their application when Ramnarain's application was successful 
was allegedly reached. Ramnarain was successful in his 
application for renewal and Ramroop's application was 
refused. The respondents' application was not withdrawn and 
was granted a while later, no objectors taking part in the 
proceedings. The respondents, who formerly operated outside 
of the applicant's area were consequently in direct 
competition with him. He therefore applied for an interdict 
restraining the respondents from undertaking road 
transportation in the area, based on the alleged agreement 
between them. A rule nisi had been granted and the judgment 
in the case under discussion was given on the return day. 
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It was argued inter alia on behalf of the respondents that 
the provision of road transportation was in the public 
interest and a matter of public concern. Consequently any 
agreement restricting an application for a permit is contrary 
to public policy and unenforceable: the effect of such an 
agreement is to remove a particular applicant from the number 
from which a choice can be made and so, if the application 
would have been successful, the agreement would be 
prejudicial to the public, Kumleben J rejected this argument 
for two reasons: first, any real need would be met by grants 
to other applicants and the conducting of the services so 
authorized would be regulated by the Act; secondly, the 
freedom of contract is a fundamental of public policy and the 
55 
application of this doctrine superceded other considerations. 
The agreement was accordingly held to be enforceable because 
it was not against public policy or otherwise objectionable. 
It is submitted that the learned judge's strong support for 
the freedom of contract principle in an area of law involving 
a large degree of public policy, must be questioned. To 
hold, as he did, that the public interest is not affected 
because one is dealing with a single agreement, begs the 
56 
question. There may possibly be wider scope for the 
freedom of contract if a board could invite applications or 
take other steps to ensure that the transportation services 
offered to the public in its area are sufficient. In the 
present system of regulation, boards must await applications 
and then deal with them on their merits. Consequently, it is 
submitted that agreements which aid the stifling of 
competition should be regarded as contrary to public policy 
and hence be unenforceable. It is enough of a restriction on 
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[IIIJ 
the rights of the public that the choice of who shall convey 
is taken away from it and vested in statutory bodies. To go 
further and hold that, in addition, the operators themselves 
can decide, cannot be seen as desirable. 
CRITICISMS OF THE PERMIT- SYSTEM 
The permit system, as the appropriate regulatory technique, 
57 
was recommended by the Le Roux Commission. The 
legislature accepted the recommendation when it passed the 
Motor Carrier Transportation Act in 1930. It has remained in 
58 
operation since then, with only minor modifications and has, 
until relatively recently been accepted without question. The 
system has, of late, been subjected to severe criticism by, 
inter alia, such organized bodies as the Public Carriers 
Association, which represents a large number of road 
59 
transportation operators throughout the country. A 
number of objections have been raised against the permit 
system as it operates at present. 
discussed below. 
Some of these will be 
[AJ HIGHER OPERATION COSTS 
It has been alleged that the permit system results in 
operators facing higher cost. One reason for this is the 
time spent, and the delays caused, by the decision making 
process. This has been attributed to the fact that SATS 
(and, it must be added, many other operators,) appeal against 
60 
a high proportion of applications. Secondly, the permit 
system is widely regarded as a factor which inhibits hauliers 
from operating as efficiently as possible, thus contributing 
to inflation and soaring costs: it is seen as a major 
obstacle to the achievement of a high utilisation of 
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61 
vehicles. It has been pointed out that in 1982 the average 
utilisation of vehicles involved in long hauls was 50 
percent, whereas an acceptable level would be at least 
75 percent. The Public Carriers Association has 
contended that such a level of utilisation would have the 
62 
effect of cutting costs by at least 30 percent. 
[BJ THE STIFLING OF COMPETITION 
It has been argued that the permit system has not changed 
with changing needs. This has led to practices which seek to 
63 
avoid the law and a thriving black market which has 
resulted from the restrictions which the system has imposed. 
The chairman of the Public Carriers Association has made the 
point that 'there would be no illegal operators who deprive 
legitimate operators of business and are the bane of the 
authorities' lives, if there was not demand for them from 
65 
commerce and industry'. 
64 
In addition, when operators are in a position to do so, they 
may agree not to oppose each others' applications or they may 
band together to oppose the applications of newcomers, thus 
carving out complementary markets for each other. Protective 
applications of this sort are common in the industry and if 
66 
the decision in Ramnarain v Goordeen_and_Others is 
correct, such agreements may be enforceable. The result of 
collusion of this nature is that price fixing can occur, and 
monopolistic practices are not prevented. It has been 
alleged, in any event, that the system per se tends to 
encourage price fixing and monopolistic practices: when a 
permit is issued to an operator it places him in a very
strong position and may effectively lock out competition. 
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67 
Bekker J has pointed out that while this is not the main aim 
68 
of the Act, it may be an ancilliary effect. The Financial 
69 
Mail has concluded in this regard: 
'Competition is discouraged, if not stifled by the 
permit system, which becomes the backbone of a 
company's planning. The road transportation industry 
in its present form has been built on permits, not 
competition. ' 
[CJ THE SALE OF PERMITS 
It has been explained above that permits are transferable 
and, as a form of property, are capable of purchase and sale. 
Because of the immense importance of permits, they have 
become very valuable assets. 
71 
sale, of up to Rl00 000. 
They can command prices, on 
The sale of permits is not a new 
72 
phenomenon as the Page Commission pointed out in 1947: 
'In another case it is alleged that an operator sold 
thirteen buses with the certificates for more than 
70 
70 000 pounds, the thirteen buses being worth only a small 
fraction of that sum; and it is admitted that it is a 
usual practice to buy and sell certificates at high 
prices. The Motor Transport Owners' Association contends 
indeed that it is a legitimate practice, suggesting that 
the greater portion of the purchase price is paid for 
ttgoodwill", and that though the remainder may be regarded 
as "monopoly" value that is a value which properly accrues 
to the holder of the certificate. ' 
The effect of the high pric�s which attach to permits is that 
the cost of acquisition is, in the end, borne by the 
73 
transport user. 
[DJ CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that the problems which have been outlined 
are not an inherent characteristic of road transportation, 
but exist as consequences of the regulatory system which the 
legislature has opted for. While it may have been adequate 
and desirable at its inception, it has failed to meet the 
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[IVJ 
needs of transport users and operators in the economic 
environment in which the South African road transportation 
industry finds itself at present. 
THE POSSIBLE REFORM OF THE PERMIT SYSTEM 
Two proposed reforms have been canvassed: complete 
deregulation (subject, it is submitted, to adequate safety 
regulations) on the one hand, and a restructuring of the 
permit system on the other. The second alternative is, in a 
sense, a via media between deregulation and the present 
74 
system. Deregulation has already been discussed, but the 
reformation of the permit system will be dealt with below. 
The criticisms of the vehicle based pe�mit system has 
resulted in proposals that an alternative method be adopted, 
namely the so-called operators permit: the shift in emphasis 
is one from quantitative control to qualitative control. It 
has been suggested that while control will still be present 
the new system will ensure that 'only legally loaded, 
properly maintained vehicles driven by competent drivers use 
75 
the road'. All operators of commercial vehicles will be 
required to possess an 0-license. The Director-General: 
Transport outlined the criteria which would need to be 
76 
satisfied before an 0-license was issued: 
'To qualify for an 0-license, an undertaking will have 
to prove that it complies with criteria which would 
include the following: That it employs a competent 
person, a holder of a Certificate of Professional 
Competence (CPC), it has adequate parking facilities, 
it has made adequate arrangement for maintaining its 
vehicles and it has sufficient finance not to prejudice 
the safety of the operation.' 
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The proposed change is to be welcomed, but the extent to 
which the system will free itself from the problems inherent 
in the vehicle based system remain to be seen. The new 
regime, as envisaged by the Director-General, will have a 
77 
vehicle based component but, it is submitted, may serve as 
an adequate blueprint for the minimum of control in a 
deregulated environment. 
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[.I) APPLICATIONS IN GENERAL 
l A) GENERAL
As a general rule a board with territorial jurisdiction must 
be approached if an applicant requires a permit. The 
Commission acts as an appellate tribunal but it has power to 
entertain an application as a tribunal of first instance. It 
2 
only makes use of this power in special circumstances. 
Before an application for a permit will be considered by a 
board or the Commission certain formalities must be complied 
with: the application must be lodged on the appropriate form, 
the fees prescribed by reg 18(1) must be paid; and clear 
3 
answers must be given to questions relating to the application. 
Neither the Act nor the regulations require the publication 
of information in respect of applications for private or 
temporary permits. This contrasts with the provisions 
relating to public permits; prior to dealing with any 
application for the grant, amendment or transfer of a public 
permit, a board or the Commission must publish the following 
particulars in the Government Gazette: (1) the name of the 
applicant; (2) the place where the applicant intends to 
conduct business; (3) the nature of the application; (4) 
the number and types of vehicles which are the subject of the 
application; and (5) the nature of the proposed road 
transportation. The board or the Commission may cause the 
above information to be published if the application in question 
concerns the renewal of a permit, an amendment (concerning 
increases in tariffs) as contemplated by s12A or the amendment 
5 
to a permit authorizing the permanent replacement of a vehicles 
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Permits for public and private transportation may be issued 
6 
for an indefinite period or for a fixed period. If a permit 
has been granted for ·a fixed period, and on the date of its 
expiry, an application for its renewal is pending, the permit 
shall remain in force until the application has been dealt 
with. Temporary permits may be granted for transportation 
on a particular date or in relation to a particular 
8 
occurrence. The period of validity for such a permit may 
9 
not exceed 14 days. 
(BJ FEES 
A fee must be paid by an applicant to allow him to lodge his 
application. The amount payable is Rl0.00. The sum is 
forfeited irrespective of the success or failure of the 
10 
application. 
After a permit is granted, renewed or amended it must be 
issued along with distinguishing marks by the board or the 
Commission on the prescribed form. Before any permit is issued 
11 
the fees laid down by reg 18(1) must have been paid. The 
amount payable will depend on the type of permit in question. 
For a temporary permit to be issued a sum of RS.00 must be paid 
12 
per motor vehicle for each day upon which the permit is valid. 
Rl.00 is payable if the temporary permit is granted as an 
interim measure pending an application for the replacement of a 
13 
vehicle specified in a public permit. Prior to the issue of 
a public or private permit the following fees must be paid: 
Rl00.00 for the first issue or the renewal of a permit for an 
14 
indefinite period; Rl0.00 per transport year for the grant or 
15 
renewal of a permit for a specified period for each vehicle; 
16 
Rl0.00 for the amendment or transfer of a permit and for the 
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17 
issue of a duplicate permit; and 50 cents per vehicle if the 
holder of a permit successfully applies for the amendment of a 
18 
time-table or tariff rate. 
[CJ OBJECTIONS 
The provisions dealing wit� objections differ in relation to 
the types of permits. Therefore they will be dealt with 
separately. Mention has already been made of the difference 
regarding the publication of particulars in respect of 
public permits on the one hand and private and temporary 
permits on the other. These differences, and those mentioned 
below, it is submitted, testify to the varying degrees of 
public interest involved in the three types of permits, and 
the widely divergent economic activities which they 
authorize. The type of transportation authorized by a public 
permit has the most profound and far reaching competitive 
impact on SATS and potentially carries the highest public 
policy component. The widest rights of objection and duties 
of disclosure are therefore to be found in applications for 
public permits. The socio-economic impact of ancilliary use 
are not as far reaching, and it is more difficult to justify 
such large scale interference with the conducting of an 
ancilliary user's business. Thirdly, temporary permit holders 
are less of a threat to SATS and less important in the broad 
socio-economic system because the life of the permit is 
short. 
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(1) Public Permits
It has been explained above that before a board or the 
Commission may consider an application it must, in certain 
circumstances, cause to be published a number of particulars 
concerning that application. In other situations it has a 
19 
discretion as to whether it will do so or not.. This is 
int.ended to allow any interested party the opportunity to 
object to, or support, an application, to prepare 
representations and to inspect documents. 
Interested parties who wish to submit representations must do 
so in the manner prescribed by regulation and within the 
20 
specified time: the representations or information must be 
in writing and must be delivered by hand or sent by 
registered post to the board or the Commission not later than 
ten days after the details of the application are published in 
21 
the Government Gazette. The representations, if submitted 
to the Commission, must be in quindecuplicate and if submitted 
22 
to a board be in quadruplicate. 
If SATS or a holder of a permit wishes to make 
representations objecting to an application, full particulars 
of the objector's existing transport facilities within the 
relevant area,_on the �elevant routes or between the relevant 
23 
points, must be contained in the representation. Such 
objectors may inspect free of charge, and make copies of, the 
applicant's application form, as well as other documents 
24 
submitted by the applicant. The board or the Commission may 
provide an int�rested person with copies of an application 
form or other documents on request 7 provided he has paid the 
25 
fee prescribed by regulation. An applicant is entitled to 
access to representations either supporting or 
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opposing his application. 
Before disposing of an application the procedure laid down by 
the Act must be followed. S9(1) (a) provides that the board or 
the Commission may, in its discretion allow affected or 
interested parties, or their duly authorized representatives, 
to appear before it to give evidence or make oral 
representations, call witnesses and lead evidence and 
question any witnesses. Locus standi as an objector is 
specifically granted to municipal councils, city councils or 
town councils in certain circumstances. These bodies must be 
given an opportunity to make representations, before a permit 
is granted authorizing conveyance of persons for reward 
within the council's area of jurisdiction, or prior to the 
amendment of a permit which involves changes to 'the points 
between which or the route or routes upon which the motor 
vehicle to which the permit relates may be used in road 
27 
transportation'. 
SATS also has locus standi as an objector in respect of the 
grant of a permit authorizing the conveyance of persons for 
28 
reward or the amendment of such a permit, if the amendment 
relates to the alteration of points between which or on 
29 
which the motor vehicle operates. This body may, subject 
to compliance with the regulations, submit information 
concerning any new railway service either within the area to 
which the grant of the permit would relate, or between points 
which would be affected by a contemplated amendment of an 
30 
existing permit. 
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(2) Private Permits
Interested persons wishing to either support, or object to, 
an application for a private permit have similar rights to 
those granted in respect of public permits. In other words, 
the interested party may inspect the relevant application and 
related material, make copies of them, and have copies made 
by the board or- the Commission after paying the fee prescribed 
31 
by regulation. Unlike the case of a public permit, when a 
representation is made regarding an application for a private 
permit, no time period is stipulated within which the 
representation need be made. The regulation simply states that 
any interested party may, prior to the consideration of the 
application inspect and copy the relevant form and other 
related documents, and lodge with the Commission or board 
written representations either supporting, or objecting to, the 
application. Delivery must be made by hand or by registered 
32 
post. 
(3) Temporary Permits
The Act and the regulations are silent on the rights of 
objectors to applications for temporary permits. The 
question of whether a person can object to such an 
application must therefore be answered by reference to the 
common law. While it is conceded that the public interest in 
the issue of temporary permits is less important than that in 
relation to public permits, a perusal of s20(3) reveals that 
a board or the Commission is required to take into account 
alternative means by which the applicant can effect the 
33 
conveyance in question. This raises the issue of whether an 
operator of an existing transportation facility who thinks that 
it would be reasonable for the applicant to make use of his 
180 
services may object to the application. 
(a) Would an Objector Have Standing?
Before dealing with the question of whether the statute's 
silence on objections impliedly withdraws rights of 
objection, it is necessary to ascertain whether a transport 
operator in the area would have standing to object to the 
application. The answer appears to be in the affirmative. 
Baxter says that in order for a person to have a sufficient 
interest (and hence standing) he must claim a legal right or 
recognized interest, that the right or interest is direct 
34 
and that it is personal to him. On these grounds, it is 
submitted, a transport operator who feels that he could 
reasonably provide the conveyance in question would have 
standing. 
(b) Arguments for an Interpretation in Favour of Objections
There are three arguments which may be advanced in favour of a 
right to object to applications for temporary permits. First, 
the statute has the effect of protecting the interests of 
35 
existing (lawful) operators. The regulatory scheme locks them 
into the system, makes them subject to its provisions and in 
return protects them from undue outside competition. They 
should therefore be given the right to object to any decisions 
which have the potential of interfering with their 'privileged' 
position. Secondly, the Act forbids a board or the Commission 
from granting a temporary permit if in its opinion 'reasonable 
transportation facilities exist by means of which the persons 
or goods in respect of which such permit is sought can be 
36 
conveyed'. In order to ascertain whether those facilities 
exist the tribunal requires evidence. This can be acquired in 
the cheapest and speediest way by allowing inte�ested parties 
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to state their cases in the form of objections to the 
37 
application. Thirdly, the cases dealing with the review of 
decisions of boards to grant temporary permits have all 
appeared to accept the standing of the parties opposing the 
38 
decision. If they had standing in review proceedings, 
surely they had standing to object prior to the granting of 
39 
the permit. 
(c) Arguments Against an Interpretation in Favour of
Objections
The strongest argument against the right to object is that 
the legislature has expressly granted the right in respect of 
public and private permits but is silent as regards temporary 
permits. It is therefore to be presumed that the right has 
not been granted in terms of the maxim expressio unius est 
40 
exclusio alterius. A second argument is that the nature of 
temporary permits are such that the time factor is of great 
importance. Because objections would be time consuming the 
right to object cannot be inferred. Thirdly, it might be 
contended that because there is no duty on the board or the 
Commission to publish details of applications for temporary 
permits, there is no right to object. This contention rests 
on the assertion that the primary purpose of the duty to 
41 
publish particulars is to facilitate objections. 
(d) Conclusion
A tentative answer to the question posed above may be made 
with reference to the practice of boards. They treat 
applications for temporary permits in the same way as 
applications for private permits i.e. they allow objectors to 
make representations but do no publish particulars prior to 
the application being heard. Boards will, if the nature of 
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the application appears to demand it, notify at least the 
largest operators in the area. This policy is subject 
to one common-sense limitation: if the application 
is of an urgent nature the operators of existing services 
will not be notified. For the rest the onus lies on persons 
claiming to have an interest to familiarize themselves with 
the board's agenda, as they would have to do in order to 
object to an application for a private permit. 
It would appear therefore that objectors to temporary permits 
have standing to make representations simply through the 
process of board practice. To strengthen further the 
argument that they have a right to object, the fact must be 
pointed to that parties have often taken decisions on rev{ew 
when boards'have issued temporary permits without having to 
42 
face objections to their standing. The above would tend to 
point away from an interpretation of the Act in which effect 
is given to the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. 
[DJ WHO IS AN INTERESTED PARTY? 
(1) The Method of Determining Who is an Interested Party
Baxter makes the following observation regarding the 
right to participate in the procedures of administrative 
43 
tribunals: 
'The range of participants who may appear before a 
tribunal is usually delimited in rather vague terms by 
the relevant statute. For example, persons Kaffected" 
by the decision and persons "interested" in the 
decision are usually said to be entitled to appear and 
call witnesses. In practice this usually includes 
applicants for licenses, for example, and objectors to 
the application; but sometimes the right of appearance 
is not certain. When such provisions have been 
interpreted in court, the courts have tended to treat 
the "standing" of an individual before a tribunal in 
the same way as they have applied the requirement of 
locus standi in respect of applications for judicial 
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review, and they have evaluated his right of appearance 
accordingly.' 
The Road Transportation Act makes use of similar terminology. 
S9(1) says that a board or the Commission may allow 'any 
person affected by or interested in' a matter to appear 
before it give evidence, make oral representations, call 
witnesses, lead evidence and cross examine witnesses. The 
case of Polikor Investments (Pt�)_Ltd v Chairmani Local Road 
ii 
Transportation Board
i_Q�e�_Town and Others dealt with the 
interpretation of these provisions, the rights of an objector 
to the grant of a private permit being in issue. 
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In the Polikor case the applicant had been granted public 
permits for the conveyance of goods. It had subsequently 
agreed to transport goods belonging to the third respondent. 
At a later stage and despite this contract, the third 
respondent applied for, and was granted, private permits so 
that he could undertake his own transportation. The 
applicant had communicated its opposition to the application. 
When it become aware of the fact that the permits had been 
granted it appealed to the Commission. It was argued that 
the proceedings before the board had been irregular in that 
the applicant had not been given notice of the application 
and had thus been denied a hearing. This objection was 
overruled and the applicant sought an order setting aside the 
decisions of the board and the Commission. 
The court (per Grosskopf J) held that before granting 
a private permit, the board must (in terms of s18(3)) take two 
considerations into account: first, whether the applicant 
carries on the industry, trade or business for which the 
application is made at the place or places specified; and, 
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secondly, whether it would be unreasonable to expect th� 
applicant to make use of the existing railway service for the 
46 
conveyance of the goods in question. 
The learned judge decided on the basis of s18(3) that the Act 
only contemplated that the interests of SATS should be taken 
into account when considering an application for a_ private 
permit to convey goods. Therefore the adequacy of the 
service provided by other carriers, such as the applicant, 
47 
need not be taken into account. Grosskopf J went on to add: 
'This interpretation seems to follow from the terms of 
the legislation itself. Moreover it seems to me to be 
the most reasonable one in the circumstances. On 
general principles it does not seem unreasonable to 
allow an industrialist, trader or businessman to 
convey, in the ordinary course of his business, his own 
goods in his own vehicles on public roads. Where the 
Act limits this liberty, it should in my view be 
interpreted strictly.' 
The second question to be decided was whether a right to be 
heard could be read into the Act by virtue of the prejudice 
suffered by Polikor Investments. In this regard Grosskopf J 
began by pointing out that Polikor's own permits remained 
valid and that it had a contract with the third respondent 
which, if valid, could be relied on. It would thus not 
suffer any pecuniary prejudice. The only prejudice suffered 
would be the loss of a de facto monopoly, which was not a 
matter of legal right. In other words, its permits did not 
expressly or impliedly indicate that no competing permits 
would be granted. 
Consequently, because the applicant was not a person 
contemplated by s18(3} as someone whose interests must be 
taken into account, and that its interest in the granting of 
185 
the permits was not sufficient, there was no obligation on 
the part of the board to give it notice of the hearing or a 
48 
hearing. The learned judge stated obiter that he was 
inclined to the view that Polikor was not an interested party 
for the purposes of s18(2) either. Therefore the board was 
not obliged to allow it to inspect documents or make 
49 
representations. 
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The method adopted in the fQli�Q� case to determine who is 
an interested party, and therefore entitled to object and 
make representations, is a test with two steps: the first 
issue is whether the Act, in setting out the factors to be 
taken into account in the decision-making process, 
contemplated the person claiming standing; the second issue 
is whether that person, apart from the provisions of the Act, 
has a sufficient interest. The common law priciples on 
51 
standing apply to the second leg of the test. It may be 
observed that in most cases, if a purported objector falls 
outside the scope of the first leg, he will also fall outside 
the scope of the second. 
(2) An Application of the Polikor Test to Public and
Temporary Permits 
(a) Public Permits
While the factors taken into consideration in the fQ1ik£� 
52 
case only apply to private permits because the Act itself 
restricts the persons whose interests must be taken into 
account, the test for standing as an objector to the grant of 
a public permit is a wider one. S15(1) of the Act lays down 
matters to be taken into account by a board or the Commission 
when dealing with an application for the grant of a public 
permit. These factors include, inter alia, the necessity or 
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desirability of the transport in the public interest, the 
requirements of the public, the available transport 
facilities, economy in the use of petroleum fuel, 
justifications for the consumption of fuel, planned or 
contemplated railway services, the co-ordination of all forms 
of transportation and the ability of the applicant to provide 
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a satisfactory service. It will be noticed that the 
interests of the public generally are more prominent in an 
enquiry into the granting or refusing of a public permit. 
This necessarily means that a greater number of people must 
be able to object to or support applications than where a 
private permit is considered. The issues differ and the 
interests of the public are more directly affected. So in 
Roberts v Chairman, Local Road Transportation Board and 
54 
Another (1), where City Tramways Ltd had applied for an 
amendment to its permits to authorize an increased tariff, 
Roberts had standing by virtue of the fact that he was a user 
of the bus service. Friedman J dealt with this issue as 
55 
follows: 
'Any person who has been adversely affected by this 
premature decision of the Board - has locus standi to 
apply to this court to set aside the Board's decision. 
Applicant as a user of the buses has been so affected 
in the sense that he is obliged to pay higher bus fares. 
He is therefore entitled to approach this Court for 
appropriate relief.' 
The learned judge went on to hold that actual prejudice did 
not have to be proved but that potential prejudice was 
56 
sufficient to give an applicant standing. In conclusion, 
the following points may be made regarding standing to object 
to, or make representations regarding, applications for 
public permits: (i) standing to make representations is 
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expressly granted to municipal councils, city councils and 
57 
town coucils as well as SATS in defined situations; (ii) 
the provisions of s15(1), which detail the matters to be 
taken into consideration by a board or the Commission, point 
to interests which may be affected by the grant of an 
application. If a would be objector can show that he has an 
interest in terms of this section, he will have standing. In 
other words he must establish that he falls into a group of 
persons which was contemplated by the legislature in the 
58 
framing of s15(1}; (iii} if the would-be objector is· 
unable to establish that he falls within any of the groups 
mentioned in (i} or (ii}, above, he may nonetheless be 
entitled to standing: he would have to prove that he has a 
sufficient interest notwithstanding the fact that his case is 
59 
not expressly covered by the legislation. To do so he would 
have to establish a legal right or recognized interest, that 
60 
the right or interest is direct and it is personal to him. 
Because of the fairly wide set of interests which s15(1} 
covers it would be difficult to conceive of a situation in 
which standing is established in this way.
(b} Temporary Permits 
The problem of whether anyone may object to a temporary 
permit application has been dealt with above. If it is 
accepted that some persons may have standing as objectors, 
61 
the test as laid down in the Polikor case may be applied. 
On this basis it is submitted that any operator in the area 
in which the proposed conveyance is to take place will have 
standing. The reason for this submission is that ·the Act 
directs a board or the Commission to take into account 
62 
existing transportation facilities. In addition, if a person 
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[II) 
who is not an operator contemplated by the section can 
establish a sufficient interest he will be able to claim 
standing to make representations or to object. 
APPLICATIONS: THE HEARING 
The different economic and social functions which public, 
private and temporary permits serve have been discussed 
above. It is clear that in enacting the Road Transportation 
Act the legislature had these distinctions in mind: a 
glance at the relevant sections of the Act reveal that the 
substantive decision-making processes bear little resemblance 
to each other. The widest public interest is present in the 
case of applications for public permits, and this is 
reflected by the complex machinery of s15. The relative 
simplicity of ss18 and 20 contrast sharply with that section. 
[.A) PUBLIC PERMITS 
The process of applying for a public permit may be divided 
63 
into two parts: first, certain facts must be proved by 
the applicant in order to make himself eligible for the grant 
of a permit; secondly, the board or the Commission must take 
a number of factors into account when making the decision as 
to whether to grant or refuse the application. In the result 
the applicant must clear the first hurdle before the board 
or the Commission is competent to exercise its discretion 
either for or against the application. These two processes 
will be discussed separately below. 
(1) Facts Which the Applicant Bears the Onus of Proving
When no transportation facilities exist in an area or over a 
route, an applicant who wishes to provide a service has a 
relatively simple task. He bears the onus of proving two 
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things: that there is a need for a transportation 
facility as contemplated by the application and 
that he has the ability to provide the service in a manner 
64 
satisfactory to the public. The task of the operator who 
wishes to compete with existing services is more demanding. 
He bears the onus of proving the following: that the 
existing facilities are not satisfacory and sufficient to 
65 
meet the requirements of the public that will be affected; 
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that he has the ability to provide a satisfactory service; 
and either that the tariffs for existing facilities are 
unreasonable (SATS tariffs, however, are deemed to be 
67 
reasonable}, that it will be expedient in the public 
68 
interest to grant the permit to the applicant, or that he 
belongs to the same class (i.e. race} as the majority of the 
persons to be served and that it is in their interests to 
69 
grant the permit to the applicant. 
In its original form s15(2) placed the onus on an applicant, 
when a transportation facility already existed, to prove: 
'(i) such existing transportation facilities are not 
satisfactory and sufficient to meet the transportation 
requirements of the public in that area or along that 
route or between those points; or 
(ii} the tariff at which payment for such existing 
transportation facilities is to be made is 
unreasonable: Provided that railway tariffs shall, for 
the purposes of this section, be deemed to be 
reasonable; or 
(iii} having regard to the circumstances, it will be 
expedient in the public interest to grant him the 
permit; or 
(iv) he belongs to the same class as the majority of the
persons to be served by the transportation service
for which the permit is sought, and that it is in the 
inter�st of such per�ons desirable to grant him the
permit; and
(v) he has the ability to provide in a manner satisfactory
to the public the transportation for which the permit
is sought'
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This section was interpreted in the leading case of WC Greyling 
and Erasmus (Pty) Ltd v Johannesburg Local Road 
70 
Transportation Board and Others. -The facts of the case were 
as follows: the applicant had unsuccessfully applied for 
the grant of permits authorizing it to transport roof bolts 
to mines. Evidence was led to show that storage of the bolts 
or more than the minimum of handling could lead to damage, 
which in turn could impair safety in the mines in which the 
bolts were used. In addition, it was impossible for the 
mines to assess their needs in advance, so a speedy service 
to the shaft was necessary. The appellant provided such a 
service while the Railways Administration, who opposed the 
application, did not. Instead, it loaded at a factory or 
required the factory to transport the goods to a siding 
where they were loaded onto a train. They were off-loaded at 
the siding nearest the mine requiring the bolts. The mine 
was required to collect the goods and convey them to the 
shaft. The mines were therefore bound to the time-tables of 
trains in the area: if no train was due when roof bolts were 
needed production would either have to stop or, 
alternatively, continue in dangerous circumstances. 
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In the court a quo Van Reenen J held that paragraphs (i) to 
(v) of s15(2)(a) should be read conjunctively. In other words
the 'or' that appears at the end of each paragraph should be 
read as 'and'. An applicant wishing to compete in an area 
or over a route would, on this interpretation, be required to 
prove five things. The first difficulty in this argument 
lies, it is submitted, in s15(2)(a)(ii): an applicant is 
required to prove that tariffs for existing transport are 
unreasonable, but the tariff charged by SATS is deemed to be 
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reasonable. On Van Reenen J's interpretation, no applicant 
can succeed when a railway service exists. 
In the Appellate Division, Kotze JA (and an unanimous court) 
rejected the construction adopted by the court a quo for the 
72 
following reasons: 
'That conclusion rests on an interpretation of 
s15(2)(a) with which I cannot agree, viz that paras 
(i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) of s15(2)(a) are to be read 
conjunctively. No glaring absurdity or other compelling 
reason for disregarding the ordinary meaning of 
language suggests itself for construing "or" 
conjunctively in the several places where it occurs in 
s15(2)(a). On the contrary, there are weighty 
considerations which, in my view, point to an intention 
to attribute to the word "or" its normal meaning rather 
than an intention to treat "and" as a substitute for 
"or". The first consideration is that a conjunctive 
interpretation would necessarily require proof of 
paras (ii) and (iv) in every case whereas these 
paragraphs concern issues which may often be 
irrelevant The second consideration is this: in contra­
di stiction to the use of "or" between para (i )-(iv) the 
word "and" links para (i)-{iv) with para (v) - a 
clear indication that the Legislature had no intention 
of deviating from the ordinary meaning of two words 
which are in daily use.' 
The third reason advanced by the learned judge of appeal was 
that s15 should be regarded as a whole. In terms of s15(1) 
the board must take a number of factors into account. All of 
these must be considered. This envisages that the public 
should have a satisfactory service and if this is not being 
provided a service which meets this criterion should, if 
available, be given to the public. Thus a permit should not 
be refused if the refusal has the effect of protecting an 
unsatisfactory service and disrupting the business of the 
73 74 
public. The learned judge of appeal concluded: 
'It is in the light of ss(1) that ss(2)(a) must be 
considered. It provides in ss(2)(a)(i) that where there 
is in existence a service there is an onus on the 
applicant for a public permit. He mus-=rsnow that the 
existing service in the relevant area etc is not 
satisfactory and sufficient. If one has regard to the 
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essential requirments of s15(1) it is obvious that if 
an applicant does show that the existing service is not 
satisfactory and sufficient and (my italics) that he can 
provide a service "satisfactory to the public" he 
should (unless there are other reasons to the contrary) 
be granted the permit. The same considerations apply 
when one has regard to s15(2)(a)(iii). It provides 
that an applicant must discharge the onus of showing 
that in all the circumstances 11it will be expedient in 
the public interest to grant him the permit." It 
follows, as in the case of s15(2)(a)(i), that if he 
does he should be granted a permit.' 
With respect, the reasoning of Kotze JA seems sound and, it 
is submitted, reflects the intention of the legislature. The 
aim of the Act is to provide for control of certain forms of 
75 
road transportation and not simply to prevent all 
competition. 
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The Road Transportation Amendment Act altered s15(2)(a) in 
form but not in substance. The amendment simply re-arranged 
the matters which an applicant bears the onus of proving. It 
deleted the old s15(2)(a)(v) and replaced it, in its 
entirety, as s15(2)(a)(iA) below s15(2)(a)(i). The remainder 
is left untouched. Boards and the Commission took the sub­
section to mean that an applicant must prove that existing 
transportation facilities are not satisfactory and that he 
has the ability to provide facilities in a satisfactory 
manner, in addition to one of the remaining three 
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requirements. In Ratner and Collett Agencies (Pty) Ltd v 
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Chairman, National Transport Commission and Others, Le Roux 
J accepted this to be a correct interpretation. The learned 
judge held that it 'does not seem as though the effect of 
the sub-section has been materially altered from that 
considered by Kotze JA in the Greyling and Erasmus case'. 
More recently another interpretation has been given to 
s15(2). In Olgar v Chairman, National Transport Commission 
193 
I� �� 
and Another, Didcott J held that the sub-section: 
' ••• requires proof of all the circumstances specified 
in sub-paragraphs (ii), (iA) and (ii) taken together 
or, as an alternative, proof of those prescribed by 
sub-paragraph (iii), alone or, as a further 
alternative, proof of those mentioned only in sub­
paragraph (iv).' 
The learned judge opted for this interpretation because he 
said, both it and the one favoured by Le Roux J are equally 
plausible but the former is less onerous on those wishing to 
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seek permission to do business as carriers. 
(2) Factors to be Taken into Account by the Board or the
Commission
S15(1) contains thirteen factors which a board or the 
Commission must consider prior to granting or refusing an 
application for a public permit. The importance of the 
section in the decision-making process was emphasized by 
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Kotze JA in the §���li�g_and Erasmus case: 
'Each and every one of these matters must be considered. 
A study of the list shows that not only must existing 
facilities be considered and co-ordinated but a board 
must also consider the requirements of the public in 
the particular area, over the relevant routes and 
between the relevant points; the extent to which the 
transport is necessary or desirable; the co-ordination 
of transportation on an economically sound basis with 
due regard to the public interest; the ability of the 
applicant to provide transportation in a manner 
satisfactory to the public.' 
All of the factors will not be discussed. Instead some of 
the more important considerations will be examined in 
relation to their interpretation by the courts. 
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(a) The Public Interest
and_Anot.her, the public int:erest. requirement. was t.he major 
issue. Cape Carriers had entered into a contract., reliant on 
the granting of permits, to convey asbestos cement pipes from 
Cape Town to Port Elizabeth. Despite the objection of the 
first. respondent, the permits were granted. On appeal t.o the 
Commission, the boards decision was reversed. In review 
proceedings, evidence was led t.o the _effect. that. a railway 
service existed between the two cent.res, the cost of such 
conveyance being 22 300 pounds. The cost of a shipping service 
was 11 166 pounds while the cost. would have been 12 250 pounds 
if the appellant conveyed the pipes by road. Beyers J held 
that in the absence of evidence of an incorrect motive on the 
part of the second respondent the only ground open to the 
applicant was a failure by the Commission to apply the 
provisions of the Act relevant to the case. 
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The learned Judge 
held: 
'It appears to me that the quest.ion to which second 
respondent was by law obliged to apply itself was 
whether, having regard to all the circumstances of the 
case and having regard in the widest possible terms to 
national and public interest, it would allow applicant 
to conduct the proposed road carrier transportation or 
not.. ' 
Beyers J, in deciding that this enquiry had been properly 
conducted, went on to say that, bearing in mind the fact that 
the route was serviced by rail and ship, there was no reason 
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to allow another mode of transport. 
The meaning of 'the public interest' was canvassed fully in 
86 
the case of H��Q§i v Qittmar en 'n Anderi in which it was 
unsuccessfully argued that the protection of existing 
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services from competition was, per se, in the public 
interest. The applicant had challanged the validity of a 
permit granted by a board in excess of its territorial 
Jurisdiction. In addition he sought to claim damages as a 
result of the first respondent's unlawful transportation 
activities in the area in which he (the applicant} operated. 
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The rule in E�i� v Greene_and_Co was invoked on behalf of 
the applicant. In terms of this rule if an enactment has 
prohibited the doing of an act in the interests of a class of 
persons any member of that class is entitled to compensation 
from the person who contravened the prohibition, without proof 
of special damages. It is insufficient for the applicant to 
show that the prohibition works to the advantage of the class 
of which he is a member: it must be intended to protect that 
class. 
The applicant argued that the aim of the Act was to create an 
economically healthy and stable transportation industry and, 
to achieve this aim, boards were precluded from issuing 
permits which created competition with existing operations. 
The intention of the Act, as opposed to one of its 
consequences, was to protect existing transport businesses, 
this being in the public interest. The rule in f�t� v Gre�rr� 
§.§. 
�m!_fQ would therefore apply. 
Bekker J rejected this argument, holding that the first and 
fundamental duty of a board is to ensure that the rail and 
road transportation facilities of the country operate on a 
sound basis and that the public interest does not suffer any 
89 
prejudice. 
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'Na my mening was dit nie die doel van die Wetgewer om 
bestaande besighede to beskerm nie. Die enigste oor­
weging en doel voor oe was om openbare belang te 
bevorder en soos Murray HR, sf dit is die grondleggende 
doel van die Wet en die uitskakeling van moontlike 
kompetisie "is only an element in the former". Dit volg 
dus dat applikant slegs kan slaag indien by nou as 
gewone burger bewys kan lewer dat die onwettige optrede 
van die respondent horn skade berokken het.' 
It is submitted that Bekker J's conclusion is correct. The 
bar to the grant of a permit when existing facilities operate 
in its area of authorization is not absolute. If the 
facilities are not adequate a board would be bound to grant a 
permit to an operator who can (in its opinion) provide an 
adequate service. Similarly, the fact that services in an 
area are adequate does not mean that they cannot be improved. 
In dealing with these issues the board would have to apply 
its mind, inter alia, to the public interest which is quite 
clearly in opposition to the desire of existing operators for 
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protection from competition. 
(b) The Requirements of the Public
515(1) (b) requires a board. or the Commission to take into 
account 'the requirements of the public for transportation 
within the area or along the route or between the points in 
or over or between which the applicant proposes to operate'. 
This section may be distinguished from s15(1) (a) by the fact 
that while the latter requires consideration of the public 
interest in the broadest terms, the former narrows down that 
interest to one particular area. 
The most obvious and, no doubt, easiest way of acquiring 
information as to the requirements of the public would be by 
means of evidence given·during proceedings before a board. 
Representatives from organizations in an area or acknowledged 
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leaders in a community are examples of the witnesses who may 
be able to furnish the necessary information. The case of 
�2��-Elizabeth Local Road_I�����ortation Board and Others v 
91 
�l��lrrg provides an illustration of another method. The 
respondent had successfully tendered for a contract to carry 
mail between two small towns in the Eastern Province. He had 
been awarded the contract at the expense of one Hydenryck, 
who had carried the mail for a number of years. The 
respondent then applied to the board for a permit authorizing 
him to convey the goods. Hydenryck objected to the 
application and the board (and later, the Commission) refused 
Liesing's application. 
The most important aspect of the case for present purposes is 
an obiter dictum dealing with the requirements of the public. 
The contract between Liesing and the government was entered 
into, on the latters behalf, by the Postmaster-General. 
Munnik J assumed for the purpose of the judgment that the 
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Postmaster-General and the public could be equated. 
The principle which emerges from this case is that where a 
contract is entered into between a transport operator and a 
public official for a service to the public in an area, the 
choice of operator having been made by the official, it will 
be assumed that the official's decision represents that of 
the public. This general statement must, no doubt, be 
subject to qualification: the official could not be seen as 
the agent of the public if he acted in a corrupt manner; a 
proper choice would have to be open to him; and the way in 
which a tender is awarded would have to be scrutinized. In 
short, the question as to whether the decision of the public 
official could be equated with the choice of the public would 
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depend on the facts.of the individual cases. 
(c) Existing Facilities and the Conservation of Fuel
S15(1) Cc} is a blend of the old and new. The first part of 
the section directs a board or the Commission to consider the 
'existing transportation facilities available to the public'; 
the latter part, introduced into the Act by the Road 
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Transportation Amendment Act, makes the economical use of 
petroleum fuel resulting from the intended conveyance a 
relevant consideration. 
(i} Existing Transportation Facilities 
It is perhaps trite to state that the deciding tribunal must 
ensure that transportation facilities do in fact exist if a 
refusal to grant a permit is based on such existence. This, 
however, was the mistake which the board and the Commission 
94 
Hydenryck, the conveyor of mail 
prior to the tender being awarded to Liesing, had a permit 
for that conveyance. Liesing had the contract but no permit. 
His application was refused. It was decided that Hydenryck 
provided an existing facility which the hoard was required to 
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consider. Munnik J rejected this by stating that: 
' ... the grant of a certificate to the respondent could 
in the particular circumstances of this case never be a 
grant of a certificate in competition with an existing 
service, because only one carrier could carry the mail 
i.e. the carrier who had a contract with the
Postmaster-General to do so.'
In R�i���-and Collett_�g��£ies (Pt�} Ltd v Chairman, National 
�� 
Transeort_Commission_and_Others, it was argued that the 
Commission had misdirected itself by not taking into account 
the air service between Durban and Johannesburg. Le Roux J 
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held that the air service should have been considered in the 
context of the applicant's express overnight service. 
(ii) The Conservation of Fuel
Boards and the Commission must, in dealing with an 
application for a permit, take into account whether or not 
there will be a saving in the consumption of petroleum fuel 
resulting from the proposed transportation. If no saving 
will be effected any justifications for the use of fuel must 
be considered. 
(d) Co-ordination of Services
In tl�h���J v Qentral Road Trans2ortation Board and Another 
the duty of a board to consider the co-ordination of all 
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forms of transportation was in issue. The terminals of a 
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route which was to be operated by the City Council, were not 
connected to existing routes. It crossed two existing routes 
and one terminal was within 200 yards of an existing 
route. The court held (per Broome and de Wet JJ) that in 
these circumstances co-ordination was not impossible. 
Passengers on the route could, if it was convenient, connect 
up with the other routes which crossed the one authorized, or 
walk the 200 yards from the terminal to the route that passed 
at that point. In the circumstances the decision of the 
board was supportable as it took account of the proper 
considerations. S15(5) Cb) of the Road Transportation 
Act seems to overcome any confusion or doubt created by the 
above judgment. It says that 'transportation shall be 
deemed to be capable of being co-ordinated with existing 
transportation facilities if sucq transportation is to be 
provided to or from a place or area situated on or along a 
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route, or included in an area, served by such existing 
transportation facilities'. 
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In the Ratner and Collett Agencies case, consideration of 
the air service was argued on the basis of slS(l) (e): the 
service should have been considered when the Commission gave 
attention to the co-ordination of services: 
'The various services rendered by the South African 
Airways, their relative cost and the possible saving to 
the public should, in my view be investigated and the 
objections, if any, of the applicant and its clients 
thereto should be fully investigated and considered before 
the Commission could be said to have exercised its 
discretion properly.' 
(e) Previous Convictions
The weight to be attached to any previous convictions of the 
applicant, for offences in terms of the Act, depends on a 
number of factors e.g. the number of previous convictions, 
the regularity with which the offences were committed and the 
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severity of the offences. The mere fact that the applicant 
has been convicted for road transportation offences is, in 
itself, insufficient to warrant the refusal of a permit. In 
Asmal's Bus Service (Pty) Ltd and Others v Local Road 
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!�����ortation Board and Others an applicant had been
convicted six times for overloading buses, not being in 
possession of certificates of fitness, failing to issue 
tickets and not operating according to time-table. It had 
challenged the validity of the grant of permits to the fourth 
respondent. Miller J held that while the previous 
convictions and attempts to mislead the board could be taken 
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into account, they were not decisive. 
(f) Representations
Not only must a board or the Commission take into 
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consideration 'any representations duly submitted in 
103 
connect.ion with the application,' but also any 
recommendations made by a committee appointed by the Minister 
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in terms of s22(h) and any report or document drawn up as a 
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result of a s3(1) (g) enquiry. 
It should be noted that if any such representations are made, 
a board or the Commission is bound to inform the applicant of 
the contents of the representation so that. the latter can 
challenge or refute any prejudicial evidence. The Asmal 's 
!.Q.§. 
Bus Service case provides a clear example. The court found 
that the real reason for the boards's decision to grant a 
permit to the fourth respondent was not the applicant's 
unsuitability, either morally or racially. Instead it had 
come to its decision after the chairman had had discussions 
with a Bantu Affairs Commissioner who had recommended that 
the permit be granted to the fourth respondent, who was 
African. Miller J's findings on this point appear from the 
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following extract: 
'I am prepared to accept that it was not irregular for 
the chairman to have discussed the matter with the 
Commissioner in private, but having done so and having 
come by information which might influence it against 
the interests of the applicant, it was the duty of the 
Board to disclose such information to the applicants 
and to give them an opportunity of dealing with it.' 
{g) The Race of the Applicant 
When originally enacted, the Motor Carrier Transportation Act 
was free of racially discriminatory provisions. The race of 
the applicant. became relevant when Act 14 of 1955 inserted 
s13(2) (i)bis and s13(bis). These provisions are now 
contained in s15(1) (j) and s15(3) of the Road Transport.at.ion 
Act.. The former provides that a board or the Commission must 
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take into account, when dealing with an application 'the 
class of persons to which the applicant belongs and the class 
or classes of persons to be served by the transportation 
services for which such permit is sought'. 
The latter provision provides that a board or the Commission 
may, when dealing with an application for a public permit 
'give preference to an applicant who belongs to the same 
class as the majority of the persons to be served by the 
transportation service for which a permit is sought'. 
(i) The Position Prior to the Amendment
The reason for the inclusion of the racial provisions may be 
traced to the decision of the Appellate Division in Tayob v 
108 
Ermelo Local Road Transportation Board. Tayob operated a 
first class taxi, i.e. one for the conveyance of white 
people. During the years in which he provided this service 
he had received no complaints. On applying for a renewal of 
his permit his application was refused and in its place a 
permit for a second class taxi (i.e. for the conveyance of 
blacks) was offered to him. Three white operators had 
applied for, and were granted, permits for the conveyance of 
whites. It appeared from the reasons furnished by the board 
and the Commission (dismissing Tayob's appeal) that the 
application had been refused in accordance with a policy to 
grant whites permits to convey whites, and blacks permits to 
convey blacks. In delivering the unanimous decision of the 
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court, Centlivres CJ held: 
'There is no statutory prov1s1on to the effect that 
non-European drivers should cater for non-Europeans and 
it is common knowledge that many Europeans employ non­
European drivers. Moreover to apply the principle that 
non-European drivers should cater for only non-
203 
Europeans generally and without qualification may 
result in very great hardship to non-Europeans. For it 
may well be that the holder of a second class taxi 
exemption may in certain circumstances find it 
difficult, if not impossible, to make his taxi service 
pay, while the holder of a first class exemption may 
have no difficulty in doing so.' 
The learned Chief Justice went on to hold that he could find 
nothing in the Act which empowered the board or the Commission t 
act unreasonably, and to refuse the application on the basis 
of race was unreasonable. The granting of a second class 
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exemption did not cure this defect. The court pointed out 
that the proper approach to be applied was to consider all 
four applications on merit and, if only three permits were 
required, to grant them to the three most deserving 
applicants. In upholding the appeal, Centlivres CJ decided 
that, in the special circumstances of the case, it would be 
inappropriate to remit the matter to the board. Instead it 
111 
ordered the grant of the permit to Tayob. 
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I�YQQ�� case was distinguished in Das� v Durban Local Road 
11� 
Tranportation BQard and Others. Dass, an Indian, operated a 
bus service to Lamontville which is a African township. He 
applied for three additional permits for the route from the 
centre of Durban to the township. At the same time the 
African Transport Company, whose shareholders were African, 
applied for permits too. These were granted while those of 
Dass were refused. It appeared from the reasons given by the 
board, that the permits were granted to the African Transport 
Company because it was owned by Africans and the majority of 
passengers were African. The board believed that the people 
of Lamontville wished to be conveyed by operators of the same 
race. 
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Befo�e the Natal Provincial Division the applicant argued 
that the board's decisions were ultra vires because they were 
based solely on the race of the applicant and third 
respondent. It was argued on behal_f of the board that there 
was nothing to chocise between the two applications as far as 
efficiency, proper running of bu�es, adequacy of maintenance 
and service was concerried. It therefo�e took a number of 
other· factors into account: the third respondent had f6rme_d 
to convey Africans; after riots in 1949 grievances were 
expressed about Indiari operators by African communities; it 
was obvious that these communities were ill-disposed towards 
Indian bus owners and wanted their own services; 
representations by the Durban City Council and the Department 
of Native �ffairs were to the effect that Africans who showed 
a desire to set up transportation services should be 
encouraged to do so in the hope that this would satisfy the 
communities and diminish the risk of further rioting. On the 
basis of these additional factors th� board granted the 
114 
permits to the African Transport Company. 
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The applicant relied on Tayob's case as authority for the 
propo�ition that, as the Act did not authorize 
discrimination, the board's decision was ultra vires. De Wet 
J distinguished that case by pointing out that Tayob was 
debarred from operatihg a first class taxi simply because he 
was an Indian and, in that situation the court was dealing 
with a multi-racial community. 
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was different: 
In the present case the issue 
'Here we are concerned with a particular location, 
Lamontville, which is purely a Native Location, which 
is restricted to Native occupation. It does ncit seem 
to me that the Local Board, in considering the 
suitability of th� person who is to operate in that 
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area, would act unreasonably if it takes into account a 
recommendation by the public bodies who administer the 
Location that buses serving the Location should belong 
to Africans, or, for that matter, if it took into account 
the views of the people in the Location itself. The 
differentiation here is brought about objectively, not 
subjectively. The race of the community that has to be 
served is a factor that is taken into account, just as 
is the state of the roads, the density of the population 
and other features in the particular area which are 
weighed up when the Board has to decide whether or not 
a certificate of transportation should be granted.' 
The application was accordingly dismissed. 
(ii) The Present Position
The racial qualification is now part of the Act. No longer 
is the issue one of reasonableness. The fixed policy, which 
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was held to be invalid in Tayob's case, is now part of the 
law. This fact has not had the effect of removing problems 
in relation to the application of ss15(1)(j) and 15(3). 
In National Transport Commission and Another v Chetty's Motor 
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Transport (Pty) Ltd ffie respondent and the second appellant, the 
Pietermaritzburg City Council, had both applied for permits. 
These permits were to authorize the conveyance of passengers 
along a route from Pietermaritzburg to Newholme, a 
residential complex within an Indian Group Area. The 
applications were reciprocally opposed. One of the arguments 
put forward on behalf of the respondent was that, as an 
Indian company, it should be given preference in terms of 
s13(3)(bis) (now s15(3)) of the Motor Carrier Transportation 
Act. 
Holmes JA pointed out that the weight to be accorded to the 
discretion granted by s13(3)(bis) varies according to the 
circumstances of each case. If, for instance, two applicants 
of different races applied for a permit to convey persons and 
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both were ably qualified to do so, the board could in its 
discretion prefer the operator of the same race as the 
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potential passengers. The learned judge of appeal went on 
to say that when one of the applicants is a Council or local 
authority, the situation is different. Such a body is 
expected to provide transport.at.ion services for all of its 
inhabit.ants and to all areas within its jurisdiction where a 
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service is required. Consequently Holmes JA concluded that.: 
'in the cont.ext. of transportation therefore, it cannot 
be said that the Council, which is a corporate body, 
belongs to any one particular class. And it gathers 
beneath its t.ransportat.ional wing all classes 
throughout the entire municipality. In these 
circumstances the Commission, or local board, would be 
entitled, in its discretion, to give little weight to 
any preference under s13{2) (bis). To put it another 
way, any preference in favour of the Chetty company 
might. well, in the discretion of the Commission, have 
lost much of its force in the circumstances of the 
present. case, bearing in mind also what is said in the 
following paragraph hereof. ' 
It is submitted· that a proper construction of ss15(1) (j) and 
15(3) is that the board or the Commission must take the 
racial factor into account along with the other factors 
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mentioned in s15{1). Then, having done so, s15(3) grants it 
a discretion to give this factor as much weight as the 
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circumstances of the case call for. In this regard the 
overriding considerations should be the efficiency of the 
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service and the public interest. If there are no special 
circumstances which favour one applicant above another the 
discretion to grant. the permit to the operator 'racially most 
suitable' may be employed. 
[BJ PRIVATE PERMITS 
When a private permit is applied for the enquiry is not as 
comprehensive as the enquiry under slS. The reasons for this 
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difference are that the public interest is not as directly 
affected and that the transportation in question is on 'own 
account'. The ancilliary user therefore is required to prove 
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a lesser number of facts than the professional carrier. 
In order to be in a position to receive favourable 
consideration, an applicant for a private permit must 
discharge the onus of proving two things: first, that he 
carries on the industry, trade or business for which the 
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permit is sought at the address or addresses specified, and 
secondly, that it would be unreasonable for him to make use 
of any available railway service, despite the fact that 
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railway tariffs are deemed to be reasonable. The phrase 
'available railway service', for the purpose of s18(3) (b), 
was interpreted in R�xnolds Brothers Ltd v ChairmanL_Local 
lf-I 
Road Transportation BoardL Johannesburg_,_ and_Another. The 
applicant had applied for private permits to convey sugar 
from its mill to its customers. The nearest railway station 
capable of handling the freight was 105 kilometres away. It 
argued that the railway service was not available to it 
because of the distance and because it fell outside of the 80 
kilometre exclusion contained in s1(2} (y). Coetzee J, in the 
court a quo rejected this contention, holding that the service 
was available even though it was not readily available and 
permits would have to be granted to the applicant to enable it 
to make use of the service. On appeal, however, Miller JA held 
that for the railway service to be 'available' to an ancilliary 
user it must lie within the 80 kilometre radius contemplated by 
127a 
sl <2> Cy>. 
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Once the onus has been discharged the board or the 
Commission only has to take one consideration into account: 
whether the promotion of economy in the use of petroleum fuel 
128 
will be served by the grant of the permit. 
CCJ T�MPORARY PERMITS 
Temporary permits are at the bottom in the descending order of 
public interest. The provisions relating to the grant of 
these permits are short and simple: a board or the 
Commission is debarred from making a grant if reasonable 
transportation facilities exist by means of which the persons 
or goods in question may be conveyed, and if no Justification 
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exists for the proposed use of petroleum fuel. The onus of 
proving that the proposed transportation is necessary is cast 
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upon the applicant. 
CIIIJ THE DISPOSAL OF APPLICATIONS AND THE ISSUING OF PERMITS 
CAJ THE DISPOSAL OF APPLICATIONS 
A hoard or the Commission has power to receive and consider 
applications for the grant, renewal, amendment or transfer of 
131 
public permits. These powers are limited when an 
application is made for a private or temporary permit: in 
the case of the former, a board or the Commission may receive 
and consider applications for the grant, renewal or amendment 
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of such a permit, while in the case of the latter, the 
tribunal is simply empowered to 'receive and consider any 
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application for a temporary road carrier permit'. It may 
then grant the application in full, in part, in full or in 
part but subject to conditions or requirments, or it may 
134 
refuse the application. 
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While a board or the Commission must receive and consider 
applications for public permits generally, it may refuse to 
do so if an application has the same, or substantially the 
same object as an unsuccessful application made less than 
135 
six months previously. No appeal will lie to the Commission 
in relation to a b9ard acting-in this manner but, it is 
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submitted, the decision will be reviewable. If two boards 
have joint jurisdiction and one of them refuses an 
application, that refusal will not act as a bar to a similar 
137 
or substantially similar application within six months. 
The provisions relating to applications for public and 
private permits correspond in respect of two aspects: first 
if an application is made for the renewal of a permit granted 
for a fixed period, it will not be considered if the 
application (and the prescribed fee) has not been received 
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before the expiry date of the permit; secondly, an 
application will not be considered if a public or private 
permit has been issued to a person other than the applicant, 
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in respect of the vehicle to which the application refers. 
Two further provisions apply to the disposal of applications 
for public permits. In the first place, a board or the 
Commission is able to refuse to deal with an application for 
the grant, amendment or transfer of a permit if the fees 
prescribed by regulation have not been paid. This rule 
applies not only to applicants but also to persons wishing to 
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submit representations objecting to the application. It is 
submitted that the deciding body has a discretion as to 
whether to refuse to entertain the application or 
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representation. This provision does not apply to 
applications for the renewal of a permit, which is dealt with 
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in sl3(2) (bB). The final provision applies to the grant, 
renewal, amendment or transfer of a permit. It gives a board 
or the Commission a discretion as to whether to entertain 
such an application if the application form is not completed 
142 
in full in accordance with the regulations. 
CB] THE ISSUING OF PERMITS 
<1> General
Ss13, 18 and 20 of the Act confer powers on a board or the 
Commission to g��£i permits (either in full, in part or in 
full or in part, but subject to conditions or requirements) 
while s21 confers the power to !��g� permits. Clearly a 
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distinction between granting and issuing is envisaged: 
'Section 5(1) (c) (now s3(1) (c)) envisages that the act 
of granting a certificate is a separate act from that 
of issuing it. The Board cannot delegate the 
discretion which is vested in it of granting a 
certificate; accordingly it cannot order a local board 
to grant and issue a certificate for and on its behalf 
But where the Board has already granted a certificate 
its issue is a matter of a purely mechanical nature 
which it may delegate to a local board under sub­
section 2, or to any duly authorized officer. p 
The maxim delegatus non delegare potest clearly has no 
application when the power to issue a permit is delegated by 
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the Commission. 
(2) Facts Which Must Exist Prior �o the Issuing of a Permit
While the issuing of a permit does not involve the exercise 
of a discretion, it may only be done after certain facts are 
found to be present. Before being in a position to exercise 
this power (and after a permit has been granted), the issuing 
body must satisfy itself as to two facts: first, that the 
vehicle involved is suitable for the class of road 
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transportation for which it is to be used and secondly, that 
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a certificate of fitness, issued by the licensing and 
registration body_of the appropriate province, has been 
146 
submitted to it. 
147 1 
In the case of£����� v Matiso t/a Matiso_Bros and Others it 
was contended that a board had issued permits without 
satisfying itself as to the roadworthiness of the vehicles to 
which the permits related and that the issuing was therefore 
ultra vires. The case was decided in terms of the provisions 
of the Motor Carrier Transportation Act which then applied in 
the Transkei. The relevant section, s9(7), said that a board 
or the Commission 'shall refuse to grant, renew, amend or 
transfer any motor carrier certificate or exemption ... if it 
is not satisfied that the motor vehicle in respect of which 
the certificate or exemption is sought is roadworthy ... ' 
Munnik CJ held that while the Act did not specifiy how the 
board was to satisfy itself of the roadworthiness of 
vehicles, it had adopted the method of requiring the 
production of certificates of fitness. (This method is now 
.contained in s21(2) (b} of the Road Transportation Act). The 
learned Chief Justice concluded that the 'provisions of s9(7) 
are peremptory and therefore the Local Board, far from being 
entitled to issue the renewal, was in the circumstances bound 
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to refuse it'. 
A certificate of fitness must be lodged in respect of each 
vehicle for which a permit has been granted. If the original 
is not handed to the board or the Commission then a copy or 
photocopy, certified as a true copy by a Commissioner of 
Oaths may be handed in. Delivery must be made by hand or 
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registered mail and this requirement must be complied with 
not later than 60 days after the applicant has been informed 
149 
of the grant. The date of issue of the certificate may not 
be more than 180 days before the date on which the permit was 
150 
granted. The period within which the certificate of fitness 
may be lodged can be extended by the board or the Commission 
151 
following a request by the applicant. 
(3) Information Which a Permit Muat Contain
Any permit issued by a board or the Commission must contain 
certain information. This includes the name and address of 
the holder and, if the holder carries on any road 
transportation business, then his business address must be 
specified. If the holder has been granted a private permit 
the folowing must appear in addition to his name: the 
address at which the industry, trade or business, in respect 
of which the permit was granted, is carried on, or a 
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description of the place or places where it is carried on. 
If the permit is granted for a fixed period, this period must 
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be specified on the document when issued. Information about 
the vehicle must be included. This includes the registration 
number, make, the year of manufacture, the type of and 
154 
seating capacity of the vehicle •Or its carrying capacity. 
If tariffs have been approved or laid down by the board or 
the Commission, the manner in which they are to be published 
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or exhibited must be laid down. In addition, the nature or 
class of road transportation which is authorized must be 
specified as well as the class or classes of persons which 
may be conveyed. If the permit contains authority to convey 
goods, then the class or classes of goods must be stated as 
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well as the class or classes of persons whose goods may be 
conveyed. 1hese factors are determined by the board or the 
Commission in the exercise of the body's discretion when 
156 
granting the permit. Similarly any permit must show the 
territorial area to which it applies either by specifying 
routes or areas. Restrictions and conditions in respect of 
157 
these routes or areas must also appear. 
(4) Conclusion
In conclusion it will be noted that when � board or the 
Commission decides on whether to grant, renew, amend or 
transfer a permit it has a wide discretion limited only by 
the factors the Act requires it to take into account and the 
principle of legality. When a permit is to be issued, 
certain jurisdictional facts must exist as a condition 
precedent for the issue of the permit. No discretion exists 
in this case. The board or the Commission must satisfy itself 
as to the existence of the facts in accordance with s21 and 
with the guidance of the regulations. On review a court must 
ensure that these statutory conditions, which limit the 
extent of the issuing body's powers, ,have been complied with. 
Non compliance will invalidat� the purported exercise of 
power: to allow its decision to stand would be to allow 
it, by its own error, to give itself powers which were never 
conferred upon it. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Act makes provision for the withdrawal, suspension or 
variation of public and private permits. The reason for the 
existence of powers to alter the authority originally 
contained in a permit is not hard to find: a permit is 
granted because there is, at the time, a perceived need for a 
road transportation service in an ar.ea. If circumstances 
change, the existing service may be rendered superfluous. 
The boards and the Commission are given the task of 
administering the transportation policy embodied in the Act. 
They are given some far reaching powers to fulfill that 
function. The power to withdraw, suspend or vary a permit is 
an instance in point. 
The rights which a permit embodies may be lost in another 
way. Public and private permits may lapse in defined 
circumstances. In this case the authority contained in the 
permit ceases to be effective as a result of acts or 
omissions of the permit holder and not through the actions of 
a board or the Commission. 
CIJ THE_WITHDRAWALL_SUSPENSION_OR_VARIATION_OF_PERMITS 
The Act envisages the withdrawal, suspension or variation of 
permits in three situations: when such a course of action is 
deemed to be necessary by a competent board or the 
1 
Commission, 
2 
when a railway service is established in an 
3 
area and after an enquiry instituted by the Minister. 
all of the above instances procedural safeguards are 
prescribed and, in the case of the last two, provision is 
made for the payment of compensation to the holder of the 
permit which has been withdrawn or amended. 
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In 
CAJ WITHDRAWAL, SUSPENSION OR VARIATION IN THE DISCRETION OF THE 
BOARD OR THE COMMISSION 
<1> Grounds upon which the Discretion may be Exercised
525 grants a board or the Commission the power to withdraw, 
suspend or vary public arid private permits in certain 
circumstances. For example, a permit may be withdrawn or 
suspended (for an appropriate period of time) if a holder, or 
a holder's employee, is convicted of an offence under the 
Act, under any law relating to motor vehicles or the 
regulation of traffic or contravenes a binding determination, 
agreement, award, licence or exemption dealing with remunera-
tion for work or hours or work. The same consequences may 
befall a holder who has not faithfully carried out the 
5 
conditions or requirements of the permit. 
The section makes provision too for withdrawal or suspension 
if, in the tribunal's discretion, it believes that the 
circumstances under which the permit was originally granted 
have materially changed. In addition a permit may be 
cancelled, varied or amended in any way if a board or the 
Commission deems this step necessary in the interests of 
promoting the efficient use of fuel or for any other reason. 
The interpretation of s25 was dealt with in the case of 
Rauties Transport (Edms) Bek v Voorsitter�_Plaaslike Padvec= 
8 
�Q�����g� Johannesburg en 'n Ander. The _applicant had 
7 
approached the court to have a decision of a board set aside. 
The board had purported to act in terms of s25 in order to 
amend permits held by the applicant because, it was alleged, 
their terms did not comply with s21(3) (e). While the 
board's decision was set aside on other grounds, Goldstone J 
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4 
6 
9 
discussed those provisions of s25 which were argued before 
him. These included the interpretation of s25(1) (c). 
S25(1) (c) empowered the board, of it's own accord, to 'cancel 
or vary any condition or requirement of, or add any condition 
or requirement to, or define, redefine, curtail or otherwise 
amend, the authority contained in any public or private 
10 
permit granted by it', if it deemed such action to be 
necessary in the interests of the promotion of economy in the 
use of petroleum fuel of for any other reason. It was argued 
by the applicant that in interpreting the phrase 'or for any 
11 
other reason' the eiusdem generis rule should apply. This 
argument was, correctly it is submitted, rejected by 
Goldstone J: for the rule to be of application the specific 
12 
words of the enactment must form a genus and no genus could 
13 
be found in the specific wording of s25(1) (c). The learned 
Judge went on to hold that the section was intended merely to 
incorporate the saving of fuel as a consideration, and not to 
14 
limit the power of the tribunal: 
'Na my mening is dit uiters onwaarskynlik dat die 
Wetgewer by wyse van die 1980 wysiging die 
magtiging van 'n, raad of die Kommissie nou wou 
beperk tot oorwegings betreffende die besparing van 
petroleumbrandstof. Inderdaad is'dit wel meer 
waarskynlik dat die Wetgewer daardie oorweging wou 
invoeg as 'n bykomende oorweging.' 
The court accordingly held that the phrase 'or for any other 
reason� meant 'enige rede wat deur die wet as geheel 
geoorloof word en behoorlik deur 'n raad of die Kommissie in 
15 
oorweging geneem mag word'. 
S25(1) (c) was amended again by s13 of Act 8 of 1983. The 
effect of the amendment is to clarify the section in 
accordance with the interpretation given to it in the R���i�� 
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I 
16 
The section now says that a board or the 
Commission may exercise its powers under s25(1) 'if the 
commission or that board for any other reason (including the 
promotion of economy in the use of petroleum fuel}, deems it 
necessary ... ' 
(2) Procedure
The power granted under s25(1} is far reaching and may have 
disastrous consequences for an operator affected by action 
taken under the section. Therefore s25(2) lays down 
procedures to be followed by a board or the Commission before 
an exercise of power under s25(1) will be valid. The first 
requirement is that at least 21 days written notice must be 
given of the tribunal's intention to act, together with the 
reasons for the intended action. The notice and reasons must 
be given to the holder of the permit in question by 
17 
registered or certified mail. Thus s25(2} Ca) envisages the 
existence of jurisdictional facts as conditions precedent to 
any exercise of power under s25(1). S25(2} Cb) incorporates 
the audi alteram partem rule into the procedu�e which must be 
followed. It allows the holder or his representative to 
appear before the board or the Commission, to adduce evidence 
and make representations in regard to the proposed action. 
The purpose of the provision was explained by Goldstone Jin 
18 
'Op die manier mag die permithouer die optrede van die 
raad befnvloed en hom vra om een of ander behoorlike 
besluit te neem. Na my mening is die aard van die 
prosedure dus nie sodanig dat die permithouer nie die 
raad mag nader om 'n behoorlike besluit te neem nie. 
Of die regshulp deur die permithouer gevra toegestaan 
behoort to word, hang af van die aard van die 
oorspronklike verrigtinge wat die raad uit eie beweging 
in aanvang laat neem het.' 
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the Rauties_Trans2ort case: 
It is submitted that, even if s25(2) did not exist, the rules 
of natural justice would nonetheless apply. While there is 
little clarity in our law as to when the audi alteram partem 
rule is relevant in borderline cases, this is clearly a 
situation where a duty to hear the other side exists. 
S25(2) (b) is a codification of the common law for the 
situation envisaged by s25(1). 
The final procedural safeguard granted by s25(2) is peculiar 
to public permits for the conveyance of persons 'within or to 
19 
or from the area of Jurisdiction of a local authority'. It 
grants the local authority in question standing to submit 
representations to a board or the Commission in regard to the 
proposed action. These representations must be submitted not 
later than 21 days after a request to make them has been made 
by a board or the Commission. They must be in writing and be 
20 
delivered either by hand or by registered mail.
It is trite law that a court has the power to set aside a 
decision which has been taken without regard to the 
provisions of s25(2). 
21 
In the Rauties_Transeort case, 
however, it was argued that because the s25(2) procedures had 
not been followed, the court was precluded from making any 
order other than one remitting the matter to the board. The 
reason for this submission was that the court could only make 
an order which the board or the Commission could make. As 
the procedures had not been followed, no valid decision could 
be made by either of the latter bodies. Goldstone J held 
that the court, in review proceedings, has a discretion when 
it finds that a tribunal has acted improperly: it can either 
remit the matter or, in appropriate circumstances, make the. 
22 23 
decision itself. The learned judge accordingly held: 
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'Dit maak nie saak of die nietigheid daarvan die gevolg 
is van die gebrek aan voldoening aan die vereistes van 
art 25(2), of dat die Raad ultra_vires opgetree het nie. 
Dit is verder van geen belang of hierdie Hof teen die 
verrigtinge of besluit van die Raad of die van die 
Kommissie optree nie. Die bevoegdheid en magte van die 
Hof sou presies dieselfde wees.' 
(3) Appeals
SB provides a right of appeal to interested parties against 
any act, �irection or decision of a board. The case of 
Nasionale Vervoerkommissie_van Suid Afrik� v Salz_Gossow 
24 
Transeort_<Edms)_Bek dealt with whether a decision by a
board to institute a s25 enquiry was subject to appeal to the 
Commission. The court (per Smuts AJA) held that the word 
'decision' in s8(1) must be interpreted to refer to the 
merits of an application. Consequently decisions made in 
relation to procedural matters during the course of an 
application are not subject to appeal. Therefore a decision 
to hold a s25 enquiry is not a decision (or an act or 
direction) as intended by s8(1). The court's reasons appear 
25 
from the following extract from Smuts AJA's judgment: 
'Indian aan die woord "beslissing" waar dit in art 8 
voorkom, die besonder wye betekenis geheg word wat 
appellant voorstaan, sal dit gevolge meebring wat nooit 
deur die Wetgewer bedoel kon gewees bet nie. In die 
gewone loop van sake kan dit gebeur dat dit nodig sal 
wees vir 'n raad wat 'n aansoek aanhoor om 'n reeks 
beslissings te gee op uiteenlopende punte voordat daar 
uiteindelik by die beslissing van die aansoek, op die 
meriete daarvan, gekom word. Voorbeelde hiervan is 
beslissings in verband met aansoeke om uitstel en 
beslissings met betrekking tot die tersaaklikheid van 
getuienis (kyk art 9(1) (a). Indian elke sodanige 
beslissing onderhewig is aan appal kan dit 'n 
uitgerekte, tydverspillende, duur en frustrerende proses 
tot gevolg h�. Die spoedige beslegting van aansoeke 
ingevolge die Wet op Padvervoer van 1977 sal sekerlik 
nie bevorder word deur die vertolking voorgestel deur 
appellant nie. Vertraging sal eerder aan die order van 
die dag wees en dit moet noodwendig benadeling vir die 
partye en selfs die landsekonomie inhou, gesien die aard 
van die ondersoeke waarop die Wet op Padvervoer 
betrekking bet.' 
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CBJ WITHDRAWAL OR AMENDMENT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A RAILWAY 
SERVICE 
(1) Procedure
If a railway service is established over a route or between 
points for which a public permit has been granted for the 
conveyance of persons, the Commission may withdraw the permit 
or amend it be curtailing the authority conferred by it. The 
Commission must act with the approval of the Minister, but it 
need not give prior notice of its intention. It must inform 
the holder in writing and the withdrawal or amendment may not 
take effect earlier than six months after the railway service 
26 
commences operations. Once a permit has been withdrawn or 
amended in terms of this section no permit replacing, or 
substantially replacing, the one withdrawn or amended may be 
granted except if the Commission believes that such a grant 
27 
will be in the public interest. 
(2) Compensation
Provision is made in the Act for compensation to be paid to 
the operator whose permit has been withdrawn or amended. 
When the holder is informed (by registered or certified post) 
of the Commission's action he must submit his claim for 
compensation, setting out how the amount claimed is arrived 
at. This must be substantiated by three separate sworn 
appraisements and be submitted to the Commission not later 
than 90 days after the Commission's decision becomes 
effective or within a further period allowed by the 
28 
Commission. The compensation payable is for the loss 
suffered, or likely to be suffered, as a result of the 
29 
withdrawal or amendment. Loss of possible profits in 
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respect of any period more than 12 months after the date of 
30 
the withdrawal or amendment of a permit is not payable. 
(3> The D•t•rmination of the Amount 
The amount of compensation to be paid shall be determined by 
the Minister with the concurrence of the Minister of Finance. 
If the holder of a withdrawn or amended permit is not 
prepared to accept the amount decided on by the Ministers, 
.the amount of compensation will be determined according to 
32 
the provisions of the Arbitration Act, by an arbitrator or 
arbitrators appointed in the manner prescribed by regulation. 
In terms of the regulations compensation must be determined 
by two arbitrators. The Director General : Transport may 
nominate one while the party to be compensated may nominate 
the other. 
If the latter either fails to appoint an arbitrator or does 
not inform the Director General of his choice within i4 days 
of being called upon to nominate a person, he (the Director 
34 
General) may nominate the second arbitrator. S26<7> 
provides for interest to be paid on the amount of 
compensation which has been decided on. The rate of 
interest, payable from the date upon which the permit was 
withdrawn or amended, will be that applicable to loans in 
35 
terms of s26(1) of the Exchequer and Audit Act. 
(4) The Appointment of a Committee
The Minister has power to appoint a committee before a 
railway service is established, but after it has been 
36 
approved. This committee has been granted certain powers 
and has a number of duties imposed on it: it may negotiate 
with a holder in an attempt to find alternative routes for 
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33 
37 
him; it may make recommendations to the Commission or a 
38 
competent board which the affected holder may lodge; it may 
negotiate with the holder and any interested party in an 
attempt to change from road to rail transportation as easily 
39 
and cheaply as possible; and it may meet at any place it 
deems most suitable, and inspect 'any place, route or area 
40 
whose inspection it deems necessary'. 
The committee may consult with a holder whose permit will be 
affected and any other interested party, as well as exercise 
any of its powers or functions irrespective of whether a 
notice has been sent to the holder in terms of s26(2}. The 
committee is composed of three members, coming from the 
41 
Department of Transport, the Treasury and SATS. In addition 
the Minister may, in his discretion, appoint an advisory 
member. This member shall be a person whom the Minister 
considers to have an interest in the matter dealt with and 
may only attend meetings on the written request of the 
42 
chairman. 
Members hold office at the Minister's pleasure, but a member 
shall vacate his office if he ceases to work for the 
Government Department concerned or SATS, or he resigns or is 
43 
relieved of his office by the Minister. There are two 
grounds on which the Minister may dismiss a member: first, 
if the Minister believes that the member has been guilty of 
improper conduct or has regularly neglected his duties, and 
secondly, if he believes that the member is incapable of the 
44 
efficient discharge of his duties. It should be noted that 
the above provisions apply to full members and advisory 
46 
members. 
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(CJ WITHDRAWAL OR SUBSTITUTION OF A PERMIT AFTER AN ENQUIRY 
(1) Appointment of a Committee
When the Minister has reason to believe that improvements in 
transportation facilities may be brought about, or for any 
other reason believes it to be in the public interest to. 
withdraw a public permit completely, or to replace it with 
one issued to a person other than the holder, he may cause a 
public enquiry to be instituted. This enquiry is conducted 
47 
by the Commission or by a member of the Commission. 
(2) Procedure
Certain procedures must be adhered to by the members 
conducting the enquiry. The first is that notice must be 
given and all interested parties must be allowed to attend 
48 
and be heard. The notice must specify the venue of the 
enquiry, the time and date of the commencement of the 
enquiry, and if it is instituted by a member of the 
49 
Commission, that member's full names. The notice must 
appear in one issue of the Government Gazette and at least 
one issue of an Afrikaans newspaper and one issue of an 
English newspaper which circulate in the province concerned. 
50 
Prior to an amendment, copies of the notice had to be sent by 
51 
registered mail to every interested party. 
enquiry s15(1) must be taken into account. 
During the 
Once the commissioner or commissioners have conducted the 
enquiry a report must be submitted to the Minister. After 
considering this document and any recommendations, the 
Minister may direct that the permit in question be withdrawn 
completely or that it be withdrawn and, in its place, another 
permit or other permits be issued to persons other than the 
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53 
original holder. 
(3) Compensation
The Minister may not exercise his power to withdraw a permit 
unless the person or persons who are to undertake transport­
ation in lieu of the original holder have given an under-
54 
taking to pay compensation to the latter. This sum is to 
cover the likely loss suffered by the original holder as a 
55 
result of the withdrawal of the permit and in the absence 
of agreement between the parties, it will be determined by 
arbitration in accordance with the provisions of the 
56 57 
Arbitration Act and the Transport Regulations. Note that, 
as in the case of compensation granted under s26, the 
affected permit holder may not claim for loss of possible 
profits in respect of any period later than 12 months after 
58 
the date of withdrawal of the permit. 
!Hl_LAPSING_QL�IRMITS
The circumstances in which permits may be withdrawn, 
suspended or varied has been discussed above. In each case 
the alteration of authority is brought about by the exercise 
of power vested in an authorized body. While acts or 
omissions of the permit holder may bring about the conditions 
necessary for the exercise of power, that is not always the 
case. In each instance a discretion exists as to whether or 
not the authority contained in a permit should be withdrawn, 
suspended or varied. The lapsing of permits may be 
distinguished from the situations discussed above. Permits 
lapse by operation of law (brought about by circumstances 
within the control of the permit holder) and not by way of an 
exercise of power by an official or body. A permit may lapse 
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in a number of ways which will be dealt with below. 
CAJ PRIVATE PERMITS 
529(2) deals specifically with the lapsing of private 
permits. This type of permit may cease to have effect if the 
holder does not carry on the industry, trade or business for 
which the permit was granted at the place or places 
59 
specified. Alternatively, if two or more places are 
specified and the holder's operations cease at any of these 
60 
places his permits will lapse in relation to those places. 
In other words the permit would lapse partially, remaining in 
force in relation to those places from which the industry, 
trade or business is carried on. 
CBJ PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PERMITS 
Public and private permits will lapse if the transportation 
for which they were issued does not commence on a date 
specified by the board or the Commission. This date must be 
specified in a written notice sent to the holder by 
registered or certified post. The permit lapses on the date 
set out in the notice unless that board or the Commission 
has, in writing, declared itself satiified that the holder 
61 
has commenced the road transportation in question. 
CCJ PUBLIC PERMITS 
A public permit will lapse if a person or company acquires a 
controlling interest in the permit holder's business or 
company without the prior approval of a board or the 
Commission. The permit will lapse on the date on which the 
62 
controlling interest is acquired. An application for 
63 
approval must be made on the prescribed form. In 
considering such an application the following factors must be 
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taken into account: whether a monopolistic situation which 
is not expedient in the public interest is likely to be 
64 65 
created; other permits }1eld by the applicant; the 
applicant's interest in other transportation undertakings; 
the applicant's interest in other companies, partnerships, 
industries, trades or businesses; 
68 
67 
the provisions of 
s15(1); and any other factors which may affect the 
69 
desirability of the grant of the application. 
66 
A 'controlling interest' is defined in terms of the Companies 
70 
Act. Sl of the Act says that a controlling company is one 
which directly or indirectly is able to control another 
company. The term includes a company which: (1) holds more 
than 50 percent of the equity share capital of another 
company; (2) can exercise more than half of the voting 
rights in respect of the shares of that other company; and 
(3) is entitled to, or has the power to, determine the
majority of the directors of the other company. This 
includes the power, without the consent or concurrence of any 
other person, to appoint or remove all or the majority of the 
directors, and the power to prevent appointments as 
directors. If a person's appointment as director follows 
necessarily from his appointment as a director of the first 
named company (ie the controlling company) it shall be deemed 
to be a power exercised by the controlling company. So, if a 
company holds an interest in any other company and by virtue 
of this interest, is able to exert control as contemplated by 
the Companies Act, approval for the acquisition of that 
interest is a condition of the continued validity of any 
permits held by the company so controlled. A similar 
interest held by a natural person in a company has the same 
233 
71 
effect. 
Beuthin says that the factors mentioned in the Companies Act 
are merely examples of control. The term 'controlling 
interest' can consequently have a wider meaning. The essence 
of control is to be found in the de facto, and not the de 
jure position. Thus the test for a controlling interest is a 
72 
factual one and not a legal one: 
'g�-f�£�£ control can exist despite the absence of any 
legal control. Shareholders are notoriously apathetic, 
and if the membership of a company is large and 
dispersed widely, even a small proportion of the total 
shares is capable of vesting actual control in the 
holders, and if the holders constitute the management, 
they will have the additional advantage of being able to 
control the proxy-voting machinery. It will be 
realized, however, that control may exist even when the 
controlling company does not hold any shares at all, as 
would be the case, for example, if control were 
conferred by way of debentures or by way of management 
control.' 
CDJ CONSEQUENCES OF LAPSING 
If a permit lapses, the holder is under an obligation to 
return the permit and the distinguishing mark to the board or 
the Commission within seven days of the lapsing. Delivery 
73 
must be made by registered or certified mail. Failure to 
comply with the above requirement constitutes an offence and 
a fine of not more than 50 rand may be imposed on conviction. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. S25 < 1).
2. S26 < 1).
3. S28(1).
4 • S2 5 < 1 > <a> ( i ) . 
5. S2 5 < 1 > <a> Ci i ) .
6 • S2 5 < 1) < b > • 
7. S25(1) (c); for an outline of s25 see Nasionale_Vervoer­
kommissie_van_Suid_Afrika v Salz_Gossow_Transport_(Edms) 
�ek 1983 <4) SA 344 CA>, 359 B - D. 
8. 1983 (4) SA 146(W).
9. See Ch 8 above.
234 
74 
10. $25(1) (c) has, since the decision in the R��ll��
I�err�QQ�t case supra been amended by s13 of the Road
Transportation Amendment Act 8 of 1983. The effect of 
the amendment is discussed below. 
11. The board, when it wished to act in terms of s25(1) (c),
was clearly n9t seeking to amend the permits in question
in the interests of the promotion of the economical use 
of petroleum fuel. It was acting for another reason viz
to make the permits comply with the provisions of
s21(3)(e).
12. Steyn , 30; HR Hahlo, and E Kahn The_South
African_Legal_S�stem_and_it's_Background, 189.
13. Rauties_TransEort supra 160A.
14. At )60 C - D.
15. At 160 F.
16. Supra.
1 7 • S2 5 ( 2 ) < a ) . 
18. 1983 (4) SA 146(W>, 159 A-8.
1 9 • S2 5 ( 2 ) ( C ) •
20. Reg 4(4).
21. Supra.
22. See Ch 13 below at 353.
23. Rauties_TransQ_ort supra 162 A; Goldstone J, at 162 H,
found it unnecessary to decide whether to exercise the
discretion or not in the circumstances of the case.
24. 1983 (4) SA 344 (A}. 
25. At 356 G - 357A.
26. S26 < 1 > •
27. S26(3).
28. S26 (3).
29. $26 < 4 > •
30. S26(5).
31 . $2 6 < 5) .
32. No 42 of 1965.
33. S26(6).
34. Reg 20.
35. No 66 of 1975.
36. S2(h) read with s27.
37. Reg 22(a).
38. Reg 22(b).
39. Reg 22(c).
40. Reg 22(d>.
41. Reg 21 (2>.
42. Reg 21(3).
43. Reg 21(4>.
44. Reg 21 (6) (b).
45. Reg 21(5).
46. Reg 21(4).
47. $28(1).
4 8. $2 8 < 2 > • 
49. Reg 19<1>.
50. Reg 19<2>.
51. Reg 2, published in Government_Gazette No 6941 of 11
April, 1980, Governme·nt Notice R772, deleted Reg 19(3).
52. S28(3).
53. S28 < 4 > •
54. S28 (5).
55. $28 (5).
56. No 41 of 1965.
57. Reg 20.
58. $28 (6).
235 
5 9 • S2 9 < 2 > <a> • 
60. S29 <2> (b).
61. S29 (1 >.
6 2 • S2 9 < 3 > <a> •
63. Reg 6.
64. S29(3)(c>Ci).
6 5. S2 9 < 3 > ( c) < i i ) . 
66. S29 <3> <c> <iii>.
6 7. S2 9 < 3 > ( c > <iv) •
68. S29 (3) (c) (v). 
6 9 • S2 9 < 3 > Cc > C vi > • 
70. No 61 of 1973. 
71 • S2 9 < 3 > ( e > •
72. RC Beuthin Basic ComRe�Y-�e�, 152.
7 3 • S2 9 < 3 > < b > •
7 4 • S2 9 < 3 > < d > •
236 
INTRODUCTION 
CIJ IHI_Q!�I!NCTIOH BETWEEN GRANTING AN_�PPLICATION IN ��RL�HQ 
GRANTINg_!I-��BJECT TO_CONDITIONS 
CIIJ THE VALIDITY OF CONDITIONS 
----------- ---·==:.;.=.;"'---=�= 
CAJ THE ULTRA VIRES DOCTRINE 
[BJ THE GROUNDS FOR ATTACKING THE VALIDITY OF CONDITIONS 
CIIIJ THE GROUNDS DISCUS§�Q 
[AJ EXCEEDING OR IGNORING THE PROVISIONS OF THE ACT 
(1) General
<2> Sp•cific Example•
[BJ VAGUENESS OR UNCERTAINTY 
( 1) General
( 2) The Basia of the Rule Aaainat. Va1uene.ss
(3) The Test
(4) Specific Example•
(a) Condit.ions
Cb> Conditions
(c > Condit.ions
Cd) Condi t.i·ons
[CJ UNREASONABLENESS 
(1) General
Relating 
Relating 
Relating 
Relating 
to Race 
to the Number 
to Competition 
to the Route 
of Passengers 
(2) The Basis of the Rule Against Unreasonableness
(3) The Tests
(4) Specific Examples
237 
CH~fIIL!Q 
~QH~!I!QNS_6IIACHID_tQ_f~RH!I~-6H~-THl!R_VALID!IX 
<5> The Suaaeated Teat to be Applied to Determine the
Reaaonableneas of Conditions
Ca) The By-Law Analogy
(b) The Justiciability Theory
' 
238 
INTRODUCTION 
A board or the Commission is empowered to grant an 
application for a permit 'in full or in part subject to such 
1 
conditions or requirements as it may deem necessary'. The 
reason for the existence of this power is to be found in the 
duty of boards and the Commission to co-ordinate transport­
ation services in an area. It may defeat the purpose of the 
Act if it was not possible to prescribe how the authority 
which has been granted may be used. By granting a permit 
subject to conditions it is possible for a board or the 
Commission to direct a service to routes on which it is most 
necessary. The alternative would be to either grant or 
refuse an application, but such an approach contains 
problems: it is too rigid and therefore is not suitable to 
the implementation of transportation policy. 
The case of Flying Lotus (Pty) Ltd v Chairman, National 
Transport Commission and Another provides an example of the 
use of conditions. The applicant had applied for a permit 
authorizing it to convey passengers over a route which, it 
was claimed, consisted of both private and public roads. The 
board had granted the application but the second respondent 
appealed to the Commission. The appeal was upheld because, 
it held, the board had no jurisdiction to grant permits for 
4 
conveyance on roads which were not public roads. 
In review proceedings Didcott J pointed out that while 
conveyance of persons or goods on a private road is not 
covered by the Act, in that it does not fall within the 
definition of 'road transportation', it may still be relevant 
to a board when considering an application for a permit over 
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CIJ 
a 'mixed route'. It has a bearing, for instance, on how a 
bus will get from place to place, whether it will ever get 
there, the feasibility of the route as well as time factors, 
distances, tariffs and time-tables. The learned Judge went 
on to hold that, in addition, the board or the Commission 
could impose conditions in relation to the roads which were 
not 'public'. In other words, because part of a route does 
not fall within the definition of a public road, this does 
not mean that the board or the Commission cannot control the 
operations of a transport service on those parts. This 
power, he said, stemmed from the broad authority conferred by 
s13(1) (c). In deciding that the Commission had misdirected 
6 
itself, Didcott J held: 
'The effect, if the blue stretches were not really 
public roads, was neither to vitiate the application nor 
to deprive the Board of Jurisdiction over it. The Board 
had the power to grant it, either in full or in part. 
Section 13(1) has seen to that. Having satisfied itself 
of the application's merits, it could therefore have 
ordered a permit to be issued which, since one was 
required for the brown stretches alone, was confined to 
these. It could at the same time have added the 
condition that the blue stretches were to complete the 
route.' 
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN GRANTING AN APPLICATION IN PART AND 
-------------------------- ----------- -----
GRANTING IT SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS 
While it has been noted that a board or the Commission has 
the power to grant an application either in part or subJect 
to conditions, it must be emphasized that these two functions 
can be conceptually seperated. 
The difference between the two powers was dealt with in the 
case of Pietermaritzburg_Citx_Council v t2£al Road 
!���porta�!Q�-�Q��d, Pietermaritzb��g. 
8 
drawing the distinction held: 
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Henochsburg J, in 
•
5 
7 
'a grant subject to conditions is not necessarily a 
grant in part. In order that there should be a grant 
in part of an application there must be a grant of 
portion only of what was applied for, something less 
than that for which appellant asks, it cannot be 
something more. There can be no grant in part if the 
whole is not notionally capable of division ••• A 
grant subject to a condition on the other hand, 
implies that the whole of what is sought is granted, 
but some condition is superimposed which effects the 
exercise of that whole by the grantee. The whole is 
nevertheless granted, whereas a grant in part implies 
that part only is granted.' 
Burne AJ, in a concurring judgment, said that the distinction 
between the two concepts is of great importance and, where 
language is used which may cloud the nature of the power 
exercised, the court is entitled to go behind the words used 
and examine the intention of the board or the Commi3sion. 
9 
The learned acting judge described the situation thus: 
'For instance if an application were made for a licence 
to sell commodities, A, B and C, the tribunal seized of 
the matter, might say that it granted the licence only 
in respect of commodities A and B. That would, I think, 
be a correct way of saying that it granted the 
application in part. But the same tribunal, although 
intending exactly the same thing may, as a result of 
looseness of phraseology, express itself by saying that 
it granted the application subject to the condition that 
the applicant did not sell commodity C. That would I 
apprehend, be an incorrect way of saying what it really 
meant. ' 
The importance of the distinction lies, it is submitted, in 
the court's powers to interfere with the particular exercise 
of power by a board or the Commission. Its p'ower to 
invalidate conditions may be wider for two reasons: 
they are 'drafted onto' permits and so may require 
first, 
interpretation in a different sense to the provisions of the 
permit itself: the standard provisions of a permit are 
prescribed by the Act, whereas the provisions of conditions 
are individualized additions to the primary authority; 
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secondly, the grant of an application or its refusal may be 
invalidated on well recognized, mainly procedural, 
10 
grounds, hut in the case of conditions their effects may be 
Justiciable. In short, a court may be more willing to 
interfere because conditions (being analogous to legislatioh} 
may more readily b� seen to operate harshly. 
C I I J THg__ VALID I TY O� .. J�QHP.lIIQNS 
[AJ THE ULTRA VIRES DOCTRINE 
The ultra vires doctrine has been described as the 'central 
11 
principle 0£ Administrative Law'. Wade, in explaining the 
12 
doctrine and its relationship to Acts of Parliament says: 
'It is presumed that Parliament did not intend to 
authorize abuses, and that certain safeguards against 
abuse must be implied in the Act. These are matters of 
general principle, embodied in the rules 0£ law which 
govern the interpretation of statutes. Parliament is 
not expected to incorporate them expressly in every Act 
that it passed. They may be taken for granted as part 
of the implied conditions to which every Act is subject 
and which the courts extract by reading between the 
lines, or (it may be truer to say) insert by writing 
between the lines. These implied conditions are taken 
to be part and parcel of the Act, just as much as 
express conditions. Any violation of them, therefore, 
renders the offending act ultra_vires.' 
Rose Innes says that the doctrine is simply based on the 
axiom that a body which owes its existence to a statute can 
perform no valid act unless authorized to do so by the 
13 
instrument which created it. 
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CBJ THE GROUNDS FOR ATTACKING THE VALIDITY OF CONDITIONS 
The grounds for attacking the validity of conditions are, to 
a large extent, the same as those available when attacking 
14 
the validity of any exercise of administrative power. In 
this chapter those grounds which lend themselves to, but are 
not necessarily peculiar to, challenges to the validity of 
conditions will be examined. The grounds which have been 
isolated for discussion here are: first, exceeding or 
ignoring the provisions of the Act in the broad sense (i.e. 
where the purported exercise of powe� results in a lack of 
co-incidence between the condition and the enabling Act>; 
secondly, the vagueness or uncertainty of the terms of the 
condition and; thirdly, the unreasonableness of the 
condition. 
CAJ EXCEEDING OR IGNORING THE PROVISIONS OF THE ACT 
It is trite law that an administrative body, when exercising 
powers, must do so within the four corners of its source of 
power. At the same time it should be remembered that not 
every power which may be exercised lawfully needs to be 
specifically spelt out in the parent Act. A body would be 
acting intra vires if it exercised powers which were 
incidental to those which the statute mentioned expressly 
i.e. the legislature must have intended the body in question
to possess those powers, but found it unnecessary to detail 
them in the statute. The court, in construing the extent of 
an administrative body's power, will read between the lines 
of the statute or, as Wade has said (perhaps more correctly} 
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15 
write between the lines. 
If the body goes beyond these limits it will have acted 
ultra vires, and the purported exercise of power will be a 
nullity. Thus, if a board purported to impose conditions 
relating to the sex of passengers to be conveyed by a permit 
holder, or the number of times he could refuel his vehicle 
per week, it is clear that the conditions would have no 
force: in both instances there is no co-incidence between 
the content of the conditions and the terms of the enabling 
statute. In other words, the invalidity of the conditions 
would stem from the fact that their substance infringes or 
bears no relation to the parent Act. 
(2) Specific Examples
16 
In� v Ramatlo the validity of a condition limiting the 
number of passengers which a taxi-operator could convey was 
attacked. The basis of the attack was that the regulation 
under which the condition was made was ultra vires: the Act 
authorized the issuing of exemptions for the conveyance of 
not more than eight people {including the driver} in a 
17 
vehicle designed or intended to carry that number. 
S19(1) (c) of the Motor Carrier Transportation Act empowered 
the Commission to make regulations (with the approval of the 
Governor-General) prescribing conditions and requirements 
which could be imposed on a certificate of exemption. Reg 
11(5) (a) was made in terms of this power and read as follows: 
'The Board or a local board may impose in connection 
with, or include, in, any exemption issued by it any or 
all of the following conditions or requirements: (9) 
prohibiting the holder or his servant from c�nveying 
more than a specified number of passengers ..• at one and 
the same time.' 
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Acting in terms of this regulation, a board had limited lhe 
appellant's authority lo lhe conveyance of not more than five 
passengers. The prosecution arose after he had been stopped 
with eight passengers in his taxi. 
Il was argued that while reg 11(5) (a) fell within the 
language of s19(1) (c}, il was nevertheless ultra vires 
because it went beyond the scope and purpose of lhe Acl. 
This argument was dismissed by Murray Jin the court 
18 
a quo: 
'It seems to me that when the Board or a local board is 
in terms given the discretion by sec 9(2) (g) lo grant 
exemption for the conveyance of not more lhan a 
specified number of passengers, and allowed to attach 
conditions prescribed by regulation approved of by the 
Governor-General, il is a fair and reasonable 
inlerprelation lhal their discretion covers lhe right to 
fix, at a figure less than eight (including driver) the 
maximum number of passengers who may be conveyed.' 
On appeal, Schreiner JA held loo that the regulation (and lhe 
condition framed under it) was valid. The learned judge of 
appeal held that the board's competence to fix lhe number of 
passengers was nol inconsistent with the primary and 
secondary objects of lhe Act because overloading a vehicle 
could be regarded as a form of unfair competition as it 
reduces the cost of conveyance.Furthermore the safety of 
passengers is a consideration which is nol foreign lo the 
scheme of lhe legislation and so a board may consider this 
19 
aspect in selling conditions. 
20 
In R v Zondi and Another il was argued that a condition was 
ultra vires because ils terms did not correlate with lhe 
terms cf the regulation under which il was framed. The 
condition sought.to prohibit lhe picking up of passengers in 
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certain circumstances whereas the regulation provided for the 
formulation of conditions prohibiting the holder from seeking 
to pick up passengers. The court (per Milne AJP) held that 
the condition was intra vires. The essence of the court's 
21 
decision appears from the following dictum: 
'Further, I am not at all certain that a power to 
prohibit the seeking to pick up passengers does not 
necessarily include the power to prohibit the actual 
picking up. Where the law enacts a prohibition against 
attempting to do a thing it is difficult to imagine that 
it contemplates, at the same time, that it will be 
lawful to do that very thing. This is not a case of 
giving meaning to ambiguous words. The grammatical and 
ordinary meaning of the words "seek to pick up" is 
plain but it seems to me that the scope and intention of 
a power to prohibit a holder seeking to pick up other 
passengers, in specified circumstances, contemplates the 
making of a prohibition against the actual picking up of 
such passengers.' 
The race of a passenger was the issue in the case of� v 
22 
��geldoe's Taxi Service_(Pty) Ltd and Another. The permit 
in question authori�ed (by means of a condition) the 
'conveyance of not more than four non-white passengers'. It 
further provided that the provisions of the permit did not 
relieve the holder from complying with the provisions of any 
other law relating to motor vehicles. The appellant had 
conveyed a white person and had been convicted in terms of 
s9(1) of the Motor Carrier Transportation Act. It was 
argued, inter alia, on appeal that the condtion was repug­
nant to s22 of the Taxi Regulations of the Cape Town 
23 
Municipality framed under two provincial ordinances. S22 
imposed a duty on taxi drivers to accept all fares if seating 
24 
was available in the car or if the taxi was not engaged. 
Wessls JA rejected this contention. He held that the proviso 
to the condition did not relate to s22 of the Taxi 
Regulations but was intended to impose on permit holders a 
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duty to obtain any other licences or permits which may have
been necessary in terms of any other law relating to motor 
25 
vehicles. The learned judge of appeal concluded: 
'I might add that the holder of a certificate would no 
doubt also be bound by any other provisions of a law 
relating to motor vehicles which are not inconsistent 
with a condition which a board is required to and does 
incorporate in a certificate issued by it.' 
[BJ VAGUENESS OR UNCERTAINTY 
(1) General
Glanville Williams, writing on the interpretation of 
statutes, says that 'the words we use though they have a 
central core of meaning that is relatively fixed, are of 
doubtful application to a considerable number of marginal 
26 
cases'. While statutes must be given effect to by the 
courts despite vagueness or uncertainty this is not the case 
when subordinate legislation suffers from the same defect. A 
by-law may be invalidated because its terms are vague or it 
27 
is uncertain in its operation or application: 
'That is not, however, to say that the court will think 
up fanciful arguments, for if a bye-law is capable of 
reasonable interpretation within the terms of the 
enabling statute, the court will be prepared to give it 
that interpretation.' 
While the chief application of the rule against vagueness is 
in cases involving subordinate or administrative legislation, 
it applies equally to judicial, quasi-judicial or purely 
28 
administrative acts. No distinction can be drawn on this 
basis; one test is used irrespective of the form which the 
29 
instrument under scrutiny takes. Vagueness or uncertainty 
(whether seen as a separate ground of review or part of the 
JO 
rule against unreasonableness) allows considerable scope 
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for judicial activism or restraint as a result of the fact 
that language is an imperfect medium of communication, being 
31 
inherently ambiguous. 
(2} The Basis of the Rule Against Vagueness 
The rationale of the rule that administrative action which is 
uncertain or vague is ultra vires derives from a presumption 
that Parliament, when it delegates powers, intends them to be 
used in such a way that those subject to the enactment in 
32 
question know how to comply. 
This point was made forcefully by Lord Goddard CJ in Brierley 
33 
v Phillips: 
'It is surely desirable that orders creating criminal 
offences should be stated in language which the 
persons who may commit the offence ••. can understand •.. 
I am certainly not prepared ... to find persons guilty of 
criminal offences when the orders which they are charged 
with violating are couched in language which is open to 
all sorts of meanings and causes all sorts of 
difficulties, so that the persons to whom they apply 
cannot know whether they are acting legally or not, 
unless possibly they get counsel's opinion, or at any 
rate a solicitor's advice.' 
(3) The Test
In R v [Q�Q and Another 
34 
Broome J set out the test for 
vagueness in the following terms: 
'But these principles have no application where the only 
claim is that the bye-law or regulati�n is void for 
uncertainty. In that case the Court must first construe 
the bye-law or regulation, applying the usual canons of 
construction with no bias towards "benevolence". Having 
ascertained the meaning, the court must then ask itself 
whether the bye-law or regulation, so construed, 
indicates with reasonable certainty to those who are 
bound by it the act which is enjoined or prohibited. If 
it does, it is good; if it does not, it is bad; that 
is the end of the matter.' 
The test which is applied is that of the reagonable man with 
average intelligence. If this hypothetical figure would, in 
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the court's opinion, know what it is that he is to do, or to 
35 
refrain from doing, the act is valid. Absolute clarity is 
not essential. All that is required is a hard core of 
certainty which is sufficient to justify enforcement. 
Thus in a case in which the appellants had, in terms of the 
36 
Internal Security Act, been restricted from attending social 
gatherings and gatherings at which social intercourse also 
took place, Didcott arid Shearer JJ, in deciding on the 
37 
validity of the instrument held: 
'Had the notice simply prohibited the appellants from 
attending what in common parlance were social 
gatherings, the banning orders would have contained a 
hard core of certainty, sufficient for present 
purposes.' 
Taitz has suggested a contrary approach to testing for 
vagueness. He submits that the courts construe the 
38 
instrument in question benevolently. With respect, it must 
be pointed out that the benevolent interpretation doctrine 
39 
does not apply to the test for vagueness.
40 
The learned 
to establish this proposition, 
but that case dealt with the unreasonableness, and not the 
41 
vagueness, of a bye-law. took 
pains to distinguish the two enquiries. He said that when 
testing subordinate legislation for vagueness 'the court must 
first construe the bye-law or regulation applying the usual 
42 
canons of construction with no bias towards "benevolence".' 
(4) Specific Examples
(a) Conditions Relating to Race
In� v Salama Taxis (Pty) Ltd_and Others, 
43 
it was argued 
that a condition limiting a taxi company to the conveyance of 
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'non-Whites' only, was ultra vires because of vagueness. S7 
of the Motor Carrier Transportation Act required a board to 
specify the class or classes to be conveyed under the 
authority of a permit issued by it. It was argued that, if 
the term 'non-white' connoted a race group, the various 
groups included under that head should have been specified. 
In other words, counsel's contention was that the term 'non­
white' was too vague to allow the condition in which it 
appeared to be valid. Corbett J, in upholding the validity 
of the condition, held that the terms 'White' and 'non-White' 
as well as 'European' and 'non-European' had well known and 
well accepted meanings in South Africa, not only in statutes 
44 
but also in common parlance: in other words the term 'non-
White' had a hard core of certainty. Although problems may 
arise 'in determining the classification of persons who 
45 
belong to the periphery of each of these classes' the 
existence of such borderline cases did not Justify the 
46 
invalidation of the condition as a whole: 
'The fact that in a relatively small number of 
individual cases the persons obliged to obey the terms 
of the Act, read together with the certificate, would 
have difficulty in deciding whether a passenger is a 
non-White or a White, does not, in my opinion, render 
the condition as a whole void on the ground of 
vagueness. ' 
(b) Conditions Relating to the Number of Passengers
47 
In� v Aziz and Another a condition purporting to limit the 
number of passengers to be conveyed by a taxi was held to be 
void for uncertainty. The condition limited the driver to 
conveying not more than six passengers on trips within a 30 
mile radius of the Kranskop Post Office or on 'casual trips' 
from within this area to any place outside the 30 mile radius 
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and vice versa. A proviso then limited the permit to the 
conveyance of four passengers (including-the driver) per trip 
48 
between Kranskop and Stanger and Kranskop and Durban. This 
proviso, it was argued, was ultra vires for want of 
certainty. 
Fannin J pointed out a number of problems which the proviso 
raised without the possibility of clear answer. For instance 
the learned judge could not say with any certainty what the 
meaning of the phrase 'trip between' meant. If the taxi went 
from Kranskop to Durban and then returned via Stanger had it 
made a trip between Kranskop and Durban or three separate 
trips from Kranskop to Durban, Durban to Stanger and Stanger 
to Kranskop? For the purposes of the condition, did one 
consider a trip as a trip by the vehicle and driver or a trip 
by the passengers? If the former was the case, one trip had 
been made and only three passengers would have been 
permitted. If the latter interpretation applied, clearly 
several trips could have been made and the legality of each 
passenger's conveyance would have had to be tested against 
the proviso. The learned judge pointed out further that 
insurmountable problems arise when the terms of the proviso 
are mixed with the terms of the condition. In other words 
the position of the taxi owner and driver is uncertain when
some passengers are travelling from Kranskop to Durban, for 
instance, while others are travelling from the former point 
to a point before Durban, or from a point after Kranskop to 
Durban. In holding that the condition was ultra vires 
49 
Fannin J held: 
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'In order to ascertain whether he may do any of these 
things, he must refer to the proviso to the condition in 
his certificate, and he is entitled to find a reasonably 
precise answer to his question. It seems to me that he 
will not find such an answer there and counsel who 
appeared for the State found himself unable to suggest 
to us in argument what the answers are. Thus the 
proviso fails to measure up to the standards laid down 
in the cases referred to above and must therefore be 
held to be void for vagueness, and the convictions and 
sentence cannot be allowed to stand.' 
{c) Conditions Relating to Competition 
50 
The appeal in R v Hahabeer succeeded in part because the 
first condition imposed by the board was held to be void for 
vagueness. This condition prohibited the holder from 
51 
'competing unfairly' with existing railway services. In 
52 
Ex Parte Naidoo the court came to a similar decision when 
dealing with a condition which was worded identically, save 
that the word 'unfairly' had not been included. Carlisle J 
found that the insertion of the word tended to increase 
rather than diminish the state of uncertainty. In both cases 
the prohibition was such that the holder of the permit, or 
his servant, could not be expected to know what they may or 
may not do. 
Cd) Conditions Relating to the Route 
SJ 
The condition held to be intra vires in Zondi's case was 
54 
invalidated in the case of S v Maharaj and Another. The 
attack on the validity of the condition in the latter case 
55 
was based on a different ground. In Zondi's case it was 
unsuccessfully argued that there was a lack of co-incidence 
between the condition and the enabling regulation. In 
Hahara:i..!..a case 
56 
the condition was challenged successfully on 
the ground of vagueness. Harcourt J held that the words 'the 
same Journey' were sufficiently clear to be capable of 
application. The learned judge experienced difficulties with 
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the term 'or for the return journey or any portion thereof'. 
He pointed out that an exact retracing of an outward journey 
or a substantial retracing of that journey would obviously 
not run the risk of falling foul of the condition, but when 
the taxi driver does not retrace his original route exactly, 
uncertainty begins to creep in. In this regard a variety of 
meanings can be attributed to the word 'return'. If, for 
instance, a taxi driver was chartered for four successive 
trips with terminal points in the directions of the cardinal 
points of the compass, he would not travel on the same roads 
from dropping his first fare at the northern point to 
dropping his second at the western point and so on. Could 
any of those trips be said to be a return journey? If so, 
which one is that return journey? Is the last leg of the 
journey (i.e. back to the starting point) the return journey 
of the first trip or the last one? Does an outward journey 
start at the driver's home where he garages his taxi or at 
the taxi stand? After each fare must he return to one of 
these places? If he gets a fare by way of a radio or 
telephone where does the receipt of the fare take place? The 
conclusion that the learned judge arrived at after posing the 
57 
above questions was: 
'From this welter of uncertainty, anomaly and apparent 
plurality of possible meanings there emerges only one 
certainty and that is that the condition - so far as it 
relates to the "return Journey� or any part thereof - is 
lacking in certainty to such an extent that it should be 
regarded as void or ultra vires for vagueness in terms 
of lQee�§ case, ����� and the many subsequent cases in 
which that case has been followed and applied. The same 
reasoning applies to the corresponding portion of the 
regulation.• 
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[Cl UNREASONABLENESS 
(1) General
It is not surprising that what Wiechers calls the rule 
58 
against unreasonableness is uncertain in its application. 
This uncertainty goes to whether unreasonableness per se is 
a ground for review and, if so, what test applies for 
determining whether an exercise of power {or its consequence) 
59 
is unreasonable. In the words of Baxter: 
'Some Judges of Appeal have gone to extraordinary 
lengths to emphasize that unreasonableness (and then 
only "gross" or even "strikingly gross" 
unreasonableness} can at most serve only to indicate 
that "another", recognized ground for review might be 
present. ' 
The issue is further complicated by the fact that a long line 
of cases in England and South Africa have, following the test 
60 
laid down in Kruse v lQh��Q�, held that certain exercises 
of power (ostensibly of a legislative nature) can be 
invalidated for unreasonableness. It is submitted that 
unreasonableness per se is a ground for review, whether the 
act sought to be invalidated be administrative or 
61 
legislative. 
(2) The Basis of the Rule Against Unreasonableness
Despite the fact that statutes often confer a discretion to 
take certain action (or make rules) without expressly 
limiting the power, it is trite that in public law there is 
62 
no such thing as an unfettered discretion, but only wide 
and narrow discretions. Certain prerequisites, one of which 
is reasonableness, are implied in the terms of Acts which 
63 
confer a discretion. This standard of conduct applies even 
when a discretion is conferred by highly subjective language 
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64 
as happened in lhe case of Roberls v Hopwood. Borough 
Councils were empowered lo pay employees such wages as they 
saw fit. The court (per Lord Wrenbury) held lhat councils 
65 
could not pay in excess of what was reasonable: 
'A person on whom is vested a discretion must exercise 
his discretion upon reasonable grounds. A discretion 
does not empower a man to do what he likes merely 
because he is minded to do so - he must in the exercise 
of his discretion do not what he likes but what he 
ought. In other words, he must, by the use of his 
reason, ascertain and follow the course which reason 
directs. He must act reasonably.' 
A slightly different formulation is to be found in the case 
66 
which involved the reasonableness of a 
bye-law. Lord Russell CJ held that if a legislative act was 
found to be unreasonable (in the special sense in which the 
word was used in that case)' the court might well say 
"Parliament never intended to give aulhority to make such 
67 
rules; they are unreasonable and ultra_vires tt .' So, just 
as lhe common law presumes that when powers are delegated by 
Parliament it is intended that the resultant enactments are 
clear, il also presumes that they will be reasonble. 
<3) The Teat 
In Union Government {Minister of Mines and Industries> v 
68 
Union Steel Corporation (South Africa) LiQ, Stratford JA 
held that unreasonableness per se was insufficient to set 
aside the Minister's act. 
69 
ness as follows: 
He set the test for unreasonable-
' ••• emphasis is always laid upon the necessity of the 
unreasonableness being so gross that something else can 
be inferred from il, either that it is "inexplicable 
except on the assumption of mala_fides or ullerior 
motive" ... or that it amounts to proof that the person 
on whom the discretion is conferred has not applied his 
mind to the malter ... ' 
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This test has, until relatively recently, been unchallenged. 
70 
Indeed the courts have, if anything, tightened the test. 
The case of Theron v Ring_van_Wellington van die NG Sending= 
71 
kerk in Suid Afrika has, however, provided an alternative 
test without expressly overruling the Union Steel 
72 
formulation. Jansen JA, in the Ih��Q� case, accepted that 
unreasonableness is a ground for review for two reasons: 
first, from the presumption that Parliament did not intend 
delegated powers to be used unreasonably it could be assumed 
that the courts could set such actions aside and, secondly, 
the learned judge of appeal held that there was authority for 
the proposition that the courts could set aside decisions 
which could not reasonably be arrived at on the available 
73 
evidence. He limited this approach (the 'uitgebreide 
formele maatstaf') to 'purely judicial decisions', because 
such decisions are most familiar to courts. 
The test for unreasonableness in����� v f�hnson 
·the application of the enactments in question:
74 
looks to 
'If, for instance, they were found to be partial and 
unequal in their operation as between different classes; 
if they were manifestly unjust; if they disclosed bad 
faith; if they involved such oppressive or gratuitous 
interference with the rights of those subject to them as 
could find no Justification in the minds of reasonable 
men, the Court might well say, "Parliament never intended 
to give authority to make such rules; they are 
unreasonable and ultra vires".'
It has been argued that there is no real difference between 
the Union Steel test and the����� formula except in 
75 
terminology. This view is not, it is submitted, vindicated 
76 
by the cases: in Sinovich v Hercules_MuniciRal_Gouncil, 
for instance, the majority, applying the ��i��-Steel test, 
arrived at a different result to Schreiner JA, the only 
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dissentient, who applied the Kruse test. A second approach 
is that the Union Steel test applies to all administrative 
acts, the Theron formula applies to purely judicial 
decisions. and the Kruse test applies to subordinate 
legislation.· While the cases, (with exceptions) tend to 
support this view, there are problems involved: first, it 
requires a prior classification of the function in question 
77 
with all the dangers inherent in such a process; secondly, 
it is difficult (if not impossible) to classify accurately 
and with the desired result, especially in borderline 
78 
cases. 
A third theory suggests that the test to.be applied depends 
on the judge 1 s conception of the justiciability of the 
79 
issue: judges are able (and willing) to decide on the 
reasonableness of the decision-making process {the 
1 dialectical reasonableness' of the act) because one is 
dealing with factors common to all decision-making and 
'judges know as much as administrators how decisions should 
80 
be reached'. The Union Steel test would be applied in such 
a case. The issue would involve a high degree of public 
policy and so the court, on review, would be limited to its 
powers, falling outside the 'reasonableness constituency 1 for 
the purpose of looking at the outcome of the decision or its 
effects. In situations where the decision does not involve a 
high degree of discretion the court may go further in 
exercising its review powers. Jansen JA called such a 
81 
decision a 1 purely judicial decision 1 in Theron's case. 
Here the judge will form part of the 'reasonableness 
constituency' in respect of the 1 substantive reasonableness' 
of the decision. In other words the weight to be attached to 
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evidence is justiciable in such a case and the 'extended 
formal test' may apply. In short, the public policy content 
in a -'purely Judicial decision' is low and therefore the 
judge will see himself as competent to review the crux of the 
decision. Finally, some decisions are so patently 
unreasonable in their effect that, it being possible to 
recognize unreasonableness easier than reasonableness, the 
court will regard the �pplication of the administrative 
action as being justiciable. When the court is of the 
opinion that it can form part of the 'urireasonableness 
constituency' it will apply the K���� formula. (i.e. the 
substantive unreasonableness of the action will be 
justiciable, but subject to limitations such as the political 
accountability of the decision-maker, its position in the 
political hierarchy, the prominence of public policy and the 
82 
exactness of the enabling provision.) 
The applicability of the appropriate tests will be considered 
in the final section of this chapter. 
(4) Specific Examples
83 
dealt with the validity of a 
number of regulations, but the approach adopted in that case 
is of importance for present purposes. The purpose of the 
regulations was to prescribe the power of a board in imposing 
conditions. The validity of th� regulations alone was 
attacked, but if it had been successful, the conditions 
framed thereunder would have fallen too. 
While it emerges from the Judgment that there were 
insufficient facts to justify the invalidation of the 
regulations, it is clear that Carlisle J did not approach the 
258 
matter from the basis of the Kruse test. Instead the learned 
judge adopted the formulation which was applied by the 
84 
majority in Sinovich v Hercules Municipal Council, 
85 
emerges clearly from the dictum quoted below: 
which 
'The powers granted to the Board are extremely wide. If 
they are to be attacked as unreasonable the appellant 
must put before the Court some evidence to show that 
when the Board promulgated the Regulations it did not 
genuinely exercise its discretion or that it acted 
mala_fide or for some ulterior motive,' 
86 
The majority in Sinovich,s case drew a distinction between 
general and specific powers conferred on the empowered body. 
If the powers are specific the court will only interfere on 
the basis of the Union_Steel test. 
It is submitted that Carlisle J's approach in Mahabeer's 
87 
case is incorrect. Not only was it an erroneous 
88 
application of Sinovich's case but the correctness of that 
decision is open to doubt: subordinate legislation, having a 
life of its own, operates over time and has the potential to 
effect a great number of persons so it is important that its 
validity is tested in terms of the reasonableness of its 
application. The Kruse formula allows for this, while the 
Union St.eel formula does not. 
In l§m�il v Local Road Transportation Board
L
-�!�i��maritzburg 
89 
and Northern Districts and Another the reasonableness of 
---� -------- -
conditions was argued on the basis of the Union_S1eel 
90 
formula. No mention was made of Kruse v Johnson and Caney 
AJP decided it on the narrower test enunciated in the former 
91 
case. In Ex_Parte_Naidoo the applicant sought a 
declaratory order on the validity of conditions imposed on 
him as the owner of a taxi. He at.tacked them on the basis of 
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their vagueness and their un�easonableness. With regard to 
the latter issue the court found itself unable to reach a 
decision because, apart from making the submission in his 
affidavit, the applicant placed no material facts before the 
court. Selke J indicated that the wider test for 
unreasonableness was the one which applied to the case. He 
held that the failure to provide the court with these facts 
was central to enabling the court to 'decide upon the reason­
ableness or otherwise of the conditions, in so far as a 
decision of that question may depend y2on the 2��£ii£e! 
���lication of these conditions or requirements to circum­
stances affecting SRecially the a2Rlicant or his tyR�_Qf 
92 
business'. (emphasis added.) 
(5) The Suggested Test to be Applied to Determine the
Reasonableness of Conditions
It is apparent from the cases cited above that confusion 
exists as to which test applies. In addressing this problem 
it is assumed that there is indeed a difference between the 
tests which have been postulated. The problem will be 
approached from two perspectives which, it is submitted, will 
achieve the same result, namely that the Kruse formula should 
be used to test the reasonableness of conditions. 
(a) The Bye-Law Analogy
If a strict classification is made the imposition of a 
condition will most probably be regarded as an administrative 
93 
act and not a legislative act. Prima facie therefore the 
narrower Union_Steel formula will apply when a condition is 
tested for reasonableness. At the same time it will be noted 
that a condition has legislative characteristics in that it 
operates over time and impinges on a holder t a rights by 
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curtailing the manner in which he operates. The effect of 
the condition is thus more important than the motivation or 
reasons for its imposition, especially because of the 
criminal consequences of contravening the provisions of a 
condition. 
The English courts have adopted a functional approach to 
94 
classifying in order to avoid strict conceptualism. In 
95 
Fawcett ProRerties Ltd v Buckingham_Count�_Council, a case 
involving planning conditions, Lord Denning examined the 
96 
reasonableness issue as follows: 
' ••• or yet again, to borrow the words of Lord Mcnaghten 
and Lord Wrenbury in this House, a public authority 
which is entrusted with a discretion must act 
reasonably .•. ; and I take it that if the authority acts 
reasonably the result will be reasonable. Out of these 
various shades of meaning I am not sure that the last 
is not the best: for it puts planning conditions on 
much the same. footing as bye-laws made by a local 
authority, to which they are so closely akin. Indeed I 
see no difference in principle between them. As with 
bye-laws so with planning conditions. The court can 
declare them void for unreasonableness but they must 
remember that they are made by a public representative 
body in the public interest.' 
So too in Mixnam's Properties Ltd v £h������ Urban District 
97 
the reasonableness of conditions attached to a site 
licence for a caravan site was approached on the basis of the 
conditions being analagous to bye-laws. 
98 
reasoned as follows: 
Lord Diplock 
'Failure to comply with a condition attached to a site 
licence is a criminal offence. The power to impose 
conditions is thus, in effect, a power to make 
subordinate legislation analogous to a power to make 
bye-laws.,. The validity of such conditions is thus to 
be tested by the same principle as the validity of bye­
law.s.' 
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It is submitted that conditions attached to road 
transportation permits are so similar in effect to those 
99 
dealt with in the Mixnam's Properties case that the bye-law 
analogy could be applied to justify the use of the����� 
100 
formula. 
(b) The Justiciability Theory
The justiciability theory is predicated on the court's insti­
tutional competence to interfere with administrative 
101 
action. It is clear that the decision to impose conditions 
is not a 'purely judicial' one. Therefore no question of the 
justiciability of the 'substantive reasonableness' of the 
decision can arise: the fact that the decision-making 
process is policy-loaded �ill preclude the court from 
deciding on, for example, what weight to be attached to the 
various considerations. While it is conceded that the 
'dialectical reasonableness' of the decision-making process 
will certainly be justiciable, the fact that conditions have 
certain ascertainable effects (in which the underlying policy 
is largely irrelevant) will ensure that the court will fit 
into the 'unreasonableness constituency'. In short, because 
the 'substantive unreasonableness' of the decision to impose 
conditions can be judged by its application in a relatively 
policy free environment, it is submitted that the K�g�� 
formula is particularly appropriate when the reasonableness 
of conditions is in issue. 
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INTRODUCTION 
S9 of the Road Transportation Act deals with the procedure 
that boards and the Commission must use in dealing with 
matters. It is thus a section of general application. Three 
other sections dealing with procedure will be discussed in 
this chapter. They describe the procedure to be followed in 
specified situations: s25 empowers a board or the Commission 
to withdraw; suspend or vary permits, s26 allows for the 
withdrawal or amendment of permits on the establishment of a 
railway service and s28 deals with the withdrawal or 
substitution of permits after an enquiry. 
Prior to dealing with the rules contained in ss9, 25, 26 and 
28 it is necessary to discuss decision-making and procedure 
in general terms. As the procedure which a statute 
prescribes has an effect on the common law, the rules of 
natural justice and related issues will be dealt with where 
appropriate. 
[I] THE PLACE OF PROCEDURE IN DECISION MAKING
lAJ DECISION-MAKING AND PROCEDURE 
It is perhaps trite to say that the decision-making process 
is a complex one because, except in cases where a decision is 
reached mechanically, the decision-maker is always working 
under conditions of uncertainty involving 1 complex and often 
1 2 
ambiguous environments'. In order to reach an 1 acceptable 1
decision, the decision-maker is required to weigh up 
alternative courses of action and consequences and to 
evaluate these consequences. Whether these choices are 
unlimited {as adherents to the unbounded rationality school 
argue) or narrowed, .out of necessity (as Braybrooke 
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and Lindblom submit), the person or body entrusted with 
making the decision is faced with a task of unenviabl• 
3 
complexity. To this must be added the difficulty of 
4 
assessing the result: 
'Correctness, good/bad and efficient/inefficient 
are all concepts which can only be established by 
appealing to value judgements. Thus value 
judgments will, in addition to evaluating the 
ends/goals of the decision process, also evaluate 
the means through which the attainment of these 
ends are effected.' 
These problems are exacerbated yet further by the fact that 
the validity of administrative decisions can be attacked on a 
number of grounds, one of which is relevancy. Thus if the 
court holds that a relevant �onsideration ws.s not taken into 
account or that an irrelevant consideration tainted the 
decision it will be struck down. Craig, while stressing that 
relevancy, if properly used, is an appropriate control 
5 
mechanism, points out: 
'The unspoken premise behind this ground of attack 
is somewhat dubious. It presumes s. decision taken 
with all relevant information at hand, which is 
then carefully weighed and a conclusion reached. 
Yet one thing upon which the literature upon 
decision-making, at least in its descriptive 
aspect, appears to be clear is that this premise 
does not represent actual practice.' 
The role of procedure should be seen against the background 
of decision-making as outlined above. It is important in 
enabling a decision-maker to reach an acceptable decision by 
setting out rules to follow and thus narrowing the issues 
that have to be weighed up. Ideally it should also be 
designed to place those issues (or sufficient of them to 
provide the basis for a satisfactory decision) before the 
deciding person or body. Seen in this light, procedure is 
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7 
not designed or intended to ensure a correct result. 
It has widely been assumed that, for reasons of information 
gathering and fairness, the adversary system is best suited 
8 
to the resolution of disputes before administrative bodies. 
Craig challenges a blanket assumption that this system is 
best suited to the needs of all tribunals. He argues that 
it is premised on the equality of the parties (apart from 
intellect and experience). This, he says, is not necessarily 
10 
the position in public law disputes. Secondly, while the 
adversary system may be appropriate in private law matters, 
involving for example two parties contesting a piece of land 
or the spoils from a contract, wider issues are at stake in 
11 
public law disputes: 
'There may be a wider public interest involved, 
over and beyond that of the particular parties 
before the tribunal, and whereas much private law 
litigation is retrospective in the sense of 
concerning a completed set of past events, public 
law will often be concerned with the future, with 
the modification of the public body's conduct, and 
with a series of events which will continue to have 
ramifications outside of the present dispute.' 
He suggests therefore that a more 'active' role should be 
played by the deciding body, but at the same time, that the 
area of involvement be carefully assessed so as to avoid 
12 
'accusatory inquisition.' 
[BJ THE IMPORTANCE OF PROCEDURE 
The importance of fair procedure in the administrative sphere 
cannot be over emphasized. The courts have developed rules 
enabling them to control the means by which a decision of a 
tribunal or official is reached. The most widely used 
device, where it has not been excluded, is the principle of 
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natural Justice which is based on the premise that a fair 
procedure (one which is impartial and affords parties a 
hearing) is not only desirable to ensure Just results but js 
13 
a sign of good administration. These considerations have 
been used to justify the insistence of the courts that 
procedures similar_ to their own can be forced on 
14 
administrative bodies. To illustrate the important role 
15 
played by procedure, Wade says: 
'Procedure is not a matter of secondary importance. 
As governmental powers continually grow more 
drastic, it is only by procedural fairness that 
they are rendered tolerable. The legislation which 
controls the use of land, for example, contains a 
large element of expropriation without compensa­
tion, which is for the most part accepted without 
public complaint. But if there is the least sug­
gestion that a planning appeal has been handled 
unfairly, public complaint is loud and widespread. ' 
It is often argued that the value of prescribing procedures 
is to ensure fair results, or at least, a high possibility 
of fair results. For instance, the underlying rationale of 
the audi alteram partem rule is, in part, to ensure that s 
power is exercised correctly because it is exercised after 
16 
certain facts have been found to exist. At the same time it 
must be conceded that unjust laws may be administered with 
due regard to procedures and bad decisions may be reached 
17 
despite meticulous care in observing procedures. The latter 
instance does not create an insurmountable problem because 
such a decision may be attacked on substantive issues. The 
usual grounds for reviewing administrative action will be 
18 
available. If the decision is attacked simply because it is 
alleged to be wrong, the court will not interfere. 
entitled or qualified to deal with the merits and so 
It is not 
substitute its decision for that of the body entrusted by 
19 
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slalule wilh exercising lhe discretion. 
[CJ WHAT IS MEANT BY THE WORD 'FAIR'? 
It is oflen glibly said lhal decisions of courts and 
tribunals should be fair, and that lhe reason for lhe 
imposilion of procedures or procedural safe-guards is to 
ensure fair results. One must therefore enquire inlo what 
exaclly is meanl by lhe word 'fair'. This enquiry is 
complicated by lhe fact lhal fairness is a contested concept. 
In other words, one person's notion of fairness may differ 
substantially from another person's notion of the same 
concept, while both agree that procedures should be fair. X 
may feel, for example, thal fairness is enshrined in 
equality, while Y may lhink lhal anything is fair if lhe 
20 
parties consenled lherelo. A related justification for 
observing procedures is lhal certain objectives, deemed to 
be desirable, will be achieved by so doing. These objectives 
include accuracy of decision-making, objectivity and 
21 
efficiency. Baxter says: 
'Underlying lhese assumptions are value judgments 
that lhose objeclives are·desirable - one could 
imagine an adminislralive slale where the sole 
objective was efficiency in administration, in 
which case accuracy may take only second place and 
objectivity none at all. So even lhe purely ulili­
larian approach lo procedural standards is based 
upon moral notions of fairness'. 
If it were possible lo measure lhe correclness of a decision 
against an objective yardstick the need for procedural 
observance would fall away. Where subjective standards 
regarding lhe merits of a decision have lo be weighed up 
procedure plays a valuable role. Three categories of 
22 
procedural justice may be distinguished: 
'Perfect erocedural �uslice may be devised where 
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(a) there is an independent criterion for measuring
�he correctness of the result, and Cb) it is
possible to devise a procedure that will ensure the
·desired outcome. As Rawls says, 'perfect 
procedural justice is rare, if not impossible, in 
cases of much practical interest.' 
Imperfect Qrocedural iustice is exemplified by 
trials. The procedure is framed to ascertain the 
facts, but 'it seems impossible to design the legal 
rules so that they always lead to the correct 
. result. • 
����-erocedural justice, on the other hand, 
'obtains when there is no independent criterion for 
the right result; instead there is a correct or 
fair procedure such that the outcome is likewise 
correct or fair, whatever it is, provided that the 
procedure has been properly followed' 
Because procedures in administrative decision-making, 
exemplified by the principles of natural justice, will 
inevitably fall into the category of imperfect procedural 
justice or that of pure procedural justice, the justification 
exists for judicial interference when those principles are 
not complied with. 
[AJ SECTION 9 - GENERAL PRECEDURE 
(1} Th• Provlaiona of the S•ctlon 
The procedure laid down in s9 of the Act is general because 
it prescribes the way in which a board or the Commission must 
23 
deal with any matter before it. It is, however, subject to 
the provisions of ss25{2) (b) and 28. 
In terms of s9, a board or the Commission may, in its 
deacretion, allow any person who is affected by, or 
interested in, the matter before it to give evidence or make 
oral representations, to call witnesses and lead evidence and 
to question any person who has testified as a witness. 
These rights may be exercised by the affected or interested 
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party personally or by his duly authorized legal 
24 
representation. 
The remainder of s9(1} gives a board or the Commission powers 
to enable it to gather sufficient information on which to 
base a decision. S9(1} (b) grants the power to subpoena any 
person to appear before a board or the Commission to give 
evidence or to produce any book, plan or other document or 
article in his possession or under his control. 
This power must be exercised by written notice and served in 
25 
the manner prescribed by regulation. S9 ( 1) (c) contains 
almost identical provisions but it applies to persons who are 
present at the place where the hearing is taking place. The 
formalities of reg 11 are not required in such a case. 
Furthermore, a board or the Commission may question any 
26 
person appearing before it as a witness and refuse to hear 
27 
any person who refuses to be sworn or affirmed. 
<2) The Discretion Exercised by a Board or the Commission 
S9 is of relevance, not only to applications for permits but 
also to all of the other functions entrusted to boards and 
28 
the Commission. Seen in this light, the discretion 
contained in s9 is merely an acknowledgment of the variable 
29 
content of the audi alteram partem rule. When a board or the 
Commission is hearing an application for a permit, the 
decision to refuse to allow an interested party a full 
hearing would most certainly be fatal. On the other hand, 
if the decision in RoQ��t� v Qhairman�_Local Road 
30 
Transportion Board and Others(2) is to be seen as correct, 
the refusal to hear a party when the Commission acts in terms 
of s7(2) is not contrary to the principles of natural 
275 
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justice. 
Thus, while the discretion must be exercised properly, a 
failure to allow a party a hearing will not, on its own, 
invalidate the final decision. To exercise the discretion in 
the proper way, a board or the Commission must consider the 
matter, apply its mind to the issue, act in good faith, for a 
proper purpose and without an ulterior motive. If the 
tribunal has exercised its discretion in accordance with the 
above principles of legality, the further question of the 
applicability of natural justice can be tackled. This 
amounts to asking whether the correct procedure was adopted 
in the circumstances. Whether natural justice applies will 
depend, inter alia on ' ... die omstandighede van die saak, die 
aard van die onder9oek, die reels waarvolgens die 
regsinstansie handel, die onderwerp waarmee gehandel word, 
31 
ens • • •  t
CBJ SECTION 25 - THE WITHDRAWAL, SUSPENSION OR VARIATION OF PERMITS 
(1} The Proviaiona of th• Section 
The procedures laid down in s9 are made subject to the 
32 
special procedures of s25(2). S25(1) empowers a competent 
board or the Commission to withdraw or suspend public or 
private permits or to cancel, vary or amend any conditions or 
33 
requirements. Before exercising any power under this 
section the following procedures must be observed: the board 
or the Commission must give the permit holder -in question at 
least 21 days written notice of its intention, along with 
reasons for its proposed action. This notice must be 
34 
tendered by registered or certified post; the permit 
holder must be allowed, either personally or through a legal 
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representative, to appear before the board or the 
Commission to adduce evidence and submit representations; 
and the appropriate local authorities must be allowed to make 
representations if the permit which may be withdrawn, 
suspended or varied is a public permit authorizing the daily 
36 
conveyance of persons. The representations must be 
delivered to the board or the Commission not later than 
21 days after being requested and must be in writing. 
37 
Delivery must be made either by hand or by registered post. 
(2) Th• Giving of Notice as a Jurisdictional Fact
Rose Innes defines a Jurisdictional fact as r • • •  a fact the
existence of which the legislature contemplates as a 
38 
prerequisite to the exercise of a statutory power'. Non 
compliance, by a tribunal, with a Jurisdictional fact will 
39 
render any purported exercise of power ultra vires, unless 
40 
the statutory provision is merely directory. While the 
answer to whether the terms of a statute are mandatory or 
directory depend to a large extent on the context and wording 
of the enactment in question, Evans makes the following 
41 
observation: 
'Some classes of procedural requirements are so
'important that they will nearly always be held to 
be mandatory, For example, an administrative 
authority which fails to comply with a statutory 
duty to give prior notice or hold a hearing or make 
due enquiry or consider objections in the course of 
exercising discretionary powers affecting 
individual rights will seldom find the courts cas­
ting an indulgent eye upon its omissions.' 
The giving of notice and reasons to a permit holder, in terms 
of s25{2) (a), are jurisdictional facts which must exist prior 
to the exercise of any powers, in terms of s25, by a board or 
the Commission. It is submitted that a decision taken 
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42 
without compliance with the subsection will be invalid. 
The onus of proving the existence of a jurisdictional fact is 
on the person or tribunal vested with power. It is not cast 
43 
on the applicant to prove its non-existence. 
(3) The Giving of Notice as a Requirement of Natural Justice
It is submitted that had s25(2){a} not been enacted, the 
44 
giving of notice would still be necessary. The common law 
principle audi alteram partem would apply because the act in 
question is quasi-judicial in nature or, alternatively, 
45 
fairness would demand that natural justice be applied. The 
content of the right to a hearing is variable, so 
those elements which the courts regard as particularly 
appropriate to the situation would have to be complied with. 
It is difficult to envisage a fair exercise of power, in the 
set of circumstances contemplated by s25, in which notice has 
not been given: the right to a hearing would be rendered 
worthless if no time was allowed to a permit holder in which 
he could prepare his representations and evidence. 
[CJ SECTION 26 - THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A RAILWAY SERVICE 
526 provides that on the establishment of a railway service 
the Commission, acting with the approval of the Minister, may 
withdraw or amend any permit which formerly authorized the 
conveyance of persons who would be served by the railway 
service. In such a situation the permit holder is presented 
with a fait accompli because no prior notice need be 
46 
given. Notice must, however, be sent to the permit holder 
{by certified or regi�tered post) requiring hiro to submit a 
claim for compensation. The claim must be submitted within 
90 days of the withdrawal or amendment becoming effective 
47 
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or such longer period as the Commission may allow. The 
amount of compensation is determined by the Ministers of 
48 
Transport Affairs and Finance but provision is made 
for arbitration if the permit holder is not prepared to 
49 
accept the amount decided on by the Ministers. 
[DJ SECTION 28 - PUBLIC ENQUIRIES 
(1) The Provisions of the Section
S28 makes provision for a public enquiry with a viev to 
withdraving or substituting existing permits. 
as follows: 
S28(1) reads 
'Whenever the Minister has reason to believe that, 
in order to bring about improvements in 
transportation facilities within any area or over 
any route, or for any other reason, it may be 
expedient in the public interest that any public 
permit be withdrawn or that any such permit be 
withdrawn and in lieu thereof one or more such 
permits be issued to a person other than the holder 
of such permit, the Minister may cause a public 
inquiry in regard to the position to be instituted 
by the commission or by a member of the commission.' 
The following procedures must be followed when a s28 enquiry 
is instituted: notice must be given to all interested 
parties who must also be afforded an opportunity to attend 
50 
and be heard at the enquiry. Reg 19 stipulates how notice 
is to be given and the facts which must be made public. These 
consist of the venue of the enquiry, the time and date of its 
commencement and, if the enquiry was instituted by a member 
51 
of the Commission, that member's full names. Notice must be 
published in one issue of the Government Gazette and in at 
least one issue of an English and an Afrikaans newspaper 
circulating in the province in which the road transportation 
52 
is undertaken; in conducting the enquiry the Commission or 
member thereof must take into account the provisions of 
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sl5(1), which sets out the matters which have to be 
considered when an application for a public permit is dealt 
53 
with. When the enquiry has been completed the Minister is 
empowered to make the final decision. 
54 
He may, subject to 
undertakings of compensation, direct that the permit be 
withdrawn, or that it be withdrawn and one or more permits be 
issued to a person or persons other than the original permit 
holder. In reaching his decision the Minister is required to 
consider the report made by the Commission and any 
55 
recommendations. The amount of compensation payable should 
be determined by the parties, but in the absence of agreement 
it will be determined by an arbitrator in accordance with the 
56 
Arbitration Act. 
(2) Natural Justice and the Commission's Report
S28(2} codifies three aspects of the audi alteram partem 
rule, namely, the rights to notice, to a hearing and to an 
opportunity to attend the enquiry. Whether these rights may 
be supplemented by the common law is a vexed question which 
has received much attention by the courts in South Africa and 
in England. The decisions, unfortunately, have shown a great 
deal of diversity. At the heart of the controversy is the 
fact that the body which hears the matter does not decide on 
it. The exercise of that power is left to the Minister whose 
decision is made on the basis of the Commission's report. 
The argument in favour of a restrictive approach to the 
problem is based on a classification of the function in 
question. The body entrusted with hearing the matter is not 
entrusted with deciding, and so cannot affect the rights of 
interested parties. Consequently it does not exercise a 
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quasi-judicial function in the normal sense and so only those 
aspects of natural justice which are enshrined in the statute 
need be applied. The case of Cassem en 'n Ander v QQ� 
57 
K��ese Komitee van die G�Q�R�gebiedraad en Andere provides a 
clear example of this approach. 
58 
In terms of the Group Areas 
Act a Group Areas Board was entrusted with the task of 
investigating and reporting on whether areas should be 
proclaimed as Group Areas. The report was made to the 
Minister and effect was given to findings by way of 
proclamations made by the Governor-General acting on the 
advice of the Minister. The appellants wished inter alia to 
be allowed to give oral evidence before the Board and to 
cross examine other witnesses. In dismissing the appeal, 
Steyn CJ held that the appellants were only entitled to make 
use of those procedures which the Act laid down. He held 
that the rules of natural justice ? apart from the statute, 
59 
did not apply:
'Voordat die funksie van n statut�r gemagtigde uit 
die aard daarvan as kwasi-geregtelik in bedoelde 
sin beskou kan word, meet, afgesien van ander 
moontlike vereistes, in n geval soos die huidige, 
eers blyk dat die uitoefening daarvan die regte van 
n persoon sal tref. ' 
60 
Rose Innes says that Cassem's case went against the weight 
0£ previous authority and that the courts generally treated 
the proceedings of fact-finding and advisory bodies as quasi-
61 
judicial. Notwithstanding the above, it is submitted that 
the decision can be criticized on a number of grounds: 
first, to assert that the enquiry will have no effect on the 
rights of interested parties overlooks the fact that a 
decision which will af£ect rights will be made. In other 
words, the enquiry should not be seen in isolation; 
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secondly, by short-circuiting natural justice the type of 
situation is created which the concept seeks to avoid. The 
decision-maker is allowed to make a decision without all of 
the relevant facts at his disposal, but, because he took no 
part in the enquiry, that decision, if made honestly in the 
broad sense, will be immune from attack; thirdly the 
62 
formalistic approach manifested in Cassem's case elevates 'a 
63 
convenient classification into a source of legal rules' at 
the expense, it is submitted, of equity and efficiency; 
fourthly, the correctness of the decision must be questioned 
against the general policy of South African law. The law, in 
many other areas, experiences no problems in looking at the 
substance and not the form. Indeed this is seen as a healthy 
characteristic. Thus a disguised sale will be exposed as a 
64 
loan in appropriate cases; an agreement which the parties 
call a lease in which the dominant right is the ius abutendi 
will be held not to be a lease, despite the form of the 
65 
agreement; and an agreement which is framed as a partnership 
to avoid a minimum wage provision will have the trappings of 
partnership stripped away and be categorized as a contract of 
66 
employment. 
It is submitted that the way out of the conceptual trap 
created by the classification of functions is the adoption of 
the approach favoured by the English courts. Recognizing the 
variable content of natural Justice, the English courts have 
applied the fairness doctrine, which does not depend on the 
type of function in question. Far from tipping the scale too 
much in favour of the individual, the application of natural 
justice in this way has allowed judges sufficient latitude to 
decide the extent to which the concept applies in situations 
67 
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of an extremely varied nature. This determination will 
68 
depend upon a number of factors which Craig outlines: 
•the proximity between the initial investigation and
the final decision; the construction of the statute; 
the importance of the subject matter for the 
individual; and the need for administrative 
efficiency.' 
(3) Th• Minister'• D•ciaion
The Minister is given the power to make the decision as to 
whether the permit which was the subject of the enquiry 
should be withdrawn completely or withdrawn and replaced by 
69 
another permit or other permits. Prior to making his 
decision he is required to consider the report made by the 
Commission and, where applicabl�, any recommendations. 
Two initial points must be made about the decision-making 
process before a fuller discussion of the Minister's decision 
is embarked on: first, a Minister, as a member of the 
executive should have a policy in respect of the affairs 
70 
which form part of his portfolio; secondly, the Minister of 
Transport Affairs acts as the 'co-ordinating factor' between 
SATS and the Commission, both of which fall within his 
71 
department. Bearing the above two factors in mind the 
problem of departmental bias will be canvassed as will the 
process of the Minister's decision-making. 
It will be remembered that in terms of s28(1) the Minister 
has power to initiate the enquiry. The permitted reasons 
for doing so are widely stated in the Act: 
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'Whenever the Minister has reason to believe that, in 
order to bring about improvements in transportation 
facilities ..• or for any other reason, it may be 
expedient in the public interest that any public permit 
be withdrawn .•• the Minister may cause a public enquiry 
in regard to the position to be instituted ••• ' 
It can generally be assumed that the Minister's decision to 
hold an enquiry is based on a policy which h� holds (and is 
entitled to hold}. As the ultimate decision-maker, that 
policy will come into his considerations. Wade points out 
that 'ministerial or departmental policy cannot be regarded 
as disqualifying bias' and that attempts to have decisions 
72 
set aside on this basis have 'uniformly failed'. 
73 
The same 
author says elsewhere: 
'The minister's policy, however loudly he proclaims 
it, will not vitiate it by itself. For, 0£ course, 
the minister is required by Parliament to have a 
policy and it is absurd to suppose that Parliament 
puts duties upon him with the intention that he 
shall lay his policy aside while he performs them'. 
74 
The case of Er�rr�!irr v Minister of Town_and Country_El�n�i�g 
is perhaps an extreme case of ministerial bias. In terms of 
the New Towns Act 1946, the Minister of Town and Country 
Planning had decided that Stevenage was to be a new town. 
Prior to this (and prior to a public enquiry) the Minister 
had made a speech at Stevenage at which he was jeered and 
heckled. Despite this he stated his policy and also said: 
'It is no good your jeering: it is going to be done'. The 
objectors, after the final decision was made, attacked its 
validity on the basis of the Minister's stated bias. The 
House of Lords, in upholding his decision held that the law 
did not, in the circumstances, require impartial 
consideration on the part of the Minister. Wade favours the 
approach taken by the Cour� of Appeal in the same case. This 
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court held that the law required impartial consideration 
and that the Minister had dealt with the matter impartially, 
75 
despite his outburst at the public meeting. 
If the Minister's decision cannot be impugned on the basis of 
ministerial bias, are there any other available grounds? 
The answer to this question is in the affirmative, although 
it must be conceded that these grounds are limited. Wade 
illustrates this point in distinguishing between procedural 
76 
regularity leading to the decision and the decision itself: 
'If the minister has come safely through the pre­
scribed course, and provided (it must be added) 
that he acts in good faith, he is then at liberty 
to decide as he likes free of all legal trammels. 
If he secretly decides by tossing a penny, or by 
drawing lots, there ls no process by which the 
substance of his decision can be attacked - though 
if he discloses that he has so decided, this might 
be accepted as evidence that he had not considered 
the obligation.' 
77 
The decision in �R���N� v Governor-General is perhaps wider 
in its terms. The court held that the proper enquiry into 
the validity of the Minister's decision is whether, when he 
considered the report and made his decision, he genuinely 
addressed himself to the question with an open mind. 
[IIIJ SOME OBSERVATIONS ON PROCEDURE AND THE AUDI ALTERAM 
PARTEH-RULE 
[AJ THE FLEXIBILITY OF THE AUDI ALTERAM PARTEM RULE 
The principles of natural justice are flexible and can be 
78 
applied in varying degrees; 
'The audi alteram partem rule does not postulate 
rigid norms of invariable content and accordingly, 
its ambit must vary with the context in which it 
is invoked' 
Craig says that, while the court takes a number of factors 
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into account when applying natural justice, it is often 
influenced by a utilitarian concept of fairness. This will 
not usually be expressed. 
79 
The result is therefore a balance 
of three factors: 
'the individual interest at issue; the benefits 
to be derived from added procedural safeguards; 
and the cost to the administration, both direct 
and indirect, of complying with those procedural 
requirements.' 
The advantage of flexibility cannot be overemphasized: it 
enables courts to apply those principles most suited to a 
80 
particular situation. In the words of Baker AJ: 
'Dit is, algemeen gesproke, stellig reg om to s� 
dat die vereistes van natuurlike geregtigheid van 
die omstandighede van die saak, die aard van die 
ondersoek, die reels waarvolgens die regsinstansie 
handel, die onderwerp waarmee behandel word ens 
afhang ••. ' 
The trend to apply natural justice in an all or nothing 
81 
manner has been severely criticized. Such an approach is not 
only inappropriate, but also a dangerous deviation from the 
common law safeguards inherent in the concept. Thus, while 
the 'procedural' sections of the Road Transportation Act 
codify some aspects of the audi alteram partem rule, those 
provisions are not necessarily the beginning and the end of 
the matter. The court may, in appropriate circumstances, 
bolster the omissions of the statute with the principles of 
82 
the common law, 
[BJ THE CONTENT OF THE AUDI ALTERAM PARTEM RULE 
The exact content of the audi alteram partem rule is 
difficult to define. The main reason for this state of 
uncertainty is the flexibility of the concept and its 
286 
variable content, dependent on the facts of each case. 
Corder, in looking for the essentials of natural justice, 
suggests that any attempt to codify the audi alteram partem 
principle should contain the following as minimum 
83 
requirements: 
1 1. Timeous notice of intended administrative
action which may affect a particular
individual's rights, including notice of the
time and place of a hearing and the nature of 
the prejudicial allegations against that
individual.
2. An oral hearing, at which the individual be
given an opportunity to produce rebutting
evidence, and to be assisted by legal
counsel, if he so desires.
3. The giving of reasons for a decision, which
reasons will be made available only to the
parties concerned.'
At the same time, it should be noted that in certain 
circumstances the above requirements would be inadequate to 
ensure fairness in the administrative process. In these 
situations additional safeguards would be necessary, whether 
they are prescribed by the relevant statute or not. When 
applying natural justice a court should always bear two 
conflicting interests in mind: the need for fairness and 
just results on the one hand and considerations of 
administrative expediency on the other. An over strict 
application of the rule by the courts would result in the 
administrative process grinding to a standstill. Three 
84 
guidelines have been suggested in Durayappah ::!_ Fernando to 
assist judges in deciding whether the rule is appropriate or 
85 
not. These guidelines are: 
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' •.. first, what is the nature of the property, the 
office held, status enjoyed or services to be 
performed by the complainant of injustice: 
secondly, in what circumstances or upon what 
occasions is the person claiming to be entitled to 
exercise the measure of control entitled to 
intervene; thirdly, when a right to intervene is 
proved, what sanctions in fact is the latter 
entitled to impose upon the other.' 
It must be added that despite the undoubted convenience of an 
all embracing formula, the application of �hich determines 
the admissibility or otherwise of the rule, the inherent 
flexibility of natural justice which is, after all, its 
principle characteristic, defies attempts to formalize it to 
any extent. Wade succintly makes this point as follows: 
'On the other hand, it must be emphasized that 'it 
is not possible to lay down rigid rules as to when 
the principles of natural justice are to apply: 
nor as to their scope and extent. Everything 
depends on the subject matter.' The application 
of natural Justice, resting as it does upon 
statutory implication, must always be in 
conformity with the scheme of the Act and with the 
subject matter of the case.' 
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INTRODUCTION 
Appeal must be distinguished from review. The former is 
1 
always the creature of statute while the basis of the latter 
is the common law: the court, on review is simply acting in 
accordance with its inherent powers and 'performing its 
2 
ordinary functions in order to uphold the rule of law'. A 
further distinction is that appeals deal with the merits of 
a decision, whereas reviews are concerned with the legality 
of a decision. The importance of this distinction is 
4 
outlined by Baxter: 
'The primary function of the courts is to apply 
the law in the resolution of disputes. This 
provides the justification for their inherent 
review jurisdiction ••• but it also limits this 
jurisdiction to matters involving the leqality of 
administrative action. Without statutory 
authority, the court may not venture to question 
the merits or wisdom of any administrative 
decision that may be in dispute. If the court 
were to do this, it would be usurping the 
authority that has been entrusted to the 
administrative body by the empowering legislation. 
More than this, the court would be moving beyond 
its special area of expertise.' 
THE NATURE AND FUNCTION DF APPEAL 
( A] WHY ARE APPEALS NECESSARY? 
The first, and perhaps, most obvious reason for the creation 
of appeal mechanisms is to correct bad or wrong decisions. 
Humans, being fallible, make mistakes which may be corrected 
if the matter is decided again. The existence of an appeal 
procedure should not be seen solely as a safeguard against 
dishonesty or bad faith: review procedures are designed to 
cure such abuses of power. Instead it should be seen as a 
means of curing bona fide errors made by adjudicators of 
first instance. It is thus an invaluable safeguard for, in 
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the words of Baxter: 
'It provides an aggrieved individual with the 
assurance that the decision will be reconsidered 
by a second decision-maker. The appellate body is 
able to exercise a calmer, more objective and 
reflective judgement. Detached from the "dust of 
the arena", as it were, and the immediacy of the 
initial decision, the second decision-maker is in 
a better position to discern a f��liY reasoning 
��Q£�s2 and, in particular, to evaluate facts.'
In addition, it is an unfortunate fact that not all 
adjudicators, despite the best selection methods, will 
provide a suitable standard of decision-making. The 
hardships that can be caused by the poor quality of 
adjudication may be overcome on appeal. 
[BJ THE TYPES OF APPEALS 
The types of appeals may be examined from two perspectives: 
in terms of hierarchy and in terms of appellate powers. It 
should be remembered in what follows that, because appeals 
are creatures of statute, they are created on an ad hoc basis 
by individual statutes: the types of appeals need not 
necessarily conform to any particular general principle. 
{1) Hierarchy 
In the judicial system the hierarchy of appeals is stable and 
relatively simple: a litigant has an automatic right to 
appeal from the decision of a magistrate to the Supreme 
Court. Leave to appeal is required to appeal from a decision 
of any division of the Supreme Court to either a full bench 
6 
of that division or the Appellate Division. 
It is unusual for an appeal to be granted from a decision of 
7 
an administrative tribunal to a court: courts as a rule, do 
not possess the institutional competence to decide on the 
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merits of often highly complex policy issues but other 
members of the administration would be better suited to do 
8 
so: 
'Since the executive branch of government exists 
in order to administer, it seems appropriate that 
the wisdom of its actions should be left in its 
hands. But neither departmental supervision nor 
procedural safeguards are sufficient to guarantee 
that administrative discretion will be exercised 
wisely. Hence provision is often made for an 
administrative appeal against particular 
administrative decisions.• 
The hierarchical structure of appellate jurisdiction 
9 
varies from statute to statute. Baxter points out that the 
relative importance given to the protection of individual 
rights on the one hand and the application of public policy 
on the other will be the major factor in determining the type 
10 
of body to which an appeal should lie: 
'Seldom is the choice between legal rights and public 
policy clearcut. In many cases both require adequate 
protection. Various blends may be employed in order to 
achieve the most appropriate balance of representation, 
skill, accountability and independence in the appellate 
body to match the subject matter of the appeal.• 
Hence an appeal may lie to a minister (usually from a power 
exercised by an official in his department}, from a member of 
a department to a superior (such as a director general}, from 
a local tribunal to a supervisory agency which operates on a 
national level, from a tribunal of first instance to a body 
representative of various interest groups, from boards to 
specially created appellate bodies (such as the Publications 
Appeal Board) or to special courts staffed by people with the 
1 1 
necessary expertise. 
(2) Powers
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Despite the ad hoc nature of the creation of appellate 
jurisdiction, appeals can be classified according to how 
narrow or wide the powers of the appellate body are. In the 
12 
case of Tikly and Others v Johannes NO and Others� Trollip J 
isolated three distinct types of appeal on this basis: 
'(i) an appeal in the wide sense, that is, a 
complete re-hearing of, and fresh 
determination on the merits of the matter 
vith or without additional evidence or 
information. 
(ii) an appeal in the ordinary strict sense, that
is, a re-hearing on the merits but limited to
the evidence or information on which the
decision under appeal was given and in which
the only determination is whether that
decision was right or wrong.
(iii> a review, that is, a limited re-hearing with 
or without additional evidence or information 
to determine, not whether the decision under 
appeal was correct or not but whether the 
arbiters had exercised their powers honestly 
and properly.' 
The sense in which the word is used in each case must be 
13 
determined from its statutory context. 
[CJ APPEALS AGAINST DISCRETIONARY DECISIONS 
An appeal from an administrative body to a court, when the 
former is required to exercise a discretion, may be 
inappropriate. The court is not necessarily familiar with 
the policy which underpins the administrative body's 
functions. In instances where such an appeal is created it 
may perhaps be most suitable to grant the narrowest appellate 
jurisdiction i.e. what Trollip J described as a 'review'. 
The more policy loaded the decision of the tribunal of first 
instance, the more appropriate will it be to grant appellate 
powers to an administrative body: in such cases less 
objection can be raised against granting a wider appeal. In 
an appeal in the widest sense, the appellate body will have 
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original jurisdiction of its own. 
14 
In other words, it will 
have: 
' .•. the power and duty to hear the administrative 
proceedings afresh and to hear new evidence if 
need be, and to substitute its opinion, discretion 
and decision for that of the inferior 
administrative tribunal. It exercises the same 
powers on the appeal as the inferior authority had 
in the first instance.' 
Finally it must be stressed that the above comments are 
qualified by the fact that the type of appeal created will
depend on the terms of the parent legislation. It may also 
be dependent on the procedural machinery contained in the Act 
and the facilities available to the appellate body. 
[II] IH�_AEElALttEcHANisM Qt_!H�_RQA�_r!a��foRTAT10N a�!
(AJ THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 8
(1) Who Kay Note an Appeal
15 
S8(1} of the Act provides for an appeal to the Commission 
against any act, direction or decision of a board, unless the 
context of a particular section of the statute provides 
otherwise. A person may appeal if: (a) he has applied to a 
board for the grant, renewal, amendment or transfer of any 
permit; (b) if he is the holder of a permit; or (c) if, in 
accordance with the regulations, he submitted representations 
to a board 'objecting to or supporting any application 
published under section 14(1) or any application for the 
grant, renewal or amendment of a private permit'. Such a 
person must, in addition, he affected by the act, direction 
16 
or decision of the board. 
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S8Cl) as outlined above was introduced by amending 
17 
legislation in 1980. Before the amendment it provided a 
wider right to appeal. It read: 
'Save as otherwise provided in this Act, any 
person affected by any act, direction or decision 
of a board may, in the manner prescribed by 
regulation, within 21 da✓s after ,the said act was 
performed or the said direction or decision was 
given by the board concerned, appeal against such 
act, direction or decision to the commission. ' 
Prior to the amendment therefore, an affected person could 
await a decision of a board before becoming involved in the 
issue. That is no longer possible. If the person is not the 
applicant or a permit holder, involvement {through the 
submission of representations at the very least) is a 
18 
condition for standing on appeal. 
(2) How is an Appeal Noted?
The appeal must be noted within 21 days of the act of the 
board being performed or the direction or decision being 
given. Furthermore it must conform with the requirements 
19 
prescribed by regulation. These requirements are contained 
in reg 10(1) and comprise of the following: (a) a clear, 
full description of the act, direction or decision which forms 
the basis of the appeal; (b) the name of the board whose 
act, direction or decision is sought to be challenged and the 
date on which it was performed or made; and (c} the grounds 
of appeal, which must be clearly set out. Reg 10(1} (d) 
required elaboration of the grounds to be relied upon but it 
20 
has been held to be ultra vires because of its vagueness. 
Reg 10(1) (e) says that the notice of appeal must be in 
writing and copies of the document must be lodged by hand or 
by registered mail with the Commission in quindecuplicate and 
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with the board concerned in duplicate. It must, in terms of 
reg 10(1) {f) be accompanied by a fee of Rl00 as prescribed by 
reg 18(4). 
(3) The Powers of the Commisaion
The Commission is empowered to receive and consider any 
21 
appeal which has been lodged. In reaching its decision it 
may, in its discretion, adopt one of the following courses: 
(a) it may reject the appeal and thus confirm the original
22 
act, direction or decision; (b) it may uphold the appeal
23 
and set aside the act, direction or decision; (c) it may
uphold the appeal partially and vary the act, direction or 
24 
decision of the tribunal of first instance. 
In the event of the Commission following the second course of 
action (i.e. setting aside the board's act, direction or 
decision), it has two choices open to it: it may either 
substitute its own act, direction or decision, provided that 
the resultant exercise of power could have been performed by 
25 
the board, or it may remit the matter to the board for fresh 
26 
consideration. 58(4) provides that when the Commission 
either substitutes an act, direction or decision for that of 
27 
a board, or upholds an appeal partially, thus varying the 
28 
act, direction or decision, the resultant act, direction or 
decision is deemed to be that of the board of first instance. 
The Commission has powers to request the board whose act, 
direction or decision has been appealed against to forward to 
it all documents relating to the appeal as well
as the written reasons for its act, direction or decision. 
This the board must do within 21 days of the request, 
but the Commission may extend this period at the request of 
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29 
the board concerned. 
A duty is imposed on the Commission to take cognisance of all 
information contained in the documents of both the appellant 
and the board. This duty relates to the handling of an 
appeal in terms of s8{2Y of the Act and s9 which prescribes 
30 
the procedure to be followed. In addition the Commission 
may, at its discretion, inspect any place or object 
31 
relating to the appeal and direct the board to collect 
information on any matter arising from the appeal and to 
submit, or to specify, the reasons for its decision in 
32 
greater detail. The Commission must inform the appellant 
and any other party who is, in its opinion, affected by the 
appeal of the decision reached. 
33 
writing. 
(4) The Powers of the Chairman
This must be done in 
The chairman of the Commission, or any member who has been 
nominated by the chairman, has a number of wide powers 
conferred by s8(3). The first relates to the condonation of 
the late filing of a notice of appeal. The chairman or his 
nominee has a discretion as to the granting or refusing of 
such an application, provided that the late appeal is lodged 
within 42 days of the act, direction or decision 
appealed against, and it conforms to the requirements set out 
34 
in the regulations. Secondly, he may grant or refuse an 
application to suspend the operation of an act, direction or 
35 
decision of a board which has been appealed against. If he 
grants such an application, but a permit has already been 
issued in terms of the act, direction or decision under 
challenge, the Commission or a competent board may demand of 
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the holder that it be lodged with either body. The holder 
36 
must lodge it either by hand or by registered mail.
Thirdly, the chairman has power to set aside an act, 
direction or decision of a board which has been appealed 
37 
against and remit it to the board for fresh consideration. 
It is submitted that this power should only be exercised in 
exceptional circumstances, e.g; when the original act, 
direction or decision is so blatantly wrong that there is no 
reasonabale chance of the appeal being rejected. Thus, if on 
the documents before the chairman it is clear that the board 
acted beyond its powers or reached its conclusion contrary to 
the overwhelming weight of the evidence or misdirected itself 
in some other way, the paver conferred by s8(3) (c) may be 
invoked. In the above instances no duty rests on the 
empowered person to give notice or to hear any interested 
38 
party. 
[BJ AN ANALYSIS OF SECTION 8 
(1) The Type of Appeal
58(2), which grants appellate jurisdiction to the Commission, 
has been interpreted in a number of cases. In 
Golden Arrow Bus Services v Central Road Trans2ortation 
39 
Board_and_Others, for instance, it was argued that because a 
board had a discretion to grant an application, the appeal to 
the Central Board (the present Commission) was intended to be 
limited, The appellate powers of this body only went to 
ascertaining whether the board had exercised its discretion 
properly and had taken into consideration those matters which 
the Act required it to consider. 
40 
argument: 
302 
Centlivres JA rejected this 
1 
44 
'One can hardly imagine clearer language to 
indicate that the Legislature intended that an 
appeal to the Central Board should be an appeal in 
the fullest sense of the word.' 
41 
In CaQe_Carriers_Ltd v SAR and H and Another, Beyers J dealt 
with the powers of the Commission. He stressed that it was 
an admi n i s·tra ti ve body and not a court of 1 aw. In addition 
it has appellate jurisdiction and original jurisdiction to 
grant or refuse applications. An appeal to the Commission is 
not, however, an appeal in the sense in �hich that term fg 
used in a court of law because there is not, as a matter of 
42 
course, a record of evidence from the board. He 
43 
concluded: 
'In my view, if a matter comes before the Central 
Board on appeal it becomes the duty of that Board 
to consider it in all its aspects and to arrive at 
a fair and honest decision thereon. While the 
Central Board will obviously attach importance to 
the Local Board's reasons, the proceedings before 
the Central Board are more in the nature of an 
original hearing of the application than of an 
appeal stricto_sensu. • 
Holmes JA examined the powers and duties of the Commission in 
its appellate capacity in Johannesburg_Local_Road 
r��u��ortation Board and Others V David Morton TranS�Q�� 
44 
• ( a)
(b)
(d) 
(e) 
He made five points in this regard: 
The Commission does not sit as a court; 
It is not bound by rules of judicial 
procedure; 
It is a body of laymen (from a lawyer's point 
of view), appointed for their expertise in 
their particular field; 
It is not obliged to hear oral evidence. It 
is not required to keep a record of the 
proceedings or to give reasons for its 
decision; 
It can reach its decision in its own way, so 
long as it honestly applies its mind to the 
issue, and observes the statutory behestg 
and the tenets of natural justice.' 
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--�--------� 
The same learned judge of appeal had dealt with this issue in 
National Transport Commission and Another v Chetty 1 s Motor 
Transport {Pty) Ltd. He pointed out, inter alia, that on 
appeal the issue is not whether the Commission concludes that 
the board was wrong, because the Commission comes to its own 
decision. At most the decision and reasons of the board will 
46 
be factors which the Commission will bear in mind. He 
described the Commission 1 s position in the regulatory 
structure by saying that the legislature had 'appointed it as 
the final arbiter in its special field and right or wrong, 
for better or worse, reasonable or unreasonable, its 
47 
decision stands 1 • 
If it is accepted that the type of appeal is determined by 
the wording of the legislation which creates the appeal and 
the procedural machinery available to the appellate 
tribunal, the Commission has appellate powers of the widest 
kind. From the discussion of the cases it is apparent that 
the legislature has granted it complete powers to rehear 
matters and to reach its own decision. Further indicia of 
48 
its wide powers are its competence to consider oral evidence, 
require the production of 'any book, plan, or other document 
51 
inspect places or objects 
52 
49 50 
or article, 1 compel witnesses, 
and require reasons from the board of first instance as 
53 
well as additional information and more detailed reasons. 
54 
In short therefore: 
'The NTC has the fullest powers and facilities to 
redetermine the decisions of local boards, or even 
to take the original decision itself. It 
therefore has power to review and set aside or 
correct illegalities perpetrated by local boards, 
except where such illegalities prevent the NTC 
itself from applying the relevant legislation.' 
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<2> Lat• Appeal•
It has been noted that an appeal must be lodged within 21
days of the making or giving of the act, direction or 
decision under challenge. In addition, the chairman of the 
Commission or his nominee may condone the late filing of 
notice to appeal. This discretionary po�er may only be used 
for a further 21 days after the original period has expired. 
55 
Thereafter no possibility of an appeal exists. Essentially 
similar provisions were dealt with in the case of fi!l�Y v 
56 
Central_Road_T rans�ortation Board and Others. Pillay applied 
to have a decision of the Central Board set aside, in which 
it had upheld certain appeals. In terms of reg 12 framed 
under the Motor Carrier Transportation Act, an appeal was 
required to be noted within 14 days of the decision of a 
a local board. Appeals were noted 17 days and 25 days after 
the original decision and there had been no condonation of 
the late appeals. Selke J, in granting the application, held 
that the language of the regulations in question was 
peremptory and so a failure to comply with the time period 
set down was, in the absence of condonation, fatal to the 
validity of the appeals. The result of this failure on the 
part of the Central Board was to rob it of its appellate 
jurisdiction. 
(3) Notice tc ObJectcra
S8 and reg 10 are silent on the need to inform affected 
persons of an appeal against an act, direction or decision of 
a board. This problem was dealt with by Hathorn JP in 
Durban_Cor2oration v Rugnath and Central Road Trans22��e1i2� 
57 
In holding that notice must be given to interes ted 
parties the learned Judge President pointed to the usual 
305 
practice of the Central Board which was to give notice. The 
58 
ratio of the court was stated in the following terms: 
'I do not think that the silence of the 
regulations on this subject can properly be 
construed as a provision that notice need not be 
given, but, if I am wrong about that, then 
clearly, in so far as the regulations have the 
effect of depriving an interested party of his 
right to be heard on appeal, the regulations are 
ultra vires because the power to regulate 
procedure cannot possibly include the power to 
deprive an interested party of his right to be 
heard on appeal. This right is fundamental. The 
principle is audi alteram eartem. • 
(4) The Suspension of the Ac�, Direction or Decision 
Pending and Appeal
In terms of s8(3) (b), the chairman of the Commission or his 
nominee may grant or refuse an application to suspend the 
opera�ion of an act, direction or decision of a board pending 
an appeal. The empowered official may exercise his 
discretion 'without giving prior notice to or hearing any 
interested party'. 
The rationale for s8(3) (b} was deal� with by Broome J in 
Marineine_Transeort_(Pt�)_Ltd v Local Road Transeortation 
59 
'Disputes over transportation certificates are 
seldom any different from any other form of 
dispute ventilated in court and it is a time­
honoured principle that, in the absence of 
extraordinary circumstances, the court, as �he 
chairman did here, will always maintain the 
s�atus quo until the last word has been spoken 
by the final court of appeal.' 
In Leburu en Andere v Voorsitter, Nasionale_Vervoer-
60 
kommissie L_en_Andere on the other hand, Grosskopf J took a 
wider, and it is submitted, a more correct view of s8(3) (b). 
He held that the maintenance of the status quo was not all-
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l
important, but merely a factor to be taken into account by 
the empowered official. That person is required to decide 
61 
whether the status quo should be returned to or not: 
'Die gevolgtrekking waartoe ek dus kom, is dat die 
blote aantekening van appel teen 'n handeling, 
cpdrag of beslissing van 'n plaaslike 
padvervoerraad nie meebring dat daardie handeling, 
opdrag of beslissing, of die werking daarvan, 
outomaties opgeskort word nie. Die Wetgewer het 
egter ingevolge art 8(3) (b) aan die eerste 
respondent die bevoegdheid verleen om na goeddunke 
'n aansoek om opskorting toe te staan of te weier.' 
Prior to the promulgation of amending legislation the section 
was silent as to whether the audi alteram partem rule applied 
to s8(3) decision-making. In addition, the Transvaal and 
Eastern Cape Provincial Divisions had arrived at conflicting 
62 
decisions regarding the right to a hearing. In Anderson 
I�e���Q��-iE��l-�i� v ChairmanL National_Trans�ort Commission 
63 
and_Others, however, Berman AJ held that the position after 
the amendment was clear and that prior to the change was 
64 
academic: 
'It seems to me to be abundantly clear from the 
incorporation, by amendment, into s8(3) of the Act 
of the words » • • •  and without ••• hearing any 
interested party," that it was open to first or 
second respondent to decline to hear applicant if 
it desired to make representations or submissions 
in opposing third respondent's application for 
suspension of applicant's permits, however 
cogent, weighty or unanswerable they might appear 
to applicant to be.' 
It is clear from the above that the discretion exercised by 
the empowered official is a very wide one indeed. Two 
questions arise: 'how is the discretion to be exercised?' 
and 'is it reviewable?' The answer to the first question 
must, it it submitted, depend on the facts of each case. In 
simple matters the maintenance of the status quo may be 
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sensible, necessary or convenient. So in Anderson_Trans2ort 
65 
(Pl�)_Ltd v QhelcmanL National Transport Commission 
and_Others
L 
Berman AJ appeared to have regarded the exercise 
of the discretion with favour where the official, without 
concerning himself with the merits or the grounds of the 
pending appeal, suspended permits on the basis that they 
authorized a new service and so 'the status quo ought to be 
66 
maintained pending the outcome of t.he appeal'. In 
South African Transport Services v Chairman L_Port_Elizabeth 
67 
Local Road Trans2ortation BoarQ...i_ and_Others, the second 
respondent had used temporary permits for a considerable 
period but had applied successfully to the board for public 
permits. The grant was suspended in terms of s8(3) (b), and 
Jennett AJ held that this allowed for the continued granting 
of temporary permits. In both of these examples t.he 
restoration of the status quo did not appear lo prejudice any 
of the parties and so the 'time honoured principle' spoken of 
68 
by Broome Jin the Marinpine case could be given high 
priority. Where a party may suffer prejudice the decision 
will not be as easy to make because that prejudice and the 
need to maintain the st.atus quo may conflict. In such cases 
a dictum of Jansen J in �i�g and Co <Pty} Ltd v 
Pietermaritzburg_Local_Road_Transeortation Board 
69 
and Another provides, it is submitted, a useful approach in 
terms of which the empowered official can exercise his 
70 
discretion: 
'The very urgency excludes a full investigation 
into the facts and the law, and it allows only of 
a superficial approach which might lead to a view
which, upon full invest.igation, might well appear 
to be erroneous. It seems to me that. if the court 
does err it should rat.her err in the direction of 
preventing irreparable harm from happening.' 
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The learned judge, it must be conceded, was dealing with the 
policy which the court should adopt when asked to grant an 
interim interdict, but many of the same considerations 
apply when an official is asked to suspend an act, direction 
or decision of a board: little time may be available for 
independent research, difficult inferences and questions of 
law relating to the merits may be involved and the urgency of 
the matter may exclude a full investigation. 
In conclusion, it is submitted that an exercise of power in 
terms of s8(3) (b) is subject to review. The full range of 
grounds will be available with the exception of a failure to 
observe the audi alteram partem rule, which has been 
expressly excluded. Practical problems brought about by the 
wide discretion, the closed decision-making process and the 
interlocutory nature of the decision will no doubt affect the 
justiciability of the issue and render proof of the 
irregularity more difficult. 
(5) Which Acts, Directions or Decisions are Subject to 
Appeal?
S8 provides an appeal against��� act, direction or decision 
of a board. While the section does not prima facie limit the 
type of act, direction or decision which is subject to 
appeal, the court found, in Nasionale_Vervoerkommissie van 
71 
Suid_Afrika v Salz Gossow Transport (Edms) Bp�
i 
that there 
are indeed limitations to the applicability of sB. 
The facts of the case were briefly as follows: Wesbank 
Transport had applied to a board for the transfer of five 
public permits belonging to one Theron. At the hearing the 
respondent asked the board to institute an enquiry in terms 
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of s25 into Theron 1 s use of the permits in order to have 
them withdrawn, suspended or varied. The board decided to 
institute the enquiry and for that reason postponed Wesbank's 
application. The latter appealed successfully against these 
decisions and the respondent took the matter on review. The 
court a quo set aside the Commission 1 s decision because, it 
held, no appealable decision had been taken and the 
Commission was therefore not competent to consider the 
72 
matter. On appeal, the case turned on the interpretation of 
the word 1 decision 1 in s8. 
In holding that a wider meaning for the word could not have 
been intended, Smuts AJA found that a great number of 
decisions may be taken by a board before a final decision on 
73 
the merits. If all of the preliminary decisions were 
subject to appeal, the object of the Act (to provide quick 
resolution of disputes) would be frustrated and would result 
in ' 1 n uitgerekte, tydverspillende, duur en frustrerende 
74 
proses, 1 Delays would be common place and would cause 
prejudice not only to the parties but also to the economy. 
75 
The learned acting judge of appeal therefore concluded: 
1 Waar die een vertolking dan die gevaar van 
moontlike verydeling van die Wetgewer se bedoeling 
inhou en die ander vertolking gevolg daaraan sal 
gee, moet laasgenoemde vertolking voorkeur geniet 
..• Dit sal dan in heirdie geval beteken dat die 
woord 11beslissing 11 vertolk moet word om betrekking 
te he op die meriete van die aansoek en nie op 
beslissings wat in die loop van so 'n aansoek gegee 
word met betrekking tot prossessuele 
aangeleenthede nie. 1 
Similar meanings were given to the words 1 act 1 and 
1 direction'. Neither of the decisions taken by the board was 
therefore subject to appeal and the appeal was dismissed. 
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( C] EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES AND THE GIVING OF REASONS 
(1) May a Party Approach the Court Before Appealing?
(a) Doctrine
Wade contends that there is no rule that administrative 
remedies must be exhausted before a court will review a 
76 
tribunal 1 s decision. He says: 
1 0ne aspect of the rule of law is that illegal 
administrative action can be challenged in the 
court as soon as it is taken or threatened. There 
is therefore no need first to pursue any 
administrative procedure or appeal in order to see 
whether the action will in the end be taken or 
not. An administrative appeal on the merits of 
the case is something quite different from 
judicial determination of the legality of the 
whole matter; and so even may be an appeal to a 
court of law. 1 
Baxter argues that, while the right to approach the court on 
review only after internal remedies have been exhausted is 
not absolute or automatic, the relief may be refused if the 
governing legislation requires the exhaustion of remedies. 
Relief will, on the other hand, be granted if domestic 
remedies cannot redress the wrong or where the alleged 
77 
unlawfulness undermines those remedies. 
In principle therefore, internal remedies will not have been 
exhausted if an administrative appeal is wide enough to 
cover reviewable irregularities or to cure defects at the 
a quo stage. It would appear on this basis that the duty to 
exhaust internal remedies would prima facie apply in road 
transportation cases because the Commission is empowered to 
78 
correct proceedings of a board which are ultra vires 
79 
decide on jurisdictional matters. Furthermore, as a 
complete rehearing is allowed, even defects in natural 
80 
justice at the first stage can be cured on appeal: 
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and to 
'In the case of the former, (a complete hearing 
de novo) it is possible for the appellate 
tribunal, by observing the precepts of natural 
Justice, to gather completely fresh evidence in a 
fair manner and to weigh it objectively and 
impartially. To this extent the injustice of the 
first hearing can be remedied.' 
The above should not be seen as a dogmatic statement because 
the circumstances of each case will determine whether the 
applicant should have exhausted internal remedies. The 
nature of the appeal and the wide powers of the Commission 
would appear to militate in favour of exhaustion prior to 
approaching the court. 
(b) Road Transportation Cases
In Main Line Transport v Durban Local Road Transportation 
81 
�2���L it was argued by the respondent that the applicant 
was not entitled to the relief sought because it had not 
exhausted its internal remedies by making use of an appeal. 
Henochsberg J held that the applicant could approach the 
court at any time unless the Jurisdiction of the court was 
expressly or impliedly ousted by the statute conferring the 
82 
right of appeal or other remedy. After a thorough 
examination of the case law, the learned judge concluded as 
83 
follows: 
'Now it seems to me that it is not clear that the 
terms of the Motor Carrier Transportation Act, 
1930 are such as necessarily imply that an 
aggrieved party cannot approach a court of law on 
the ground of irregularity or illegality. There 
is no express ouster of the court's jurisdiction 
and there is always a strong presumption against a 
statute being construed so as to oust the 
jurisdiction of the court completely. The remedy 
of applying to court for redress where a person's 
fundamental rights have been disregarded has long 
been in existence and the mere creation of a 
statutory right of review and appeal cannot in my 
view be regarded as an indication on the part of 
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the Legislature to take away that remedy and as 
entirely ousting the jurisdiction of the court in 
such cases. 1 
The learned judge appeared to disregard the failure to 
exhaust remedies for two reasons: first, if the board was 
to continue with the hearing (having adjourned the matter) 
without correction, its decision would have been void because 
84 
it had failed to comply with the proper precedure. This 
would, it is assumed, rob the applicant of a fair and proper 
hearing��� appeal; secondly, the consent of the board, 
evidenced by its decision to adjourn, was given to the 
applicant so that it could approach the court. In this 
regard Henochsburg J held that the board could not 'depart 
from this attitude and claim by its counsel that the 
proceedings are premature and that applicant must first 
85 
exhaust its remedy of appealing to the Commission'. 
In Pietermaritzburg_Cit�_Council v Local Road_Trans2ortation 
86 
�Q���
L 
Fannin J granted the relief sought by the applicant 
despite the fact that it had not taken the board's decision 
on appeal. His reason for not requiring internal remedies to 
be exhausted was that, while the Commission could grant 
temporary permits to the applicant pending the outcome of an 
appeal, it could not do so if the board's proceedings were 
87 
taken on review. If the board's decision was set aside, 
there may be no appeal, but in the meantime, the applicant 
would suffer irreparable harm. If the court refused interim 
relief, the applicant would have a choice of: 
' ... closing down its service pending the outcome 
of the review, or putting into effect a decision 
which it contends was not properly made, or as an 
alternative to both of these courses, of 
abandoning the review proceedings and confining 
itself to its statutory remedies. That would be 
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tantamount to refusing to the applicant the right 
which it had chosen to exercise.' (88) 
Miller J decided the issue on different grounds in Durban 
�iiy_Council and Another v Local_Road_Trans�ortation_Board 
89 
and Another. He held that the Act's appeal mechanism does not 
necessarily oust the court's jurisdiction and, even though 
the appeal is a complete hearing de novo, the Commission has 
a discretion as to whether more evidence should be adduced or 
to decide the matter on the documents before it. This 
discretion militated against a rigid application of the 
principle that internal remedies should be exhausted prior to 
90 91 
approaching the court. On appeal Holmes JA approved of the 
approach· adopted by the court a quo, holding that the court's 
jurisdiction was not ousted by necessary implication in 
regar� to 'matters such as an illegality or a material 
irregularity committed by the local board, which fall outside 
92 
the purview of the application of the Act,' especially where 
the illegality or irregularity complained of may render the 
effectiveness of the statutory remedy problematic. 
The most recent case on point is Rauties Trans�ort (Edms} BQ� 
v Voorsitter, Plaaslike Padvervoerraad�_Johannesburg_��-�rr 
93 
aag�� in which Goldstone J held that the noting of an appeal 
does not preclude a party from approaching the court for the 
same relief. In following the Appellate Division decision in 
94 
the Durban Cit�_Council case, the learned judge concluded 
that in the case before him internal remedies did not have to 
95 
be exhausted: 
'Kortom is die bewering namens die applikant, en 
is dit betoog van sy advokate, dat die Raad en die 
Kommissie, onder andere, mala fide, in fraudem 
l�&l� en minagtend teenoor hierdie Hof opgetree
het. In hierdie omstandighede is dit klaarblyklik 
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wenslik en gepas vir hierdie Hof om die 
verrigtinge aan to boor.' 
(c) Conclusion
From a perusal of the case law it is evident that the court's 
power to intervene prior to the outcome of an appeal has not 
been ousted. Despite the fact that the Commission has wide 
appellate powers, the courts have adopted a flexible approach 
which appears to favour the maintenance of jurisdiction. 
Perhaps the principle that a party is entitled to a proper 
two-tiered hearing plays an important part in this regard. 
The following emerges as the court's basis for interference 
or non interference: (i) if illegality or irregularity of a 
material nature is alleged, the court will usually assume 
jurisdiction; (ii) the circumstances of each case are 
important, so if the matter is urgent and/or the applicant 
may suffer irreparable harm the court will review the 
decision, but if these factors are not present it may hold 
that the proceedings are premature; {iii} it may not 
interfere in matters incidental to the general application of 
the Act which can be cured on appeal. 
(2) The Giving of Reasons
(a) The Importance of Reasons
The importance of reasoned decision-making has been 
emphasized by many commentators. For instance, Wade says 
'reasoned decisions are not only vital for the purpose of 
showing the citizen that he is receiving justice: they are 
96 
also a valuable discipline for the tribunal itself'. 
Baxter highlights four advantages of creating a general 
statutory duty to give reasons: the duty would ensure that 
decisions are rationalized: the giving of reasons is fair 
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and engenders public confidence because the individual is 
informed as to how the decision was made: rational 
criticism, especially to form the basis of an appeal or 
review, can only be made if reasons are furnished: and an 
educative function will be served by the giving of reasons 
because unsuccessful applicants will be able to ascertain 
97 
what is expected of them in the future. While Craig too 
argues that the furnishing of reasons is important he points 
98 
out that there is opposition to the extension of the duty! 
'There is no doubt that the idea would be opposed 
upon grounds of time and cost to the 
administration. Jhere is no doubt that both time 
and expense would be incurred. How much is more 
difficult to evaluate. Whether the expense is 
worthwhile would depend upon a value judgment in 
which the other side of the equation is the 
greater accountability thereby engendered, 
Another fear might be that the courts would become 
too involved in subsequent challenges based upon 
the information thereby provided. t 
(b) Is There a Duty to Give Reasons?
In South Africa there is no common law duty imposed on 
decision-makers to give reasons and the courts have been 
99 
reluctant to impose such a duty. 
the creature of statute. 
Where a duty exists, it is 
A limited duty to give reasons exists in the Road 
Transportation Act: a board must submit reasons to the 
Commission when an appeal is noted against its act, direction 
100 101 
or decision. No similar duty is imposed on the Commission, 
although a failure to give reasons has been criticized by the 
courts. In �-�-����li�g and Erasmus <Pt��-��� v f2������Q��g
102 
Local Road Transportation Board and Others� for instance, 
103 
Kotze JA held: 
'It has repeatedly been held that a body like the 
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Commission is not obliged lo give reasons for its 
decision. But that does not mean that it should 
not furnish reasons for its decision., 
An interesting point to note is that the Commission is under 
a statutory obligation to give reasons when it deals with air 
service licence applications in terms of the Air Services 
104 105 
Act, but not when dealing with road transportation appeals. 
When reasons are given in the latter instance they are 'often 
prefaced by a warning that they are given as a matter of 
106 
grace and not duty'. 
(c} The Result of a Failure to Give Reasons 
Baxter says that 'the good administrator will give reasons 
107 
even if there is no duty upon him to do so' . In certain 
circumstances, however, a failure to give reasons, where no 
duty exists, may lead to an inference being drawn adverse to 
the decision-maker. The extent to which such an inference 
will be drawn 'depends to some extent on the relative 
108 
activism or restraint of the court concerned,' but 
obviously no inference can be drawn in cases where the 
failure is reasonable. It is submitted that the South 
African courts, in road transportation matters, have moved 
away from a relatively restrained approach to one whereby an 
adverse inference will more readily be drawn. This shift is 
highlighted by two important Appellate Division cases which 
will be discussed below. 
In National_Trans�ort Commission and Another v 
109 
�h���y's Motor Trans�Q��-1E�Yl_���
L 
the Commission refused 
to give reasons (as it was entitled to do) despite request. 
Instead the chairman, by way of affidavit blandly asserted 
that the Commission had sufficient facts at its disposal, 
317 
had fully canvassed the merits, had given them full 
consideration and had applied the relevant provisions of 
110 
the Act. Holmes JA held that an election to remain silent 
on the part of the Commission did not give rise to a 
presumption of unlawfulness. Only if direct prima facie 
testimony of unlawfulness was placed before the court would 
the Commission's refusal be af relevance: in such a 
situation an adverse inference would be drawn but 'if the 
evidence is circumstantial, a failure to give reasons does 
not necessarily strengthen it'. 
112 
continued: 
111 
The learned judge of appeal 
'In other words, it is not enough for an applicant 
to aver vitiating conduct by the Commission: he 
must demonstrate it, prima facie, before he can 
draw supporting inferences from the absence of 
reasons by the Commission., .the refusal to give 
reasons is an important element to be taken into 
account only where there is evidence �ll���� of 
bad faith. ' 
This approach has been criticised. Baxter, for instance, 
argues that where no explanation for the failure is given and 
no rebutting evidence is offered, an inference of 
unlawfulness should be drawn: the individual is left to 
flounder 'in the dark' in attempting to establish a case, 
while the tribunal which, after all, must act in the public 
113 
interest, is able to achieve immunity by its secrecy. 
A shift in emphasis was evidenced by the decision of 
� C Greyli�g and Erasmus {Pty) Ltd v lQ������QY�g-�Q£�1 
114 
Road_Trans�ortation Board and Others in which an adverse 
inference was drawn from the Commission's refusal to give 
115 
reasons. Kotze JA in giving the judgment of the court held: 
'Where, as he�e, the only evidence presented is 
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impressive and acceptable, remains unchallenged in 
cross-examination and uncontradicted by other 
evidence, then the failure to give reasons does 
tend to support an inference that the evidence was 
ignored.' 
The more activist approach has been followed in other road 
transportation cases: in Salz Gossow Transport (Edms) B2k v 
116 
Nasionale Vervoerkommissie van Suid Afrika en Andere� for 
instance, Bethune J held that, in the absence of reasons, it 
was difficult for the court to arrive at any other conclusion 
but that the Commission had misdirected itself as to the law 
{'mistasting van die reg begaan') or had acted in an 
117 
arbitrary manner. In Airoadexpress (Pty) Ltd v ChairmanL
118 
Local Road Transeortation_Board� Durban and Others, Broome J 
came very close to imposing a duty to give reasons (on a 
119 
board): 
'I have, on the one hand, what appears to be a 
strong case and I have nothing at all to weigh 
against that. Now I do not consider that the first 
respondent was entitled simply to remain silent if 
in fact there were valid reasons for the refusal. 
An appeal having been lodged to the NTC, reasons 
have to be furnished, and the failure to furnish 
reasons at this stage must affect the court's view 
on the issue of whether or not a erima facie case 
has been made out.' 
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[ I J REVIEW IN GENERAL 
[ A] THE PURPOSE OF REVIEW
The purpose of review was set out clearly by Bristowe Jin
1
African Realty Trust Ltd v Johannesburg Municipality
'If a public body or an individual exceeds its 
powers the court will exercise a restraining 
influence; and if, while ostensibly confining 
itself within the scope of its powers, it neverthe­
less acts mala fide or dishonestly, or for ulterior 
reasons which ought not to influence its judgment, 
or with an unreasonableness so gross as to be inex­
plicable, except on the assumption of mala fides or 
ulterior motive, then again the court will 
interfere. But once a decision has been honestly 
and fairly arrived at upon a point which lies 
within the discretion of the body or person who has 
decided it, then the court has no functions what­
ever. It has no more power than a private 
individual would have to interfere with the 
decision merely because it is not one at which it 
would have arrived.' 
The judgment of Innes CJ in Johannesburg Consolidated Invest-
2 
ment Co Ltd v Johannesburg Town Council was to similar effect. 
The learned Chief Justice said that where a public body 
disregards provisions of a statute which impose duties on 
it, is guilty of gross irregularity or clear illegality the 
court may review and set aside its decision. Thus the 
purpose of review is to ensure that the principle of 
legality, which derives from an adherence to the rule of law, 
3 
is observed. 
[ BJ THE SOURCE OF THE COURT'S POWER TO REVIEW 
4 
Review is a remedy which derives from the common law. In 
the words of Wade, it is simply a matter of the court 
'performing its ordinary functions in order to uphold the 
5 6 
rule of law'. The same author says elsewhere: 
'Every act of governmental power i.e. every act 
which affects the legal rights, duties or liberties 
of any person, must be shown to have a striclly 
legal pedigree. The affected person may always 
resort to the courts of law, and if the legal 
pedigree is not found to be perfectly in order the 
court will invalidate the act, which he can then 
safely disregard.' 
The existence of this power has been recognized and stated by 
7 
s19(1) of the Supreme Court Act which says that the Supreme 
Court has jurisdiction to hear all causes arising within its 
area of jurisdiction. The power to review the acts or 
decisions of tribunals exists apart from any review or appeal 
mechanism created by statute. It is only excluded if a 
statute so enacts either expressly or by necessary 
8 
implication. A presumption applies against construing a 
9 
statute in such a way as to oust the courts jurisdiction. 
Rose Innes makes the point thal no special statutory 
provisions or rules of court govern the review of administra-
10 
tive tribunals. The rules which apply are those derived from 
1 1 
the common law and developed by the courts. 
[CJ REVIEW AND APPEAL COMPARED 
The terms 'review' and 'appeal' have been used interchange-
12 
ably by our courts in a number of cases and in many statutes, 
This careless use of language led Lansdown J, in �tQ��t�� v 
13 
Durban_Town Council_and_Another, to say: 
'In 1897 and for many years onwards, certainly up 
to 1909 there was much confusion in Natal legal and 
forensic practice between review and appeal, the 
terms often being used indiscriminately.' 
The first difference between review and appeal to warrant 
mention is that the former derives from the common law while 
14 
appeals are created by statute. This proposition is subject, 
of course, to the existence of special statutory reviews, 
15 
such as that found in s20(1) (a) of the Liquor Act. 
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Secondly, the purpose of the two remedies is different. 
Review proceedings are designed to rectify illegalities and 
16 
to ensure a fair hearing. Thus the emphasis is placed on 
controlling procedural irregularities. 
17 
Rose Inneg says in 
this regard: 
'The result of the trial or proceeding - the 
decision, judgment or order made - whether correct 
or wrong, is not the concern of the reviewing 
court. ' 
Wad�, dealing with the same point says that while, on appeal, 
the question is whether the prior decision is right or wrong, 
on review the issue is whether the decision was lawful or 
18 
unlawful. 
Thirdly, a court of appeal has, generally speaking, 
jurisdiction to examine the merits, while on review the court 
19 
must stop short of this. In the latter case it will examine 
procedural, Jurisdictional and ·evidential issues. The fact 
that none of the recognized grounds for review go directly to 
the substantive issues of the decision was succinctly stated 
20 
by De Beer Jin R v Hlatswa�o� 
'in reviews the Court will not, as a rule question 
the decision of the magistrate on the facts - nor 
will it give the same weight to technicalities. 
The Court is in fact concerned only with the 
question whether the proceedings appear to be in 
accordance with justice. ' 
Appeal and review may overlap in one particular sense: where 
illegality is averred and provision is made for an appeal, a 
court of appeal may adjudicate on the issue. It is not 
essential for an aggrieved party to bring review proceedings. 
If no appeal lies, then obviously, the aggrieved party will 
21 
only have the remedy or review available. 
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An integral part of exercising appellate power is that the 
higher body substitutes its decision for that of the 
22 
inferior body. When the court reviews the decision of an 
inferior court or tribunal the principle is different. In 
that case, as a general rule, the court will remit the 
matter, if a decision is found wanting, to the original 
23 
arbiter for fresh consideration, The reasons for this rule 
were outlined by Van Blerk JA in��£& v �L����t���������� 
24 
vir_Gebied_42 in the following terms: 
'Maar dit gaan hier om 'n geval waar die wetgewer 
die ondersoek aan 'n raad toevertrou het, en nie 
aan 'n geregshof nie, gevolklik kan die Hof nie, 
selfs by nietigverklaring van die verrigtinge, 
administratiewe funksie§ vir homself aanmatig deur 
sy diskresie te substitueer vir die toevertrou aan 
'n raad nie.' 
There are instances where a court may intervene by refusing 
to remit the matter and by substituting its decision for that 
25 
of the tribunal or official whose decision it has reviewed. 
[DJ THE TYPES OF REVIEW 
Innes CJ, in Johannesbur�_Consolidated_Investment_Co_Ltd v 
26 
Johannesburg Town_Council, identified three distinct and 
separate meanings for the word review. These are: ( 1 ) the 
process by which the proceedings of inferior courts are 
brought before the S\lpreme Court in or·der to cure grave i r-
regularities or illegalities. The grouds upon which such 
proceedings may be based are limited by statute. The 
application is by summons; ( 2) the review of actions by 
public bodies or officials where important provisions of a
statute have not been complied with or gross irregularity or 
clear illegality is alleged. The court will exercise this 
type of review despite the absence of a statutory power 
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allowing it to examine the act in question. In comparing 
27 
this common law review lo the first type, Innes CJ said: 
'The body whose proceedings are reviewed is not a 
judicial one; the application is by way of motion, 
and not by way of summons; and the grounds upon 
�hich a review may be claimed are somewhat wider 
than those which alone would justify a review of 
Judicial· proceedings. '; 
(3) lh� third lype of review identified by Innes CJ is a
special statutory review. This type, he said, is wider than 
the other t'\olo and can be likened to a hearing de novo. In 
this sense it overlaps with an appeal. 
The type of review available to an aggrieved party who wishes 
to challenge an act, decision or direction of either a board 
or the Commission is the second type mentioned by Innes CJ. 
No statutory provisions exist which create review machinery 
and clearly the processes created by the Road Transportation 
Act are administrative in nature. 
THE GROUNDS OF REVIEW AND SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF THE EXERCISE 
----------------------------------------------------------
[AJ GENERAL 
A problem associated with any writing on review is that the 
cases do not fall easily into clearly defined categories: 
the grounds on which the courts will interfere with an admin­
istrative decision have been developed in an ad hoc manner. 
For this reason, and because of the use of widely varying 
terminology, a great degree of overlapping is found in the 
cases: a failure on the part of a tribunal to apply its mind 
may also be seen in terms of the application of a fixed 
pol icy; the failure to take into account a relevant 
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consideration may be evidence of an ulterior motive; the 
cumulative effect of a number of misdirections and abuses of 
power may be expressed in unreasonabl�ness terminology. The 
discussion below will seek to isolate and illustrate the 
grounds on which the courts wil I set aside decisions of a 
board or the Commission. For this purpose, a loose distinc­
tion has been made between discretionary acts and non­
discretionary acts. 
( :8 ) THE REV! EW OF DISCRETIONARY ACTS 
(1) Failure to apply natural justice
The procedures prescribed by the Act and the common law
require decision-makers, as a general rule, to apply the 
principles of natural justice. There are exceptions to this 
28 
statement which have been dealt with elsewhere. 
(a) Nemo Judex in Sua Causa
The common law requires that any person engaged in decision­
making of the type undertaken by boards and the Commission 
should be impartial. This aspect of natural justice has been 
29 
dealt with but it should be noted that both the Road Trans-
30 31 
portation Act and the Transport (Co-ordination) Act 
prescribe classes of persons who are not eligible for 
appointment. Only two of these categories have a bearing on 
32 
natural justice, but both Acts further provide that the 
mere fact that a disqualified person takes part in a decision 
33 
is insufficient to invalidate that decision. It has been 
argued that these statutory validity clauses do not, per se, 
34 
exclude natural justice. Consequently the partiality (or in 
some cases, the apprehended partiality) of a decision-maker 
35 
will render the decision in question a nullity. 
(b} Audi Alleram Partem 
36 
With limited exceptions, any person who has standing has a 
right to a full and proper hearing in proceedings before a 
board or the Commission. This proposition was clearly enun-
cialed by Henochsberg Jin Main_Line_TransEort v Q�£Qe� 
37 
Local_Road_Transeortation_Board: 
'As I appreciate the legal position it is that a
statutory body or tribunal such as the local board 
must in its proceedings apply the principles of 
natural Justice; that is to say, in particular it 
must inter_alia comply with its own rules or con­
stitution and the principles involved in the maxim
audi_alteram_earlem.' 
A failure to comply with natural Justice will be a revie�able 
irregularity and will result in the setting aside of the 
decision under review. 
38 
The procedures laid down by the Act are explicit. Therefore 
cases of gross denials of natural justice are rare. Cases 
like Du_Toit en_'n_Ander v Plaaslike_PadvervoerraadL 
39 
are exceptional: the applicants had approached 
the board for the grant of permits to authorize the 
conveyance of rubber. Five of the sixteen vehicles for which 
applications were made were authorized to carry meat and game 
carcasses from various points in Namibia to places within 
South Africa, excluding Bophuthatswana. The applicants were 
informed that the applications had been granted in part. 
When the permits were issued they authorized conveyance to 
the South African border with Namibia. The same amendment 
was made to a permit which had been lost, when the applicants 
asked the board for a replacement. Bethune J set aside the 
amendments made by the board because the audi alteram parlem 
rule had nol been applied: the amendments did not stem from 
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an application brought before the board, at no stage were the 
applicants informed of the board's proposed action and they 
were not given an opportunity to make any representations 
with regard thereto. 
Boards (and the Commission) are expected to be familiar with 
available transportation facilities and transportational 
needs. Knowledge of this kind is essential because without 
it, 'they would not be able adequately to perform their 
40 
duties'. This raises the issue of whether a board or the 
Commission must disclose information which is within its 
knowledge when this is relevant to an application before it. 
In Asmal's Bus Service (Pty) Ltd and Others v Local Road 
41 
Transportation Board and Others, . Miller J held that private 
information given to the board by a Bantu Affairs Commis­
sioner on which the board had based its decision should have 
been disclosed to the applicants, unless those 'facts or 
considerations were discarded by the Board and in fact did 
42 
not influence or sway its decision 1 • Similarly (although
obiter) in Road Services Board and Another v John Bishop 
3 
(Africa) Ltd, Tredgold CJ said that before acting on 
information, the applicant should be informed of it and be 
44 
given a chance to deal with it: 
'But this does not mean that it must disclose every 
jot and tittle of such information or the sources 
from which it is obtained. For example, a Board, 
such as this, may have in its possession 
information relevant to an application, that has 
been obtained in proceedings before it from other 
and rival applicants. It need not ignore such 
information, nor need it give to the applicant 
details of his rivals businesses, which might be of 
value to him as a trade competitor. It would be 
sufficient were he told the general effect of such 
information. 1 
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In Clairwood_Motor_Trans�ort_Co_Ltd v Pillai_and_Others, 
Kennedy J held lhat information which is prejudicial to a
party, 'the non-disclosure of which may result in a failure 
46 
of justice' had to be digclosed. The court decided that 
where the board (and subsequently, the Commission) had, after 
hearing argument, held an inspection in loco no infringement 
of natural justice had occurred. 
<2) Failure to Exercise a Discretion
When an administrative body has been vested with discretionary 
powers it must exercise them when called upon to do so by a
47 
person who is entitled to a decision. The body may fail to 
exercise a discretion by simply refusing to make a decision 
(however that refusal may be couched), by applying a rigid 
policy and thus not deciding properly (i.e. on the individual 
merits of each case) or in some other way by not applying its 
48 
mind. A failure to exercise a discretion properly is often 
linked to an error of law made by the tribunal on a 
preliminary point (e.g. as to the standing of a party or the 
powers of the tribunal itself), an error in assessing factual 
matters (the weight to be attached to particular factors 
which must be taken into account> or even errors occasioned 
by a failure to apply the principles of natural justice. 
(a) Avoiding a Decision
While the case of YQ����� v National_Trans�ort Commission 
49 
and_Others does not deal with road transportation, it 
provides a clear example of an admininstrative body refusing 
to make a decision. The applicant wished lo slarl an air 
service in the Transkei. 
50 
He therefore applied, in terms of 
the Air Services Act to the Commission for a licence to do 
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so. He completed sufficient of the application form as was 
required for publication in the Government Gazette but 
intended leading oral evidence at the hearing to establish 
the further information which was needed to put the matter 
properly before the Commission. The legal representative of 
the third respondent raised a point in limine: the 
application was materially defective because it did not 
contain all the information required in terms of the Act. 
The Commission found that the application was indeed 
defective and refused to hear the matter. 
On review, Davies AJ held that only those details which were 
required for publication in the Government Gazette had to be 
included in an application. For the rest, the Commission had 
a discretion as to whether to allow omissions in the form to 
51 
be cured at the hearing by memorandum or oral evidence. The 
Commission had not exercised this discretion because it was 
unaware that it had a discretion. Consequently its failure 
52 
constituted an irregularity which was justiciable on review. 
The case of Flying Lotus (Pty) Ltd v Chairman, National 
Transport Commission, and Another provides a further 
example of the avoidance of a decision. The applicant had 
been granted a permit by a board. The second respondent, an 
objector, appealed to the Commission which upheld the appeal. 
The reason for doing so was that the route, according to the 
Commission, covered both private and public roads and this 
deprived it of jurisdiction. In setting aside the decision 
Didcott J held that the disputed roads were public roads and 
so the Commission should have heard the matter fully and 
given a decision. The learned judge held further that even 
if some of the roads were private roads, this fact would not 
prevent the Commission from granting the permit. 
(bl Fixed Policies 
Regulatory agencies and other administrative bodies are 
expected to have policies; part of the justification for 
their existence iB the familiarity of their memberB with 
policy. These policies are intended to play a part in the 
54 
decision-making process, but as Baxter says: 
'Where discretionary powers are exercised, the 
courts will insist that discretion is in fact 
exercised and they will not accept that it has been 
if the decision has really been dictated by an 
informal rule, policy, standard or precedent �hich 
hes become inflexible.' 
The same learned author submits that policies, standards or 
precendents may be applied if discretion is not totally 
excluded, if they are compatible with the enabling 
legislation and if the person affected is informed of them 
55 
before a decision is reached. 
Perhaps the most notable road transportation case involving 
the application of a rigid policy is I��QQ v Ermelo_Local 
56 
Road_Trans�ortation_Board, in which an Indian taxi-driver 
was refused a 'first-class' permit (for the conveyance of 
whites) solely on the basis of his race. The board had 
refused his application for various other reasons, but before 
the Commission, the appeal was dismissed because it had 
adopted a policy: 'Europeans' should convey persons of that 
race group while 'non-Europeans' should convey only 'non-
Europeans'. Although Centlivres CJ phrased his decision in
terms of unreasonableness, he dealt briefly with the 
Commission's policy: he held that there was no statutory 
foundation for the policy and therefore no basis for the 
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decision. It had, in short, failed to exercise the 
discretion which the legislature had vested in it. 
Similar issues were involved in Pietermaritzburg_City_Council 
58 
v Local_Road_Trans£ortation_Board. The board had resolved 
to implement a policy of segregation in passenger conveyance. 
It advised the applicant of this and when the applicant 
wished to renew its permits for its passenger service the 
board asked it to specify which vehicles would be used for 
the conveyance of particular race groups. It thereafter 
resolved to grant the applications subject to a condition: 
separate vehicles were to be used for the conveyance of 
members of each race. The applicant applied to the court for 
a rule nisi interdicting the respondent from requiring 
compliance with its decision pending an application to have 
the decision set aside. 
59 
In confirming the rule Fannin J 
held: 
' ... the applicant has made a �rima_facie case for 
the proposition that the policy has been rigidly 
and inflexibly applied, without a proper 
consideration of the question as to whether the 
circumstances justify its application, and whether 
it should be applied forthwith.• 
While most will agree that like cases should be treated in 
the same way, a deciding body may not use a 'rule of thumb'. 
This would mean that individual consideration is not given to 
60 
each case, and a proper decision on the merits, reached. 
In other words where a 'rule of thumb' is used, the deciding 
body has not exercised its discretion and its decision can be 
61 
set aside. 
The case of National_Transeort_Commission v Airoadexeress 
62 
<Pty)_Ltd provides an illustration. In deciding on the 
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carrying capacity of vehicles for the purpose of the now 
defunct s1{2) fl) permit, the Commission had applied a rule that 
if the gross vehicl� mass of a vehicle was in excess of 
4 000 kilograms it would not grant a permit: it said that, 
in its experience, vehicles of that mass or more had a 
63 
carrying capacity in excess of 1 000 kilograms. James JP 
remitted the matter to the Commission for fresh consideration 
because it did not decide the carrying capacity of vehicles 
in a proper way. The same mistake was made (after the repeal 
of sl (2) (1)) in the unreported decision of Ratner_and_Collett 
Agencies_(Pt�>_Ltd v Chairman
L
_National_Trans�ort_Commission 
64 
and Others. The Commission had imposed a condition when 
granting an application for permits to authorize an express 
freight service. The condition was to the effect that the 
gross vehicle masses of the vans used could not exceed 2 500 
kilograms. Le Roux J held: 
'There is no evidence of an acceptable nature that 
I could find either before the Board or before the 
Commission that justifies the bald statement by the 
chairman of the first respondent that a standard 1 
ton truck does not weigh more than 2 500 
kilograms.' 
(c) Irregularities Distorting the Decision
An irregularity (which may or may not be justiciable on 
review) can lead to a decision being made in which the 
deciding body did not apply its mind properly. A failure of 
natural justice, an error of law or a misdirection in 
assessing evidence can cause a distortion in the exercise of 
the discretion. 
So, in Asmal's_Bus_Service_<Ptr>_Ltd_an':!_Others v Local_Road 
65 
Trans�ortation_Board_and_Others a failure on the part of 
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the board to apply natural justice had resulted in an 
arbitrary and capricious decision in which it had not applied 
66 
its mind. The misdirection of the board in Frasers_(OVS) 
67 
��� v VoorsitterL_Nasionale_Vervoerkommissie_en_'n_Ander 
was an error of law which resulted in the first respondent's 
discretion being exercised incorrectly: in refusing an 
application for a private permit it had erroneously 
interpreted s18 of the Act to give itself power to take into 
account the second respondent's service and it held that it 
was bound to protect it from competition because '[dit het] 
vir baie jare reeds 'n diens in Namakwaland !ewer wat in 'n 
68 
groat mate onekonomies is'. 
{3) Abuse of Discretion 
The term 'abuse of discretion' is used here to describe the 
improper use of discretion, the use of discretion for an 
ulterior motive and the dishonest exercise of power, all of 
which are grounds for setting-aside decisions. 
The power to refuse an application in part was used for an 
improper purpose in Ratner_and_Collett_Agencies_(Ptl)_Ltd v 
69 
Chairman�_National_TransQort_Commission_and_Others: 
application had been made unsuccessfully to a board for 
permits for six vehicles and six trailers, each having a 
carrying capacity of 1 000 kilograms. The Commission, on 
appeal, granted the applications in respect of the vans but 
refused authorization for the trailers. The chairman, in 
giving his reasons for the refusal, said that •it was very 
difficult to see whether a trailer had been overloaded where­
as il was easier lo recognize an overloaded truck. The 
Commission had therefore, in effect, decided to remove the 
temptation of overloading the trailers by not granting 
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permits for th�m. Le Roux J held: 
'The anticipation of and attempt to guard against a 
possible contravention of the prohibition against 
the carrying of a load of more than a thousand 
kilograms appears to me to be improper and 
unwarranted.' 
It amounted to using powers which were to be exercised for 
particular purposes (in broad terms, in the public interest) 
to prematurely anticipate criminal action on the part of the 
applicants. Furthermore, no reasons existed for the belief 
that the trailers would be overloaded. 
The case of Rauties_Transeort_<Edms)_Bek v Voorsitter
i 
70 
Plaaslike_PadvervoerraadL_Johannesburgi_en_'n_Ander 
provides an example of bad faith on the part of the decision-
maker. The board and the Commission had acted in collusion 
in trying to prevent the applicant from obtaining judicial 
redress. Goldstone J, in affirming that the decision was 
invalid stressed 'dat die redes vir hierdie nietigheid die 
mala_fide oogmerk van die Raad en die departmentele amptenare 
71 
insluit'. 
14} Irrelevant Considerations and Failures to take Relevant
Considerations into Account 
Relevancy is an important judicial tool vhich is used to 
control discretion. A decision will be set aside if 
irrelevant considerations motivated it or if relevant con-
72 
siderations vere not taken into account. To some extent 
73 
relevancy overlaps with purpose as a control mechanism. 
What factors, however, are relevant and what factors are 
irrelevant? The e5sential problem in answering this question 
is that, as Craig points out, the considerations deemed to be 
74 
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relevant are not self-defining. He says: 
' ..• the term relevancy is often used to denote not 
the types of interests which the decision-maker 
exercising discretion must take into account, but 
rather the purposes which he is entitled to pursue. 
A consideration is deemed to be irrelevant because 
its content is based upon a purpose which the 
courts believe the legislation does not authorize.' 
The courts are guided in assessing relevance by the fairly 
full list of factors contained in sl5(1) which applies only 
to public permits. That the list is not closed is made clear 
by s15(1) (m) which empowers the deciding body to take into 
account any other factor which, in its opinion, is relevant. 
Ss18 and 20 which deal with private and temporary permits 
respectively do not provide clear guidelines. 
75 
I��2Q v Ermelo_Local_Road_Transeortation_Board provides a 
ready example of an irrelevant consideration which led to the 
board's decision being s•t aside: the applicant's race had 
nothing to do with his ability as a carrier yet his 
application was refused because he was an Indian. In Er.���!:.§.
76 
iQY��-�E� v VoorsitterL_Nasionale_Vervoerkommissie, the
second respondent's service was irrelevant to the decision 
because the Act did not entitle the board or the Commission 
77 
to take it into account. 
In a number of cases relevant considerations were nol taken 
78 
into account: in the Ratner_and_Collett_Agencies case the 
service offered by South African Airways should have been 
considered but was not, while in Bangtoo_�ros_and_Others v 
79 
National_Trans�ort_Commi"ssion_and_Other.s the transport 
needs of the affected community were ignored: 
'By dismissing the appeals and refusing to renew 
the certificates the people in Chatsworth in need 
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of transport facilities were in effect told: you 
shall take this medicine whether or not it is good 
for you, and regardless of your dislike for it; 
you are offered a Hobson 1 s choice, which is better 
than no choice at all!' 
In WC Greyling and Erasmus (Pty) Ltd v Johannesburg Local 
80 
Road Transportation Board and Others the interests of SATS 
were taken into account, but the genetal public interest was not 
considered, and in Johannesburg Local Road Transportation 
81 
Board and Others v David Morton Transport (Pty) Ltd. Kotze 
AJA (dissenting) held that the board should have considered 
the fact that when the respondent conveyed the goods for 
which permits were sought (under the authority of temporary 
permits) no complaints were made about the service. This 
consideration was of importance when viewed against the 
numerous complaints made about the service given by SATS when 
that organization conveyed the goods. 
(5) Unreasonableness
The traditional approach to reviewing discretionary acts of 
boards or the Commission on the basis of unreasonableness has 
been to apply the case of Union Government (Minister of 
Mines and Industries} v Union Steel Corporation (South 
82 
Africa) Ltd. The test enunciated in that case is predicated 
on the assertion that unreasonableness is not, on its own, a 
ground for review: to warrant interference the unreason­
ableness must be so gross that something else can be inferred 
from it: either mala fides, ulterior motive or a failure on 
the part of the body vested with the discretion to apply its 
83 
mind. This approach to unreasonableness is clearly 
illustrated by the case of National Transport Commission and 
Another v Chetty's Motor Transport (Pty) Ltd. Holmes JA 
held that decisions of the Commission stand unless it is 
found that it did not 'apply its mind to the issues in 
accordance with the behests of the statute and the tenets of 
85 
natural justice' or if 'the Commission's decision was 
grossly unreasonable to so striking a degree as to warrant 
the inference of a failure to apply its mind as aforesaid, .. ' 
Henning Jin Ban&loo Bros_and_Others v National_Trans�ort 
87 
Commission_and_Others criticized Holmes JA's formulation, 
88 
while ackno�ledging that he was bound by gh�i���� case, by 
suggesting that 'the acknowledgement of degrees of gross 
unreasonableness might well be regarded as importing a notion 
89 
of super-superlatives'. 
The Appellate Division decisions mentioned above applied the 
90 
so-called formal standard of unreasonableness. The court in 
W C_Gre�ling_and_Erasmus_(Pt�>_Ltd v Johannesburg_Local_Road 
91 
Trans2ortation_Board_and_Others, while paying lip service 
to lhe previous decisions appears to have applied an 
'extended formal standard': Kotze JA set aside a decision 
of the Commission because no reasonable evidence supported 
92 
it: 
'It follows that the conclusion to be arrived at, 
on the balance of probabilities, is that the 
Commission, by reason of ignoring the evidence, 
failed to apply its mind to the question, firstly, 
whether the appellant discharged the onus of 
proving that the transportation facilities provided 
by the Railway Administration were not satisfactory 
and sufficient to meet the transportation require­
ments of the mining industry within the area out­
lined in the application, or to the question, 
secondly, whether having regard to the circum­
stances il was expedient in the public interest to 
grant the permits applied for. It seems clear that 
on the evidence it should have come to a conclusion 
opposite to the one it did arrive at and that, in 
ignoring the cogency of the uncontradicted evidence 
presented to it, the Commis5ion, in coming to the 
conclusion that the Railway Administration is able 
lo provide a satisfactory service and that 
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additjonal services are not necessary or in the 
public interest, arrived at a grossly unreasonable 
decision - one to which no reasonable body could in 
the circumstances of the present matter have come.' 
This decision, in effect, recognizes what many judges and 
writers have disavowed: unreasonableness per se is a ground 
for review. It is perhaps a pity that Kotze JA expressed 
himself in cautious terms. As Baxter points out, the learned 
judge cif" appeal made use of the 'gross unreasonableness' 
terminology in deference to the long line of cases which had 
93 
applied the 'formal standard'. 
94 
It is submitted that the Gre�ling_and_Erasmus case is a 
very important one, not only for road transportation law but 
also for admininstrative law generally. A number of 
observations are therefore warranted: the influence of 
Jansen JA's judgment in Theron_en_Andere v Rini_van 
95 
Wellington_N_G_Sendingskerk_in_Suid_Afrika is apparent from 
the extension of the 'no-evidence' rule, to require of the 
decision-maker reasonable evidence for the conclusion 
96 
reachedj Jansen JA postulated the 'extended formal test' 
97 
for specific situations viz 'purely judicial' decisions. 
What is envisaged by this term is � decision which closely 
98 
resembles the decisions with which courts are familiar. The 
99 
decision in the Gre�ling_and_Erasmus case involved a higher 
policy component and was prima facie 'the very kind of 
decision to which Jansen JA had conceded the "reasonable 
100 
evidence" test would not apply'. Despite the caution which 
Kotze JA exercised in �£� holding that previous decisions 
were wrongly decided (i.e. by using the 'gross unreasonable­
ness' terminology) he, in fact, recognized unreasonableness 
per se as a ground of review. 
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It is submitted that the approach adopled in the ���l���( 
101 
and_Erasmus case is an appropriate one far the judicial 
control of regulatory bodies, Despite dicta to the contrary 
102 
in the court a quo in that case, it has long been accepted 
that rights, and not privileges, are involved when an 
103 
application for a permit is made. It is therefore desirable 
that decisions involving the grant or refusal of a permit 
should be based on reasonable evidence. The appropriateness 
of the symptomatic unreasonableneBs test is open to question 
in the modern administrative state: regul�tory agencies 
abound and wield considerable power in controlling the 
activities of individuals; judicial control is therefore a 
very necessary safeguard, especially in a country like South 
Africa where the majority of the population do not have 
104 
access to the electoral process and its attendant benefits; 
105 
the Union_Steel case dealt with a very different situation 
to the one found in lransportation regulation; the bounties 
which the Minister could give were intended to stimulate the 
production of steel and not to regulate the industry; the test 
formulated by Stratford JA was, no doubt, appropriate to the 
case before hi�, but a blanket acceptance of it to economic 
regulation is, it is submitted, open to doubt. 
106 
At the lime 
of the Union_Steel decision, the courts were relatively 
unfamiliar with the intervention of government in what had 
hitherto been a private domain. This piclure has changed, 
107 
but decisions like Q��itr evidence no realization of this 
fact and the crippling effect an adverse (and unreasonable) 
decision can have on the individual. Finally, it is 
submitted that fears that; if unreasonableness per se is 
accepted as a ground of review, the line between review and 
108 
appeal will be blurred, are unfounded. The court is not 
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asked to hold that a decision is wrong, but that it was 
arrived at incorrectly: the decision-maker has a duty to act 
fairly, and surely that entails reaching a rational decision 
based on the evidence and the policy considerations which it 
109 
is required to consider. If, as in Gre�ling_and_Erasmus, 
most of the evidence points towards the granting of a permit 
and the board refuses the application, a grave miscarriage of 
justice has occurred and the court is entitled to intervene. 
[CJ THE REVIEW OF NON-DISCRETIONARY ACTS 
(1) Failure to Comply with Jurisdictional Facts
A statute may require a deciding body to satisfy itself as to 
the existence or non-existence of certain facts or circum-
stances before it can exercise any power. Such facts or 
circumstances are known.as jurisdictional facts. Where the 
existence of a jurisdictional fact is peremptory, a purported 
110 
exercise of power in its absence will be a nullity. 
The case of Roberts v ChairmanL_Local_Road_Transportation
1 1 1 
Board_and_Another(l} provides an example of the setting 
aside of a decision because of the non-compliance with a 
jurisdictional fact: the City Tramway Co applied to the board 
for amendments to its permits to authorize a fare increase. 
The board published particulars in the Government_Gazette, as 
it was required to do in term of sl4(1}. This section, read 
with reg 4(1), gave interested parties ten days within which 
to make representations, The board heard the application 
prematurely. The steps laid down by the Act for the board to 
follow were conditions precedent to the exercise, by the 
board, of any powers. Friedman J accordingly held that the 
112 
board's decision was invalid: 
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'Thus, if, objectively speaking, the steps pre­
scribed by the Legislature as a prerequisite to the 
exercise by the Board of its statutory power have 
not been taken, the purported exercise by the Board 
of the power is invalid. One of the steps which 
the Board was required to take was to afford 
interested persons 10 days within which to object 
to an application, This the Board failed to do. 
The decision taken by the Board on 3 July 1979 is 
accordingly invalid.' 
Other examples of jurisdictional facts are to be found in the 
Act: the body or official issuing a permit must be satisfied 
as to certain pre-requisites before the issuing of the permit 
113 
will be valid; the Minister must satisfy himself that 'it 
may be expedient in the public interest that any public 
permit be withdrawn' before instituting an enquiry in 
terms of s28. Where such a limit is placed on a functionary 
in largely subjective terms, the existence or non-existence 
of the particular state of affairs must, it is submitted, be 
objectively capable of assessment i.e. the Minister's 
114 
'reasons to believe' must be objectively acceptable. 
12> Ni�t•k•• aa to Jurisdiction
Many mistakes as to jurisdiction can be made by a board or 
the Commission. If the deciding body assumes jurisdiction 
when it may not, or fails to assume jurisdiction when it 
should, the result will be set aside on review. No 
discretion is involved in determining whether the board or 
Commission has jurisdiction to decide a matter: it either 
does have or it does not, but the difficulty will lie, in 
hard cases, in the interpretation of its powers. 
Herbst v Dittmar_en_'n_Ander 
115 
provides a clear example of 
the board actirig outside its territorial Jurisdiction: the 
Johannesburg board granted a transfer of permits, issued for 
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Johannesburg, lo Dittmar, whose business was situated in 
116 
Rustenburg. Bekker J held: 
'Die Johannesburg se plaaslike raad dra kennis van 
aangeleenthede binne sy gebied en kon geen 
oorweging skenk kragtens bepalings van die Wet aan 
die aangeleenthede heersende te Rustenburg nie. Of 
dit daarvan bewus was en/of dit in die oorweging 
geneem is, weet ek nie. Indien dit in oorweging 
geneem is sou dit 'n onreelmatigheid wees aangesien 
'n raad se bevoegheid beperk is tot sy eie gebied.' 
The case of Local Road_Trans�ortation_Board_and_Anolher v 
117 
Durban_Cil�_Council_and_Another involved a more complex 
interpretation of the board's powers. The Council had formed 
a body called the Durban Transport Management Board, as it 
was empowered to do in terms of the legislation under which 
it drew its powers. The Management Board applied for the 
renewal of the permits which authorized the Council's 
passenger transportation undertaking. Il did not state that 
it was doing so in the name of the Council. The rules made 
by the Council relating to the powers and functions of the 
M�nagement Board said that the latter should act 'in the name 
118 
of and on behalf of the Council'. The board had, on this 
basis, upheld an objection that the application by lhe 
Management Board was invalid. The court, per Holmes JA, 
held that the board's decision was invalid, because the 
provision directing the Management Board to act in the name 
119 
of the Council was merely directory. Consequently, the 
application had, in fact, been made on behalf of the Council. 
In short, the board had erroneously decided that it had no 
120 
jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the case: 
'It (the board) wrongly decided that g�-l��� there 
were no certificates in existence and therefore, in 
effect, that there were no applications before it. 
Thereby it precluded itself from considering them. 
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Thus il failed to exercise its discretion in regard 
to them. ' 
The case of Nasionale Vervoerkommissie van Suid Afrika v ----------------- -
121 
___ --- -- --
Salz�Gossow_Transeort_(Edms>_Bek involved a misdirection 
by the Commission as to its appellate powers. A board had 
postponed an application pending the outcome of an enquiry 
conducted under s25 of the Act. 
upheld) against this decision. 
An appeal was lodged (and 
122 
The court a quo set aside 
the Commi�sion's decision on review and this was confirmed on 
appeal: the decisions to hold an enquiry under s25 and to 
postpone the application were not acts, directions or 
decisions as comtemplated by s8(1); they were therefore not 
subject to appeal and the Commission had assumed powers which 
it did not have, 
The issue of standing to object was involved in EQl��£� 
Investments_<Pt�)_Ltd v Chairman�_Local_Road_Transeortation 
123 
A board or the Commission is 
required to determine whether any would-be objectors have 
standing at a preliminary stage. The importance of this 
process lies in lhe fact that· an incorrect decision will have 
124 
an effect on any decision on the merits. A further 
complication exists: not only must lhe deciding body 
interpret the provisions of the Act relating to standing, but 
it may be required to go further and deal with the principles 
125 
found in the common law. the court 
held that the Commission had correctly held tha� the 
applicant did not have standing. 
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(AJ GENERAL 
Judicial review per se is not a remedy. It is a process 
designed to test the validity of administrative action. Only 
after review proceedings have been successful will the court 
126 
be in a positio� to grant a remedy. The court, on review, 
performs two separate functions: deciding on the validity of 
the act and t if it is found to be invalid, providing the 
127 
appropriate remedy. If the act is invalid, a remedy will 
be granted: the maxim ubi ius ibi remedium expresses an 
underlying principle of South African law and, indeed, the 
law in most legal systems. It describes the 'correlative 
nature of basic rights on the one hand and remedial rights on 
128 
the other'. The principle was judicially expounded in 
129 
��h�� v �hit� as follows: 
'If the Plaintiff has a right, he must of necessity 
have a means to vindicate and maintain it, and a 
remedy if he is injured in the exercise and 
enjoyment of it; and, indeed it is a vain thing to 
imagine a right without a remedy, for want of a 
right and want of a remedy are reciprocal.' 
A characteristic of the South African law of remedies is its 
flexibility: it is, as Baxter points out, a relatively 
modern development in our legal system. Despite the 
influence of Roman Dutch law and English law, the South 
African law has an indigenous character and has avoided the 
technicalities which plagued the English system. It is none-
theles� comprehensive in nature and provides a wide array of 
130 
remedies which ensure adequate relief from unlawful acts. 
The remedy which an aggrieved party will be granted will 
depend on the context of the illegality and the purpose of 
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the relief claimed. In other words, the court will determine 
an appropriate remedy to counter lhe harm. It would, for 
example, be totally inappropriate lo ask for a mandamus which 
would have the effecl of compelling an administrative body to 
exercise its discrelion in a particular way. On lhe other 
hand such a remedy would be appropriate if the body refused 
131 
to exercise a discrelion vested in it. 
[BJ SOURCES OF RELIEF 
< 1 > Appeal 
The appeal from acls, direclions or decisions of boards to 
the Commission is the only statutory route lo remedies. 
132 
It is also the only internal means of possible redress. 
(2) Defence to a Criminal Charge
The invalidity of an administrative act can, where 
appropriate, be used as a defence ta a criminal charge. 
The most ready examples are cases involving alleged 
134 
contraventions of conditions or regulations. 
<3> Setting aside or Correcting
133 
The nature of road transportation decision-making makes the 
quashing of invalid decisions of boards or the Commission a 
common remedy: the complex policy issues involved will very
often restrict the court to this remedy. It involves the 
setting aside of lhe invalid decision and the remittal of the 
135 
matter lo the tribunal for fresh consideration. In limited 
circumstances the court will assume jurisdiction lo decide 
136 
the matter on its merits. 
The term 'interdict• is used here lo describe a 'prohibitory 
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interdict'. It is 'a dedree whereby the administrative 
organ is ordered to desist from an act or course of conduct 
which is causing direct prejudice to the applicant and 
137 
constitutes an encroachment on his rights'. 
The usefulness of the interdict as a remedy lies in the fact 
that it can be sought as a matter of urgency and, if 
ordered, will freeze the situation pending final determina-
tion. This is because it is unusual for a final interdict to 
be granted immediately! usually an interim interdict will be 
ordered to maintain the status quo: it will be made final if 
the party against whom it is directed does not argue its 
138 
merits on the return day or does not do so successfully. 
(5) Mandamus
The remedy of mandamus is a form of interdict: it is a 
mandatory interdict. It is used to compel action rather than 
139 
to prevent action. Wiechers therefore says: 
'In reality an interdict 
sides of the same coin; 
prevented by means of an 
with a statutory duty is 
mandamus. ' 
and a mandamus are the two 
unauthorized action is 
interdict and compliance 
enforced by means of a 
As a remedy, it is limited in the administrative sphere by 
the fact that it cannot be used to compel a decision-maker to 
decide in a particular way, but only to compel the decision-
maker to decide a matter. 
interfere with discretion. 
(6) Declaratory Order
In other words, it cannot 
While other remedies 'have a direct effect upon the adminis-
140 
trative action in question', the declaratory order does not. 
Such an order does no more than declare on the legality of 
141 
actual or pending administrative action: 
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.'A declaration of rights may be sought by a subject 
if a ·clear legal dispute or legal uncertainty 
exists in regard to the acl of an administrative 
organ. Such an order may also be soughl in order 
to ensure that an administrative organ's attention 
is drawn to lhe statutory duty it is obliged to 
perform. In this way a declaration of rights 
provides a convenient solution to a legal dispute 
even if other legal remedies may be available. ' 
The declaratory order is particularly useful where a statute 
creates offences. It allow5 a person to determine his legal 
position and so regulate his affairs in accordance with the 
law. The Road Transportation Act creates, inter alia, the 
offence of failing to comply with the provisions of a_permit. 
The declaratory order is therefore a convenient remedy in 
cases where the meaning of a regulation or a condition is not 
142 
clear, 
(7} Substitution by the Court of its Decision for that of 
the Deciding Body 
(a) General
Review proceedings are aimed al correcting irregularities in 
143 
the decision-making process of administrative bodies. The 
corrective role of the court does not extend lo substituting 
an invalid decision with its own: it does not have power to 
deal -with the merits and is not usually institutionally 
competent or entitled to exercise the discretion which the 
144 
legislature granted to the administrative body. Van Blerk 
JA stated this principle in Kroq v Dranklisensieraad_vir 
145 
Gebied_42: 
'Maar dit gaan hier om 'n geval waar die wetgewer 
die ondersoek aan 'n raad toevertrou het, en nie 
aan 'n geregshof nie, gevolglik kan die Hof ni�, 
selfs by nietigverklaring van die verrigtinge, 
administratie�e funksies vir homself aanmatig deur 
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sy diskresie le substitueer vir die toevertrou aan 
'n raad nie. • 
When a court sets aside an administrative decision it 
therefore remits the matter for fresh consideration, the ir­
regularity having been brought to the attention of the 
decision-maker. 
In limited circumstances the court will go further: it wi 11 
substitute its decision for that of the deciding body. The 
court will, in the words of Hiemstra J, depart from the 
146 
general rule: 
'(i) Where the end result is in any event a fore­
gone conclusion and it would merely be a waste 
of time to order the tribunal or functionary 
to reconsider the matter. This applies more 
particularly where much time has already un­
justifiably been lost by an applicant to whom 
time is in the circumstances valuable, and the 
further delay which would be caused by 
reference back is significant in the context. 
(ii) Where the tribunal or functionary has
exhibited bias or incompetence to such a
degree that it would be unfair to require the
applicant to submit to the same jurisdiction
again. •
Baxter (who treats Hiemstra J's first ground as two separate 
147 
grounds> has identified a further one: 'Where the court 
148 
is in a good position to make the decision itself'. 
(b) Road Transportation Cases
It is a fairly common feature of road transportation cases 
that one party asks the court to substitute its decision for 
that of the board or the Commission. Not surprisingly the 
courts have shown a reluctance to do so. A factor of high 
priority in this regard is the policy-laden nature of 
decisions on the merits. Cases are to be found, however ) in 
which courts have decided against remitting a matter and have 
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instead come to a finding on the merits. 
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In I���Q v Ermelo_Local_Road_Trans2ortation_Board, the 
court decided the matter by ordering the board to issue 
permits to the respondent, The reasons for doing so were 
150 
given in the following terms: 
'In the present case, however, the Court granted the 
order it did, because it was clear on the facts 
before it that, even assuming that three first 
class taxis were adequate for the needs of Piet 
Retief, no complaint had been made against 
appellant's taxi service and that there was no 
justification for the more favourable treatment 
that was meted out to the other applications. It 
is impossible, again assuming that three first 
class taxis are adequate, for the local board to. 
rectify the position at this stage, for the Court 
cannot in these proceedings set aside the granting 
of exemptions to the other three applicants and 
order the board to consider on the merits which of 
the four applicants should be refused an exemption.' 
The same course of action was adopted in Ban&too_Bros_and 
151 
Q!:.h�r.� v National_Transeort Commission_and_Others: Henning 
J did not expressly deal with the question of remittal, but 
it is implicit in the judgment that the decision on review 
was so unreasonable that it would have been a waste of time 
to remit the matter because the re�ult would be a foregone 
152 
conclusion. In W_C_Gre�lin&_and_Erasmus_<Pt�)_Ltd v 
Johannesburg_Local_Road_Transeortation_Board_and_Others
L 
the court also exercised the discretion vested in the 
153 
deciding body. Kotze JA held that it was entitled to do so, 
despite the wide discretion in s15(1) (m} which allows the 
Commission to take into account any relevant factors not 
mentioned in s15(1), because the Commission relied on the 
assertion that the appellant had not discharged the onus of 
proving the requirements of s15(2) (i) and (iii). 
155 
substituted its decision because: 
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154 
The court 
'In th� present instance, the appellant made out a 
strong case for the issue of the desired permils to 
it which should hav� been granted long ago. It 
first lodged its application some three and a half 
years ago and to this day has not received relief. 
It has obviously been severely prejudiced by the 
long delay. It seems to me that consideralions of 
fairness require that the appellant should 
forthwith be granted the relief which it seeks in 
its notice of motion.' 
Where a board or the Commission has stood or fallen on one 
issue, the courts show less reluctance to decide the matter 
without further ado. In J_S_Breytenbach_en_Seun_<Edms)_B�k v 
156 
Voorsitter
L
_Plaaslike_Padvervoeraad_en_AndereL for 
instance, Solomon J found that the applicant had discharged 
the onus of proving the necessity of the proposed road trans-
portation. At the same time, the second respondent had 
failed to apply its mind properly. The learned judge 
therefore found no impediment to ordering that the permits be 
issued. A similar conclusion was reached in Sonnex_(Edms) 
157 
B£k v Voorsitter
i
_Nasionale_Vervoerkommissie_en_'n_Ander, 
in which the relative simplicity of the decision and the 
financial prejudice suffered by the applicant were decisive. 
The long period of time which elapsed between the applicant's 
original application and its success on review resulted in a 
favourable exercise of discretion in Frasers_(OVS>_B£k v 
158 
Voorsitter
L
_Nasionale_Vervoerkommigs!e_en_'n_Ander. 
Stafford J held: 
'Hierdie aansoek dateer vanaf 15 Junie 1981 toe 
die applikant sy aansoek om 'n privaatpermit gedoen 
het. Dit is nou meer as drie jaar later en indien 
ek reg is dat die eerste respondent regtens 
gefouteer het in die handhawing van tweede 
respondent se appel, moes applikant lank gelede sy 
privaatpermit gehad het om sy eie goedere to ver­
voer, socs gevra in Junie 1981 en soos toegestaan 
deur die Plaaslike Padvervoerraad in Desember 1981.' 
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The time issue on its own was not sufficient: the fact that 
a strong case had been made by the applicant was also of 
importance. 
(c) Conclusion
Il is apparent from the cases cited that the positive 
exercise of a discretion by the court in favour of the 
substitution of the board's or the Commission's decision rests 
on more than one factor: in all of the cases the strength of 
the applicant's case was stressed. The court must be 
satisfied that no hidden policy issues are present which will 
render it incompetent to make the decision. The court Must, 
in other words, satisfy itself that the decision at which it 
159 
arrived is a foregone conclusion. In addition, reliance is 
usually placed on at least one additional factor which 
involve� the redressing of an inequitable situation apart 
from the actual misdirection. This may be financial pre-
Judice or the long delay which the applicant has had to 
endure before successful review proceedings. 
160 
does not fit as easily into the above 
analysis. By reading the case as a whole it is possible, 
however, to detect a concern, on the part of the court, for 
the treatment the appellant would receive from a clearly 
hostile board if the matter was remitted. It is therefore 
submitted that part of the motivation for deciding the matter 
was an apprehension that the board would again display 
hostility towards the applicant. Two further reasons emerge, 
the first of which is to be found in the general principles 
enunciated by Hiemstra Jin Johannesburg_City_Council v 
161 
Administrator� Transvaal_and_Another: the end result was a 
357 
foregone conclusion because no complaints had been received 
about the appellant's service and his application was for the 
renewal of a permit; secondly, it was not possible to decide 
the -matter again because three other operators had already 
been granted permits. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter the offences created by the Road Transport-
ation Act will be dealt with under four heads: specific 
off�nces, general offences, offences committed by passengers 
and offences contained in the regulations. 
The specific offences are those which are central to the 
object of the legislation: the regulation and control of 
road transportation. The general offences are those which 
fulfill an ancilliary function to the main object. They are 
intended to aid those entrusted with the adminislralion of 
the Act and to protect the public from certain abuses. They 
are general in the sense that substantially similar offences 
are found in a number of other statutes. The offences con-
tained in the regulations share much the same purpose as the 
general offences. They are discussed separately because they 
emanate from a different source. Being subordinate legis-
lation their validity can be challenged. The offences 
committed by passengers serve to widen the net of liability 
beyond the permit holder and his servants. The purpose of 
these offences is to maintain the regulatory scheme at a 
micro level i. e. to give effect to the conditions which 
boards have prescribed for individual permit holders and to 
provide for the implementation of those conditions despite 
possible intransigence by passengers. 
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CIJ THE_SPECIFIC OFFENC�S 
[AJ INTRODUCTION 
The specific offences are intended to provide deterrents, in 
the form of criminal sanctions, for carriers who ignore or 
infringe the regulatory scheme of the Act. They provide, in 
the first place, for the punishment of those who simply 
function outside of the Act and are lherefore not controlled 
by its provisions and, in the second place, they attempt to 
ensure (as much as criminal provisions can) that those who 
have been granted permits or operate under an exemption do so 
in accordance with the law. The main thrust of the specific 
off�nces is, therefore, to prevent outsiders from competing 
with insider$, to ensure that authorized operators undertake 
transportation in the approved manner and, possibly, to 
protect the public from services which do not meet a required 
standard. 
S31 creates six offences. The general effect of the Road 
Transportation Act was to retain the offences created by its 
predecessor, the Motor Carrier Transportation Act, but to 
enact them in a clearer form. The most important offences 
are those found in s31(1) Ca) and s31(1) (b). They are most 
frequently dealt wilh by the courts and are central to the 
functioning of the regualtory machinery embodied in the Act. 
CB] THE CENTRAL ELEMENTS OF THE SPECIFIC OFFENCES 
The specific offences created by s31(1} will be dealt with 
below. The central elements of those crimes will be dealt 
with here. The concept of 'undertaking road transportation' 
is central to the regulatory scheme. To fall within the 
provisions of the Act, and thus be liable for any contraven-
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tion, an accused must have undertaken road transportation as 
defined in s1(1). It is therefore possible to isolate the 
central elements of the specific offences in terms of that 
section. They are (1) undertaking and (2) road lransporla-
lion (which consists of a number of sub-elements}. Whether 
mens rea is an element of these offences will be discussed 
afler an outline of lhe offences themselves. 
< 1) Undertaki n1 
The Holor Carrier Transportation Acl prohibited lhe 'carrying 
on' of motor carrier lransporlation without a certificate or 
exemption, or the 'carrying on' of transportation which is 
not in accordance with the certificate or exemption. While 
Cooper and Bamford point out lhat the lerm 'carrying on' 
implies a repetition or series of acls, the courts have 
4 
interpreted it lo include an isolated instance. The more 
precise word 'undertakes' �as substituted for 'carries on' in 
the Road Transportation Act. This word obviously covers 
isolated instances. It bears no connotation of a repitition 
or 5eries of acts. Rather it bears the meaning of 'engaging 
5 
in' or 'entering upon'. 
(2) Road Transportation
Subject to the exceptions !isled in s1(2), road transportation 
6 
means: 
' (a} 
(b) 
( C) 
<d> 
the conveyance of persons or goods on a public 
road by means of a motor vehicle for reward; 
the conveyance of persons or goods on a public 
road by means of a motor vehicle in the course 
of any industry or trade or business; 
the conveyance of persons on a public road by 
means of a hired bus; 
the conveyance of goods on a public road by 
means of a hired motor vehicle.' 
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Milton and Puller say that it is essential that the charge 
should specify in which way the accused undertook road trans-
portation. If the State do�g not specify which form of 
transportation is alleged to have taken place, the indictment 
7 
will be fatally defective. The individual components of 
this definition will now be dealt with. 
(a) Conveyance
In most cases the element of conveyance, by nature of the 
factual circumstances, is self evident. Conveyance is none-
theless an integral part of the definition of road trans-
8 
portation. the appellant argued 
successfully that he had not conveyed persons. He was 
charged, as the owner of an omnibus, after he had let the 
omnibus to a certain Mrs Wagenaar who used it to take a group 
of persons from Murraysburg to Graaff-Reinet. Unknown to the 
appellant each passenger had contributed to the cost of 
hiring the vehicle. In acquitting the accused, Kannemeyer J 
relied on the analogous case of i�gg v Railway_Passen&er 
9 
Assurance_Co in which four men had embarked on a fishing 
venture. To reach their destination they hired a vehicle and 
shared the costs of doing so. After a subsequent accident 
one of the party, who happened to be a passenger, sued the 
third party insurer on the ground that he had been conveyed 
for reward. In rejecting the passenger's argument, De 
10 
Villiers JP held: 
'The true position on the facts was that all four 
of them had joined together for a common purpose, 
to hire the use of this ear for a fishing 
expedition. Properly regarded they were conveying 
themselves. It is merely an accident of language 
that the petitioner, not being the driver "was 
being conveyed".' 
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In a similar way, Kannemeyer J concluded, the appellant could 
not be said to have conveyed the passengers in the omnibus, 
or to have permitted their conveyance, 
was to permit them to convey themselves. 
With respect, this judgment is correct. 
What he may have done 
11 
Some measure of 
participation or knowledge must be present. on the part of the 
owner of. the vehicle. Hiring out the vehicle and washing his 
hands of any further details cannot be sufficient. 
(b> On a Public Road 
A public road is defined in sl(l) of the Act as 'any road 
declared or recognised as a public .road under any la�, and 
includes any road, street or thoroughfare or other place 
(whether a thoroughfare or not} to which the public or any 
section of the public has a right of access'. 
In the case of Fltin&_Lotus_(Pti>_Ltd v ChairmanL_National
12 
Trans�ort_Commission_and_Anothec, Didcott J was called upon 
to decide whether disputed sections of a route were 'private 
roads'. These stretches had not been declared or recognised 
under any law to be 'public roads' but in laying down guide­
lines, Didcott J held that this was not the end of the matter. 
The test to be applied to determine whether a road is a 
public road within the meaning of the Act consists of a 
possible twofold enquiry, The first question to be asked is 
whether the road is recognised as, or has been declared to 
be, a public road. If this enquiry is answered in the 
affirmative �he road in question will be a public road. If 
it is answered in the negative, a further question must be 
asked: does the public or any section of the public have a 
right of access to it? If a right of access exists, the road 
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is a public road. The State must allege and prove that the 
unlawful road transportation took place on a public road 
13 
within the meaning of the Act. 
<c) By Means of a Motor Vehicle 
(i) General Definition
The definition of a motor vehicle excludes motor bicycles 1 
but includes any vehicle 'designed or adapted for propulsion 
or haulage on a road by means of any power other than human 
or animal power and without the aid of raiJs, and includes 
any trailer, but does not include such vehicle also designed 
or adapted exalusively for towing another vehicle, and not 
14 
used for the conveyance of goods'. 
Note that sl(l) of the Act defines a bus as 'a motor vehicle 
designed or adapted for the conveyance of more than 9 persons 
(including the driver)'. From this definition it is possible 
to describe the characteristics of a motor vehicle for the 
purposes of the Act: (a) the vehicle must be capable of 
movement; Cb> 
such as rails. 
this capability must be independent of guides 
This raises the question as to whether an 
electric bus is a 'motor vehicle' because while it operates 
on a road and not on rails, its power source comes from 
overhead lines. Thus while it travels on a road it can only 
do so in a limited sense, viz. while it has rails above it 
as a source of power; ( C) the power to propel the vehicle 
must come from fuel, because vehicles driven by animal or 
human power fall outside the definition. 
that is used by the vehicle is immaterial; 
The type of fuel 
Cd) trailers are 
motor vehicles if they are towed by a vehicle which falls 
within the definition. A trailer which is propelled or 
pulled by human or animal power falls outside the scope of 
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the definition; (eJ the vehicle must be used for 
conveyance. Thus a towlruck would fall outside the 
definition unless it was used lo convey, and not lo low, 
other vehicles; (f) the nu�ber of wheel� the vehicle has is
of no relevance as long as it is not a motor bicycle. 
{ii) The Vehicle's Source of Power 
Would a vehicle with two sources of power, one human and the 
other mechanical, fall within the scope of the definition? 
15 
In R v Fletterman the issue was whether a pedal cycle was a 
molar vehicle for the purposes of the Transvaal Motor 
16 
Vehicles Ordinance. lt consisted of a bicycle with a small 
petrol-driven motor attached to the handlebars. This motor 
could be engaged by the rider, but was only of use in 
propelling the machine on downward slopes, or on level ground 
in the absence of a headwind. De Wet J, in reaching the 
conclusion that the pedal cycle was not a motor vehicle, 
isolated what he considered to be the essential features 
with regard to the propulsion and source of power of the 
vehicle: 
'It seems lo me that this definition envisages a 
vehicle which has as an integral part of its 
equipment, an engi�e which provides motive power 
except on the occasions, rare in modern times when 
the engine breaks down through mechanical failure. 
It also envisages that the engine should be gub­
slantially its sole and only motive power. Unless 
these two conditions are fulfilled it would not be 
correct to say that the vehicle is "self propelled•.' 
While the definition in the Ordinance under consideration in 
17 
Flelterman's case differs from that in the Road Transporta-
lion Act, it is submitted that in a similar case the 
principles which De Wet J developed could be applied. In 
other words where a dispute arises in relation to a vehicle 
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with a mechanical source of power and a human or animal 
source, the questions to be asked are: (a) is the 
mechanical source of power an integral part of the machine? 
and Cb} is it substantially the sole source of motive power? 
(iii) Other Characteristics
18 
the appellant was charged with contravening 
19 
s77 of the Roads and Road Traffic Act of Southern Rhodesia. 
He owned a lorry which was not in a mechanical state to 
travel under its own power. In order to move it he had it 
towed while he steered it. The Act defined a motor vehicle 
as 'any vehicle propelled by mechanical or electrical power 
and intended or adapted for use or capable of being used on 
roads'. 
In deciding whether the lorry was a motor vehicle for the 
purposes of the Act, Clayden FJ held that the fact that the 
lorry was, at the time, incapable of moving under its own 
power did not mean that it was not a motor vehicle. With 
regard to the word 'propelled' the court held that 'the word 
"propelled" refers to a quality of the vehicle, and not to 
actual motion. A vehicle does not become or cease to be a 
20 
motor vehicle as it starts or stops'. 
Clayden FJ went on to hold that the word 'intended' related 
to the original design of the vehicle. If it was the 
intention of the manufacturers or makers of the machine that 
it be used on roads, then it is a motor vehicle for the 
purposes of the Act. The word 'adapted' refers lo a motor 
vehicle not originally made to be used on roads but later 
21 
altered for this purpose. Finally the phrase 'or capable af 
22 
being used on roads' was interpreted as follows: 
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'The meaning is not that any vehicle, to be a motor 
vehicle, must be capable of use in the sense of 
being "in going order''. The phrase is an 
al tern a ti ve to "intended" and "adapted". So that 
if a vehicle has mechanical means of propulsion it 
is a "motor vehicle" within the Act if it was made 
to be used oo roads, or in any way able to be used 
on roads. ' 
The con cl usi on reached by the l earne·d judge as to the charac-
23 
teristic of mobility of a vehicle was: 
'And it seems to me that a vehicle does not cease 
to be a "motor vehicle" because its means of 
propulsjon are defective, unless they be so 
defective that it has not in effect means of 
propulsion at all. Short of that stage the fact 
that the vehicle was not in working order does not 
alter its character as a motor vehicle.' 
It is submitted that substantially the same meanings will be 
given to the words 'designed or adapted' in the Road 
Transportation Act as were given to the words 'intended' and 
'adapted' in the Rhodesian legislation. Similarly the word 
'propulsion' will bear the corresponding meaning that 
'propelled' was given by Clayden FJ. 
(d) For Rewar-d
( i > Gener-al 
Milton and Fuller say that the crucial aspect of road trans-
24 
portation is the notion of reward. A perusal of the case 
law bears out this observation because most contraventions of 
the Act involve conveyance for reward. The words 'for 
reward' have not been defined in the Act and many problems 
have arisen as to their meaning. It is submitted, however, 
that a definition can be gleaned from the numerous decisions 
of our courts dealing with both road transportation and motor 
vehicle insurance. 
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Ciil The Definition of Reward 
The case of �i�£ht�g v London_Assurance_Co. 
25 
dealt with a 
claim for damages �gainst the defendant (excipient> as a 
result of a motor accident. It was necessary to decide 
whether the plaintiff's wife (on whose behalf the proceedings 
were instituted) was conveyed for reward within the meaning 
26 
of the �otor Vehicle Insurance Ac�.
Herbstein AJP defined the word 'reward' as: 'a return or 
recompense made to or received by a person for some service 
27 
or merit'. This definition has generally been accepted in 
28 
other cases dealing with conveyance for reward. 
29 
In� v 
where Caney J separated the concepts of 'conveyance 
for reward' and 'conveyance in the course of any industry, 
30 
trade or business', the following definition emerged: 
'It is unnecessary to decide the limits of the word 
reward, but I think clearly the word envisages 
material gain. It need not necessarily be a fare 
in the sense of a fare paid by a passenger;' 
31 
In Kitchin&'s case Watermeyer J said: 
• ..• any sum of money, no matter how it is arrived
at, which is given as a guid_ero_guo to the person
who undertakes the conveyance of the passengers is
a 'reward' within the meaning of the Act and this
is so regardless of whether it results in profit to
the conveyor or not.'
The meaning given by the learned judge should be read within 
the context of the case because it has been held that the 
32 
reward does not have to comprise of money. 
While the definitions of re�ard mentioned above are clear, 
application to a particular set of facts may prove 
difficult. Obviously grey areas exist around the meaning of 
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the word. In this regard Bresler J ' in s V Stassen and 
-------
----
33 
�!!.�ih�E, pointed out. that where an equivocal word or 
ambiguous sentence leaves sufficient doubt. as t.o its true 
meaning, the court. should, especially when dealing with a 
penal statute, give the benefit of the doubt. to the subject.. 
The learned judge suggested that Parliament. could 
have clarified its intention by adding words such as 'or in 
expectation of any gain or any advantage whatsoever, whether 
34 
direct or indirect'. 
(iii) The Test for Reward
For conveyance to be for reward, the quid pro quo must be for 
the conveyance and not for any incidental or ancilliary 
35 36 
service. the appellant conveyed 20 empty 
drums and 35 pockets of acid cement for X. When the appellant 
was asked how much she would charge for the work, she replied 
that she would nol charge anything except a 'handling fee' of 
1 pound. This was for off-loading the goods at. a certain 
destination. Golding AJ held that the test 'is whether the 
carriage or haulage of passengers or goods is for hire or 
37 
reward'. 
The conclusion reached by the court was that the charge was 
not made for the transport of the goods, but for the off-
38 
loading thereof. In Kitching's case Watermeyer J algo 
made the point. that the reward must relate to the conveyance: 
'It is not enough that the reward should be given 
for something other than conveyance as, for 
example, where the passenger hires the services of 
a driver or the use of a car, for the passenger is 
then not paying for being conveyed even though the 
payment may result in his being transported'. 
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(e) In the Course of any Industry, Trade or Business
39 
set out a test for conveyance in 
the course of business, as well as outlining the approach to 
determining whether conveyance is in the course of industry 
or trade. The facts were that the appellant, the owner of a 
shop, had, after delivering goods lo a nearby quarry, 
repeatedly given lifts to his shop to men working at the 
quarry. The purpose of the conveyance was to enhance the 
goodwill of the shop among potential customers. In this 
sense, the court found that it was clearly related to the 
business, because the appellant would not have done what he 
did if he had not owned the shop. 
40 
test to be applied as follows: 
Hiemstra J set out the 
'What is the overriding cause of the presence of 
the passengers on the vehicle? If it is the 
interest of the business, more than mere 
considerations of courtesy or generosity, the 
conveyance is in the course of business. Whether 
the presence of the passe�gers will be demonstrably 
lucrative to the owner of the vehicle is irrelevant. ' 
41 
it is possible to draw two
distinctions between conveyance for reward and conveyance in 
the course of any industry, trade or business. The first 
distinction relates to the motive for the conveyance. In the 
case of conveyance for reward the motive of the conveyor is 
irrelevant. All that matters is that a reward is accepted. 
In the case of conveyance in the course of any industry, 
trade or business the motive for the conveyance must be 
linked to the industry, trade of business. In other words 
the conveyor must act in order to enhance the goodwill or 
profits of the industry, trade or business concerned. The 
second distinction turns on the channelling of any gain 
derived from the conveyance. Where conveyance is for reward, 
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the gain goes directly to the conveyor but where the 
conveyance is in the course of industry, trade or business 
the gain is channelled through that undertaking to the 
recipient. 
(f) By Means of a Hired Bus or Motor Vehicle
The meanings of the terms 'bus' and 'motor vehicle' have been 
dealt with above. The meaning of the word 'hired', in the 
context of the Act, will be examined here. 
It is submitted that, without the aid of a statutory 
definition, the meaning of the word 'hired' should be arrived 
at by a factual examination of a possessor's relationship to 
the vehicle: the word must be given its ordinary meaning of 
paying for or availing oneself of a thing or service which is 
42 
let out. There is ho�ever, one qualification: the word 
'owner' is defined in the Act in terms of 'the law governing 
the registration of motor vehicles in force in that area•. 
The Road Traffic Ordinances of the four provinces are 
identical in this regard, save for one addition to the 
43 
definition in the Transvaal Ordinance. 
44 
An 'owner' 
includes: 
' (a> 
(b) 
(c) 
a joint or part owner of that vehicle; 
a person having possession of that vehicle by 
virtue of a hire-purchase or suspensive sale 
agreement, or by virtue of an agreement of hire 
providing for the hire of such vehicle for a period 
of not less than 12 months, but does not include 
the seller or lessor under any such agreement; or 
a motor dealer who is in possession of a used 
vehicle for the purpose of sale.• 
This definition will have to be borne in mind in determining 
whether a vehicle is hired or not, i.e. the meaning of 
'hired' must be modified in accordance with meaning of owner 
378 
in the ordinances. 
It should he noted that the person requiring a permit is the 
hirer of the vehicle and not the owner. Where a board had 
issued permits to Rent-A-Bakkie, which did not convey persons 
or goods, but merely made vehicles available for hire, it was
held in 5outh_African_Railways_and_Harbours v ChairmanL 
45 
Bo�huthatswana_Central_Road_Trans�ortation_Board_and_Another 
that the board's action was a nullity. Hiemstra CJ held 
that the person conveying is the person who hires the 
vehicle, not the owner thereof. The hirer may have to apply 
for a permit if he wishes to convey persons or goods for 
46 
reward. 
ECJ AN OUTLINE OF THE OFFENCES
(1) Unauthorized Road Transportation
S31 ( 1) {a) makes it an offence for any person to undertake 
road transportation 'except under the authority of a permit 
authorising such road transportation'. 531 ( 1 l (al has been 
held to be applicable in the following cases: where con-
veyance was undertaken by means of a vehicle which had been 
47 
used as a sub�titute, in contravention of sl (2) (f); where 
it was alleged that conveyance was in contravention of a 
48 
regulation; where a worker transported his colleagues to 
49 
work, for reward, without the authority of a permit; where 
an accused gave a lift to two strangers who unloaded his 
so 
vehicle for him as a recompense; 
51 
where a person operated a 
'pirate-taxi'; and where a company had conveyed goods in 
the course of its business without the authority of a permit. 
531 <1) (b) complements s31 ( 1) (a) by providing: 
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'Any person who being the holder of a permit, 
undertakes road transportation other than in 
accordance with the provisions of such permit, or, 
subject to the provisions of section 12A, contra­
venes or fails to comply with any condition or 
requirement of a permit or any provision of section 
24 shall be guilty of an offence.' 
A change under s31 (1) (b) was appropriate where: a company 
transported goods which did not fall within a list of goods 
53 
specified in a permit; an accused overloaded his vehicle by 
conveying more passengers than a condition attached lo his 
54 
permit allowed; and a company attempted to convey an ab-
normal load beyond a distance limit set by a board as a 
55 
condition. 
The distinction between the subsections was discussed in� v 
56 
s31(1} (a) will apply when a person undertakes road 
transportation either without a permit or in contravention of 
the provisions of the Act itself; s31 ( 1) (b} applies when a 
permit holder infringes conditions or requirements which a 
board or the Commission has imposed. 
<2> Refusal to Convey Persons or Goods
S31(1) (c) (i) imposes a duty on a permit holder lo convey any 
person.who, or any goods which, he is authorized to convey. 
He may only refuse to do so if he has sufficient reason. The 
onus of proving that a refusal was justified rests upon the 
accused. It is submitted that the reason for the creation of 
thi• �ffence is to be found in the policy underpinning the 
legislation: transportation is regulated, inter alia, to 
allow for the coordination of services in the public 
interest; the right to convey must, therefore, be accompanied 
by an obligation to provide services without favour; to 
allow the carrier lo pick and choose �ould make it difficult, 
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if not impossible, for a board or the Commission to assess 
transportation needs accurately and consequently to co­
ordlnat� services properly, 
It is submitted that the meaning of the term 'without 
sufficient reason' will depend on the circumstances of each 
case. An operator would clearly be justified in refusing to 
convey persons or goods, if, to do so would constitute an 
offence under a statute or the common law. Would a taxi 
driver avoid liability, however, if he refused to convey a 
person whom he knew to be a prostitute and whom he was sure 
was going to visit a client? It is submitted that in order 
to deal adequately with a question like this, an objective 
approach to the meaning of the term 'without sufficient 
reason' must be adopted. This would enable such issues as 
public policy to play a part in determining the sufficiency 
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of the reasons for refusal. On this basis it is suggested 
that the answer to the above question would be in the 
affirmative: objectively speaking a taxi driver would be 
justified in refusing to convey so�eone whom he knew to be 
involved in an immoral activity. A subjective test would 
tend to militate against the smooth functioning of 
transportation. Such an approach would, for instance, have 
to take cognisance of any number of personal attitudes and, 
perhaps, prejudices of the permit holder. By using an 
objective test sufficient reason for refusal would not exist 
where a taxi driver refused for moral, religious or political 
grounds to convey a soldier in uniform. If a subjective 
approach was used these factors would have to be taken into 
account and would result in the acquittal of the driver. The 
overall effect, on the transportation system which the Act 
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seeks to establish, would be disastrous. 
A board or the Com�ission has the power to attach require-
58 
ments or conditions to a permit, relating to tariffs. S12A 
allows for a limited increase in tariffs after an increase in 
the price of petroleum fuel but prior to an application to 
have a _p,rmit amended to reflect the increase. Subject to the 
provisions of s12A, a permit holder may not charge a tariff 
which is not in accordance with that set down as a condition 
of the permit or which a permit holder may be required to 
publish. S31 (1) (c) (ii) makes it an offence to contravene the 
above provisions relating to tariffs. 
(4) The Type of Remuneration
It is an offence, in terms of s31 (1) (c), for a permit holder 
to accept remuneration for conveyance in any form other than 
money. Conveyance on a set-off basis (except where author-
ized in s1(2)} or for payment in kind is therefore unlawful. 
(5) Other Offences
S31(1) (d) makes it an offence for a permit holder to convey 
goods if to do so contravenes any prohibition contained in a 
notice in the Government_Gazette published under s2(f), s2(g} 
or s2 { gA}. S2 grants the Minister of Transport Affairs 
various powers. For the purpose of s31 these include: 
first, the power to declare any public road between any two 
places or areas, or between any place and area, to be a 
transportation route. The effect of the declaration is to 
prohibit the conveyance of goods on any other route except 
59 
the transportation route; secondly, the power to prohibit 
the conveyance of any goods or a specified kind or category 
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of goods on any day or between specified hours of any day, 
60 
within an area or over a route; thirdly, the power 
to 'prohibit the conveyance of goods which ere loaded 
on a goods vehicle in a specified manner from a specified 
61 
date'. The above prohibitions override the provisions of 
a permit. 
S31 (1) (e) affects both permit holders and carriers operating 
under a sl 12) exemption. It creates an offence for contra-
vening 'any prohibition contained in a pr�clamation 
contemplated in s43 ( 1) Id) or (e) '. In terms of �43, the 
State President has the power lo prohibit the holder of a 
permit or a person conveying goods in terms of s1(2) from 
conveying 'to or from a specified place or area or between 
specified places or areas as specified in the proclamation,' 
as long as the conveyance crosses the borders of South 
Africa. Such a proclamation has lhe effect of overriding 
anything to the contrary contained in a permit. 
In terms of s31 (1) (f) it is an offence for a permit holder to 
make a permit available to any other person for transporta­
tion which has not been authori2ed by the Act. 
(6) Justifications for Contraventions
S3112) contains two provisos. The first deals with conduct 
which would have constituted a breach of s31(1) (b) in the 
absence of s31 ( 1) (d). In other words, where a condition or 
requirement which is attached to a permit, conflicts with a 
prohibition promulgated by the Minister dealing with 
transportation routes, the conveyance of certain goods or the 
loading of a goods vehicle, or a proclamation issued by the 
State President in terms of s43 ( 1) (d) or (e), a breach of 
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s31 (1) (b) will not constitute an offence. In this situation 
the permit holder is required to ignore the provisions of the 
permit: compliance with .s31 (1) (d) or (el takes preference. 
The second qualification to s31(1) deals with the refusal of 
a permit holder to convey persons or goods which the permit 
authorizes him to convey. The permit holder's refusal (apart 
from him having a sufficient reason) is sanctioned by 
s31(2) (b} if 'at the time of such refusal, he has discon­
tinued the road transportation authorized by his permit or 
any part of such road transportation after having given such 
notice as may be prescribed by regulation, and where part 
only of such road transportation has been so discontinued, 
the refusal related to the part so discontinued'. 
[DJ MENS REA 
11) Mens Rea and Statutory Offences
Mens rea, usually in the form of dolus, is an element of all 
common law crimes. This is not necessarily the case in 
statutory offences. Mens rea may be excluded as an element, 
thus creating strict liability, or it may be expressly or 
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impliedly included in the penal provisions of a statute. 
There is a reluctance on the part of the courts to decide, in 
the absence of express indications, that strict liability was 
63 
intended by the legislature. This proposition was stated by 
64 
Botha JA, in S v Arenstein: 
•The general rule is that �£l��-rrQ�-L�£i�-���m-�l�i
mens sit rea, and that in construing statutory pro­
hibitions or injunctions, the legislature is 
presumed, in the absence of clear and convincing 
indications to the contrary, not to have intended 
innocent violations thereof to be punishable.' 
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The majority of statutory penal provisions give no express 
indications as to whether mens rea is an element of the 
offences which they create, To arrive at the intention of 
the legislature the courts take certain factors into account: 
the language and context of the prohibition, the object and 
scope of the statute, the nature and extent of the penalty 
which is imposed and the ease with which the prohibition 
65 
could be avoided if mens rea is held to be an element. The 
usual form of mens rea required, if a statute is construed in 
66 
such a way as to include it, is dolus. At the same time it 
should be noted that a proper construction of a particular 
statute may point to culpa as the necessary form of mens rea. 
(2} Mens Rea and the Specific Offences
The two most important specific offences are those contained 
in s31(1)(a) and .s31(1)(b): undertaking road transportation 
without a permit or in contravention of the Act, and under­
taking road transportation contrary to the provisions of any 
conditions or requirements attached to a permit. These 
offences will be concentrated on because of their importance. 
S31 (1) (a) gives no indication as to whether mens rea i.s an 
elemenf of the offenc� which it creates. 
67 
One case, � v 
has held that strict liability was intended by the 
legislature, but it must be seen as wrongly decided: later 
cases have uniformly held that mens rea, in the form of 
68 
dolus, is an element of the offence. 
69 
Botha AJ examined the 
issue fully in � v Mathebula. He held that: 
(a) nothing in the language or context of the section pointed
to strict liability; Cb) the object of the Act was, 
inter alia, to regulate transportation and so the object did 
not suggest the exclusion of mens res.; (c) the penalties for 
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contraventions of the section were relatively severe, 
indicating that the legislature did not intend innocent 
conduct to be punished; and Cd) a reliance on a lack of mens 
rea could not be easily used to avoid liability because if 
the permit holder had no knowledge of the contravention, the 
driver could nonetheless be convicted. The learned acting 
judge concluded that no special reasons existed for holding 
that mens rea did not form an element of the offence. 
Whether mens rea forms part of the offence created by 
70 
.s31(1)(b} is less clear. In R v Dickin.son a condition 
---------
relating to an operator's time-table was contravened by a 
driver. The permit holder had no knowledge of the infringe-
ment and the driver had acted against specific instructions. 
71 
Greenberg JP confirmed the appellant's conviction: 
'The actual terms of the legislation may show that 
a person may be guilty no matter how free from any 
evil intention he may have been. One class of case 
where this will apply is where a privilege is 
granted to a person and it is provided that he must 
exercise such privilege in a certain way.' 
He held further that it was no excuse for a permit holder to 
say that he acted to the best of his ability in ensuring that 
the GOndition was not breached. By placing the fulfillment 
or non-fulfillment of the condition into someone else's 
hands, the permit holder must bear the responsibility if that 
person does not adhere to his instructions. 
72 
The facts in� v Glover_and_Another were virtually on all 
73 
fours with those in Dickinson's case. James JP held that 
the first appellant, the permit holder, was liable for the 
act of her servant. His reasons for this conclusion were 
74 75 
that he was not convinced that Dickinson and Combrinck 
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were wrongly decided, that they had remained unchallenged for 
38 years and that it was in the interests of judicial 
continuity to follow the ratio decidendi in those cases, He 
did suggest, ho�ever, that the time had come for the Appellate 
Division to give the question its attention. 
76 
S v Reids_Transeort_<Pt�l_Ltd_and_Another dealt with an 
alleged offence committed by the permit holder personally. 
The appellants argued that they did not know that the 
conveyance in question was unlawful. 
77 
conviction Eksteen J held: 
In setting aside the 
'In the light of these circumstances it seems to me 
that the evidence shows that the appellants acted 
in the bona_fide belief that they were entitled to 
do what they did, and that they were fortified in this 
belief by the legal advice they had obtained. It 
follows that the State has failed to prove that 
they acted with the requisite ����-�!� and that the 
conviction therefore cannot stand.' 
This dictum indicates that the learned judge considered 
mens rea, in the form of dolus, to be necessary to support a 
conviction, The only qualification of the mistake made by 
the appellants was that it was bona fide (i.e. honest). No 
mention was made of the reasonableness of the mistake, which 
would indicate the objective enquiry characteristic of 
mens rea in the form of culpa. Furthermore, if no mens rea 
was required at all, the mistake, whether bona fide or 
reasonable, would have been immaterial to liability. 
Although no cases have been decided on the remaining offences 
of s31, it is submitted that mens rea is essential for 
conviction. Nothing in the language or objects of these pro-
visions points to a construction in which mens rea plays no 
78 
part. 
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(AJ INTRODUCTION 
S33 of the Act contains a number of offences which may be 
seen as general offences for two reasons: first, the type of 
offences described in the section may be found in a great 
number of statutes dealing with a wide variety of subjects 
and, secondly, the scope and intention of the offences is
different to those created by ss31 and 32. The latter 
offences deal with the direct object5 of the legislation, 
namely the regulation and control of road transportation, 
while lhe s33 offences are designed to aid those entrusted 
with the administration of the Act and to protect the public 
at large from abuses by persons who do not hold positions of 
authority. 
(8) THE OFFENCES
S33(a) makes it an offence for a person to make any writing
which falsely purports to be a permit or other document
issued under the Act or to alter, deface, mutilate or add to 
such a document. In creating this offence, the legislature
has expressly provided for mens rea in the form of dolus by
79
requiring intent to deceive on lhe part of the culprit.
The second offence created by s33 deals with uttering. 
Uttering is, in broad terms, the passing off of a false or 
80 
forged document as genuine. S33(b) provides that a person 
shall have committed an offence if he knows that certain 
writing is not a permit or other document issued under the 
Act but nonetheless utters such writing, permit or other 
document or uses it for the purposes of the Act. The offence 
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also embraces the uttering or using of documents which the 
accused knows are instruments issued under the Act which have 
been altered, defaced, mutilated or added to. It should be 
noted that knowledge on the part of the accused is an 
Bl 
essential element of s33(bl. 
The Act prescribes the manner in which permits or disting-
uishing marks may be transferred. To effect a transfer the 
written consent of a competent board or the Commission is 
82 
required. To deter persons from transferring permits or
distinguishing marks in any other way, s33fcJ makes any un­
authorized transfer an offence. 
To aid in the policing of the Act, sll allows the Director 
General: Transport Affairs to appoint any officer or 
employee of lhe Department of Transport Affairs to the 
83 
position of road transport inspector. It is an offence, in 
terms of s33(d), to pretend to be an inspector, whether by 
84 
words, conduct or demeanour. Furthermore, it i� an offence 
to wilfully obstruct, hinder or interfere with an inspector 
in the exercise of his powers or the performance of his 
85 
duties. It is submitted that, by virtue of the use of the 
words 'pretend' in s33(d) and 'wilfully' in s33(e), the 
legislature did not intend liability without fault: first, 
Burchell and Hunt say that the word 'wilfully' has generally 
been held lo import mens rea in the form of intention. The 
learned authors concede that the word has also been inter­
preted as 'voluntarily' which carries no connotation of 
mens rea but the weight of the authority is against this 
86 
construction; secondly, the word 'pretend' carries an 
implication of a conscious effort to deceive. Indeed, the 
most helpful meaning of 'to pretend' speaks of professing to 
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have a particular quality or to hold oneself out to be some-
87 
thing which one is not. In addition the very nature of the 
offence created by s33(d) militates against the possibility 
of a blameless infringement. 
S9(1) grants a board or the Commission power, inter alia, to 
call any person to appear before it as a witness for the 
purpose of giving evidence, or to produce any book, plan or 
other document or art1cle in his possession or under his 
control. Failure or refusal to app�ar before a board or the 
Commission without sufficient reason is an offence. 
Similarly, a person will commit an offence if he appears, but 
fails or refuses to answer to the best of his knowledge any 
questions lawfully put to him, or to produce any book, p.lan 
or other document or article which he is required to_produce. 
In providing that failure to comply with s9(1) Cb) and (c) is 
punishable, the Act has qualified this by stating 
sp�cifically that liability will only result if the failure 
or refusal is without sufficient reason. The onus of proving 
a sufficient reason is cast upon the accused. While no cases 
have been decided as to what constitutes a sufficient reason, 
it is submitted that if a witness can claim a privilege, his 
refusal to give evidence will be sanctioned. Secondly, on 
wider gr.ounds, where no privilege exists, assistance may be 
derived from cases involving sl89(1) of the Criminal 
89 
Procedure Act. This section provides that a witness who 
refuses to be sworn, answer questions or produce documents 
may s·o refu.se if he ·has a 'just excuse'. The cases are in 
conflict as to whether a just excuse simply means a legal 
excuse (that the witness is not compellable) or that it is 
humanly intollerable for the witness to give evidence. While 
88 
lhe decisions appear to favour the former view, Hoffman and 
Zefferlt commend the latter view, mainly because it is more 
90 
humane. 
It should be remembered that s189(1) of the Criminal 
Procedure Acl applies to criminal proceedings and so, in 
hearings before tribunals such as boards or the Commission, 
the narrow view expressed above may not be appropriate. 
S33(g) is closely related to s33(f). It creates an offence 
for knowingly making any false statement, whether orally or 
in writing, in connection with any application, appeal, 
91 
enquiry or investigation under the Act. 
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The Road Transportation Amendment Act has created two 
further general offences by the addition of ss33(h) and 
33 ( il . The former creates the offence of preparing a 
document which incorrectly describes goods which are to be 
conveyed. The mental element of the offence comprises of an 
intention to-deceive and knowledge that the description is 
incorrect, S33(i) relates to public or private permits. It 
is an offence in terms of this sub-section to obtain a permit 
of this type knowing that one has already been issued to 
another person in respect of the vehicle concerned. 
[IIIJ OFFENCES COMMITTED BY PASSENGERS 
--------�-----------------------
[AJ INTRODUCTION 
In addition to drivers, owners or permit holders, passengers 
can also commit offences in terms of the Act. Part of the 
object of the statute is to ensure the smooth functioning of 
a co-ordinated transport system. To achieve this end tariffs 
are regulated, routes are prescribed, time-tables are laid 
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down and, in keeping with the policy of segregation, certain 
vehicles are reserved for certain classes Crace groups). The 
two offences, embodied in s32, which may be committed by 
passengers should be seen as measures which form part of the 
internal regulatory machinery of the Act. The main object of 
the section is to place some of the responsibility on the 
passenger in ensuring that the provisions of the Act itself 
or a particular permit are adhered to. It is designed, fur-
lhermore, to cover a possible loophole whe�e a passenger 
ignores the orders of a conductor or driver to leave the 
vehicle. The permit holder or his servant may escape 
conviction, in the absence of s32, for a breach of the Act 
simply because he was unable to eject the passenger. The 
section aims at avoiding these types of violations by 
placing the responsibility for upholding the provisions of 
the Act on the passenger in certain circumstances. 
[BJ THE OFFENCES 
S32(1) makes it an offence for a person to enter a vehicle in 
which that person may not be conveyed by virtue of the terms 
of a permit or any other law. The offence is committed 
either when the accused eriters the vehicle despite objection 
by the conductor or person in charge or, having en�ered, 
refuses or fails to leave it on being requested to do so by 
the conductor or person in charge. When this stage has been 
reached, �he accused has committed an offence and may be 
forcibly removed by a police officer. 
S32(2) creates the offence of entering a portion of a vehicle 
set aside for members of a class lo which the accused does 
not belong. To commit the offence the accused must enter the 
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portion of the vehicle despite objection by the conductor or 
the person in charge. S32(2) does not apply if the accused 
entered the portion in order to gain access to the portion 
set aside for members of his class, or for the purposes of 
alighting from the vehicle. The second manner of commilting 
this offence is by refusing to leave the portion when asked 
to do so by the conductor or person in charge. 
[IVJ OFFENCES_CONTAINED_IN_THE_REGULATIONS 
[AJ INTRODUCTION 
A number of offences are contained in the regulations. The 
purpose of the offences is to compel persons to observe the 
regulations and to ensure the smooth functioning of certain 
aspects of the Act. They are thus comparable to the general 
offences created by the Act itself, They differ from the 
offences contained in thg statute in that they are 
subordinate legislation. Therefore the rules of 
interpretation which apply to this category of law-making 
will be applicable. Furthermore, the scope for defending a 
charge framed in terms of an offence contained in the 
regulations is wider, because lhe validity of the enactment 
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itself can be challenged. 
[BJ THE OFFENCES 
Offences are created by four �egulations which will be dealt 
with in turn. 
(1) Regulation 27(a)
Reg 27(a) makes a contravention of, or a failure to 
comply with, regs 13, 17, 23, 24 and 25 an offence. 
Thus, the following would carry criminal sanction: Ca) 
failure to maintain a distinguishing mark in a legible state 
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or to apply for a duplicate if the distinguishing mark is 
damaged, lost or not clearly legible and failure to affix the 
94 
distinguishing mark lo the vehicle in the proper way; (b) 
failure, by the holder of a public permit, lo notify a board 
or the Commission of a change of address �ithin 10 days of 
the change. The notification must be in writing and be 
95 
deliver�d either by hand or by registered po3t; (c)
failure by a permit holder, lo submit returns to a board or 
the Commission if required to do so. Returns must be 
submitted within 10 days of the end of each calend�r month 
on the prescribed form. They must contain the following 
information: in the case of passenger conveyance, the number 
of passengers conveyed during the previous month and the 
distance covered in the process within each area and/or on 
every route specified in the permit. Urban and rural areas 
are to be shown separately. ln the case of the conveyance of 
goods, the total mass of the goods in kilograms, as well as 
the information relating to distances and routes mentioned 
above must be given. It is is not possible to give the exact 
mass of the goods conveyed, an estimate will suffice. If the 
permit holder did not convey persons or goods during a month 
this fact must be communicated to the board or the 
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Commission; <d> failure to keep records or deal with 
records in accordance with the regulation. Reg 24 
requires that permit holders keep accurate records on every 
vehicle in respect of every trip made by it. The record must 
show the same information which the returns contain. They 
must be completed by the driver or conductor in the case of 
passenger conveyance at the end of each forward and return 
journey. When goods are conveyed the holder or his employee 
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�ust complete the records upon receipt of the goods. The 
records must be kept on the vehicle by the driver or 
conductor and be made available for inspection upon reque5t 
by an authorized officer. Records must be kept by the permit 
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holder for 12 months; (e} failure to paint the 
particulars required by s24(1) (c) onto both sides of the 
vehicle in a clear way and in letters and figures which 
98 
conform to the dimensions specified by regulation s(2). 
(2) Regulation 27 (b) 
Reg 27Cb} makes contraventions of, or failures to 
comply with regs 2, 3(3), 3(4), 7(3), 7(5) and 10(3) 
punishable. The following are therefore offences: 
failure by persons whose operations are exempted by 
(a) 
ss 1 < 2 ) ( j ) , 
99 100 101 102 
1(2}(v)
1 1(2)(w), 1(2}(x} 
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and l (2) (y) to 
paint onto their vehicles (in a colour which shows up clearly 
against the background) identifying particulars which comply 
104 
with the specifications set out in reg 2(2). In the case 
of decentralized industries a failure to supply the 
Commission with the following information will be punishable 
in terms of reg 27(b): the full business and postal address 
of the industry; the full registered name or style of the 
industry; a description of the decentralized industrial area 
in which the industry is situated; and a copy or photocopy of 
105 
the registration certificate of the vehicle to be used. 
Furthermore any change in the above information must be 
communicated to the Commission within seven days and, if a 
vehicle is replaced, a copy or photocopy of its registration 
certificate must be sent to the Commission prior to the 
106 
vehicle commencing service; {b) failure to return to a 
board or the Commission a replaced public permit after 
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its amendment and the issue of a new permit. The return of 
the replaced permit must be made within 10 days of the issue 
of the new permit and must be delivered either by hand or by 
101' 
registered mail; ( C) the same considerations apply when a
public permit has been transferred. A new permit will be 
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issued and the old one must be returnedj (d) the same 
offence is created in relation to private permits when these 
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are amended; (e) failure to return a private permit to a
competent board or the Commission within 10 days in the 
following circumstances: when the private permit has lapsed 
in terms of s29(2) (a) (i.e. when the holder ceases to carry 
on the industry t trade or business in respect of which the 
permit was issued) and if the authority conferred by the 
permit has lapsed in terms of s29(2) (bl (i.e. if two or more 
places are specified in the permit and the holder ceases to 
carry on the industry t trade or business at any, but not all 
of those places, the authority conferred by the permit in 
110 
respect of those places lapses); (f) failure to lodge 
forthwith, a permit with a board or the Commission following 
a successful application for the suspension of the operation 
of an act, direction or decision of a board in terms of 
s8(3l (b). The permit must be delivered by hand or by 
111 
registered post.. 
(3> Regulation 27(e) 
Reg 27(c) makes a contravention of, or failure to 
comply with, regs 26(2)(b), (c), (d), Ce), (fl, (g), 
(h) and Ci) criminal offences. The offences contained in 
these provisions are aimed at assisting authorized officers 
in the policing of the Act. The offences are: failure, 
by a driver 7 to supply an authorized officer with his (the 
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driver t s) name and address (and documentary evidence in 
support thereof), the name and address of the owner of the 
vehicle and particulars regarding the business for which the 
112 
vehicle is being used; (b) failure, by a driver or person
in charge of a vehicle, to produce documents or other records 
113 
on request; (c) failure, by any person on a motor vehicle 
believed to be used for road transportation or any person who 
is believed lo have recently been on such a vehicle to 
furnish the following information: the person's full name
and address (supported by documentary evidence}; whether he
paid for the conveyance or has lo pay for it; and the name 
114 
and address of the person to whom payment has to be made; 
(d) failure, by a driver or any person on a motor vehicle,
to provide the name and address of the consignor and 
consignee of goods being conveyed or about to be conveyed on 
the vehicle. The names of the places between which the 
115 
conveyance is to take place must also be furnished; (e) 
failure, by a driver or conductor, to produce records, 
116 
required by reg 24, for inspection; (f) failure by 
a person, when an inspector lawfully enters premises in 
connection with an investigation, to answer questions, 
furnish information, hand over books or documents, explain 
entries in the books or documents or allow the inspector to 
117 
make extracts or copies of them; Cg) failure by a driver 
or person in charge of a vehicle used for road transportation 
to produce any documents which have been issued by a board or 
the Commission or a local authority in respect of that 
vehicle and which are required by law to be kept on the 
118 
vehicle; (h) failure by a driver or person in charge of a 
vehicle used for road transportation to hand over the permit 
and distinguishing mark because the vehicle is so defective 
397 
that it is a possible danger to persons or property. The use 
of the vehicle must cease until the defects have been 
remedied and so continuation of such use will also constitute 
119 
an offence. 
(4) Regulation 27(d)
Reg 27(d) creates the offence of damaging, removing or 
failing to stop at a sign (described in reg 26 (2) (a)) which 
an inspector may use to stop vehicles for the purpose of 
determining whether road transportation is being undertaken 
in them. 
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(3) The Operation of the Presumptions
INTRODUCTION 
----------�
Presumptions are generally classified under three heads: 
irrebuttable presumptions of law, presumptions of fact and 
1 
rebuttable presumptions of law. Ss34 and 38 of the Road 
Transporlation Act contain a number of rebuttable 
presumptions of law. Such a presumption may be defined as a 
2 
rule 'compelling the provisional assumption of a fact•. The 
effect of a presumption on the burden of proof depends, when 
it appears in a statute, on the formulation employed by the 
draftsman. When a statute says that something is presumed to 
have happened until the contrary is proved, the onus in 
respect of that fact is cast upon the person against whom the 
presumption operates. If, on the other hand, the statute 
says that a fact constitutes prima facie proof of another 
fact, an evidentiary burden only is cast upon the person 
3 
affected to meet a prima facie case. 
The presumptions contained in s34, s38(1) and ss38(2} and (3} 
will be discussed separately below on a functional basis: s34 
presumes connivance, permission or tacit authorization on the 
part of a permit holder, s38(1) contains five rebuttable 
presumptions of involvement in offences aimed at various 
groups and ss38(2) and (3) deal with evidential presumptions 
relating to offences concerning permits and other documents. 
[IJ THE_PRESUMPTIONS_WHICH_SHIFT_THE_ONUS 
[AJ THE PRESUMPTION OF CONNIVANCE, PERMISSION AND TACIT 
AUTHORIZATION 
(1) General
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In the law of delicl strict liability can be imposed on a
master for �he wrongs of a servant. McKerron says that this 
doctrine cannot be justified on logical grounds but should 
rather be seen as be ing based on considerations of social 
policy. Al common law rio such principle exists in our 
criminal law. Liability is based on fault and the only 
deviations from this general rule are those brought about by 
5 
.statute. Where legislation expressly provides for this 
form of liability, the limits of liability and the onus of 
proof are matters which depend on a construction of the 
relevant provision. In the criminal law the justification 
for the imposition of liability on a person other than the 
actor is different from that in delict. 
7 
Middleton and Stoker 
say: 
'Justification for the imposition of vicarious 
liability by the legislature is generally sought in 
the difficulties which would otherwise confront the 
state in attaching liability lo a principal or 
master for the acts or omissions of his servant or 
agent in the conduct of certain trades or 
businesses. ' 
(2) The Provisions of Section 34
S34 of the Act imposes liability on a permit holder for acts 
or ommissions of a manager, agent or employee. To avoid 
conviction the permit holder must avail himself of two of 
three defences which the section provides. S34(1) reads: 
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'Whenever any manager, agent or employee of the 
holder of a permit does or omits to do any act 
which it would be an offence under this Act for 
such holder to do or omit to do, then, unless such 
holder proves that -
(a) he did not connive at or permit such act
or omission; and
(b) he took all reasonable measures to
prevent an act or omission of the nature
in question; or
(c) an act or omission, whether legal or
illegal, of the character of the act or
omission charged did not under any
conditions or in any circumstances fall
within the scope of the authority or the
course of the employment of such manager,
agent or employee,
such holder shall be deemed himself to have done or 
omitted to do that act and be liable to be convicted 
and sentenced in respect thereof, and for the purpose 
of paragraph (b) the fact that he forbade an act or 
omission of the nature in question shall not by itself 
be regarded as sufficient proof that he took all 
reasonable measures to prevent such act or omission.' 
In addition to liability being imposed on the permit-holder, 
8 
the manager, agent or employee can also be convicted. 
S34(1) therefore creates rebuttable presumptions of 
connivance, permission and tacit authorization. 
S34 is made to apply to all offences created by the Act. At 
the same time it should be noted that the section seeks to 
impose liability on the_holder_of_a_Eermit. Thus, it is 
submitted, the existence of a valid permit is an essential 
for the operation of s34. Whether the section applies to the 
offence created by s31(1) (a) will depend on the 
circumstances. This section makes road transportation 
undertaken by any person punishable, 'except under the 
authority of a permit authorizing such road transportation'. 
Where a permit exists and s31(1) (a) has been infringed s34 
can come into operation, but where the transportation is 
undertaken in the total absence of a permit the general 
principles of criminal law will apply to determine the 
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liability of an employer. The remaining offences in s31 all 
presuppose the existence of a permit so s34 clearly applies. 
(3) The Means of Rebutting the Preaumption
S34 does two things: first, it creates liability for a permit 
holder for acts or omissions of a manager, agent or employee; 
secondly, it provides the accused with the benefit of two 
alternative means of rebutting the presumption. 
10 
S193 of the 
Liquor Act contains a provision which is essentially 
similar to s34(1}. Cases dealing with s193 will be used to 
explain the means of rebutting the presumption because there 
are no decided cases on this aspect of road transportation. 
At the same time it should be noted that s193 is more severe: 
it encompasses a wider range of persons for whose acts or 
1 1 
omissions the licensee will be liable and the grounds of 
rebuttal are more difficult to establish because all three 
must be proved. In terms of the Road Transportation Act, a 
permit holder is required to prove two grounds: either a 
lack of connivance or permission ��g the taking of reasonable 
steps, or a lack of connivance or permission ��Q that the act 
or omission fell outside the scope of authority or course of 
employement of the manager, agent or employee. 
The following discussion will aim al providing meanings for 
the key elements of the grounds available to a permit holder 
to enable him to rebut the presumption. 
(a) 'Connivance or Permission'
The first requirement of s34(1) which a permit holder ��§� 
prove in order to escape liability is that he did not connive 
with the manager, agent or employee in respect of the unlaw­
ful act or omission and that he did not permit it. 
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It is submitted thet the meaning which should be attached to 
the word 'connivance' is 'tacit permission' or 'passive 
acquiescence' on the part of the permit holder. Thus actual 
knowledge or wilful blindness will be a prerequisite of 
connivance. Permission, by contrast, implies the actual 
(express or implied) granting of leave or license to either 
do an act or omit to do something which should be done, 
In the case of R v Megson_and_Another 
13 
12 
which involved a 
contravention of the Liquor Act in force at the time, 
14 
Tindall J dealt very briefly with connivance and permission: 
'But as he (the Magistrate) accepted the evidence 
of the second accused that he had warned the first 
accused against supplying at unauthorised hours, it 
is to be inferred that he was satisfied that the 
first accused was acting without the connivance or 
permission of the second accused. ' 
It is submitted that a permit holder who either connived at 
or permitted an unauthorized act or omission would, nonethe­
less, be guilty of the offence under the common law if s34 
did not exist. Liability would arise either because the 
permit holder was a principal offender, having the necessary 
mens rea, or as an accessory. The position is clear where the 
accused has permitted the act or omission. It is submitted 
that the necessary mens rea will exist too if the accused 
tacitly permitted or passively acquiesced in the commission 
of the offence. 
(b) 'Reasonable Steps'
The meaning of 'taking reasonable steps' is, in general, an 
15 
objective enquiry which depends on the facts of each case. 
It should be remembered that for the purpose of the permit 
holder taking reasonable steps, it is insufficient to 
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show that he forbade the act or omission. Kruger says thal a 
liquor licensee �ould not have taken reasonable care if he 
appointed a barman of such a low moral or intellectual 
standard that the latter probably could not conduct affairs 
of the bar in accordance with the many legal provisions which 
16 
allach lo that occupation. 
17 
In S v Banur_Investments_(Pti)_Ltd_and_Another, a record 
clerk served customers, and in so doing, contravened the 
18 
Liquor Act by selling quantities of liqu•or less than the 
minimum prescribed by the Act in respect of wholesale liquor 
licenses. She served customers because 1 at the time, the two 
salesmen were not in the shop. The second appellant gave 
evidence lo the effect that he, as a director and manager of 
the shop, had explained to the record clerk what her duties 
were. Further he had not expressly forbidden her from 
selling liquor. Bekker J found that, in the circumstances, 
reasonable care had not been taken and then went on to 
outline what he considered reasonable care, in this case, to 
19 
mean: 
'It seems to me that, being aware lhat employees 
might do unauthorised things, it would have been 
the simplest thing and quite within the bounds of 
reasonableness for second appellant lo have 
instrucled Mrs Luttig, whose duties kept her behind 
the counter in the shop, that she was not allowed 
to sell liquor to customers and/or to have 
instructed her should a customer arrive at a time 
when both salesmen were absent, lo call him to the 
shop. He could also have given the salesmen 
instructions that he should be called if 
circumstances arose which necessitated their 
absence from the shop at one and the same time. 
This he did not do and his omission in my opinion 
renders it well nigh impossible for him to 
discharge the 2��� resting on him. '
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20 
In the case of R v Megson_and_Another, the first accused 
served a glass of beer to a person on a Sunday. He was a 
general helper to the second accused who was the licensee. 
One of Megson's duties was to clean the bar. He was engaged 
in this activity when the offence occurred. In dgaling with 
the licensee's conduct in ensuring that Megson did not 
21 
contravene the Act, Tindall J held: 
'The second accused admitted that he had had 
occasion to admonish the first accused for treating 
people to drinks. Knowing that the first accused 
was not to be relied on, the second accused should 
nol have given him such an opportunity for breaking 
the law on the Sunday in question.• 
Turning attention back to the Road Transportation Act it may 
be concluded that a permit holder, in order to avoid 
liability under s34, must lake positive steps to ensure thal 
managers, agents or employees do not contravene the Act. 
Constant supervision by way of inspectors or personal checks 
may, in certain circumstances be reasonable. On the other 
hand such factors as the reliability, intellect or character 
of a driver or other employee may play a part. 
<c) 'Scope of Authority or Course of Employment' 
In defining the term 'course of employment' McKerron says 
that the test usually applied is: 'Did the servant do the 
act while about the business of his master or did he do it 
22 
while on his own business a�d for his own purposes?' 
The term 'within the scope of the authority' is, it is 
submitted, wider, although the two terms may overlap, Thus, 
to use an example cited by Kruger, where a cook whose sole 
duty lies in the kitchen, enters the bar and unlawfully serves 
liquor, the licensee would escape liability in the absence of 
409 
negligence. The scope of the cook's authority or the course 
of the cook's employment surely precludes serving customers. 
23 
Kruger concludes: 
'The excuse would, however, fail if it were shown 
that in some circumstances it was within the cook's 
authority to serve drink - for instance, that on 
occasions of pressure of business he was required 
to assist the barman in the sale of liquor.' 
24 
So, in R v White_and_Another, when a barman sold liquor to 
two 'natives', the licensee could not escape liability 
because it was within the scope of a barman's employment to 
25 
sell liquor. Gardiner JP went on to hold: 
'The fact that the sale was illegal does not 
absolve the licensee, for in ascertaining what was 
the scope of authority, or the course of 
employment, one has to look at the character of the 
act, and if the act be of the character of acts 
within the scope of the authority or the"course of 
the employment of the barman, it matters not 
whether the particular act in question was legal or 
i 11 egal. ' 
In the field of road transportation this part of s34(1) 
will probably be used least as a defence. Most unlawful acts 
or omissions will probably be perpetrated by drivers, so it 
would be impossible •in the large majority of cases for the 
permit holder to raise s34(1) (c), along with a lack of 
connivance or permission, to avoid liability. If, however, a 
conductor drove a bus and in the process committed an 
offence, the permit holder would escape conviction because 
driving would not fall within the scope of authority or 
course of employment of the conductor. If, on the other 
hand, it was shown that the conductor was, from time to time 
used as a driver, this excuse will most probably not avail 
the permit holder. 
410 
[BJ OTHER PRESUMPTIONS OF INVOLVEMENT IN OFFENCES 
Cl> General 
538(1) contains five presumptions which shift the onus from 
the State to the accused. Their effect is lo lighten the 
burden which the Stale has to bear in prosecuting cases in 
terms of the statute and to force the accused to raise a 
defence if possible. In other words, the accused cannot 
simply challenge the evidence of the State. He must adduce 
evidence of his own to dispute a case aga�nst him which exists 
the moment the presumption comes into operation. The jus-
tificat.ion for the existence of this formidable set of 
presumptions is found in the nature of the crimes and the 
administrative difficulty of policing the Act. In other 
words, lo make the statute effective, a drastic change to the 
normal rules of procedure and evidence was seen as necessary. 
This will work towards a higher conviction rate because the 
State's task is easier and the deterrent value of the offences 
will in turn be enhanced. 
(2) The Presumptions
The first presumption is of general application. It presumes 
that any person who has conveyed persons or goods, or 
permitted the conveyance of persons or goods, undertook road 
26 
transportation, unless the contrary is proved. Thus the 
onus would be on the accused to prove that the conveyance was 
not for reward or not in the course of any industry, trade or 
business or, in some way to show that it did not fall within 
the definition of road transportation in sl(l). 
Secondly, it if is proved that conveyance of persons or goods 
took place in contravention of s31(1J (a), the owner of the 
411 
vehicle in question is presumed to have conveyed the persons 
or goods. 
two things; 
To rebut this presumption the owner must prove 
first, that he was not the driver and secondly, 
27 
that he did not authorize or permit the contravention. 
The third presumption relates to the consignor, owner and any 
person who acted on behalf of the consignor or owner of goods 
which were conveyed in contravention of s31 (1) (a}. They are 
presumed to have conveyed the goods unless it is proved that 
they did not know that such goods were being conveyed or 
28 
could not prevent the conveyance. 
Fourthly if a person is found in possession of any writing 
falsely purporting to be a permit issued under the Act, or of 
a permit which has been altered, defaced, mutilated or added 
lo in contravention of s33(a), that person will be presumed 
to have made the writing or lo have altered, defaced, 
mutilated or added to the permit in question: 
29 
on the accused to prove the contrary. 
The onus lies 
The fifth presumption concerns persons who undertook road 
transportation in contra�ention of s31(1) in that the goods 
conveyed were not authorized by a permit, or were conveyed 
otherwise lhan in accordance with the provisions of a permit. 
Such persons will be presumed to have known what the goods 
concerned were, unless it is proved that, despite proper 
30 
care, they could not have known. 
(3) The Operation of the Presumption Contained in s38(1){a)
(a) The Onus
The Motor Carrier Transportation Act contained a presumption 
in sll(l} (a) which was similar to that contained in 
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s38(1)(a). The main difference is that, in lhe old Act, the 
presumption applied to 'any proceedings' while in the current 
31 
Act it applies to 'any prosecution'. 
The effect of the presumptions created by s38(1) is to cast 
32 
the onus onto the accused. He must prove on a balance of 
probabilities that the conveyance which he undertook-or 
permitted did not constitute road transportation as defined. 
(b} The Application of the Presumption 
The presumption created by sll(l) of the Motor Carrier 
Transportation Act has been dealt with extensively by the 
courts. As this section corresponds almost exactly to 
s38(1} (a), cases dealing with the old Act are of considerable 
importance. 
In order to bring the presumption into operation the State 
must bring the accused within the four corners of th� Act. 
Thus it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt that 
conveyance took place in a motor vehicle and it must allege 
that the conveyance was for reward, in the course of 
industry, trade or business or undertaken by means of a hired 
33 
motor vehicle or hired bus. In addition the State must 
show either that the accused conveyed persons or goods or 
permitted the conveyance to take place. 
34 
The case of� v 
Azels_and_Another provides a clear example of the 
application of this principle. In this case lhe first 
appellant ran the transport business while the second 
appellant was the driver. They were charged with a 
contravention of s9Cll of the Motor Carrier Transportation 
Act. The prosecution arose as a result of the conveyance of 
doors and empty drums. The conveyance of the former was 
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aulhorized by a permit but the conveyance of the latter was 
not. 
The Appellate Division confirmed the conviction of the second 
appellant. He actually conveyed the drums and so the 
presumption applied to him. At this stage the onus shifted 
onto him and he bore the task of proving on a balance of 
probabilities that the conveyance was not for reward. He was 
unable to discharge this onus. The position of the first 
appellant was different. He did not convey the drums so, to 
secure a conviction, the State was required to prove that he 
permitted the conveyance, To bring the presumption into 
operation and thus shift the onus, it was required to prove 
the granting of permission beyond reasonable doubt. This the 
State failed to do and consequently no onus rested on the 
accused to disprove the allegation that the conveyance was 
35 
for reward. 
(b) The Unrepresented Accused
(i) General
The presumption created by s38(1) (al may not be relied upon 
by lhe Stale if the accused is unrepresented and was not 
informed of the provisions of the section containing the 
36 
presumption. 
this basis. 
the appellant was acquitted on 
He had been charged with conveying passengers 
for reward and, in conducting his own defence, called only 
two witnesses. Both were passengers at the time of the 
alleged offence and they testified to the effect that their 
conveyance was not for reward. 
eighteen remaining passengers. 
Mkize did not call any of the 
Fannin J said that the 
appellant may have thought, in the absence of knowledge of 
414 
the presumption, that he had done enough lo avoid conviction. 
37 
The learned judge held: 
'It seems to me in the highest degree desirable, 
especially in the circumstances of a case like
this, for an accused person �ho is unlikely to be 
aware of the specific provisions of lhe law, and 
who is defending himself, to be warned of any 
presumption of this sort which may operate against 
him in terms of the statute.' 
38 
where the accused was not 
warned of the presumption, Phillips AJ held that the 
magistrate had a duty to warn him. This omission 
disentitled the State from relying on the presumption. 
Consequently the onus never shifted and the State was 
required to prove all the elements of the offence beyond 
reasonable doubt. The appeal was allowed because the 
State had made no attempt to prove that the conveyance 
had been for reward. 
(ii) The Basis of the Rule
The ruie that an unrepresented accused must be warned of a 
presumption is not embodied in the Act. It has evolved by 
39 
means of practise. Thus in S v Ntuli_and_Anolher 1 James J
held that there was no fixed rule as to warning the accused 
but, in such a situation, the court has a duty to consider 
the evidence very carefully to ensure that the accused is not 
40 
prejudiced by the omission. 
41 
Kotze J went further. The learned judge, with
the support of the Judge President and other members of the 
Eastern Cape bench, set out the procedure to be followed in 
such a case; first, the nature of the onus which rests upon 
the accused should be read out to him; secondly, an 
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explanation of how the onus could be discharged should be 
made; and thirdly, the manner in which the explanation was 
42 
given should be detailed verbatim on lhe record. 
43 
The case of� v Shangase_and_Others makes it clear that the 
rule is of general application. The case involved alleged 
offences in terms of the abuse of Dependence-producing 
44 
Substances and Rehabilitation Centres Act. Harcourt J said 
that a warning about the existence of, and effect of, 
presumptions had been applied, inter alia, 
45 
lo offences in 
46 
terms of the Dangerous Weapons Act, 
47 
the Stock Theft Act. 
the Liquor Act, 
Where a warning has not been given the acquittal of the 
and 
accused does not necessarily follow. This will only occur if 
the court finds that the absence of a warning had the effect 
48 
of prejudicing the accused. 
<4> An Explan•tion of the Remainder of s38(1)
The presumptions contained in ss38 (1) (b), (c), (d) and (e) were
not contained in the Motor Carrier Transportation Act. 
are innovations created by the Road Transportation Act. 
They 
There are no reported cases dealing with these presumptions 
but, it is submitted, the principles applicable to s38(1) (a) 
will apply to the remainder of s38(1). Thus, in s38(1) (b) 
the State would be required to prove a contravention of 
s31(1)(a). It must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Once the commission of the offence has been established the 
onus will shift onto the owner. He will have to prove on a 
balance of probabilities that he was not the driver and that 
he did not authorize or permit the vehicle to be used for the 
conveyance in question. Similarly, when a consignor or owner 
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of goods is charged, the Slate must prove a contravention of 
.s31 (U (a) before the onus shifts. To escape conviction the 
consignor or owner will be required to prove a lack of 
knowledge as lo the conveyance or that he was unable to prevent 
the conveyance. For the presumption contained in s38(1) (d) 
lo come into operation, the Stale must prove the following: 
the falsity of the document purporting to be a permit or 
illegal alterations to, defacing of, mutilation of, or 
additions lo a permit; posseBsion of the document; and an 
intent to deceive. Once these requirements have been proved, 
the onus will rest on the accused lo prove that he did not 
make the writing, or alter, deface, mutilate or add to the 
permit. The presumption created by s38(1> (e) applies to a 
contravention of any provision of s31(1). It only embraces 
the conveyance of goods not authorized by a permit or 
conveyed otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of 
a permit. To bring the presumption that the person knew what 
the goods were, into operation, the onus rests on the State 
to prove conveyance by that person and a contravention of the 
Act envisaged by s38 ( 1) (e). When this has been established 
the onus shifts and the accused must prove that he could not 
have known what the goods were despite having taken proper 
care. 
[IIJ PRESUMPTIONS_WHICH_CREATE_A_DUTY_TO_ADDUCE_EVIDENCE 
[AJ GENERAL 
Hoffman and Zeffertt quote Glanville Williams in suggesting 
that rebuttable presumptions of law be classified under two 
heads: persuasive presumptions and evidential presumptions. 
The former shift the onus from one party to another while the 
49 
latter simply create a duty to adduce evidence. Wording 
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such as that found in s38(2) and s38(3) create evidential 
presumptions. In a leading case dealing with the validity of 
50 
a will, Stratford CJ said: 
'His view is that a presumption of law only settles 
the matter provisionally and casts upon the 
opponent the duty of producing evidence. When such 
evidence is produced the presumption as_a_rule_of 
��� vanishes; what remains is an inference of fact 
the value of which must be considered in the light 
of all the evidence. This means that if the party 
seeking to persuade the jury fails in affirmative 
persuasion he fails to discharge the burden of 
proof (which has not been shifted by the 
presumption) and should be non-suited'. 
The operation, in a criminal case, of a presumption 
which creates a duty lo adduce evidence is as follows: 
the onus of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 
never leaves the State, but at the same time, the 
accused must adduce some evidence. In other words, the 
accused may not rely on silence. Once evidence on the 
part of the accused has been adduced, the presumption 
ceases to apply. It is then simply a matter of the 
probative value to be given to the evidence of the State 
and that of the accused. The requirement of proof of guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt remains and so, in adducing evidence, 
the accused only has to create a reasonable doubt as to his 
guilt, i.e that his explanation is reasonably possible. 
CBJ THE EVIDENTIAL PRESUMPTIONS 
The Act contains two evidential presumptions. These are 
found in s38(2) and s38(3). They relate to offences 
connected with certain documents and their contents. These 
documents, namely permits and documents dealing with the 
registration of vehicles are central to the functioning and 
effectiveness of the Act. 
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538(2) deals with permits. It relates to any document which 
purports to be a permit issued under the Act or a copy of a 
permit, certified to be a true copy by a person who purports 
to be an officer of the board or the Commission which issued 
the original. On production, in any prosecution under the 
Act, such a document will be admissible in evidence and it 
will be prima facie proof of two things: first, that it is a 
validly issued permit or a true copy of a validly issued 
permit and secondly, that every statement contained in it is 
true. 
(2) Documents Dealing with the Registration of Vehicles
The second presumption relates to documents dealing with the 
registration of motor vehicles. This sub-section is also 
limited to prosecutions under the Act. A document which
fulfills certain requirements shall be admissible in evidence 
and be prima facie proof of the correctness of the state-
ments which it contains. To bring the presumption of 
correctness into operation the document must relate to a 
specified vehicle under a law which deals with the registra­
tion of vehicles, the vehicle must be registered in the name 
of the person named in the document and it must purport to be 
issued by an authority charged with the registration of motor 
vehicles. 
(3) The Operation of the Pre�umptions
51 
In Mabena v Brak�an_Munici�ality, the appellant was charged 
with a contravention of s9(1) of the Motor Carrier Transport-
alien Act. It was alleged that he had undertaken road trans-
portation which was not authorized by the Act. The court 
419 
a quo accepted the evidence of an inspector who slated that 
the accused had conveyed 11 passengers while only being 
entitled to carry a maximum of six. The permit (or a copy) 
was not produced. One of lhe points raised by the Crown on 
appeal was that, in terms of s 11 ( 2) (the present .s38 (2)) , 
there was a prima facie case against the appellant. His 
failure lo adduce evidence therefore converted prima facie 
proof irilo proof beyond reasonable doubt. Williamson J 
rejected this argument because, he said, it could not apply 
in a situation where the Crown had failed to establish an 
52 
essential factor, namely the contents of the permit. It is 
submitted that if the permit was produced and Mabena had 
wished to challenge its contents the following would pertain: 
S11(2) would have applied so that a duty lay on Mabena lo 
adduce some evidence; once he had done so the presumption 
would have fallen away and the inference of fact created 
would have had to be considered in the light of all of lhe 
53 
evidence; if Mabena had not adduced any evidence the 
correctness of the contents of the permit would have been 
assumed. 
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[IJ THE_CHARGE_IN_GENERAL 
[AJ SETTING OUT THE CHARGE 
In R v Maloi_and_Another it was held that a charge sheet 
set out the charge sufficiently where il only contained the 
following averments: that the appellants had no authority to 
convey passengers; that they conveyed passengers; 
this took place on a public road in the district of 
2 
and that 
Johannesburg. on the other hand, held that 
a charge was fatally defective, where the charge sheet was 
drawn up so badly that the accused could not ascertain what 
case he was required to meet. Ramsbottom J, who described 
the charge sheet as being drawn in an extremely slovenly 
manner, held that the charge sheet must inform the accused 
of the way in which the Act was allegedly infringed and, when 
a presumption exists which shifts the onus, what the accused 
is required to prove to avoid conviction. Thus the charge 
must aver that conveyance took place in a motor vehicle on a 
public road and that the conveyance was either for reward, in 
the course of industry, trade or business, undertaken by 
means of a hired motor vehicle or a hired bus. Furthermore 
it should also be stated vhether passengers or goods had been 
3 
conveyed. 
and_Others 
4 
Similarly; in S v Theunsus_Transgort_(Pt�)_Ltd 
Addleson J held that a charge which did not 
allege that the transportation was for reward or in the 
course of industry, trade or business was fatally defective. 
[BJ THE PROVISIONS OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 
5 
The Criminal Procedure Act requires that the charge must 
provide such particulars about an alleged offence which would 
be reasonably sufficient to inform the accused of the case to 
6 
be met. In addition, s84(3) provides that in criminal 
424 
proceedings 'the description of any statutory offence in the 
words of the law creating the offence, or in similar words, 
shall be sufficient'. 
Ss31(1)(a) and 31(1)(6) do not on their own describe 
offences. It is only when read with the definition of road 
transportation in sl that the prohibitory wording of the lwo 
sub-sections acquire any meaning. Sl sets out the types of 
road transportation envisaged by the Act and the elements of 
each. Whether a charge sheet which follows the wording of 
s31(1) (a) or (b) describes the offence adequately has been 
dealt with in a number of cases. 
7 
lhe court held that a charge sheet merely 
setting out the wording of s9(1) of the Motor Carrier Trans-
portation Act did not disclose an offence. A contrary 
8 
decision was reached in R v Maloi_and_Another. Maritz J 
held that, by alleging that the appellants did not hold a 
permit to convey passengers and that they did convey 
passengers on a public road in a certain district, the charge 
sheet set out the requirements of the charge adequately. De 
Villiers J, in concurring, held that the charge sheet 
complied with s127(2) (a) of the Criminal Code then in 
operation. Both judges stressed that the appellants (who 
were represented in the court a quo) could have asked the 
Crown for further particulars. 
Ogilvie Thompson J, in R v Leibrandt, 
11 
following either ��12l 
former case had been wrongly decided. 
10 
had the choice of 
12 
He held that the 
The learned judge held 
that the words of s9(1) cannot be regarded as the 'words 
creating the offence' within the meaning of s127 of the 
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13 
Criminal Code and thus lhe charge sheet did not 
14 
disclose an offence: 
'The words of s9 of the Act do not in themselves 
create the offence: the offence is created by the 
words of s9 only when such words are conslrued as 
conveying the special meaning laid down in the 
definition clause.' 
15 
A similar decision was reached in R v Er�i��g. Jennett 
J held that s127(2) (a) of the Code could only apply if the 
words of the enactment used in the charge create the offence 
in full. To describe the offence fully, reference must be 
made to sl which defines motor carrier transportation. 
It is submitted that the view of the law expressed in 
16 17 18 
and followed in Leibrandt 
should be seen as preferable. Not only is the weight of 
19 
authority in favour of such an interpretation but an 
irnporlant policy consideration also lends support to this 
approach: in criminal proceedings the accused should have 
enough information at his disposal to conduct a proper 
defence. The minimum which he should be able to expect is an 
outline of the offence and its elements, especially in the 
case of a technical offence created by a statute such as the 
Road Transportation Act. At the same time, this does not 
place undue pressure on lhe State. It merely requires 
prosecutors to do their jobs properly. 
Thus, in setting out the charge, reference must be made to 
the definition of road transportation in sl of the Act. This 
term can mean one of four things: conveyance of persons or 
goods for reward; conveyance of persons or goods in lhe 
course of any industry, trade or business; conveyance of 
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persons by means of a hired bus; or the conveyance of goods 
by .means of a hired motor vehicle. In order t.o inform the 
accused sufficiently of t.he case he has t.o meet., the manner 
in which the Act was allegedly contravened must be stated, 
[CJ A JUMBLE OF CHARGES 
The slovenly charge sheet which was held to be fatally 
20 
defective in R v Matsa�ula read as follows: 
'that the accused had wrongfully and unlawfully 
carried on motor carrier transport.at.ion by having 
conv€yed or by having permitted conveyance by means 
of a molor vehicle TAJ 296 of persons to wit 
passengers for reward/ in the course or for the 
purpose of furtherjng any industry, trade or 
business of whatever nature.' 
In describing lhe charge as nonsense and a jumble of lwo 
different charges, Ramsbottom J proceeded to attempt. an 
2 1 
interpret.at.ion of it: 
'The charge as framed does not make it clear to the 
accused what he is charged with. Is he charged 
with carrying passengers for reward? Or is he 
charged with carrying passengers in the course of a 
business? Or is he charged with carrying 
passengers for reward in the course of a business? 
I think that it is the last meaning which this 
charge naturally bears. ' 
22 
the sufficiency of the following charge was a 
ground for appeal: 
'The said accused did wrongfully and unlawfully 
carry on motor carrier transportation by having 
conveyed or having permitted the conveyance of 
persons / goods, to wit 24 Bantu passengers and 
personal effects for reward, in the course of any 
industry, trade or business or by means of a hired 
vehicle.' 
In deciding that the charge was defective, Jennett JP held: 
'Apart from that it seems to me that the comma 
compels one to read the charge as meaning that the 
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23 
conveyance was for reward either in the course of 
any industry etc., or by means of a hired vehicle. 
Read in that way the charge is clearly a jumble of 
two offences with an alternative of - a jumble of 
another two offences.' 
A charge sheet which contains a jumble of charges discloses 
no offence because the offence alleged in it does not exist. 
As may be seen from the examples cited above, elements of one 
offence are mixed with elements of others. Such a situation 
may be distinguished from instances where the charge is not 
24 
set out with sufficient clarity on the one hand and where 
the charges are set out in the alternative on the other. 
[DJ CHARGES IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
While a charge sheet disclosing a jumble of charges will be 
defective, a charge sheet disclosing one or more ways in 
which the alleged offence was committed will be acceptable if 
these allegations are made in the alternative. 
26 
25 
Thus, in� 
the charge sheet was held lo be competent where it 
alleged that the road transportation in question consisted of 
conveyance of flour for reward, or in the course of industry, 
trade or business or by means of a hired motor vehicle, The 
accused knew from this that to avoid conviction he had to 
prove, if the presumption in sll(l) of the Motor Carrier Trans­
portation Act came into effect, that he had not conveyed in any 
27 
of the three distinct ways mentioned in the charge sheet. 
28 
The charge sheet in� v Koehan�ana mentioned the three ways 
of contravening s31(1) (a) of the Road Transportation Act. In
linking the three it used the words 'and/or', It was argued 
that it was defective because it contained a jumble of 
charges. Zietsman AJ held that while the form of the charge 
was not satisfactory it was, nonetheless, competent because 
it contained all necessary averments and he was satisfied 
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that the appellant had not been prejudiced. 
29 
The learned 
acting judge held: 
'Die beskuldigde is deur 'n prokureur verteen­
woordig. Daar was geen aansoek om nadere 
besonderhede tot die klagstaat nie, en dit is 
duidelik van die oorkonde dat die beskuldigde van 
die begin af geweet het wat die bewerings teen hom 
is en dat hy nie deur die feit dat die klagstaal 
verskillende ander misdade ook openbaar benadeel is 
n i e. ' 
30 
It was on this basis that Matsa2ula's case was 
di sti ngui shed. 
It may be argued that if a charge sheet stating the offences 
in the alternative is competent, a charge sheet linking the 
offences with 'and/or' will also be. If they were stated in 
the alternative the accused would have to prove, once the 
onus had shifted, that he did not convey in any of the pro-
hibited ways. 
difference. 
The addition of the word 'and' will make no 
It is superfluous because the ways of 
undertaking road transportation are mutually exclusive i.e. 
if conveyance is for reward, it cannot be in the course of 
31 
industry, trade or business. 
At the same lime it must be conceded that the charge,sheet 
will disclose a jumble of charges. Even though such a charge 
sheet may be more elegantly phrased than the one in � v 
32 
the result is almost identical. It will disclose, 
on the one hand, a series of alternative charges, and on the 
other, a jumble of charges. Bearing in mind the dangers of 
too formalistic an approach, it is submitted with respect 
that Zietsman AJ should have held that the charge sheet did 
not disclose an offence. By allowing alternative charges, 
the courts have made a concession which is, no doubt, 
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neces.sary. To go further and allow the type of charge sheet 
33 
which was used in Koehanxana's case is, it is submitted, an 
unwarranted extension of the expiediency principle. 
(EJ CURING DEFECTS IN THE CHARGE BY EVIDENCE 
34 
S88 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that defects in 
the charge may be cured by evidence in the trial unless the 
defect was brought to the notice of the court before 
judgment. 
35 
The corresponding section (s179 bis) of the 1955 
Act was interpreted by Van Rhyn Jin� v A_R_Wholesalers 
36 
(Pty) _Ltd_and_Another. The learned judge held that, in 
order to cure a defect by evidence, it was necessary to 
examine the evidence as a whole. This raised the issue of 
what the legislature meant by the word 'evidence'.· The 
learned judge reached the conclusion that evidence did not 
include the invocation of statutory provisions and 
37 
presumptions: 
'Na my mening "herslel" getuienis nie die gebrek in 
'n klagstaat. indien die getuienis dieselfde gebrek 
openbaar as die klagstaat nie omrede sulke 
geluienis die beskuldigde net so in die duister 
laat as wat die gebrekkige klagstaat doen. Indien 
die woord "getuienis" in art. 179 bis die byhaal 
van wetsbepalinge en slalut�re vermoedens insluit 
kan 'n beskuldigde skuldig bevind word sander dat 
hy op 'n enkele stadium weet wat die essensie is 
van die misdryf horn ten laste gel�.' 
It has been held that the existence of the presumption in 
s38 ( 1) (a), (formerly sll { 1)) makes it more important that the 
38 
accused is informed fully of the case he has to meet. 
[IIJ THE_PROCEDURAL_DIFFERENCES_BETWEEN_S31(1) (a)_AND_S31(1) Cbt 
tAJ CONFUSION OF THE TWO OFFENCES 
S31 (1) Ca} and s31 (1) (b) create (in conjunct.ion with sl) two 
430 
different offences. The former seeks to punish persons who 
undertake road transportation either without any authority or 
outside of the provisions of a permit. The latter seeks to 
punish persons who breach a condition of a permit. The 
difference is thus between the elements of a permit which 
emanate from the Act itself and those which are added onto 
39 
the permit in the discretion of a board or the Commission. 
40 
The appellant in � v ���� was convicted in the court 
a quo in terms of s9(4) of the Motor Carrier Transportation Act. 
It was alleged in the charge that by substituting a vehicle 
in a manner which was contrary to s7(1) (d), he had thereby 
failed to comply with a provision of the permit. Hefer J
held that the conviction should be set aside because Essa had 
done nothing contrary to a condition. He had contravened 
s9(1J because he had failed to comply with a requirement of 
the Act itself. 
[BJ THE PERMIT 
S31(1) (a) can be infringed by a non-permit holder or by a 
person who conveys contrary to the provisions of a permit. 
S38(1) (al creates a presumption to the effect that any person 
who conveys, or permits the conveyance of goods or persons is 
presumed lo have undertaken road transportation. It is 
therefore unnecessary for the charge sheet to refer to the 
existence of a permit in a prosecution in terms of s31(1) (a). 
S31<1) (b) creates the offence of failing to comply with a 
condition or requirement of a permit. This offence refers to
a permit holder. The charge sheet must allege that the 
accused is the holder of a valid permit and that a condition 
42 
or requirement has been contravened. a 
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charge was addressed lo the appellant as lhe owner of a motor 
vehicle. The prosecutor in the court a quo applied to amend 
the charge lo refer to Singh as lhe holder of the permit. 
This was granted but the competence of the amendment was one 
of three grounds of appeal. In dealing with lhe charge sheet 
Carlisle AJP observed that the charge sheet 'disclosed no 
offence unless and until it alleged that the appellant was 
43 
lhe holder, or the servant of the holder, of the certificate'. 
CCJ PUBLIC ROADS 
A public road is defined as any road which has been declared 
or recognised_lo be a public road under any law. Included in 
the definition are roads, streets, thoroughfares or other 
places to which the public or any section of the public has a 
44 
right of access. 
45 
In R v Mohaleomathe_and_Others,• the appellants had been 
convicted in the court a quo for contravening s9(1) of the 
Motor Carrier Transportation Act. On appeal it was argued 
that the charge sheet disclosed no offence because it merely 
repeated the words of the section. In setting aside the 
conviction, Van den Heever AJP held that the elements of 
the offence had to appear in lhe charge sheet. 
46 
Acting Judge President said in this regard: 
The learned 
'Here we have merely a label (i.e. to carry on 
motor carrier transportation), which is explained 
elsewhere in this and other Acts; here it is used 
merely as the object of the prohibition. But the 
label does not contain the elements of the offence, 
viz. that the act was committed on a public road 
or for reward or various other requisites.' 
47 
where the charge sheet omitted 
to allege that the offence took place on a public road, the 
appeal was allowed. This same point was raised in R v �1�m£i 
432 
48 
44. Road Transportation Act, sl; see too Flrin&_Lotus_(Ptr)
Ltd v Chairman L_National_Trans�ort_Commission_and_Another
1982<4) SA 253(D>.
45. 1944 OPD 117.
46. At 119.
47. 1946 CPD 275.
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